BUILDING A NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
Strategy and Tactics and the balance of forces in 2010

Introduction

1. The National General Council (NGC) is a forum between National Conferences where we review progress and challenges since the last Conference. The NGC will be amongst the largest political schools of the ANC, an opportunity to engage on critical issues facing our people and the movement.

2. The purpose of this discussion document is twofold. Firstly, it provides an overview of Strategy and Tactics and the questions it seeks to answer. Secondly, the document reflects on changes in the balance of forces and the context in which we seek to build a national democratic society since the 52nd National Conference in 2007.

3. Strategy and Tactics explains the theory of our struggle - its objectives, methods and the forces of change. An understanding of the balance of forces on the other hand help us to reflect on changes in the terrain of struggle, identify potential obstacles as well as opportunities in reaching our objectives. In the end, Strategy and Tactics and our understanding of the balance of forces at a given moment must enable us to move the struggle decisively forward.

PART 1: STRATEGY AND TACTICS

4. The ANC Strategy and Tactics, along with the ANC Constitution and The Freedom Charter, are the foundation documents of our movement, from which all other policies and actions derive. These foundation documents can only be amended and adopted by National Conference.

5. The ANC Constitution sets out the mission and character of the ANC, but most importantly it sets out how the organisation functions: how we relate to each other, rights and duties of members, how decisions are taken and how structures at all levels should work. The Freedom Charter is our vision of the type of society we struggled for and which we seek to build - it is our lodestar.

6. The Strategy and Tactics in turn defines in more detail what we struggle for - the vision of the society we work towards or the ultimate goal of the national democratic revolution. This is articulated in Strategy and Tactics as the creation of a united, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist and prosperous South Africa. Strategy refers to the conscious and consistent programme and means - the national democratic programme - by which we pursue our vision and goals over time, it is a medium to long term programme. Tactics refer to more detailed actions and activities that contribute to the achievement of our strategy and ultimately our vision.

7. Strategy and Tactics encompasses both continuity (our vision: a democratic, united, non-racial, non-sexist and prosperous South Africa and the nature of our struggle: a national democratic revolution) and change (change in the terrain of struggle, tactics in response to the balance of forces).

8. Strategy and Tactics of the ANC is our collective view of the theory of the South African
revolution. It is a dynamic and living document, which requires constant engagement to deepen understanding of its contents, and constant discussions on how it applies to our day-to-day work in whatever sector of operation.

Strategy and Tactics in the history of the ANC

9. The general approach throughout the history of the ANC was to adopt Strategy and Tactics for a particular phase of struggle - beyond short-term tactical considerations. It guided the movement in pursuit of the NDR for a long period. Changes to Strategy and Tactics were therefore introduced when there was a need for a major development or shift in strategic approaches of the ANC. These depend on the situation at the time: the historical period, the level of development of the country, actions of the regime, actions by the liberation forces, the balance of forces between those for and against liberation, the international situation, capacity of the liberation movement and so on.

10. During the first five decades since the founding of the ANC in 1912 there were a number of critical documents that articulated major strategic approaches. Such documents of this period include:

a) The African Claims of 1943 and the 1949 Programme of Action: these documents situated full political rights as a central objective of the ANC within the context of international anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles; paving the way for the emergence of the ANC as a mass movement, a non-racial and non-sexist movement and a leader of the broader forces for liberation.

b) The Women’s Charter of 1954, a document of the Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW) that acknowledged the triple oppression of women and thus the role of women in struggle, and informed subsequent approaches to building a non-sexist South Africa.


11. The 1960’s saw dramatic changes in the terrain of struggle. After taking power in 1948, the National Party moved swiftly to consolidate and expand grand apartheid. The liberation movement after the strides of the 1950’s was banned and forced into exile, with many of its leadership on trial, imprisoned and restricted from participation in political activity. The ANC after Sharpeville and its banning launched the armed struggle and consolidated underground structures. These changing circumstances posed severe challenges to the movement.

12. This changing terrain of the 1960’s and the response of the liberation movement were debated at the Lobatse (1962) and subsequent consultative conferences. Against the backdrop of the Wankie and Sipolilo military campaigns, the 1969 Morogoro Consultative Conference adopted the first Strategy and Tactics document. This was the first of what subsequently became the main document that defines the ANC and liberation forces’ approach to the national democratic revolution in South Africa:


b) This was followed by the Kabwe (1985) Strategy and Tactics, which took in
consideration the changing internal terrain, especially the mass pillar after 1976, the formation of the UDF and the growth of the trade union movement, eventually culminating in the launch of COSATU later that year.

c) The Harare Declaration, 1988 and the Strategic Perspectives of 1992: The Harare Declaration spelt out our approach to negotiations, the conditions under which we will negotiate (release of political prisoners, return of exiles, unbannings and lifting of state of emergency), the aims of negotiations (interim government, one person one vote, constituent assembly) and the fact that it should be South Africans who negotiate the future of their country.

d) The Strategic Perspectives of 1992 introducing sunset clauses such as a government of national unity, provinces, etc, arising in the context of a deadlock in the negotiations, to move the process forward.

**Strategy and Tactics after 1994 - national democratic tasks in the era of transition**

13. The unbanning of the ANC in 1990 and the start of negotiations heralded in yet a new era of struggle. Thus, Strategy and Tactics towards and after the unbanning of the ANC in 1990 went through these phases:

   a) Tactics of the transition - entrance into government and expanding the hold of the democratic forces on power (1994-2007)

14. At the 49th Conference in Bloemfontein (1994) Strategy and Tactics had to deal with the threat of counter-revolution our entrance into government, and the reality of transforming an apartheid government and security apparatus largely intact. Thus, in that phase Strategy and Tactics recognised that the 1994 election victory should be used as a 'beach-head' to start the process of deracialisation of the apartheid state and laying the foundation for addressing the apartheid legacy, based on the Reconstruction and Development Programme. It thus dealt with our approach to the de-racialisation and re-orientation of the apartheid state machinery into a state in the service of all South Africans and the establishment of the institutions of democracy, whilst beginning to address the social backlogs and underdevelopment. S&T recognized that our transition took place in an era of globalisation, which was generally hostile to the attainment of our national goals.

15. Further (new) areas of emphasis included (a) an African renaissance that build on the legacy of Pan-Africanism and must see Africans once again taking charge of their own destiny; (b) recognition of the impact social transformation and de-racialisation on the motive forces and the movement and (c) the introduction of the 'new' pillars of this phase of the NDR: the state, the economy, organisation, international terrain and ideological work. Strategy and Tactics of 1997 (Mafikeng) also ensured a more fundamental integration of gender equality into our principles and approaches.

16. The 51st National Conference in Stellenbosch (2002) re-affirmed the strategic approaches of 1997, but in the Preface to the S&T highlighted the importance of ideological struggle to the process of social transformation, located the ANC as a 'disciplined force of the left' (thus neither neo-liberal nor ultra-left), introduced issues with regards the emerging social movements and the new opportunities for progressive alternatives given the shift in the balance of forces internationally.

   b) Tactics of the Transition: building a national-democratic society (2007-)

17. Ten years after Mafikeng, the 52nd National Conference recognised that we were already into our second decade of freedom and emerging out of the phase of transition. Thus, argues the 2007 Strategy and Tactics, the major (and immediate?) task of the NDR in this phase is the building of a national democratic society, elaborating on the broad principles of a democratic, non-racial, non-sexist, united and prosperous South Africa. The S&T describes the content of this national democratic society, the motive forces, balance of forces and the methods and tasks of this phase.

18. To successfully build a national democratic society, we must eliminate the main antagonisms of colonialism of a special type. These antagonisms are the three interrelated contradictions and legacies of (a) national oppression based on race; (b) super-exploitation of black workers; and (c) the triple oppression of women based on their race, class and gender.

19. The Strategy and Tactics 2007 elaborates on the objectives, drivers and tasks of the National Democratic Revolution in the current phase. In this S&T, we noted that although we are still in a transition, the task is no longer simply to consolidate and expand the hold of the democratic forces on levers of (state) power, but to decisively tackle the task of building a National Democratic Society. Put positively, to build a national democratic society that abolishes these sources of social conflict, we must ensure:

- A united and democratic state based on the will of all the people, without regard for race, sex, belief, language, ethnicity or geographic location;
- A dignified and improving quality of life among all the people by providing equal rights and opportunities to all citizens;
- The restoration of the birthright of all South Africans regarding access to land and other resources;
- Affirmative action and redistribution to include those excluded by apartheid and patriarchy; and
- The eradication of apartheid production relations, to correct the historical injustice and as a prerequisite to economic transformation and growth.

20. In the current phase of the NDR, the ANC as leader of social transformation and of the motive forces, must therefore intensify work around the five pillars of social transformation:

- **The state**: expanding its role to become a developmental state that provides effective basic services and with capabilities to take forward a far-reaching agenda of national economic development, whilst at the same time placing the people and their involvement at the centre of this process.
- **The economy**: building a thriving, labour-absorbent and inclusive mixed economy, in the process transforming economic relations based on race, super-exploitation and patriarchy.
- **Organisational work**: strengthening the organisational abilities and capabilities of the ANC to organise and lead the people and society in the process of transformation.
- **Ideological struggle**: promoting values of a caring society, human solidarity, unity of our people, non-racialism and non-sexism in line with the society we seek to build.
• **International work:** the ongoing renewal and development of Africa, improved South-South relations and a more just global order.

**PART 2: THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN 2010**

21. The National General Council is held nearly three years after the 52nd National Conference. During this three-year period, a number of critical events and developments have occurred that impact on the terrain of change and therefore our tactics. These developments pose challenges to the movement and may constitute opportunities or obstacles to movement forward. Many of these issues are part of our ongoing assessment of the balance of forces, of deepening our understanding of both the subjective and objective, domestic and global conditions in which we carry out the programme set out in Strategy and Tactics.

22. This discussion on the balance of forces is by its very nature tentative, raising the issues and posing questions, with a view to provide a backdrop to the reviews we will be conducting at the NGC. It should lay the foundation for a more in-depth and detailed analysis of the balance of forces in preparations for the Policy and National Conferences in 2012.

23. Many of the issues are not new, since we have been grappling with them since our transition in 1994 and are likely to do so for a considerable time. They are however raised in a particular manner, indicating developments since 2007.

**Changes in the balance of forces since Polokwane**

24. In the years since the 52nd National Conference in 2007, a number of events and developments have occurred, which impacted on our people and our movement and have shaped the national debate about the state of the nation. These include:

- The continuation of the Polokwane rifts in our movement culminating in the formation of COPE at the end of 2008.
- The xenophobic violence against African migrants living in South Africa during May 2008 that spread through many parts of the country, resulting in more than sixty deaths and thousands displaced and the continued rumours about this after the World Cup.
- The impact of the global financial crisis of 2008 on our economy, putting a break on growth, strains on the fiscus, with massive job losses and unemployment rising again to above 25% and youth unemployment to above 50%.
- Months of power-outages by ESKOM and more generalised challenges faced by critical parastatals.
- The contested fourth non-racial general elections in May 2009 and the coming to power of the fourth ANC government.
- The service delivery protests that started but a few months after the general elections in 2008 and continue in various form since then.
- The reconfiguration of government around the five Manifesto priorities, the consolidation and expansion of a performance and monitoring evaluation framework in government, and the appointment of a National Planning Commission.
• Ongoing public revelations and allegations of corruption, as well as high profile trials involving senior cadres.
• And last, but not least, the successful hosting of the 2010 FIFA Football World Cup in South Africa.

25. The above developments are listed, providing pointers towards a complex process of social transformation, requiring that we pay attention not only to events but to an understanding of the essence of these developments. We will therefore deal with some of these and other developments, and their impact on our struggle for a national democratic society and the balance of forces.

The 2009 general elections - a decisive victory

26. The period approaching the 2009 general elections was a particularly trying period for the ANC. Having just emerged from a divisive National Conference, with charges against its President and a decision to recall the President of the country in September 2008, followed by the formation of COPE by former leaders of the ANC, few commentators expected the ANC to have a good showing in the 2009 elections.

27. Instead, ANC and Alliance activists and members rallied during the campaign, and the electorate delivered a clear and positive judgement that the ANC remains the most reliable movement to continue the reconstruction and development of South Africa. This was not only a decisive mandate for the future, but also a vote of confidence of the progress achieved under the previous three ANC governments over the fifteen-year period. Our internal analysis of the elections noted that the over 60% which the ANC received in four general elections “are rare in democratic societies and constitute and unequivocal mandate to implement the electoral manifesto.”

28. The ANC’s election campaigns consistently had twin objectives, (a) to win an overwhelming majority, and (b) in the context of high voter participation. This is important not only for our electoral success, but as an indicator of the confidence and participation of our people in the process of change. Voter registration between 1999 and 2009 has slowly, but steadily increased, from 72% of the population in 1999 to 75% in 2009. As was the case in previous elections, more women than men registered and voted. Registration and voter turnout in urban areas also for the first time far outpaced registration and turnout in rural areas. Unlike predictions of mass defection by the black middle classes to COPE, the ANC also managed to maintain majority support in these sectors. Overall, however, except in KZN and Gauteng, voting districts that the ANC won had a lower turnout than in 2004.

29. With regards the opposition, together the parties that contested netted just over 6 million votes to the ANC’s 11.65 million votes. The DA swept up votes from other opposition parties and also succeeded in mobilising its supporters to vote, increasing its votes by more than a million since the last elections and winning 17% of the total votes. The IFP lost nearly a million votes, mainly to the ANC, and COPE managed to also win over a million votes.

30. Our analysis of the results pointed towards the following key drivers of the overall results:
• The continued ability of the ANC to unite its forces and mount a concerted campaign, even under difficult circumstances.
• Stronger mobilisation of opposition support compared with 2004.
• Weaker mobilisation of ANC support in most provinces, especially rural areas.
• The breakaway of COPE from the ANC.
• A big swing from the IFP to the ANC and strong mobilisation of ANC KZN support.
• A swing of the Coloured voters to the DA in Cape Town, reversing the status that the ANC achieved by 2004 of being the largest party amongst Coloured voters.
• Consolidation of the opposition around two parties, the DA and COPE.

31. The election results in the W Cape require special attention, with a massive swing in support during the 2009 elections. ANC support in the province amongst Coloured voters almost halved, and in Cape Town we lost two thirds of support since the 2004 elections, most of this to the DA. There was also a swing of some African and Coloured support to COPE. The DA made virtually no headway in African townships in the W Cape. Other opposition parties (ID, ACDP) all lost votes to the DA. The reasons for this swing are manifold - amongst others the ongoing feeling of alienation by Coloured people in the W Cape ('we are not black enough') and continuing racial polarisation and lack of integration in Cape Town fuelled by DA's racist politics. However, the ANC is also to blame for our turn in fortunes, with the provincial leadership and structures on the ground wrecked by factionalism and infighting, in the process failing to develop a programme to consolidate and expand the hard-won ground we captured during the 2004 elections.

32. The W Cape is important for the ANC, not least because it is an important province in terms of population size and contribution to GDP, but also because of its impact on the national question. Whereas after the 2004 elections results in especially the W Cape and N Cape we could convincingly say that the ANC indeed represent all the oppressed national groups, the 2009 result is a setback. It also gave credence to the DA's claim of representing national minorities against the ANC, and have given them confidence to seek to expand their influence to Coloured communities in the E Cape. The situation in the W Cape demands urgent attention, not least to ensure deep-going organisational renewal of the ANC in the province, which should include its approach to building non-racialism and dealing with internal conflict. The decline in the Coloured votes for the ANC can be ascribed to the W Cape, but not exclusively so. Gauteng and N Cape have also recorded declines in support in key Coloured areas, with the N Cape experiencing significant shifts towards COPE.

Implementation of our Manifesto priorities

33. Although faced with difficulties, the process to ensure a smooth handover from the previous ANC government to the post-2009 ANC government was managed well, and the government led by President Zuma hit the ground running. In just over a year since assuming office, the reconfiguration of national and provincial government is near complete. These include the consolidation of coordination and planning capacity in the form of the Cluster system and the Planning Framework and Commission, as well as the capacity and framework for managing performance of across government.

34. The five manifesto priorities - education and health; safety, security and the fight
against corruption; decent work and a growing economy; and rural and agricultural development - are also central to the macro-organisation of government, the budget and to the communication of government. These five priorities speak to what we said in the Strategy and Tactics a developmental state should be about - able to deliver effective basic services and to leverage national development. The extent to which we are able to deliver on these five priorities, is therefore part of the litmus test for progress in building a national democratic society.

35. The Cabinet Lekgotla and the President’s State of the Nation Address of 2010 – in order to build this developmental state capable of delivering effective basic services and national development – adopted 12 strategic outcomes and measurable outputs linked to the Manifesto priorities. This marked a milestone in the process to improve government performance and a focus for delivery (see Box 1).

36. Education and opening the doors of learning for all: Since 2009, initiatives to take forward our Manifesto priorities in education include the separation of basic education from further and higher education, the review of the national human resource development framework and the national skills development strategy, and the review of the basic education curriculum as key national programmes to ensure a decisive turnaround in education.

37. In addition, government in 2010 set indicators in key focus areas to improve the performance of the public schooling system, focussing on improving teaching and learning, improving and monitoring learner outcomes, early childhood development (ECD), improving school management and developing a high quality teaching profession.

38. We do however need to escalate our nationwide mobilisation effort, with buy-in from parents, teacher unions, education administrators, learners and the community at large, akin to the NECC in the 80’s to focus attention on this most critical of national priorities. The priorities and indicators set by government therefore provide a powerful instrument to build programmes and alliances at local levels, to make sure that we make our schools work.

39. A healthy nation: Similarly the health sector faces many challenges, not least amongst these skills shortages and brain drain in the sector, unequal distribution of resources between the public and private health sectors, management skills in the public health sector; the HIV and AIDS pandemic and other illnesses and the general health profile of the nation. The ten-point plan of government is therefore aimed at addressing these challenges, returning the focus on primary health care and prevention, general improvements in the public health system and the implementation of the National Health Insurance.

40. Education and health are both critical to the national developmental agenda, and a major indicator of a developmental state with capacity to deliver basic services. Though we made progress in both areas since 1994, the fact that despite considerable resources South Africa continues to slip in African and international rankings on a number of key indicators show that we must focus on a decisive qualitative shift in the immediate future.
## BOX 1: Building a developmental state capable of delivering effective basis services and national development. ANC government 12 priorities 2009-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government priorities</th>
<th>Focus areas and outputs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANC Manifesto priority: Education</strong></td>
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<td><strong>ANC Manifesto priority: Health</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Improve the health profile of all South Africans</td>
<td>Improve life expectancy, access to health care for all. Reduce the mortality rate. Roll-out of ARVs, especially preventative mother to child transmissions. Strengthens maternal health services. Reduce impact and prevalence of HIV, AIDS and TB. Ensure an effective health care system and management. Housing in the National Health Insurance. National strategy for chronic diseases.</td>
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<td><strong>ANC Manifesto priority: Decent work and a growing and inclusive economy</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Speeding up growth and transforming the economy to create decent work and sustainable livelihoods</td>
<td>Increase income and employment on an individual basis and promote equality and economic growth on a broader scale. Industrial policy to support labour-absorbing sectors, improve competitiveness at firm level, decrease concentration and increase innovation and productivity. Stable macro economic policies that allow for exchange rate stabilisation, and countercyclical fiscal and monetary policy. Trade policy to improve quantity and diversification of exports. Develop robust business regulatory environment with international benchmarks. Develop, implement economic growth path that can create large scale employment and work with business and labour to identify job drivers.</td>
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<td>4. Massive programme to build economic and social infrastructure</td>
<td>Expand efficient, competitive and responsive economic infrastructure, a focus on the following: power provision, improving ports, rail, pipelines and communications technology, water provision and construction of roads. Delivery on major identified projects such as the power stations, expanding the bus rapid transit (BRT) system, water and irrigation projects and solar and wind power projects.</td>
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<td>5. Sustainable resource management and use</td>
<td>Diversification of our energy mix, renewable alternatives and energy efficiency. Zero tolerance to illegal and unsustainable exploitation of resources. Support local and sustainable food production. Promote sustainable water use, drinking water quality.</td>
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<td>6. Youth development</td>
<td>Meeting challenge of youth unemployment and skill increase access to post-school education and training, including programmes to attain senior certificate qualifications and occupational training (artisans, learnerships).</td>
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<td><strong>ANC Manifesto priority: Rural development, agrarian reform and food security</strong></td>
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<td>7. Comprehensive rural development strategy linked to land and agrarian reform and food security</td>
<td>Mutually supportive land and agrarian reforms. Improve quality of rural local government to create enabling local economic growth, e.g. tourism, agro-processing, mining and natural resource management, simplifying IDPs. Better provision of government services in hinterland and former Bantustan areas. Expand Community Public Works Programme. Resolve outstanding land claims by 2014.</td>
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<td><strong>ANC Manifesto priority: Fighting crime and corruption</strong></td>
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<td>8. Intensify the fight against crime and corruption</td>
<td>Reduce levels of overall contact, crimes against women and children and the trio (high-jacking, business and house robberies). An effective and integrated criminal justice system. Manage crime perceptions. Manage our borders. Anti-corruption inter-ministerial committee, to develop a coordinated strategy.</td>
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<td><strong>ANC Manifesto : Build cohesive and sustainable communities</strong></td>
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<td>9. Build cohesive, caring and sustainable communities, improve quality of household life</td>
<td>Accelerate delivery of housing opportunities, including accreditation of metros and 21 municipalities to deliver houses. Expand access to basic services, by establishing bulk infrastructure planning and funding coordination mechanism. Impact on 400,000 households by upgrading informal settlements. Implement backyard upgrading programme.</td>
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<td><strong>ANC Manifesto: A better Africa and a better world</strong></td>
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<td>10. African advancement, international cooperation</td>
<td>Implement NEPAD. Promote SADC integration. Strengthen South-South relations. Pursue developmental and investment related approach in engagements with North.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ANC Strategy and Tactics (2007): Build developmental state with capacity to deliver effective basic services and leverage national development</strong></td>
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<td>11. Build a development state including improvement of public services and strengthening democratic institutions.</td>
<td>Improve capacity of state for growth and development. Strengthening integration, planning, monitoring and evaluation across government. Build responsive, accountable and effective local government with key outputs to include: a clean, responsive and accountable administration; develop intergovernmental agreements on services and financing and support; simplify IDP process; expand Operation Clean Audit 2014; debt collection and revenue enhancement strategies; implement and support budget and report regulations; review supply chain management regulations; and develop municipality priority skills strategy.</td>
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41. Access to quality education for all is critical not only to economic and social development, but also a key instrument of social mobility and addressing inequality. Unless we are able to tackle this head-on today, we will continue to subject the majority of poor (and black) children and youth to inferior education, keeping them trapped in the poverty cycle and in effect reproducing the apartheid unskilled labour force trajectory.

42. Fighting crime and corruption: We are making strides in transforming the criminal justice system and bringing down the overall rates of priority crimes, although the levels are still unexceptionally high. A central challenge we face is the interpersonal nature of violent crimes, which makes it difficult to police and often to prosecute. This requires more than just the efforts of the police service and the rest of the criminal justice system. It requires breaking the cycles of violence at a more fundamental level, especially gender-based violence, violence against children and other vulnerable groups, and interfamily violence.

43. Many of the exposure of corruption in the public sector, are because of the institutions and mechanisms we have put in place to achieve exactly that. However, perceptions that we are soft on corruption and of widespread corruption continue to persist, not only in the media but also amongst our people. The more recent anti-corruption measures through the high level Inter-ministerial committee on Corruption and the strategy it must develop and monitor must therefore be profile. The ANC also need to be seen to lead in the fight against corruption, by taking action to ensure investigations take place and are concluded, and by leading the struggle for the regeneration of ethical

44. Rural development, agrarian reform and food security: There is work in progress to finalise an overall and mutually reinforcing rural and agricultural strategy, but the challenges in the sector remain immense. These include issues of land redistribution and usage, food security and rural infrastructure and economic development. Unless we succeed in kick-starting a more aggressive rural and agrarian reform, the pressures on urban areas will escalate, and so will land hunger and food insecurity.

45. Some of the key initiatives of this term of office are therefore to improve rural local government to lead local economic development in areas such as agro-processing, tourism, mining and so forth; better provision of government services in the hinterland and former Bantustan areas; and expanding the Community Public Works to create work opportunities in rural areas.

46. Decent work and a growing and inclusive economy: The challenge of creating decent work and our undertaking to halve unemployment by 2014, have been severely compromised by the global financial crisis. Not only did it impact on our growth rate, with severe strains especially on our manufacturing sector, but it has also resulted in the official unemployment rate again increasing to above 25%. According to StatsSA Quarterly Labour Force Survey (Q1, 2010), year-on-year, over 800,000 jobs were lost in all sectors of the economy, most of these in Manufacturing, Trade, Construction and Private households. Youth unemployment remains above 50%, with over 2.8 million young people between the ages of 18 and 24 years not working or in training.

47. The process of developing a coherent policy framework to address the challenge of economic growth and decent work in government have been slow, not least because of
coordination and mandate issues, but more importantly as the ANC we have not given sufficient leadership on these and other economic matters. Strategy and Tactics talks about political freedoms, becoming empty in the absence of economic transformation. This is particularly true for a country as South Africa with its deep-seated legacy of poverty, underdevelopment and structural unemployment. As we approach the Second Decade of Freedom, these are critical matters on which we shall be judged.

48. Cabinet has therefore in 2010 prioritised the development of an Economic growth path strategy/policy, which should include as its major focus how to ensure widespread employment creation and improving labour absorption. This will inform and expand other initiatives such as industrial policy, macro economic policy and trade policy.

49. On the whole, the five manifesto priorities resonated with our people and contributed to our elections victory in 2009. The ANC therefore has a responsibility to ensure that we have adequate (and bold) policies, resources and capacity in each of these five areas to make decisive impact over the next four years and to monitor and evaluate progress on an ongoing basis, way ahead of our twenty year review.

50. As the leader of social transformation, we must mobilise and organise local communities, sectoral formations and broader society around these goals, so that we inspire and build a common national mission and purpose.

The service delivery protests

51. Within months after the inauguration of the new ANC government in May 2009, a wave of service delivery protests broke out, some turning violent and with sporadic outbreaks across the country since then. The key characteristics of these protests are that they are locally-based and organised, involving large numbers of unemployed youth and high school students, generally around some issue of local grievance and targeted against their local authorities, mainly ANC councillors and municipalities.

52. Analysis of the reasons for the service delivery protests, from within and outside our ranks, include the slow pace of service delivery (housing, electrification, tarring of roads, etc); self-serving and uncaring local officials; internal fights in the ANC; lack of attention to the financial viability of municipalities and inability to involve communities in decision making.

53. In addition, the service delivery protests are also indicative of weak ANC local structures, which are not organising communities around local development issues and campaigns and with weak accountability mechanisms for our local representatives thus contributing to the ‘democratic deficit’. It is also indicative of the infighting we find in many local ANC structures, centring on municipal resources and positions, in the context of high local unemployment and poverty.

54. The NGC must therefore pay attention to the state of organisation and governance at local level, the accountability and responsiveness of ANC local government to the people as we approach the list process and the election campaign for Local government in 2011. Critical to this is ensuring that through the list process, we indeed select the best cadres to lead local transformation and governance.

55. Government in its 12 strategic priorities therefore correctly identified the renewal and
tumaround of local government as a critical issue in building the developmental state. The key goal is therefore to continue to build responsive, accountable and effective local government with key outputs for this period to include: a clean, responsive and accountable administration; intergovernmental agreements on services and financing and support; simplify IDP process; expand Operation Clean Audit 2014; debt collection and revenue enhancement strategies; implement and support budget and report regulations; review supply chain management regulations; and develop municipality priority skills strategy.

56. The ANC structures at all levels must ensure that our public representatives are implementing and reporting on these efforts, and drive a programme of local governance renewal, to ensure the effectiveness and confidence in local government growing.

The ANC and its allies

57. The elections of 2009 and our direct engagement with the people show that the ANC continues to enjoy the support of our people and of important strata in our society. There are a number of critical challenges facing the movement, not least what prompted the Polokwane conference to call for a concerted period of renewal. These include the issues of unity and cohesion, the relationship between the ANC and the people, the need to modernise its organisational administration and machinery and its capacity to monitor the implementation of its policies and hold its cadres accountable.

58. Relations amongst the Alliance have improved, with consistent engagements of Alliance partners in NEC committees, meetings of Alliance officials, summits and the Elections campaign. At sub-national level, the relationships are also improving. These formal meetings have however as yet to translate into a concrete and consistent common Alliance programme of action, beyond the Elections campaigns.

59. What has continue to bedevil Alliance relations, is the growing culture of public spats amongst us, often around issues that should by right be debated with rigour in Alliance engagements. The discussion on the protocol of how we relate to each other as partners must therefore be revived.

60. At an ideological and strategic level, disagreements in the Alliance has also centred around the issue of the strategic centre of the national liberation movement, with calls from our partners that the Alliance, instead of the ANC should be the strategic centre of the liberation forces. This is mainly aimed at ensuring that the ANC government is held accountable to the implementation of policies – especially economic policies – of the Alliance as a whole. The role of public sector unions in the process of transformation process and manifesto priorities in particular, is another issue yet to be resolved in engagements within the alliance. We should admit that over the years, the ANC (with some exceptions) has neglected to do consistent political work and engagement with a range of sectors, including trade unions, besides during elections campaigns.

61. On a broader level, the ANC has been reaching out to different constituencies, to engage them on the critical issues facing the country. These range from interactions with different sectoral formations around our Manifesto, to engagements with national minorities around nation-building, with the religious sector around moral regeneration and with a range of other sectors around their sectoral issues.
61. At the same time, the moral authority of the ANC as a movement and its leadership are called into question, either framed as ‘having lost its moral compass’ or as representing a self-serving elite, having become more like a ‘political machine’ to distribute power and resources amongst ourselves. The ANC has spoken over the years about the impact of the ‘sins of incumbency’ on the movement and its cadres, and the need to get tough on rooting out corruption. And yet, although many of the exposures are because of the measures we ourselves put in place to ensure accountability, we continue to appear soft on corruption, including to our allies and others supporting a progressive agenda. These matters are addressed in more detail in the other two NGC papers.

**Building a non-sexist South Africa**

62. Our programme to eradicate patriarchy and build a non-sexist South Africa is based on two major thrusts. Firstly, we seek to improve the quality of life of all South African women especially the poor through concerted programmes aimed at women in areas such as education, health, social security, basic services and employment and sustainable livelihoods and increase gender equality and opportunities for women in the public sphere, the economy and broader society through affirmative action and gender quotas. Secondly, we also seek to eradicate patriarchal relations by creating a gendered environment and perspective in everything we do, and challenge practices, institutions and attitudes that seek to continue to treat women as second-class citizens and inferior.

63. Since the adoption of the 50% gender quota at Polokwane, we have made some progress in implementing this approach. However, the statistics show that bar a few areas (e.g. Premiers), we have not yet reached 50% in a number of areas, including in the NEC, in the ANC Cabinet, Provincial Executives Councils and in ANC PECs. The NGC will therefore reflect on the reasons why we are still failing to implement the letter of the ANC Constitution and resolutions.

64. As a country, we are making steady progress in creating a women-friendly and gendered environment, through our programmes, policies and laws and through the gender machinery we have created and improved since 1994. More specifically, the implementation of our resolution of Polokwane to create a Women’s Ministry, is a major step forward.

65. However, the NEC only recently resolved to re-establish the NEC Sub-Committee on Gender, with the same gap at ANC PEC and other levels. This gap meant that monitoring progress on the transformation of gender relations have been left to the ANC Women’s League, with the ANC paying less attention to this matter. We must ensure therefore ensure that the ANC Gender committees and the ANC Women’s League are strengthened, so that we can make decisive progress in building a non-sexist society.

66. There is growing a perception amongst women in the ANC and in the broader women’s movement of a backlash against progress made in building a non-sexist South Africa. This backlash is represented by the persistence of gender-based violence, the continual inequality of women in the labour markets, the feminisation of poverty, and the persistence and in some instances worsening of sexist attitudes and believes. The ANC Women’s League and the Progressive Women’s Movement therefore have a responsibility to in addition to fighting for equality of representation, to also ensure that
the substantive issues of building a non-sexist South Africa are placed on the agenda and become a terrain of struggle. In addition, the ANC as a movement, given its character also need to pay attention to understanding the challenges we face, beyond the rhetoric of gender equality.

**International balance of forces**

67. The global financial crisis has brought into sharp relief the bankruptcy of neoliberalism - its value system and also its policy failures. The infallibility of the hidden hand of the market has been dealt a blow and so has approaches that seek to minimise the role of the state in the economy. This has opened up the space for progressive alternatives to once again be considered, something that as a developing country we must ensure to make use of.

68. In addition, this has taken place at a time when the dominance of Western - especially European and USA - of the global economy is no longer a given, and it is generally accepted that in the next decade or so the power would have shifted towards Asia. Whether the anticipation of growth in Asian share of global production and GDP, will also mean an increase in local consumption remains to be seen. The reality of the economic shift is already reflected in such initiatives as the G20 and BRIC, with the composition of the G8 increasingly suspect. These developments open up possibilities and challenges for our ongoing project of fighting for the democratisation of multilateral and institutions of global governance, in the interest of a more just global order.

67. There are also important developments in major countries of the South, for example the resurgence of the left in Latin America. Out of 500 million citizens of Latin America, over 300 million chose left and progressive governments to govern. These governments and the progressive parties in this region not only challenge the broad neoliberal frameworks to provide greater space for national development and progressive alternatives and new left economic policies, but also play a critical role in international forums to support African development and South-South cooperation.

68. South African continues to play a role in the continent, with some advances and some setbacks. Advances include the consistent levels of growth recorded by a number of countries in the continent, including such as Angola, but more generally the positive prospects for other large economies on the continent such as Nigeria and Egypt. The structures of the African Union continues to pursue an agenda of ensuring that the continent pays to key developmental priorities, including the development of its agricultural sectors, the role of ICTs and general infrastructure development and investment in the continent.

69. A serious challenge during this period is in the arena of trade negotiations, and particularly the impact that the divide and rule tactics of the EU had on the EPAs in SADC and the threat it poses to the continued existence of SACU. In addition, the slow political progress in Zimbabwe is another major challenge we face, not least because of the impact it has on South Africa in the form of migrants from this country, but also on the rest of the region.

**The SA2010 FIFA Football World Cup**

70. The 2010 Football World Cup has seen South Africa once again confounding the
critics, and pushing the boundaries of the possible. Not only did we host one of the most successful World Cups, but we have also seen South Africans rallying behind their national team and flag, and showing signs of a united nation like never seen before.

71. We need to look at how we can build on these successes, not only the improvement in our international standing and the world class infrastructure we have build, but also more broadly to harness the positive energy and the willingness to work towards a common goal displayed during the month.

Migration

72. The xenophobic or Afrophobic\(^1\) violence of May 2009 highlighted the challenges of migration after 1994, with South Africa (and other stable South African countries) becoming recipient of migrants (refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants) from all over the African continent. The number of migrants estimated to have entered South African shores and borders range from 3 – 7 million, with the overwhelming majority undocumented.

73. Most of the violence in 2009 and subsequent incidents have taken place in poor communities, with perceptions about migrants taking local jobs, trade opportunities, as a drain on public services and involvement in crime. On the other hand, theories on migration globally have highlighted the diversity and entrepreneurial culture with migration brings to any country.

74. Our approach to the issue needs to take into account the national, regional and global context of migration. This is important, since this is not an issue that will go away tomorrow, given the regional and global trends. We also need to consider how this impacts on our conceptualisation of the national question in South Africa and the question of the unity of the African continent.

Conclusion

75. South Africa in 2010 is both alive with possibilities, and pregnant with the deep-seated social cleavages and backlogs. The developments we discuss above are but some of the challenges we face, in the context of new and changing developments and trends. We must therefore as we prepare for the NGC ask the questions: how do these developments and trends impact on the balance of forces, are they favourable to movement forward; what do we need to do to decisively move forward in our efforts to build a better life for all?

76. Above all, what more must the national liberation movement - the ANC - do to unite its allies and the motive forces to harness our people’s energies in a positive way, so that we can move faster towards our dream of a better life, and a truly non-racial, united, democratic, non-sexist and prosperous South Africa?

77. These are amongst the challenges before the NGC, and we must therefore ensure that we emerge out of this large political school with a programme that will see us marching towards our Centenary, more united and determined to build the national democratic society. **Victory is certain!**

\(^1\) Called Afrophobic because the violence is only aimed at migrants from other African countries, with those from other continents largely exempt.
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