

UMRABULO

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Introduction

Umrabulo was a word used to inspire political discussion and debate on Robben Island. This concept was revived in 1996 when the ANC published the first edition of *Umrabulo*. The journal's mission is to encourage debate and rigorous discussions about the transformation process.

This is necessary, because our struggle for the fundamental transformation of South Africa, does not always take place in conditions of our choosing.

One important component of this struggle is the ongoing battle of ideas, with opposing force seeking to win society over to their point of view. "The contest of ideas should be a celebration of doubt for intellectuals in our society", said Secretary General Kgalema Motlanthe at the relaunch of *Umrabulo*."

This Editorial of this edition takes this forward with a discussion paper of the NEC on the Balance of forces in 2001, using as a starting point the theme of continuity and change which heralded the start of our second democratic term in 1999. The paper focuses on the battle of ideas and in its analysis of the opposition forces, assesses the social and class basis of the forces opposed to fundamental transformation and how they pursue this agenda since 1999.

We have received very positive feedback on the new-look Umrabulo and will in the next edition publish some of the responses to the articles in No. 9, especially the debates on Allocative capital and Zimbabwe. Contributions from readers to articles in this and previous editions are welcomed.

Editorial

The Balance of Forces in 2001

A discussion document of the ANC National Executive Committee

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of assessing the balance of forces is to identify revolutionary opportunities, determine the kinds of compromises that have to be made in a given conjuncture and the actions required to shift the balance itself.

It is critical for the ANC regularly to pause for such an assessment because the struggle is conducted not in conditions of our choosing. As such we have to master the science and art of assessing the objective conditions and subjective factors that, together, render particular preferred actions possible.

The treatise in the strategy and tactics document outlines the general assessment of the balance of forces in the current phase. As we approach the middle of this government's term, as well as the next national conference of the anc, it is necessary for us to start reflecting on this matter.

General characterisation - strategy and tactics

The strategy and tactics document asserts that, with the attainment of formal democracy, the foundation had been laid for our society to develop into a truly democratic, united, non-racial and non-sexist society. While cautioning that these developments took place in a world in which capitalism enjoyed dominant sway over the entire globe, it also argued that the agenda of the working people throughout the world had possibilities for creative expression in pursuit of a humane, just and equitable world order.

At the point of liberation, "a qualitative element of the ndr had been accomplished" (s&t). This included such positive elements as a democratic constitution, a strong liberation movement, a population whose majority supported change, and an international community that was in awe of the democratic transition.

On the other hand, there were many constraints, including the fact that the product of the negotiated settlement included many compromises; that the democratic movement only held elements of state power; and that some of the old counter-revolutionary networks were still intact. To this extent, what had been achieved was a beach-head from which to launch new advances.

The first five years of democratic governance registered many achievements in the process of shifting the balance of forces. These include:

- the adoption of the new constitution premised on democratic majority rule encompassing elements of socio-economic rights;
- definition of the legal framework for transformation of the state machinery such as legislation, regulations and doctrines on SAPA, SANDF, intelligence agencies, and the rest of the public service, combined with beginnings of changes in management;
- the legal framework and beginnings of implementation of programmes to transform south african society;
- ensuring the widest possible acceptance of the rdp as a basis for social change;
- establishing the credentials of sa as a country with rational macro-economic policies, growth potential and as an investment destination.

However, there were many areas of weakness. Among others, these include the fact that "acceptance of the RDP" on the part of some powerful forces entailed an attempt to appropriate the agenda of transformation and turn it into a paradigm of change that would not result in genuine equality, corrective action and redistribution of wealth.



On matters of the economy, the approach of these forces tended to dominate, with the democratic movement on the defensive. At the same time, they managed to put high on the agenda their own interpretation of nation-building and reconciliation as well as the interpretation of the country's priorities on such issues as crime. This approach fed most of media discourse, in tacit support of the agenda of white-based opposition parties.

While noting the predominance of rampant capitalism and its ideology within sa and across the globe, and attacks on conditions of the working class, the S&T document argued that there were possibilities to take up interests of developing countries and the poor as part of the mainstream of global discourse. These possibilities include the debate around the impact of financial markets on the real economy, the weaknesses of prescripts of bretton woods institutions, the rise of mass movements on sectoral issues including gender, and the opportunity to put africa's needs on the global agenda.

The S&T document noted the strength of the anc, the tpa and the mdm as a whole. This strength derives from the commitment of the motive forces of the ndr to continuing struggle for a better life. However, there are dangers such as the demobilisation of these forces after the establishment of a democratic government, social distance between the leadership of the democratic movement and its mass base, and problems such as corruption and the possible co-option of the black middle strata into the ranks of an elite either ambivalent or opposed to transformation.

Continuity and change

While the assessment of the s&t document remains relevant, the advent of the 1999 elections and the presidential transition posed a number of tactical and strategic questions about shifts in the balance of forces and opportunities for more rapid advance. This was aptly captured in the presentation by the [anc] president at the january 1999 nec meeting as the dynamic of "continuity and change": continuity in the substance of policy and change in the detail as well as style, pace and effectiveness of implementation.

The presentation and the discussion noted that, due to the balance of forces in 1994, the approach adopted with regard to major issues of transformation was constrained by the compromises made during negotiations. This applied to issues such as the deployment of personnel, matters of detail on economic policy and generally the pace of transformation. However, the situation had changed, characterised among others by:

- consolidated legitimacy of the democratic order, marginalizing any forces that may have had intentions of staging violent counter-revolution;
- better hold on levers of state power, making it possible to introduce far-reaching changes to strengthen the capacity to transform society;
- government's management of macro-economic issues, creating space for approaches that would assist in employing more resources to the task of economic growth and job-creation as well as socio-economic programmes;
- the general expectation of change and hope among the overwhelming majority of South Africans, as well as ambivalence and fear among some sectors, particularly among the coloured, indian and white communities.

The NEC concluded that conditions had ripened for a bold and faster pace of transformation during the following five years. We therefore needed to move with speed in implementing some of the decisive steps during the first year.

On the basis of this assessment, the election message included the theme of accelerating change. This broadly found resonance among the people, resulting in a bigger electoral majority.

What qualitative changes have taken place in the balance of forces since then?

Decisive action on strategic fronts Constitution and Parliament



Legitimacy of the democratic system as such has strengthened, in a situation in which the ANC has a bigger parliamentary majority. This should also be seen against the backdrop of welcome progress in the mastery of parliament as a platform to pursue the agenda of transformation rather than ceding this terrain to the Opposition.

However, the forum itself is still monopolised by powerful interest groups, as solutions have yet to be found to ensure genuine popular participation.

Further, lack of cohesion has manifested itself in a number of areas, including alignment of day-to-day activities with the strategic perspectives of the movement; disloyalty by a few individuals that manifests itself in slanted media reports, as well as weaknesses in media management.

Executive and Bureaucracy

Greater coherence has been introduced into the functioning of government, with the clustering of activities and movement towards joint planning and implementation. A new approach to the senior management service, including strategic handling of deployment and introduction of integrated thinking and action has created possibilities for coherent implementation of programmes.

Further, the victory of the ANC in elections in most local areas has created opportunities for systematic implementation of programmes in an integrated manner.

However, the integrated approach still has to infuse all layers of the public service; and the capacity to implement programmes as distinct from that of developing policies should be strengthened within especially senior management. Also critical are challenges of strengthening co-ordination and integration capacity within the Presidency, and of dealing with both the reality and perceptions regarding corruption. In addition, the local government level still suffers from weaknesses of skills and overall quality of cadres.

Economic Policy and Implementation

The GEAR strategy has succeeded in the aim of stabilising macroeconomic indicators, at the same time as it reinforced the "credentials" of the new government among owners of private capital, the major and decisive force in the economy. The possibility has now been created to ensure greater intervention by government to help speed up the rate of investment and job-creation. This is reflected in the programme adopted by Cabinet and articulated in the State of the Nation Address last month. In many sectors of the economy such as transport, critical strategic shifts can now be introduced.

However, the confidence of local investors still needs to be attended to; while we need more effectively to assert the correct meaning of some of our programmes such as the restructuring of state assets. At the same time, creative ways still have to be found to deal with the negative effects of movements of speculative capital. And the working class continues to suffer the consequences of slow economic growth and industrial restructuring.

Decisive action is required to deal with the paucity of loans to blacks in particular and venture capital in general. And not much progress has been made to pool, in actual practice, capital in state hands, social capital and "allied" private capital.

Socio-economic Programmes

The character of this government is defined in part by the efforts to ensure systematic targeting of poverty in an integrated manner. The ISRDS and urban renewal strategy help give coherence to the social programmes of government.

In addition to this, implementation of other programmes continues.



However, problems of capacity continue to dog the state, particularly in respect of practical implementation. Until a few weeks ago, government had been forced onto the defensive on the issue of HIV/AIDS. There is also a dangerous trend of impatience in a few communities with the delivery of services such as in transport and justice. This can easily combine with an oppositional agenda generally to blame current levels of poverty on the present government.

Safety and Security

Visible and effective intervention has been registered with the creation of the Scorpions and changes in the senior management of SAPS. This has resulted in confident self-assertion of the law-enforcement agencies, and qualitative improvements in the battle against the totality of the crime problem.

However, these and other instruments of the criminal justice system are still manned in the main by forces which either do not fully understand or do not support social transformation. This is in addition to real capacity problems, including training and competence to handle the level and sophistication of crime. These weaknesses are aggravated by deliberate campaigns to discredit the new structures and managers.

THE BATTLE OF IDEAS

It is within this context that the opposing forces in the NDR seek to assert their ideas, and win over society to their points of view. This in part is hindered or facilitated by the availability or otherwise of instruments and cadres to wage this battle, among the contending forces:

* The majority of media establishments are owned, or controlled in terms of content, by forces whose agenda is either to weaken the ANC and precipitate its long-term defeat, or to shape an ANC that satisfies their interests.

Community and/or democratically-oriented media institutions are weak, and most are struggling to survive. Poor communication structures in government and the ANC, and over-reliance on the conventional forms of communication throws the movement into a vortex of frustration.

- The educational terrain continues to witness intense struggles for the determination of content that would not only serve the technocratic needs of the country, but also help shape the "new South African". The critical challenge is that even if progress were made appropriately to change this content, a difficult battle would still have to be fought to build the requisite corps of instructors.
- In matters of arts and culture, there has been a tendency to sustain previous "struggle" modes, to adopt European/American forms, and assert frozen ethnic expressions. While there has been some progress in terms of new, rising and appealing art forms that give expression to the new South Africa, these have not developed into being the predominant national cultural and artistic expressions. This applies also in the area of literature, including writings in African languages.

In other words, our efforts to change people's material conditions take place virtually in a vacuum in terms of spiritual sustenance in the form of a defining and self-assertive culture of an emergent democratic nation. It is in this context that the call for an RDP of the Soul should be seen: a cultural revolution without which all the other efforts will lose meaning and dissipate.

Indeed, the ideology and cultural worldview propounded by various representatives of the white upper classes today form the bedrock of dominant national thinking. They are premised on crass individualism, sexism, the notion that the ends justify the means in terms of self-enrichment and the belief that the past is irrelevant to the present and the future. The cherry on top of this is shallowness in debate whose claim to relevance is the extent to which it plays to the tyranny of the sound-bite, the refuge of lazy and sensational journalism.



The poverty of searching and critical thought is reflected in large measure also in the weaknesses of social science, including economics, in the institutions of higher learning, research and generation of policy.

Virtually none of the existing ones approximate what is demanded by the profound movement of creation, which the NDR represents. Those which identify with the democratic movement have either been marginalized into loud silence or stake their claim to fame by recycling slogans which do not have much relevance to the requirements of the complex local and global conjuncture.

Attempts at strategic intervention by the trained and organic intellectuals in the liberation movement thus become a voice in the wilderness - worn out by the burdens of chores of taxing government political and administrative management, or private sector endeavours. The plethora of institutions dotting the landscape notwithstanding, there are no centres and revolutionary cadres preoccupied with ideological struggle; and the soul of the nation faces permanent and irreparable damage.

SUBJECTIVE FACTORS - THE OPPOSITION

A variety of classes and strata see in the project of social transformation an immediate challenge to their material conditions and way of life.

Especially because of the loss of political power, many are blinded to the benefits that they derive, in the long-term (and even the short-term), from the NDR. These are, in the main, the white owners of private capital, middle strata and workers. On the fringes of this group are Coloured and Indian workers - especially unskilled and semi-skilled workers - who view and sometimes experience the rise of the African worker as an immediate threat to their material well-being.

But because of the different ways in which change impacts on their lives, and the capacity or lack of it, to fit these confusing dynamics into a coherent concept, the responses of these sectors will differ. In broad social terms, there are those who will withdraw from active social engagement and simply focus on taking care of the homestead. Others will move close to the banks of the Rubicon and take a nap. Yet others will seek to gain as much as they can from the status quo, but find reasons to distance themselves from the system in their political rationalisation, such as crime and "falling standards".

Within and among these classes and strata, divisions can also manifest themselves in terms of sectoral interests: pharmaceutical companies and the battle to retain massive profits, mining capital and opposition to the proposed minerals dispensation, the big conglomerate fish to whom SA has become too small a pond, medium and small entrepreneurs and their genuine concerns on interest rates, crime, and so on.

Running across the mindsets of most of these classes and strata is a common fear of "black majority rule". This conjures up images of vengeance, collapse of the rule of law, dispossession, and all the frightening things that the Natives can do! To these, the apocalypse has just been postponed.

Reconciliation and nation-building meant a reprieve from this outcome; and the "miracle" of transition had to be followed by pestilence and the rumblings of hell and damnation.

In other words, the political constructs of the white-based Opposition are not artificially generated. They are a genuine representation of the fears, prejudices and defence-mechanisms of sections of communities that have psyched themselves into a siege mentality. The Democratic Alliance is the pre-eminent representative of these sentiments, as was the now-crumbling white wing of the UDM. Yet it should be noted that many among these forces might have rationalised to the limit of a confined paradigm, and lack the courage or encouragement to cross the Rubicon into genuinely democratic politics.

Oppositional forces use a variety of approaches and instruments to pursue their agenda. At the same time as the ANC asserted faster change, there evolved arguments and practices that include:



- Identifying areas of perceived weakness in our programmes such as HIV/AIDS, Zimbabwe, the defence procurement programme and crime; project and exaggerate these and on this basis question the capacity of this government to run the country. Flowing from this, rationalisation develops to pursue a parallel legitimacy and sovereignty.
- Laying claim to the symbols and policies of the ANC, including concepts of change and delivery as well as icons such as Luthuli and Mandela to draw wedges within the democratic movement, at the same time as muddying a noble tradition, weakening its appeal and marginalizing its representative, the ANC.
- Seeking to bypass open political engagement, and mobilising around seemingly "non-partisan" issues that have appeal among sections of the black population such as religion (including Christian fundamentalism), sport, culture and so on: to make their possible jump into oppositional political alignment much easier in the medium- to long-term. The concept of "civil society" is then appropriated to pursue this objective.
- Massive campaigns that seem to reflect operations of private security and intelligence agencies - manifested in bizarre incidents of crime, political campaigns directed at the most senior leadership of the movement, attempts to divide the ANC, Tripartite Alliance and so on. Such networks seem to have their tentacles within the media; that is, over and above "innocent" shallowness and sensation-mongering.
- Effective utilisation of the centres of power that they control to undermine change, including media, support of sections of the business community and international contacts, to peddle the message of doom and gloom. Because of this, both within SA and abroad, the image that dominates is about the negative challenges that the country faces and the whingeing of sections of white upper and middle classes, rather than the unique and exciting process of social change.

That this combined impact of oppositional forces has come at the same time as the period we had identified for faster, decisive change may be mere coincidence. Similarly, the cumulative impact of oppositional challenges may create an impression of a powerful movement, while it is in fact a fortuitous coincidence of tactical interventions by a weakened force that is struggling merely to survive.

However, we should not delude ourselves into underestimating these forces.

For instance, the establishment of the Democratic Alliance means the coming together of the networks of the former ruling political elite, the counter-revolutionary former security establishment, elements of white business and sections of white middle and working classes who yearn for the past - under a veneer of liberalism whose claim to "anti-apartheid credentials" is invoked merely to justify and legitimise opposition to change.

Whatever the case may be, the reality is that a force of "reaction" has been mustered that at least creates an impression of challenging, at the strategic level, the "action" of the democratic movement. It would be extremely dangerous for us to lull ourselves into a belief that things are "going well", for the combined effect of these efforts, including a vicious campaign against the senior leadership of the movement, can have the effect of disorganising the democratic movement and forcing back advances in social transformation. Our urgent task is to dissipate all these attempts and obviate the distraction that they can become, as we continue with the implementation of the programme of transformation.

Among the political forces in parliament are parties that share the same mass base as the ANC, a mass base which, in the main, either objectively stands to gain from progress in the project of social transformation or is susceptible to broad identification with our programmes.

- Among these are AZAPO and the PAC, which have historically defined themselves as being part of the broad liberation movement. With regard to the former, experience in parliament has shown consistent propagation of the interests of the poor, which renders possible some co-operation in a number of areas. The PAC however has evinced the same eclecticism that has characterised it over the years: in one breath mouthing slogans that would place it at the extreme left of the political spectrum, and in another breath (and in actual practice), pursuing an agenda that coincides with that of rightwing liberalism.



- A special case in the array of black classes and strata is that of sections of the (landless) peasantry and small sections of migrant workers who have pinned their flags - either out of ignorance or as a result of coercion - to the mast of ethnic identity as the main driving force of their political outlook. Closely related to this phenomenon is the role of sections of traditional leaders as well as civil servants who served in the bantustan machinery and feel threatened by democratic transformation. This defines the mass base of the IFP among sectors in and from KwaZulu/Natal where the phenomenon finds significant expression. Our co-operation with the IFP derives from the understanding that these strata, especially the poor, will benefit from change, and that they support it. To the extent that this trend manifests itself in other provinces, in the form of the UDM, UCDP and Daba Lo Rivhuwa (Northern Province), it is essentially insignificant.

SUBJECTIVE FACTORS - CHALLENGES TO THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

Pursue unity of motive forces and manage secondary contradictions: The S&T document identifies the motive forces of the NDR as the spear and shield of struggle. It is in their unity and activism that the process of change depends. There is also a recognition that these forces are united by common objectives, but do have their own sectoral interests, some of which may give rise to secondary contradictions among them. This requires consistent efforts to unite the ANC itself, defend all levels of the movement against attack, and deal with acts of disloyalty within our ranks. It also requires deliberate efforts to identify and pool the phalanx of skills in our ranks to ensure that collectives contain attributes which complement one another.

Improve effectiveness of implementation of government programmes: The programme of government to speed up change, in areas such as economic growth and job-creation, the social sector and crime combating and prevention should be monitored by the ANC at various levels, including parliament and the branches. The ANC must ensure effective implementation of this programme on the ground, and mobilise for popular participation which will help reinforce people's confidence in themselves and in the process of change.

The ANC must act as a catalyst for development, working with, rather than ceding this role to, NGO's and other civil society structures.

Give coherent and consistent political leadership to the mass movement: The motive forces are organised in various formations which articulate their sectoral interests. It is critical that the vanguard movement, the ANC deliberately works in these organs, give them leadership and ensure that their primary efforts are directed at pursuing fundamental change, as distinct from a mindset to oppose government at every turn. Such a mindset and the rise of ultra-leftism reinforce rightwing efforts to undermine transformation.

Intensify the struggle against corruption: In virtually all structures of the movement, especially but not only at local level, engagement among cadres can be dominated by competition for positions that are viewed as affording access to resources, power and influence rather than public service. It is not inconceivable that the survival of the democratic project may rely on whether we are able to eradicate corruption within our ranks, while managing genuine issues of material self-advancement.

Maintain focus on primary challenges of the moment and deflect distractions: The decision of the movement to speed up change and take decisive steps to achieve this, is the primary focus to which we should dedicate our energies.

There is a danger that we can be drawn into all kinds of battles that have little to do with this primary mission, and as such dissipate our energies and play into the hands of the forces of opposition.

Adapt forms of organisation and mobilisation to current realities: This includes further improvement in our utilisation of legislatures as tribunes of the people, creatively reaching out to the people, including the youth and engaging them in the struggle for change, employing modern technology, and expanding the intellectual activist base of the democratic movement - in brief, what has been referred to as "modernisation of the ANC".



Mobilise broad front and core forces of mutual international solidarity: The democratic movement must play a leading role in placing the interests of SA and its transformation on the agenda of international discourse. This includes mobilisation among the forces of the Socialist International for consistent support, promoting the African Renaissance and Millennium African Recovery Plan, creating broad fronts around issues of international finance, trade, transfer of skills and technology, productive investment and so on.

It also requires improvement in our communication across the globe, including combating the tendency among some of our international allies to swallow negative messages about SA hook, line and sinker.

Improve intervention in the ideological and political discourse: This requires improvements in the work of communications in government and the ANC. Creatively, more and more ways should be found to ensure that the messages of transformation reach the people, without relying only on conventional established media institutions. Conventional platforms should also be engaged to ensure at least their appreciation of, and positive neutrality towards, the agenda of transformation, while isolating those bent on undermining change. In this terrain, as in others, we should patiently seek to mobilise for consensus around the country's transformation agenda.

Divide the forces of opposition and win over potential supporters: As shown by the current tensions within the DA and haemorrhaging of the UDM, a significant section of the base of these parties can be won over or neutralised. More critically, the claim that these and other parties represent the collective interest of the white, Coloured and Indian communities, as well as the business community, should be given the lie, in actual political work. Special attention, among others, should be paid to the mobilisation of patriotic elements among white upper and middle classes in pursuit of investment and job-creation, promotion of the country abroad and active participation in the struggle for safety and security and other campaigns.

Introduction to Local government theme

The ANC 50th National Conference resolution on Local Government (1997) resolved that: "A transformed and developmental system of local government ultimately needs to function as truly accountable, effective, efficient sphere of government that plays a key role in the war on poverty, guarantees equality in municipal service provision, and the active promotion of the social and economic development and spatial integration of our communities.

(It) must be understood as an integral component of the democratization and transformation of the South African state, and the overall implementation of the principles of people-driven and integrated development. "

This resolution provided the framework for the completion of the transitional process for local government - including the legal and policy framework for non-racial, non-sexist, developmental and democratic structures, the demarcations of local municipalities to ensure integration and sustainability and the local government elections.

The feature articles focus on the myriad of challenges of this transformation process. 'In many senses, local government has been undergoing a far more intricate, protracted and challenging transition process than national and provincial government. Many countries have found it far more difficult to fundamentally change their local government than their provincial and national systems,' says **Yunus Carrim** in his paper on the Challenges of the new local government system.

The first three articles analyse the results and the campaign of the countrywide local government elections based on the new system on 2 December 2000. The article by **Michael Sachs**, from the ANC National Research Unit, provides an overall analysis of the elections results. The allocation of seats nationally indicates that the ANC clearly emerged as the dominant force in control of local government structures. The comparison of the four democratic and non-racial elections held since 1994, also indicates that the movement has managed to maintain and systematically increase its support base. The article further analysis voting turnout, issues contributing to turn-out levels in African communities and the challenges arising from the assessment of the results and turnout.

Max Ozinsky, Member of the Provincial Legislature in the W Cape focused on the difficult campaign we ran in the Cape Town metropolitan area. He assesses the strengths and weaknesses of our own campaign, issues arising from the ward results and the strategies of the Democratic Alliance. The article notes that 'there is strong indication that the results (in the Cape Metro) show a shift amongst those coloured voters who went to vote, from the DA to the ANC. (However), this will require further research to prove conclusively, ... to enable the movement to develop political and organizational strategies that will enable us to increase the about 40% support we received in the last two elections, to ensure an ANC victory in the province in 2004.'

Local elections in KZN must also be seen from the point of view of 'where the ANC comes from' writes **Dumisane Makhaye**, NEC and PEC member from this province. His article lists the issues - in particular the history of violence and absence of a culture of free political activity in the province. In comparing the results and support of the ANC and the IFP in the province, the article focuses on the social base of our electoral support and that of the IFP in the province, as well as the other opposition forces that these two dominant parties in the province have to content with.

The provided a further analysis of the local government elections results.

President Mbeki in his political overview to the NEC Lekgotla in January 2001 reflected that 'the 2000 local government results show a very stable level of support for the ANC amongst the motive forces of the NDR. These are the people who fought the apartheid regime, who fought for a government of their choice and who fought for the freedoms envisaged in the Freedom Charter.'

With the ANC in control of at least 170 local councils, accounting for around 85 percent of the South African population, President Mbeki noted the responsibility which this in turn places on the ANC to consolidate and re-double its efforts to ensure a better life and bring about fundamental change in



South African society. A key challenge is therefore to effectively utilise the local government sphere that we dominate to achieve these objectives.

The next three articles in the feature focus on this challenge. Yunus Carrim, ANC MP and chairperson of the parliamentary portfolio committee on Local government gives an overview on the role of this sphere in advancing our national democratic transition. Amongst the challenges that he discusses are the need to entrench developmental local government, emphasising community and resident participation, developing an ANC-led transformation campaign at local levels and advancing non-racialism.

Amongst the main obstacles faced by local government which the article address are the development of resources for this tier (human and financial), the need to further clarify powers and functions in a co-operative governance arrangement and responding to service delivery and other needs.

He concludes by arguing that 'given the importance of the new local government system to the national democratic project, the degree of success in implementing the new system will be an important barometer of the progress of the national democratic revolution.' Local government will be the focal institutions for the implementation of the integrated rural development strategy and the urban renewal programme, aimed at 'having a positive impact on such areas as job creation, crime and violence, health and the general quality of life of millions of our people who lead desperate lives.' (President Mbeki: [State of the Nation address](#), February 2001).

The article by **Kenny Fihla** - ANC Johannesburg REC and a member of the Executive Mayoral Committee of the Joburg metro focuses on the experience and challenges of Johannesburg, the biggest and leading unicity in the country. **Mark Wegerif** - a member of the ANC Youth League from the Northern Province and working for the rural NGO Nkunzi Development Agency reflects on the challenges for rural local government in implementing the Integrated Rural development strategy.

Results of the 2000 Local Government Elections

Michael Sachs

1. Introduction

Our aim in the 2000 local government election was to win an overwhelming victory in the context of a high voter turnout. The programme of action adopted at the National Election Strategy workshop held on 24 August 2000 notes that:

"This election is critically about mobilisation, re-energising and reactivating the base support of the movement to participate in elections with the belief that the ANC can make change happen where we live. The ANC's mobilisation objectives are:

- To ensure that all our voters come out to vote ANC on Election Day;
- To address perceived and actual dissatisfaction relating to the performance of local councillors
- Making sure all our voters have bar-coded IDs and are registered
- Educating voters regarding the process of voting, the functioning of local government and encouraging public participation."

It is clear from the results that in these local government elections, the ANC maintained its level of electoral support, and made significant gains in a number of areas. Our majority was indeed overwhelming. However, this victory was not achieved in the context of a high voter turnout, or a significant reactivation of our base support. We also did not significantly increase the number of registered voters.

2. Council Control

The ANC emerged from the local government elections as the overwhelmingly dominant force in terms of control of local government structures. The ANC was the only organisation to contest all municipalities⁽¹⁾. Of the 237 local municipalities¹ the ANC won 162 (68%). Of the 7,431 available seats, the ANC won 4,628 (62%).

In the Free State, Mpumalanga, North West and Northern Provinces the ANC controls all municipalities. In the Eastern Cape all but three, in Gauteng all but two, while in the Northern Cape we won 22 out of the 27 councils. In the Western Cape we only managed to win control of three councils, but significantly improved our overall percentage vote, resulting in 14 councils being hung, with the DA controlling the remaining eight. In KwaZulu Natal the ANC controls 8 councils, to the IFPs 33 and 10 hung, but again we increased our overall percentage compared with the last local elections. Our closest competitor in terms of popular vote, the DA, won only 17.5% of the seats and 5% of councils. Table 1 summarises the outcome of the election in terms of councils controlled by different parties.

Table 1: Summary of Councils won by Parties

Table 1: Summary of Councils won by Parties

	Total	ANC	DA	IFP	UDM	Hung
Eastern Cape	39	36	1	-	1	1
Free State	20	20	-	-	-	-
Gauteng	12	10	-	-	-	2
KwaZulu Natal	51	8	-	33	-	10
Mpumalanga	20	20	-	-	-	-
North West	20	20	-	-	-	-
Northern Cape	27	22	3	-	-	2
Northern Province	23	23	-	-	-	-
Western Cape	25	3	8	-	-	14
TOTALS	237	162	12	33	1	29

3. Comparing Local Government Elections (1995/96 and 2000)

Overall National Percentages Table 6 shows a comparison between overall results in the four elections held since 1994 (using PR votes for local elections). Compared with the 1995/96 local elections, the ANC increased its overall percentage from 58.8% to 59.4% in 2000. In terms of the number of votes cast for the ANC, we received 12.4 million votes in 1994, five million in 1995/96, 10.5 million in 1999 and 5.3 million in 2000.

Table 6: Comparison of four democratic elections (overall percentages)


	2000 Local Elections	1995/96 Local Elections	1999 National Elections	1994 National Elections
ANC	59.4	58.8	66.4	62.6
DA	22.1	21.5	17.0	22.1
IFP	9.1	8.7	8.6	10.5
UDM	2.6	-	3.4	-
PAC	1.3	1.2	0.7	1.2
ACDP	1.2	0.8	1.4	0.4
UCDP	1.0	-	0.8	-
MF	0.3	0.4	0.3	-
AZAPO	0.3	-	0.2	-
VFIFF	0.1	2.7	0.8	2.2

The DA⁽²⁾ registered an insignificant 0.6% increase in its percentage support between 1995/96 and 2000. This is despite the decline in the number of votes cast in favour of the combination of the DP, NNP and FA: down from 2.1 million in 1995/96 to 2.0 million in 2000. If we assume that the VF/FF vote in 1995/96 went primarily to the DA in 2000, then the combined "white-right" vote actually declined from 24.2% in 1995/96 to 22.2% in 2000.

The IFP increased its overall percentage from 8.7% in 1995/96 to 9.1% in 2000. The only other notable national trends are a small increase for the ACDP and a large decline for the VF/FF, the last election being its worst performance to date.

The most significant fact that emerges from this comparison is the stability in party support. This is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the performance of major parties in all elections since 1994. While there have been small shifts in support among some parties, and ANC percentages have differed in local and national elections, in general all parties (with the exception of the VF / FF) have maintained similar levels of support. The main reasons for the difference in ANC support in local and national elections are the different turnout patterns in these elections, which is discussed further below.

Figure 1: Overall % Votes for Main Parties (1994 - 2000)



Provincial Percentages


Figure 2 shows the ANC's overall performance in each province in the 2000 and 1995/96 elections. We can see gains in the ANC's percentage vote in Free State (by 5.1%), Gauteng (by 5.7%), KwaZulu Natal (2.6%) Mpumalanga (4.5%), the Northern Cape (by a whopping 15.1%) and the Western Cape (by 3%).

Declines in ANC's overall percentage can be seen in the Eastern Cape (by 6.9%), North West (2.2%) and Northern Province (by 5.8%). While these can be attributed to low turnout amongst our core support, we should be concerned about these declines, especially in the North West where the UCDP appears to have made some progress.

Compared with 1995/96, the DA gained percentage points in the Eastern Cape (1.1%), Free State (4.5%), Gauteng (1.3%), Mpumalanga (1.9%), Northern Province (3.7%) and North West (2.5%). It lost percentage votes in KwaZulu Natal (0.6%), Northern Cape (3.8%) and Western Cape (1.6%). This last statistic throws doubt on the DA's triumphalism around the Western Cape results. Even in comparison with the 1999 general election, where the DA scored 50.3% of the vote, their result in the 2000 municipal election of 51.6% in the Western Cape is a marginal increase of only 1.6%, much less than the ANC's 3% gain in the province.

In KwaZulu-Natal IFP got 43.8% in the 1995/96 elections and 45.6% in the 2000 elections. This is an increase of only 1.8%: less than the ANC's gain of 2.6%. In Gauteng the IFP's support remained stable at about 2%, while in Mpumalanga it increased from 0.4% in 1995/96 to 1.6% in 2000. In all other provinces the IFP's vote was below 0.5%.

Figure 2: ANC % Votes in 2000 and 1995/96 by province



The UDM did not exist at the time of the last local election so its performance cannot be directly assessed. However, using 1999 as a benchmark does not bode well for them. In the last general election they received 3.43% of the national vote. In the 2000 local election they could only muster 2.6%. Even in the UDM's Eastern Cape heartland, their provincial percentage of 11.1% in the 2000 election compares poorly with their 1999 result of 12.9%. In Gauteng the UDM got 2.15% in 1999 and 0.9% in 2000. In the Western Cape they achieved 3% in 1999 and 1.4% in 2000.


The UCDP also did not participate in the 1995/96 elections. Their only significant support is in the North West Province where they achieved 12.7% in the 2000 election (beating the DA, which got only 10.3% of the vote). In the 1999 general election the UCDP received 7.48% of the vote in North West.

4. Voter Turnout

Voter turnout in the 2000 Elections was 48%. This compares very poorly with the turnout in the 1999 national election (87%), but is similar to turnout in the 1995/96 local elections. It is an unfortunate fact that in most democratic countries the electorate does not regard municipal elections with the same sense of importance as a national election. This appears to be the case in South Africa.

Figure 3 compares turnout in South Africa's four democratic elections. The percentage poll of registered voters shows the proportion of registered voters who voted. The percentage turnout of eligible voters shows the percentage of South Africans over the age of 18 who voted in the election, whether registered or not. In 1994, since there was no requirement to register, both figures are the same. In 1999, the requirement to register led to a decline in the number of eligible voters who participated.

Figure 3: Turnout of eligible and registered voters in four democratic elections



It is clear that the level of voter participation was the same in 2000 as in 1995/96, whether looked at from the point of view of eligible or registered voters. This casts doubt on the view widely held in the media that there was some kind of protest against the ANC in the 2000 election. Rather, voters are less inclined to participate in local elections than national elections.

Figure 4 shows a comparison of turnout by province in the 2000 elections and the 1995/96 elections. In 2000 the lowest turnout was in Gauteng, with 43%, while the highest was in the Northern and Western Cape both with 58%.

Eastern Cape turnout was also relatively high (56%).

In the 1995/96 elections the lowest turnout was KwaZulu Natal and North West with turnouts of 45.5% and the highest was again Northern Cape with 65%. In the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu Natal, North West and Western Cape turnout in the two elections was more or less the same.

Comparing the two elections we see that turnout improved in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu Natal. It was comparatively lower in all other provinces. Large decreases in percentage turnout were observed in the Free State, Gauteng, Mpumalanga and the Northern Cape. The single largest decline was in Mpumalanga, where the 1995/96 figure of 53% declined to a percentage poll of only 45% in 2000. This 8% decline in a strongly ANC supporting area should be a cause for concern.

Figure 4: % Turnout in 2000 and 1995/96 by province




Table 2 shows the ten municipalities in the country with the highest turnout and the ten municipalities with the lowest turnout. It can be seen that:

- Those areas with the highest turnout are predominantly coloured areas, while those with the lowest turnout are predominantly African areas.
- In the areas with a high turnout there was a very close battle between the ANC and the DA. For example, in Carnarvon (NC074) the DA won by a margin of 1% and in Riversdale (WC042) by 4%. In those with the lowest turnout one party (either the ANC or the IFP) commands the overwhelming majority.
- The areas with the highest turnout are relatively small and rural, with the number of registered voters ranging from 3,000 to 21,000. The areas with the lowest turnout have a large numbers of registered voters and several key urban areas are on this list, including Rustenburg and Pietersburg. Very low turnout (below 40%) was also seen in Johannesburg.

A key feature of the 2000 local government election then was the relatively low turnout in African communities. Why was this the case? The following factors need to be considered:

- a. The historic experiences of black South Africans with apartheid local government are negative. Perceptions of continuity with apartheid local government exist and even since 1995, structural problems have hampered our efforts at transformation and delivery.
- b. The effectiveness of the DA's anti-ANC "fight back" message and the focussed nature of the DA's mobilisation efforts amongst the white and coloured community. In Cape Town the DA was able to effectively use the residue of DP structures to fight one campaign in the white areas, and use NNP structures to fight a very different campaign in the Coloured areas.

This paid off in terms of white turnout. In many areas the possibility of defeating the ANC out may have motivated many voters who otherwise would not have participated in elections.

- c. There is some evidence to suggest that turnout tended to be greater in more highly contested wards and municipalities. In solid ANC areas, some African voters may have become

complacent in the certainty of an ANC victory. Similar low turnout levels are recorded in strongly IFP areas.

However, this does not apply to all areas, since low turnout was also experienced in African areas of Cape Town, and in Umtata, both of which were highly contested municipalities.

- d. In general, the IEC's infrastructure tends to be poorer in African areas.

Partly as a result of apartheid disparities, voting stations are not as well equipped, logistical problems more likely and queues are longer in African areas.

- e. Many workers, including farm workers, were prevented by their employers from going to vote. We were able to respond to a number of reports of such behaviour, but clearly there were far more instances than we were able to monitor.

Table 2: Top Ten and Bottom Ten Municipalities by Turnout

Top Ten				Bottom Ten			
Code	Name	% Poll	ANC %	Code	Name	% Poll	ANC %
WC052	PRINS ALBERT (WC)	80	37	NW0373	RUSTENBURG (NW)	29	65
WC042	RIVERSDALE (WC)	79	48	NP361	THABAZIMBI (NP)	34	67
NC081	MIER (NC)	76	56	KZ275	MTUBATUBA (KZN)	36	19
NC066	FRASERBURG / WILLISTON (NC)	76	39	KZ282	RICHARDS BAY (KZN)	37	32
NC074	CARNARVON/KAREEKBERG (NC)	74	49	NP341	MESSINA (NP)	38	80
WC051	LAINSBURG (WC)	73	57	MP316	MDUTJANA (MPM)	38	87
NC076	STRYDENBERG / HOPETOWN (NC)	72	61	KZ253	UTRECHT (KZN)	38	17
NC075	PHILLIPSTOWN / PETRUSVILLE (NC)	72	46	NP354	PIETERSBURG (NP)	39	75
WC033	BREDASDORP (WC)	71	40	GT414	WESTONARIA (GTG)	39	66
WC013	PIKETBERG / REDELINGHUYNS (WC)	71	45	CBLC6	BUSHBUCKRIDGE (NP)	39	78

On the other hand we should not overlook our own shortcomings. In some areas we failed to adequately address perceived and actual dissatisfaction relating to the performance of local councillors. Problems were exacerbated around the implementation of the list process. In a number of cases disaffected ANC members called on our people not to vote. Added to this the overall weaknesses of our campaign had an effect. We did not manage to use the campaign to re-energise our core support, and this is reflected in low levels of turnout.

Other factors that may have affected turnout include disputes around demarcation (particularly in the Northern Province) and lack of full and enthusiastic support of traditional leaders for the process of building local democracy.

5. Conclusions

- a. Levels of party support and voter turnout were more or less the same as in 1995/96. Voter turnout was particularly low in African areas.
- b. The ANC maintained its dominant position. Even in the face of low turnout in its core constituency, no significant inroads were made into our support in comparison with the 1995/96 local government elections.
- c. In terms of overall percentage support the DA made no significant gains over the performance of the DP and NNP separately. They also failed to make any significant inroads in ANC support. However, the Indian areas of Durban and Pietermaritzburg were a significant victory for the DA. The DA also consolidated the white vote leading to a poor performance of Afrikaner nationalists.
- d. The ANC retained a solid majority of support among coloured voters in rural areas and small towns, even performing relatively better than the in 1999 general election. Amongst urban coloureds there is no evidence to suggest any significant shifts in party support.
- e. The most significant change from the last local government elections is the massive 15% swing in favour of the ANC in the Northern Cape.
- f. Support amongst smaller parties shifted considerably, with the UDM and VF/FF being wiped out as a significant force, and the UCDP appearing to make gains in the North West.

1 This figure excludes District Management Areas, Municipalities without wards and District Councils.


2 Figures for the DA in previous elections are the combined support of the DP, NNP and FA.

Our Elections Campaign in the Cape Town Metro

Max Ozinsky

The Western Cape is the province where the ANC faces the strongest challenge and opposition to our programme of nation building, transformation and democratisation. The ANC has yet to win the support of the majority of the voters in an election in this province (see figure 1).

Figure 5: ANC and DA Performance in the Western Cape



This article analyses the 2000 local government election campaign in the new City of Cape Town, also known as the Cape Metropolitan Area.

A Difficult Election

The ANC in the Western Cape faced a particularly difficult challenge in the 2000 local government elections.

Firstly, the ANC had significantly improved its support between the 1994 and 1999 national and provincial elections. In 1994 the ANC received 33.3% of the vote and in 1999 this had been increased to 42.08%. This represents an increase in support of 9% in five years. This very large increase in support, which was achieved under very difficult circumstances, made the ANC the single largest party in the province in 1999, even though it did not enjoy the support of the majority of voters in the province. (Footnote: I have discussed some of the reasons that led to this significant increase in an article in South African Labour Bulletin vol 24 no. 1, February 2000)

However this large increase in support had a number of effects on the political situation in the province and nationally. The most important effect was that the largest opposition parties in the province, the New National Party and the Democratic Party, realised that in order to keep the ANC out of power they would have to unite. Whatever their minor differences, both these parties realised that they had a common goal in protecting the interests of their mainly white core base in their opposition to the liberatory nation building and transformation programme of the ANC.

The first step in this process was the formation of a coalition government in the province in 1999, again forcing the ANC into opposition. This was followed by the formation of the Democratic Alliance in the middle of 2000 to contest the local government elections. The ANC would now face a united opposition in the province.

The increase in support for the ANC led to high expectations that it would be able to further increase its percentage of the vote in the local government election. This might have been possible under certain conditions, but was always going to be unlikely.

Whilst we were able to increase our support by 9% in 5 years, it was always going to be difficult to register another 9% increase in 1 year! There is a also a significant difference in what it takes to win over those needed to increase support when you have a third of the vote, compared to the middle ground and undecided forces that are needed to take a party from 42% to majority support.

Secondly, the ANC faced a completely different local government electoral system from that used in the 1996 elections. In 1996 half of the ward seats in three of the metro sub-structures were in the former Black Local Authority areas. This was important in the 1996 elections in Cape Town and Tygerberg, in which lived most of the population of the Cape Metropole.

These are base areas for the ANC and meant that the ANC was able to win control of these two councils, even though it did not win the support of the majority of the voters in these councils. In fact that ANC had only won about 37% of the vote in the whole Cape Metro area in the 1996 election.

In the 2000 election, parties would be allocated seats in the council in direct proportion to the PR vote the party receives in the election. In order to control the new City of Cape Town, a party would have to receive over 50% of the PR vote.

The third challenge facing the ANC was to maintain the high level of mobilisation of its voters that had been achieved in the 1999 election. In most countries, including South Africa, there is a significantly different level of participation of voters in local government elections when compared to national and provincial elections. A key part of our strategy in the 1999 elections had been to focus our election campaign on ensuring that the core voters of the ANC were mobilised to vote in the election. This strategy had led to an exceptionally high turnout of voters in the African areas in both the metro and rural areas and amongst coloured voters in the rural areas.



Particular attention had also been paid in 1999 to the targeted mobilisation of coloured ANC voters in the Metro area.

ANC Strategy in the 2000 Elections

Our political strategy for the 2000 election was based on the political strategy adopted at the Provincial Conference in 1998 and attempted to build on our experience of the 1999 election.

Firstly, we had identified the key strategic issue facing the ANC in the Western Cape as the building of solidarity between the African and coloured sections of the oppressed. In spite of the divisions created by apartheid, there exists an objective basis for this solidarity in the common experience of oppression and struggle against it. Social issues in these two communities are often similar, but experienced in different ways because of the separate and uneven development of apartheid colonialism.

The political strategy emphasised the need for the ANC to consciously develop and manage the building of non-racialism both inside and outside its structures. The Western Cape is a province that is renowned for the racist attitudes, which still persist six years into the democratic South Africa.

The ANC remains the only political party with significant organisational structures in both the African and Coloured areas and is a central catalyst for building non-racism.

The strategy correctly outlined the base support of the ANC as the African people across the province, a majority amongst coloured voters in the rural towns, farm workers and across all sections of the coloured community in the metro, but concentrated amongst the middle class.

Secondly, we attempted to run a campaign which focused the organisational work required to win elections. Our experience of fighting elections since 1994 had given us an understanding of the tactics required to win elections, even in situations where we did not have majority support. We learnt that in election organisation you should try to only mobilise registered voters who support the ANC and concentrate all efforts on this task. This involved identifying, recording and targeting registered ANC voters. We used canvassing cards to keep an easy-to-use record of our voters. By testing and learning from the use of canvassing cards in previous elections, we tried to develop an organisational strategy for the election campaign. We call this tactic the "targeted approach". We needed to target our voters to ensure that they actually go and vote. The other side of this approach was to try to ensure that we don't mobilise DA voters to go and vote, as we have done in previous elections.

Thirdly, we attempted to reach out to voters who have not previously voted for the ANC. By using canvassing which is recorded on the canvassing cards, we should be able to identify voters who have not voted ANC in the past, but who could be convinced to vote for us. An important part of our campaign should be to convince these voters to vote for the ANC and to ensure that they actually go and vote. Part of this tactic includes Nat-attack, that is causing confusion and demoralisation in the ranks of our opponents and getting the message out that the ANC is a home for all, including former NP supporters.

There were also a number of strategic issues specific to the local government elections campaign.

We needed to ensure that the candidate selection process did not lead to former-ANC members standing as independents against our candidates in the election. A lot of attention was paid to this in the metro, and in the end there were only three wards out of the 100 in the metro where there were independent candidates from within our own ranks.

ANC Message

Our message in the campaign was based on four key aspects.

Firstly, the projection of the ANC election manifesto, especially the provision of free basic services.



Secondly, we attempted to project the achievements of the ANC while it was in control of the old Cities of Cape Town and Tygerberg and contrast this with the policies of the DA in the councils which it controlled. Amongst these achievements were significant delivery of houses in Tygerberg and creation of a savings based housing scheme in Cape Town. There had also been changes to rating system in the old City of Cape Town which had brought lower rates to the poorer African and coloured areas and stopped had the subsidisation of rates in the white areas by the poor.

Thirdly, we attempted to project our mayoral candidate, Cde Lynne Brown, as a competent and skilled manager with an ability to listen with sympathy to the problems of the voters and to bring about change.

Fourthly, we tried to project our candidates at a ward level and what they would do about local issues.

Fifthly, we attempted to show to voters how DA rule in the province and local government continually brings racial division to the province and how their policies protect white domination and interests.

The Campaign of the Democratic Alliance

Our opposition began their campaign as soon as they had agreement to form the Democratic Alliance in June 2000. Their first step was to build a profile of the DA as an amalgamation of the DP and the NNP. This was an attempt to overcome the serious internal divisions that existed in the two parties caused by those opposed to the new alliance. They also attempted to educate their voters that the DA represented both the old DP and NNP.

The main issue facing the DA in this election was how to ensure that their supporters voted in the election. From 1994 to 1999 the NNP had lost about 500,000 votes! This represented a drop of 45% in the actual number of voters who had voted for the NNP in 1994. Some of these former NNP voters had shifted to the ANC, but the majority of them were disillusioned with the NNP and politics in general and had not gone to vote in the 1999 elections. Many of these voters had not even registered to vote for the 1999 elections.

Almost all these voters were in the coloured community.

To help overcome this problem for the NNP, the provincial government poured R12 million into a campaign of voter registration, which was driven not by the IEC, but from the office of the Provincial Director General, Neil Barnard.

Another part of the DA campaign was to instill fear amongst their core white voters of what they projected as the possible effects of an ANC victory.

Through this they hoped to achieve a high poll in these areas and to make up for the voters lost in the Coloured community. Initially this focussed on the issue of rates and service charges, with the DA claiming that the ANC's policies of bringing equality to the rating system would result in "unfair rates". This campaign, like their later "For all the people" campaign and their campaign around Zimbabwe, had significant racial undertones and followed on from their previous "swart gevaar" campaigns which had been so successful in the province in the past. As can be seen from the election results, the aim of this campaign was to create a massive mobilisation of white voters.

The DA nationally also focussed almost all their resources in the Western Cape. With little chance of winning any significant municipalities or support in other provinces, the DA poured almost all their money, most of their leadership and much of their national strategy into the campaign in the Western Cape and in Cape Town in particular. It has been estimated that the DA spent more than R25 million on the campaign in the Western Cape alone!

The Election Results



In 2000 the ANC won 77 seats in the new City of Cape Town. This is made up of 28 ward seats and 49 PR seats.

A comparison of the 2000 election results with those of the 1995/6 local government elections, shows a slight increase for the ANC in province as a whole as well as for the Cape Town Metropolitan Area (the new City of Cape Town). These results are summarised by the table below:

Election Results in the Cape Metropolitan Area (new City of Cape Town)

Party	1994 prov (est)		1996 PR		1999 prov		2000 PR/wd	
	Vote s(000)	%	Vote s(000)	%	Vote s(000)	%	Vote s(000)	%
DP + NP / DA		57	409	55	528	51	375	53
DP		8	51	7	142	14		
NP		49	358	48	386	37		
ANC		36	278	37	424	41	270	38
Other		5	51	7	88	8	57	8
Total		100	738	100	1040	100	702	100

Source: Prof. J. Seekings, UCT, unpublished.

What is significant about these figures is that they show a significant decline in DA support over time. This is true of both the percentage of the vote they have received, but much more significant in terms of the actual number of voters. Between 1996 and 2000 the DA lost more than 34,000 voters, which represented a 2% drop in support. In the same period the ANC lost about 8,000 voters, which represented a 1% gain in support. This shows that the ANC has been more successful than the DA in maintaining its support base.

What is also significant about the results is the significant difference in voter turnout in wards in different areas. The percentage poll in the various wards follows a very defined racial pattern. The wards in the white areas have the highest polls, with a voter turn out of between 55 and 78 percent. In the African areas the turn out is between 50 and 65 percent. In the coloured areas the turn out is between 33 and 57 percent. The wards with the highest percentage turnout of voters, also show the highest support for the DA.

This turn out would seem to show the success of the DA campaign of mobilising white voters on the basis of "swart gevaar" as discussed earlier.

This high turnout of white voters also had the effect of allowing the DA to win a number of wards which were made up of both formerly white and coloured areas.

There is a strong indication, which has been alluded to by a number of commentators, that the results show a shift, amongst those coloured voters who went to vote, from the DA to the ANC. This would require further research to prove conclusively. However what is shown clearly by the results is that



while the DA may be able to win a majority of votes in amongst those who vote in the coloured areas, they are unable to mobilise a majority of the potential voters in these areas to vote for them.

Some issues out of the ward results

The ANC maintained control of one ward and won another in overwhelmingly coloured areas. Cde Saleem Mowser held onto ward 48 which includes parts of Athlone and Rylands, increasing his share of the vote. Cde Heinrich Magerman won ward 83, which includes Macassar and a part of Somerset West, from the NNP. This is despite the fact that a former ANC member stood against him as an independent.

In both these wards, the ward candidate received more votes than the ANC PR votes. This would seem to indicate that the candidate is well known in the area and is able to mobilise voters to go and vote. Both comrades have a long history of working both in the ANC and the community. Both comrades were able to mobilise a significant number of supporters to actively work on the election campaign.

There is a significant variation in the voter turnout in the various wards.

Ward 16, a predominantly coloured ward in the Blue Downs is the ward with the lowest turnout of 33.85%. Ward 9, which is a formerly white part of Durbanville, is the ward with the highest turnout of 78.2%.

Contrary to the protests of our opponents, the demarcation process produced wards which were particularly difficult for the ANC to win.

The timing of the election, which meant that university students were not able to vote even though they had registered, led to the ANC losing one, and perhaps two wards.

In ward 33, which includes parts of Crossroads, Lower Crossroads, Phillipi and Mandalay, ward 36, which includes parts of Crossroads and Nyanga, and ward 97, former ANC members stood as independents against the ANC candidate and received a significant number of votes. In all these wards almost all of those who voted for the independent ward candidate, voted for the ANC in the PR vote. There is no ward that the ANC lost in the Cape Metro as a result of an ANC independent standing against the ANC candidate.

Way Forward

The ANC has managed to consolidate its support in the City of Cape Town in the 2000 election. However a number of both organisational and political challenges face the organisation.

Organisationally, the results show that significant work remains to be done in building the ANC on the ground, especially in the coloured areas. If we are to win wards in these areas we need to learn from the experiences of the two wards in coloured areas which we did win. The key factor seems to be to build the leading role of the ANC in the community over a period of time. At the same time we need to develop comrades who have a history of work in the community and the ANC, who will be prepared through this work to become our candidates. It is only through a consistent programme of work in the community, focussing on community issues, that we will be able to overcome the apathy and cynicism of the majority of potential coloured voters.

In the African areas the ANC needs to ensure that the DA does not marginalise these areas in development. At the same time, it would seem that the DA intends to try to gain a foothold in these areas by focussing on the weaknesses of the ANC. Already Helen Zille, the provincial MEC for Education has been deployed in the African areas of Cape Town in an attempt to use divisions in communities to build the DA.



The DA, since they have taken control of the City of Cape Town, have been quite clear that they are going to roll back the key changes and transformation that the ANC began in 1996. Already they have fired a number of senior managers, simply for being appointed by the ANC. They have made it known that loyalty to the DA is expected of every council worker. In all likelihood they will begin to turn back many of the progressive changes brought by the ANC to the former Cities of Cape Town and Tygerberg, for instance the progressive rating systems and the pro-poor policies. It also seems that they will try to reduce public participation in council activities. They have decided for instance that there will be no ward committees in the Western Cape, so that their councillors will be only accountable to the DA and not the community.

An important part of their strategy also seems to be to build a close link between the DA controlled provincial government and the new DA controlled City of Cape Town. It seems that they will be attempting to blur the distinction in the constitution between the various levels of government.

The ANC is now in opposition in both the provincial legislature and the City of Cape Town council. We need to develop a programme of action as an opposition which will build the ANC as an real alternative to the DA. This programme as an opposition will need to combine the work of our public representatives, councillors and MPLs, in the council and legislature with the building of the ANC branches in the community. Each ANC branch, with the guidance of the province and regions needs to make an honest analysis of the situation in their ward as well as a realistic programme for building the ANC between now and the next election.

The national government though its various departments and programmes play a significant role in the City of Cape Town. The national government and the ANC in the province will need to ensure that the DA does not misuse its control of the province and local government for party political reasons.

However the key issue remains - how does the ANC increase the about 40% support it has received in the past two elections to ensure an ANC majority in the province in 2004? This will depend on us winning over a significantly new section of voters who have never voted for the ANC before.

Voting Patterns in Kwazulu Natal

Dumisane Makhaye

Overview of results


When analysing the December 2000 Local government elections in KwaZulu Natal (or in any part of the South Africa), it is important to avoid two equally dangerous extremes: to project a picture of gloom and doom on the one hand or to fall into the comfort zone of complacency.

Correct methodology, especially comparing the comparables, is crucial. We must compare 1996 local elections with the 2000 local elections and the 1994 national and provincial elections with 1999, provincial and national elections (see chart).

It is also important to point to where the ANC in KwaZulu Natal comes from.

In the early 1980s, only a small township of Lamontville could defiantly and openly claim to be ANC aligned. Fear, intimidation, massacres and political killings were the order of the day. In a spate of fifteen (15) years almost twenty thousand lives perished because of political violence. There is no territory that the ANC did not have to literally fight for the right to organise in KwaZulu Natal, even after the unbanning of the ANC in 1990.

Figure 6: ANC and IFP Performance in KwaZulu Natal



By the 1994 democratic elections, the ANC had won political hegemony in almost all major industrial and urban areas in the province. Yet it remained virtually banned in rural or tribal areas. Under those circumstances, it accounted for 32% of the vote, whilst IFP received about 51% of the vote.

The overwhelming majority of the ANC support in these elections came from the urban centres of the province. Strictly speaking, the ANC remained a predominantly urban party and the IFP a rural/tribal party in the province.

It must be noted that the urban areas are not only populated by Africans.

There is strong presence of whites, Indians and coloureds who throughout the country are not traditional ANC voters. The urban vote therefore remains a terrain of contestation between the ANC, DP, NNP, Minority Front and the ACDP.

The rural/tribal areas are overwhelming African. The IFP therefore has an advantage in rural areas; it has only to compete with the ANC and not with any other party.

In the 1999 national and provincial elections, the ANC received about 40% of the vote while the IFP received about 41%. In these elections, the ANC consolidated its vote in urban areas and also extended its influence into rural areas. In the KwaZulu Natal legislature, of eighty members, the ANC accounts for 32, IFP for 34, the DP for 7 and the NNP for 3 members, the Minority Front 2 and UDM and ACDP 1 each. The alliance between the ANC and the MF makes its share of the legislature equal to that of the IFP.

In the 1996 local government elections, the ANC received 32.6% of the vote, whilst the IFP got 43.8% of the vote. The ANC still remained virtually an urban party, while the IFP remained a rural/tribal party in control of all regional councils. The ANC won about 49.56% of the Durban metro.

In the 2000 local government elections, the situation had dramatically changed. The demarcation process had ensured that 15 tribal areas had become part of the Durban metro. These tribal areas were not traditional areas of ANC support. Therefore, one would have expected that the strong African support base of the ANC would be diluted by the addition of these tribal areas - as was the case in areas around Pietermaritzburg, Port Shepstone, Newcastle, Dundee, Richards Bay, Ladysmith, Empangeni and Greytown.

The ANC therefore received 33.7% of the vote and the IFP received 48.85% of the vote in the 2000 local elections. Overall, the ANC increased its support by 2%, while the IFP increased by 1.8%. Because of the changes introduced by the demarcation processes and the introduction of tribal areas into ANC urban strongholds, the ANC now commands 46.1% of the new Durban Unicity. Its alliance with the Minority Front ensures that the ANC enjoys an absolute majority.

The population under the ANC-controlled councils from 53% of the registered population of KwaZulu Natal and about 82% of the provincial Gross Geographical Product.

Lessons and observations

- In areas where the ANC is organisationally strong, its share of the vote is proportionally strong.
- In areas where there is weak leadership, such as the former Malahleni and Ukhahlamba region, where the PEC had to disband the RECs because of internal leadership problems, the ANC suffered some unnecessary defeats.
- The ANC is now a truly urban and rural party in the province. Two district councils are firmly under the control of the ANC and in about three others, the ANC and IFP are neck and neck.
- The puzzling IFP-DA alliance at local government level is an indication that the ANC must work towards achieving an absolute majority in order to govern; and
- The majority of the Indian vote has shifted to the right. The four traditionally Indian wards that the ANC won in 1996 around Pietermaritzburg, have gone to the DA. We also did not make any gains in either Chatsworth or Phoenix.

Bridging the Gap Between the Ideas and Practice: Challenges of the New Local Government System

Yunus Carrim



Advancing the National Democratic Transition

Fundamentally, there are three inter-related tasks that define our national democratic transition. These are welding a greater sense of nationhood, deepening democracy and significantly advancing the economic and social development of our people, particularly the poor and disadvantaged. Of course, in different phases of the transition, the content and form of these tasks, the range of social forces mobilised around them, and the ways we seek to fulfill them might differ. But the basic challenges remain. The new system of local government certainly advances our national democratic transition, but even more, has significant potential to deepen this transition and substantially contribute to meeting our challenges. The extent to which it does this, however, depends on how we implement the new system. It depends on how seriously we take local government, on the amount, range and quality of resources we invest in it, and on how we locate this sphere in our overall strategy for transformation. Basically, it is up to us!

In many senses, local government has been undergoing a far more intricate, protracted and challenging transition process than provincial and national government. Many countries have found it far more difficult to fundamentally change their local government systems than their provincial and national systems. With the 5 December local government elections and the beginning of the new local government system from then, our three-stage transition, which began in 1990 (and even earlier), has entered its "final phase".

Essentially, we are moving from transition to transformation.

The new system is not being implemented fully immediately. Aspects of it are being phased in on the basis of further fine-tuning of the system, and issues around local government funding, resources and capacities. Of course, given the differing conditions, municipalities will not all be able to fully implement the new system at the same time or in the same way. It could take between three and ten years to effectively implement the new system. But to ensure the success of the new system, we have to find the right approaches now.

So what are some of the key features of the new system? What are some of the main challenges in implementing the system? How could we address these challenges in a way that advances the national democratic transition?

Entrenching Developmental Local Government

Essentially, the new system defines the senses in which local government is a sphere of government, with its original, constitutionally-enshrined powers and functions. In other words, it is not a third level of government crudely subordinate to provincial and national government. It is not a function of provincial or national government. But, on the other hand, it is not completely independent either. It is interrelated with provincial and national government in one overall system of cooperative governance, in which the more each sphere cooperates with the other two, the stronger it can become.

Fundamentally, the new system gives expression to the notion in the Constitution of developmental local government. This means that local government is not just an important site for the delivery of services, but it is crucial for the economic and social development of people. By working effectively with the other two spheres of government and a range of public and civil society organisations and the private sector, local government also has to contribute to economic growth, job creation and social development. Over time, through appropriate negotiations and securing further funding, local government will take on increasing responsibilities for service delivery and development. This is, in different forms, happening the world over.

Key to fulfilling this developmental role is the requirement in the new system for all municipalities to adopt IDPs (Integrated Development Plans).

Essentially, an IDP sets out the vision, needs, priorities, goals and strategies of a municipal council to develop the municipality during its term of office, as part of a long-term vision and plan for development. In terms of the law, the community of a municipality must have a say in both the content

of the IDP and the process by which it is drafted. The IDP provides the framework for determining the budget of a municipality. It is closely linked to the performance management system of a municipality in terms of which a municipality's progress is judged, especially by the residents. The IDP is not only a plan. It is also a strategic instrument, a management tool, and a method of running a municipality. The IDP provides a framework for all the activities of a municipality. It is also meant, over time, to be an important site of effecting cooperative governance in practice.

Emphasising Community Participation

A defining feature of the new system of local government is the space it offers to ordinary people to become actively involved in governance. In fact, the legal definition of a municipality is that it comprises not just the councillors and the administration, but the local community as well.

Deriving from this definition, each of these inter-related components has certain specific rights and duties. These are based on the Constitution and set out mainly in The Municipal Systems Act. Among the objects of local government in the Constitution are "to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities" and "to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in matters of local government".

In terms of The Municipal Systems Act, a municipality "must develop a culture of municipal governance that complements formal representative government with a system of participatory governance". The Act makes it clear that residents have the right to contribute to the municipality's decision-making processes. They also have the right to submit recommendations and complaints to the council and are entitled to prompt responses to these. They have the right to "regular disclosure of the state of affairs of the municipality, including its finances". In order to encourage residents to pay promptly for their services, municipalities are required to inform them about the costs of providing the services, the reasons for the payments of the fees, and the uses to which the monies raised are put. Residents also have the right to give feedback to the municipality on the quality and level of services offered to them.

Residents are encouraged to participate in the:

- preparation, implementation and review of IDPs;
- establishment, implementation and review of a municipality's performance management system;
- monitoring and review of a municipality's performance;
- preparation of a municipality's budget;
- decisions about the provision of municipal services.

Municipalities have to use their resources and annually allocate funds in their budget, as appropriate, to develop a culture of community participation. Municipalities have to contribute to building the capacity of the local community to participate in municipal affairs and the councillors and staff to foster community participation. In establishing structures and processes for community participation, the special needs of women, the disabled, the illiterate and other disadvantaged groups have to be taken into account. In terms of The Municipal Structures Act, a municipality's executive has to give an annual report on the extent to which the local community has been involved in municipal affairs. The executive must "ensure that regard is given to public views and report on the effect of consultation on the decisions of the council".

Although not compulsory, the new system provides for ward committees to be set up in each ward of a municipality in order to "enhance participatory democracy". A ward committee may make representations on any issue affecting a ward to the councillor or through the councillor to the council. It can also exercise any duty or power delegated to it by the council. A ward committee comprises the ward councillor as the chairperson and up to 10 other people representing a "diversity of interests in the ward". Women have to be "equitably represented" in a ward committee. While a municipality may meet the administrative costs of a ward committee, it cannot offer committee members a salary. In terms of the Code of Conduct, councillors are required to have at least four public report-back meetings.

But if residents have many rights in the new system, they also have duties.

They have to take responsibility for ensuring that the municipality functions effectively. They are required to promptly pay the municipality monies owed to it, within the framework of an indigence policy for those who cannot pay. They have to respect the municipal rights of other residents, comply with by-laws, and cooperate with councillors and officials who are fulfilling their legitimate roles. Essentially, the system overall seeks to provide a balance between giving residents the fullest space to participate in municipal affairs and ensuring the right of councillors to ultimately govern.

Advancing Non-Racialism

The December 5 elections were the first truly non-racial, democratic local government elections as they dispensed with the "racial quotas" of the previous elections. With the new demarcation of municipal boundaries on the basis of rational criteria, the old racially determined apartheid boundaries have been finally jettisoned. With the linking of racially separated areas and the merger of urban and rural areas, these new municipalities represent a further de-racialisation of South African society. With the implementation of spatial development plans as part of IDPs and other aspects of the new system, the racial segregation within municipalities will in some measure be reduced. The new system also seeks to inculcate a "local community" identity that will over time contribute to evolving a non-racial mindset among South Africans.

The new local government system is a considerable advance over the previous one in providing for the needs and interests of women, and their active participation in municipal affairs. This is reflected in the electoral system and in the many requirements to ensure the involvement of women in the mechanisms, structures and processes of community participation. In terms of The Municipal Systems Act, municipal councils are in fact required to "promote gender equity in the exercise of the municipality's executive and legislative authority".

The new local government system is represented through 284 newly established municipalities replacing the previous 843. These include six metropolitan municipalities in the big cities and outside these, 47 district municipalities and 231 local municipalities. The metropolitan municipalities are single-tier structures entitled to exercise all the powers and functions granted to local government in the Constitution. A district municipality, on the other hand, has to share powers and functions with the local municipalities that fall within its area.

Clearly, the new system of local government is more powerful, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and developmental than the previous one - and advances the national democratic transition. It serves to take forward our tasks of transforming the state identified in our 1999 Elections Manifesto and gives a new edge to debates in our ranks about a developmental state.

The new local government system certainly has enormous potential to further advance the transition. To do this, it must be implemented effectively. What then are some of the challenges in doing this?

Developing ANC-led Transformation Campaign

In the first place, it has to be stressed that the policies and laws that define the new local government system provide no more than a national framework. In view of the way in which local government is defined as a sphere of government in the Constitution, there are limits to which national or provincial legislation can prescribe a local government system. In any case there are differing conditions in different municipalities which make general legislation for all municipalities very difficult. To some extent, regulations and guidelines issued by the Minister and MECs can attend to this.

But it is also vital that the national framework be given more political detail and be linked closely to our national democratic tasks. We have to give the laws and policies a more specific political content. This has to be done by ANC structures. There are many issues that cannot be dealt with through policy papers and legislation - and can only be addressed in implementation. But again, implementation is not just a matter for the Ministry and Department of Provincial and Local Government or the provincial governments or SALGA (South African Local Government Association). It is an entire sphere of government that is being transformed. Most national and provincial



government departments have a stake in local government and have to work much closer than they currently do if local government is to be effectively transformed.

But more than this, a wide variety of other stakeholders have to work together, including: the ANC-Alliance, SANCO, NGOs, the private sector, individual experts, local communities and other sections of civil society.

In short, all of us have a role to play in making the new system work. We need a big, fat, inclusive, "revivalist" campaign to implement the new system of local government. It is for the ANC to lead this campaign!

Ensuring Community Participation

Of course, it is almost a universal norm that participation in local government elections is significantly lower than in provincial and national elections. There are many understandable reasons why the local government poll should also be much lower in our case. But given the nature of the local government transformation project and the crucial importance of popular participation to ensure its success, the level of participation in the elections - 48% of registered voters and about 40 % of eligible voters - is not a particularly good start. In parts of the country, the way we decided on our candidates left a lot to be desired and we need, perhaps, to review our system of choosing candidates. But clearly the new local government system has enormous potential to mobilise people to actively participate in governance - and we have to realise this potential.

As the ANC we need to develop our policy on ward committees. We need to give guidance to ANC-run municipalities on how these committees should be elected and what political meaning should be given to the "diversity of interests" that the law requires to be represented in these committees. Ideally, the ward committees should be used to mobilise the broadest range of interests in the community behind progressive goals as part of the overall national democratic transition. Attempts should be made to ensure representation from civic, development, trade union, business, taxi, women, youth, religious, cultural and other organisations. Organisations can be clustered and asked to forward representatives for election to the committee.

It would be important for ANC and Alliance structures to play a role in ensuring this representivity. It would be important too to avoid the ward committee becoming a site for narrow, sectarian turf battles within the ANC and Alliance - as this could be very destructive. For ward committees to work we need to have strong ANC branch and other structures and, in turn, strong ward committees must be used to strengthen ANC branch and other structures. In any case our branch and regional structures are going to be reshaped to coincide with the new ward and municipal boundaries. It would be important too to ensure that the ward committee is in touch with the residents of the ward and does not become elitist and self-serving.

Obviously, there will be very specific challenges to confront in ward committees in those wards that have been lost by the ANC - and we would need to address this.

There will be councillors and officials who will not want ward committees to be set up. ANC structures must ensure that councils give the fullest support possible to ward committees. Within the framework of a general ANC policy, there should be local and regional discussions on what powers and duties should be delegated to ward committees. While ward committee members may not be paid salaries, surely, where possible, allowances can be considered? Certainly, within a municipality's budget constraints, administrative support to ward committees should be fully forthcoming.

Obviously, residents will not be able to immediately exercise all their rights to participation set out in the law. For a long time, the average resident will not even be aware of these rights. Some councils may not be enthusiastic about them ever knowing about their rights. Alternatively, some councils will seek to do no more than nominally consult communities. Not much may come in practice either of all the provisions in the law to ensure the active participation of women. Strategies will therefore have to be developed to ensure that, over time, significant community participation takes place in municipal affairs in ways that also advance the national democratic transition.



Obviously, we cannot romanticise community participation. It requires capacities, resources and funding that do not come easy. Often the space for community participation can be exploited by privileged elites to hold back transformation or further their narrow, sectarian interests. Even a certain mode of progressive community participation can serve to paralyse councils.

Community participation should serve ultimately to strengthen a municipality and ensure that it effectively fulfills its developmental role. This will take time to get right - and the answers ultimately can only be found in practice.

Developing Resources

For the new system of local government to work, there has to be enormous investment in capacity building of councillors, officials and the community.

Of course, the national and provincial government departments, SALGA, the municipalities, the local government SETA, NGOs, education institutions and other organisations can contribute. To be more effective, they need to coordinate their programmes. But to give a more political content to this capacity-building and to link it more concertedly to the national democratic transition, the ANC also has to explore the possibilities of conducting our own capacity-building programmes.

In view of the new role of local government, there has to be a review of its finances. This would include local governments constitutionally-entitled "equitable share of the national revenue", the property rates system, district council levies, the respective fiscal powers of district and local municipalities, inter-governmental grants, the restructuring of the electricity industry, municipal service partnerships, local economic development, levels of payment for services, an indigence policy, and additional sources of revenue. Much of this is underway - and needs to be advanced. Of course, the answer does not lie in national government flinging more money at local government. Very importantly, municipalities have to invest more in securing their own funding and have to significantly improve their management of their finances. The demarcation of new boundaries are meant to make for more economically and financially viable municipalities anyway. For the new local government system to work, there has to be a drastic improvement in local government finances.

Consideration is being given to paying councillor salaries from the national fiscus. This should be encouraged. There is a fair amount of unhappiness among councillors about their salaries, particularly with the discrepancies between different categories of councillors. A strong case rests with those who argue that if local government is to be fully recognised as a sphere of government and as crucial for delivery and development, the salaries paid to full-time councillors should be reasonably similar to that of public representatives in the national and provincial spheres. This would also make it easier to redeploy public representatives from one sphere to another. Of course, there are considerable financial constraints, but the ANC has to give careful consideration to these views.

Clarifying Powers and Functions

The issue of local government finances is also linked to the distribution of powers and functions between district and local municipalities. This distribution is a highly complex and sensitive matter. It is crucial to the success of the new local government system and has to be handled adroitly.

ANC policy is clear. We need powerful district municipalities to ensure delivery, development and democracy in the rural areas. Powerful district municipalities will be key to advancing the Rural Integrated Development Strategy. The distribution of powers and functions must over time ensure increasingly powerful district municipalities.

In view of the establishment of new municipalities, the system of local government that has evolved, and the challenges of implementing the system, questions are also being raised about the powers and functions of local government generally. There may well be a need to provide greater clarity in the Constitution on what precisely some of the powers and functions mean so that they can be given more practical effect. In the case of powers and functions shared with provincial and national

government, there might be a need for greater clarity on how they might be exercised by local government as distinct from the other two spheres.

Responding to Service Delivery and Other Challenges

The restructuring of municipal services will pose a major challenge in the new system. The Municipal Systems Act provides for a range of mechanisms internal and external to municipalities to provide services. Among the external agencies are water committees, licensed service providers, traditional authorities, CBOs, NGOs and the private sector. Consistent with the ANC's Local Government Manifesto, municipalities are more encouraged to pursue public sector options for service delivery than private sector options. But the law merely provides a broad framework. How the restructuring is managed will depend on the specific conditions in different municipalities. On the one hand, if the restructuring of municipal services is done appropriately and through consensus within the Alliance, it could lead to a significant improvement in delivery and development and advance our national democratic transition. On the other hand, if the restructuring is mismanaged, it could impede delivery and development and weaken the Alliance. We have, of course, committed ourselves to providing free basic water and electricity services. We need to implement this as soon as it is feasible. Not all municipalities will be able to do it by July this year, but some certainly could, and must be encouraged to do so.

For an effective developmental local government system, it is crucial that the administration be restructured. The Municipal Systems Act sets out the principles and values of the administration and a Code of Conduct - Batho Pele in the local government sphere. The Act defines the broad structure of the administration and roles and responsibilities of key officials. The appointment of senior managers on performance-linked contracts is particularly welcome. In general, the public administration is very difficult to transform - and much work will have to be done in this area.

There is some dissatisfaction within our movement with the "mixed" electoral system that combines the ward and PR results with the effect that the more wards we win the fewer PR list seats we are allocated. Of course, this system flows from the constitutional provision that the electoral system must "ensure that the total number of members elected from each party reflects the total proportion of the votes recorded for those parties". The new "mixed system" was, of course, endorsed by the ANC. It has its advantages and disadvantages. There may be a need to have further discussions on it. There may be a need to explore whether there is another electoral system that can meet the needs of the Constitution or whether an amendment to the Constitution is appropriate. But discussions about the local government electoral system could also be usefully linked to considerations of the national and provincial electoral systems.

Of course, there are limits to what any system of local government can do, however advanced and developmentally-oriented it is. But an important test of the new system in the long term will be the extent to which it contributes to economic growth and job-creation. The new system with its powerful metropolitan municipalities and potentially strong rationalised system of district and local municipalities and its planning and developmental orientation is better suited to respond more effectively to globalisation. Strategies and programmes on local economic development, the stimulation of small businesses, municipal service partnerships, and other areas can over time contribute to economic growth and job-creation, especially if developed in co-operation with provincial and national government.

Local government will play a key role in the recently announced urban renewal programmes. We need to develop greater clarity on this. Very importantly, we need to be clear about how the new local government system can be used effectively to tackle the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Based on our NGC resolutions, it would be useful if ANC branch and other structures became more active in dealing with the immediate challenges of the establishment of new municipalities. *It would also be useful for us to define more clearly how we see the respective roles of the Mayor and the Speaker in a municipality. What role do we see for the metropolitan sub-councils and how should they relate to metropolitan councils? How can the sub-councils advance ANC political and organisational tasks ? * We need to also decide how we manage cross-boundary municipalities in terms of ANC structures. In our Local Government Manifesto we made it very clear that the ANC will act against councillors who do not fulfill



their responsibilities or who are corrupt. We will need to develop a system from branch level upwards within which to do this.

For the new system of local government to be implemented effectively there will have to be much greater cooperation between the three spheres of government in the spirit of cooperative governance. Provincial government in particular has to be more supportive of local government, notwithstanding the constraints of resources and capacity. The challenge of reconciling traditional leadership with local government will also have to be met. The need to meet this challenge cannot be overemphasized.

Need to Succeed

Clearly there are many challenges to meet. But then the system of local government we have decided on is so advanced. So many of these are challenges of our own making. And we can, over time, meet them. Of course, there are no guarantees of this. But we have now set ourselves on a course -and if we fail to follow it through, there could be adverse consequences for our national democratic transition. However, if we have long-term perspectives, strategies and programmes we could certainly achieve a significant measure of success. We have a unique opportunity to implement a fundamentally new, advanced system of local government at a very unique time. Such an opportunity will not come again. Of course, we are not just seeking to effect a new system of local government. We are also seeking to use this new system to significantly advance the national democratic transition. Given the importance of the new local government system to the national democratic project, the degree of success in implementing the new system will be an important barometer of the progress of the national democratic transition. We simply have to succeed!

Useful Sources

[White Paper on Local Government](#), 1998
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Urban renewal: The Johannesburg experience

Kenny Fihla

Over 60 per cent of the South African population resides in urban areas. This number increases every year as more and more rural people turn to the urban areas for job opportunities and better quality of life and as the country becomes increasingly urbanized.

However, the urban population growth out-paces the urban economic growth resulting in worsening living standards for the poor, a widening gap in income levels and further marginalisation of the urban poor. This trend is not unique to South Africa but is characteristic of urban areas throughout the world. For developing countries like South Africa though, the worsening disparities are much more pronounced and have strong racial features.

The economic development of urban areas has given rise to towns and cities whose physical profile reflects the class divisions. This is simply because the cities physical profile is shaped by property values and real estate development. Property values are much higher in areas where the demand for development is greater. The property demands and property prices correlate to income levels. In South Africa and in many other countries this correlation relates to race as well.

The decay of the inner cities of New York, Los Angeles, Mexico City, Johannesburg and many other cities have mainly been triggered by suburbanisation of commercial investment and high market residential areas.



In Johannesburg this suburbanisation has seen a northward flight of business and the further marginalisation of under-developed areas of the South like Soweto and Orange Farm. The question though, is what conditions encourage this northward flight and what measures are necessary to curtail it?

The answer to the first question may seem obvious. Apartheid institutionalised residential segregation. Residential areas for black people were deliberately located far away from economic areas with very little infrastructure and social amenities. The local governance system that developed was therefore geared to the preservation of the racial divide and entrenchment of inequalities.

Whilst the failure of influx control and the deregulation of the 1980s saw a movement of black people into the city, the town-planning framework of the erstwhile apartheid councils still promoted urban sprawl. The racial prejudice and fragmented Apartheid planning encouraged the exodus of business and whites from the inner city to the northern suburbs and shopping malls.

Consequently, the Johannesburg's inner city has changed from being the central economic hub of the whole of the city's population into a retail and commercial centre of mainly the African population. The residential profile has also changed and the low-income group with little disposable income now inhabits the inner city.

The inner city, however, is well located with easy access to the rest of Gauteng province. It provides the connecting transportation network for Johannesburg and the rest of the country. Indeed transportation to most Southern Africa countries can be found in Johannesburg's inner city. Thus, Johannesburg is the most cosmopolitan city in South Africa. It has a well-established infrastructure and remains the headquarters of at least three major commercial banks.

But the inner city should not be viewed in isolation to the social and economic life of the city as a whole. As the example of New York shows, the rejuvenation of the inner city must form part of the overall development strategy of the urban area and must include social development of the poor.

Without an overall approach, displacement of the poor will result from isolated areas being targeted for renewal.

The story of urban renewal in Johannesburg is underpinned by four critical elements. The first element relates to the governance model. The thirteen different councils that existed prior to 1995 promoted urban sprawl, skewed allocation of resources, uneven development and social polarisation. The creation of the two-tier council system in 1995 attempted to address some of these problems through the principle of one city one tax base.

However, the assignment of fiscal and town planning powers to the metropolitan local councils ensured the continuation of fragmented planning.

The uneven development of the past continued unabated as the individual MLCs competed for development. In the end only the Eastern MLC and to a lesser extent the Northern MLC were able to attract investments. This further undermined the inner city renewal strategy.

At a social level, the imposition of the levy by the Metropolitan Council on the Eastern MLC created an impression that monies of the richest MLC were used to fund inefficiencies and wastage in the Southern MLC. This is particularly interesting given that all the Johannesburg councils were controlled by the ANC. The lesson from this period is that political systems and structures that are created are as important as the policy objectives they are intended to achieve.

The Municipal Structures Act provides the necessary legislative framework for the creation of municipalities that are better placed to deal with fragmented planning and ensure integrated development of our communities.

The advent of the unicity post-5 December 2000 has created a firm foundation for integrated development in Johannesburg. However, legislation on its own will not redress past imbalances and



regenerate our urban areas. Urban renewal strategies should include the development of an appropriate long-term development framework.

For Johannesburg this development framework is represented by the 10-year plan, Igoli 2010. Igoli 2010 is a data driven development strategy that encompasses an economic growth agenda through competitiveness, knowledge and entrepreneurship; delivering the foundation for social development through housing, infrastructure and service provision; ensuring safety and security through prevention and human development through empowerment and creating opportunities.

This approach necessitates a paradigm shift from the traditional way of drafting Land Development Objectives (LDOs). This traditional way required of council to host a series of meetings with communities and interested role players with the view of emerging with local and city-wide plans. But this process is inherently flawed because it ignores the value of reliable data upon which various options can be interrogated. It also ignores the inherent contradictions of the interests of various stakeholders.

The LDOs that were developed by the Johannesburg councils were nothing more than a shopping list of community demands with little consideration of budget constraints and implementability. In essence the LDOs lacked economic analysis upon which any urban renewal strategy must hinge. They did not provide policy options nor did they inform local government budgets.

Igoli 2010 acknowledges that development must be people driven. But also acknowledges that this requires an interactive process that includes an understanding of the city's economy, economic trends, impact of macro-economic policies on local areas and the realities of globalisation.

For a city like Johannesburg this understanding of the economy is paramount as the city contributes 15 % of the country's real gross domestic product and 12% of the country's employment. It is home to 60 % of the country's corporate headquarters and is the financial capital of Southern Africa.

The long-term development framework for such a city, therefore, cannot be limited to a shopping list of stakeholder demands. It must acknowledge the city's contribution to the national economy; it must seek to build on the cosmopolitan nature of Johannesburg and promote the participation of Johannesburg in the economic development of Southern Africa. This raises important questions about policy options that the city must pursue and consequently the budget priorities.

Igoli 2010 proposes a balanced approach that addresses past imbalances whilst building on the competitive advantage that the city has. The Johannesburg's economy is gradually changing. Whilst the manufacturing, community and social services sectors have high employment absorption rates their relative contribution to the city's gross geographic product is gradually declining. On the other hand the relative contribution of the retail/wholesale, financial and business services and transport and communication sectors is increasing.

This reality points to specific characteristics of the city's economy and is indicative of the broader restructuring that is taking place in the national economy. As the city seeks to rejuvenate its urban area and its inner city in particular, support must be directed at these high value-adding sectors.

It is in these sectors that Johannesburg competitive advantage lies.

The incorporation of the use of data when formulating development plans enables local authorities to avoid wasting resources propping up declining industries that are not competitive. In fact this misdirected expenditure delays the restructuring of the local economy and further widens the gap between the local and global economies.

Through the 2010 strategy work, the city is now able to focus its resources on those sectors with the most economic benefits in terms of employment creation and contribution to the gross geographic product. This focus requires recognition that the city will maintain and enhance its infrastructure in the economic nodes of Sandton, Rosebank, Randburg, Inner City, Roodeport and other centres in order to defend those competitive economic activities located in these areas.

The town planning process however, will be used to discourage further real estate development in the northern areas and will seek to redirect new investment to the depressed areas of the south. In addition, Johannesburg is considering the use of incentives to encourage investments in the targeted sectors provided they are located in the inner city and other priority areas.

The high growth sectors of finance and business, retail and wholesale, transport and communication require different skills than those traditionally found in the manufacturing sector. The human development agenda of Igoli 2010 is an attempt to encourage the fast-tracking of skills development in order to support the economy's skills requirement.

An analysis of educational qualification in relation to employment status within Johannesburg shows unemployment levels of up to 37 per cent in the workforce with less than grade 8 compared to an unemployment rate of 3 per cent amongst with a degree. Again, it is the black population and Africans in particular who suffer the worst from illiteracy and unemployment.

Addressing illiteracy is an important step towards social and economic integration. The skills requirements of the knowledge based economy demands coordination from all spheres of government. It demands cooperation with the business sector and various education and training institutions.

The human development agenda also requires that attention be paid to the creation of safe environment for the city's residents. Already, the city of Johannesburg is participating in the anti-crime initiatives of national and provincial governments. The city has also partnered with business in the installation of the initial close circuit television cameras in the CBD.

Limited in coverage as they may be, the cameras have already resulted in the successful prosecution of many criminals.

The city has set additional budgetary provisions for extension of these cameras to cover a wider area and for their installation in other economic centers of Johannesburg. In the next three months the unicity council will be launching the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department. The city's police department will focus on crime prevention and visible policing. This will further enhance people's confidence in the city and contribute towards the creation of positive environment.

One of the biggest challenges facing Johannesburg is changing negative perceptions particularly about crime and grime. It is precisely for this reason that the city has initiated an informal traders management programme.

This programme is intended to establish markets with adequate storage and ablution facilities for informal traders. The markets will be located close to major transportation nodes and will therefore provide easy access to the passing trade. Whilst this strategy will relieve the city's pavements from congestion and litter it will also help to integrate informal traders into the formal economy.

The informal economy provides the necessary stopgap measure for the unemployed. In the last decade informal employment grew by over 100 per cent.

However, this sector generates less than R222 per capita income per month for the majority of informal traders. Its contribution to the GGP is minimal. Thus informal trade cannot be regarded as a lasting solution to economic growth, employment and a better quality of life. The city's plan, inline with the Growth Equity and Redistribution strategy (GEAR) is to achieve an economic growth rate of over 5 per cent. It is only through such a growth rate, particularly in employment generating sectors, that Johannesburg can overcome its unemployment rate of 30 per cent and ensure a rise in per capita income.

Already Johannesburg has set aside a significant portion of its budget for the expansion of the informal traders markets, the upgrading of the inner city infrastructure and development of low-cost housing. Through its better-buildings programme, the Johannesburg unicity intends upgrading over 70 dilapidated flats in partnership with property owners, NGOs and inner city residents.

Investment in infrastructure is an important element of Johannesburg's long-term development plan. In the next ten years the city will need to invest ten billion rand in housing, electricity, water and sanitation, roads and storm water and transport. This figure is indicative of service delivery backlogs and points to the fact that a sizable number of the city's population lives below minimum subsistence levels. Therefore infrastructure development and service delivery and economic growth should be seen as complementing elements of Johannesburg's urban renewal agenda.

But for the city to be able to undertake this ambitious programme it needs to ensure that it has appropriate administrative structures with the right orientation and work culture. At the core of this culture should be the principle Batho Pele (People First). The administration should move away from the internal focus that is characteristic of municipal departments. The council should eliminate internal duplications, streamline internal process to facilitate the implementation of adopted policies, minimize the costs of internal administration whilst at the same time maximizing outputs. In short the administrations should be efficient and effective.

Towards the end of 1997 the then Johannesburg Metro and its local councils, experienced their worst financial crisis. An ambitious expenditure programme without a sound funding plan caused this financial crisis. By September 1997, Johannesburg was relying on an overdraft facility of over R400 million to fund its operating budget. The city was defaulting on its payments to Rand Water and Eskom. This experience brought home the need to ensure that any development strategy takes into account instruments necessary for its implementation as well as the available resources.

Therefore, the design of appropriate institutional structures is a logical step that flows from the development strategy. In practice though, service delivery requirements and resource constraints may necessitate the review of structures long before the development plans are finalised. This is certainly the case in Johannesburg. The financial crisis of 1997 and the then imminent collapse of service provision prompted the review of the administration and subsequent development of the short term institutional financial restructuring, Igoli 2002.

Indeed, the city has managed to pull itself out of the financial crisis but the situation is still precarious.

The administrative restructuring and financial restructuring form the third and the fourth elements of Johannesburg's ten-year development plan. The significance of considering financial and administrative requirements for implementing a development plan is evident throughout the world. It took New York ten years to overcome its financial crisis of the seventies. It took the intervention of Central government through the dissolution of the councils to initiate the resolution of the financial crisis of Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania and Harare in Zimbabwe.

The expenditure-driven approach in budgeting has changed to a revenue-driven approach. The setting of tariffs and determination of assessment rates in Johannesburg will be informed by the ultimate goal of making services affordable and making the city an attractive area for investment. Financial planning will be over a three period. The medium term financial planning provides certainty and recognizes that the rejuvenation of our urban areas requires a long-term view.

Johannesburg's budget for the forthcoming financial year will translate the ten-year development strategy into a financial plan. Consideration will be given to the introduction of incentives to priority areas like the inner city. The budget will reflect the economic parameters that underpin the city's development framework and will conform with the macro financial parameters as determined by the National Treasury.

It is through this multi-pronged approach that the unicity council of Johannesburg seeks to implement an urban renewal approach that is sustainable.

Integrated rural development strategy

Marc Wegerif

Councillors around the country that were elected into office in December 2000 face many challenges. The greatest must be meeting the legitimate expectations that people have of "delivery". The electorate expect to see a better life for all. The millions in our country who still live in abject poverty want to experience a tangible improvement in their own lives.

For many the hope for a better life has been closely linked with the advent of democracy in South Africa. A failure to meet people's development needs and expectations will not only lead to disillusionment with the ANC, but risks people questioning the value of the democratic system.

The challenge of meeting these expectations is greatest in rural areas. This is where the majority of the poor live and where the ANC has received the largest percentage of votes in all elections. Due to a range of structural disadvantages rural areas also require a higher level of government intervention to promote development.

It is essential that the ANC, especially the ANC in government, is responding and seen to be responding to needs that are articulated by people. However, the ANC has to go beyond simply reacting to demand. If development interventions are to be successful and efficient in the long term they need to be guided by a clear vision of what kind of rural society we want to build and a plan for its achievement.

This vision is captured in the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy (ISRDS) document recently released by the Deputy President's office. The stated vision of the ISRDS is "to attain socially cohesive and stable communities with viable, sustainable economies and universal access to social amenities, able to attract skilled and knowledgeable people, equipped to contribute to their own and the nation's growth and development." The ISRDS goes to some length to expand on this vision and provides a framework for its implementation.

The ISRDS does not replace or contradict the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), but rather seeks to create a rural specific and implementable programme to ensure that the principles of the RDP are realised in rural areas. The six principles articulated in the RDP, namely an integrated and sustainable programme, a people driven process, peace and security for all, nation building, linking reconstruction and development and democratisation of South Africa should remain guiding principles that inform all of our political and development programmes.

The ISRDS aims to provide a common framework that can be applied nationally.

Initially it will be implemented in pilot areas giving an opportunity to learn about and improve the approach before expanding to other areas. The pilot areas or nodes identified to date are Lusikisiki, Bushbuckridge and Nongoma. Local government and other institutions working on rural development outside the pilot areas should also begin to be guided by the vision and approach of the ISRDS.

The implementation of the ISRDS will not require additional funding from government as it will focus on using existing resources more efficiently through coordinated efforts of different line departments and the three spheres of government - local, provincial and national. Additional financial support and inputs will be sought from the donor community, private sector, NGOs and through initiatives such as public-private partnerships. The emphasis is on achieving more with what we have through mobilising a wide range of resources for implementing common programmes, which are informed by a shared vision.

Local government has a major role to play in managing and integrating programmes at a local level to ensure they respond appropriately to local needs. The Presidency "will provide strong strategic leadership and co-ordination." The line departments have the responsibility to ensure the effectiveness of their own programmes and full participation in the mechanisms designed to achieve integration at a national, provincial and local level.



In drafting the ISRDS a wide range of international experiences were studied. One of the key lessons drawn from this process was "that successful rural development must be implemented in a participatory and decentralised fashion in order to respond to articulated priorities and observed opportunities at the local level."

It is clear that the rural areas of South Africa share many of the same development constraints faced by rural areas in other developing countries.

We must, however, also take into account the unique challenges of the South African context such as the history of the dispossession of black people from the land, which was a central part of the political, economic and social marginalisation of the majority. This is not only a historical injustice, which needs to be addressed, but also a major constraint on rural development today if it is not addressed. Increasingly the HIV/AIDS pandemic is shaping the character of rural communities and creating new development challenges.

Key elements of the ISRDS are rural development, sustainability, integration, economic growth and a rural safety net. Rural development is seen as multi-dimensional, covering all sectors and all important aspects of the life of a community. Ultimately it must transform economic, social and political relations to enable rural people to end their poverty and improve their own lives. Sustainability requires growth, people's commitment and ability to support activities, sound environmental practice and institutionalisation of development activities particularly at the local government level. Integration of programmes around a common vision is seen as essential to the success of rural development. To be achieved it needs a clear strategy from the vision to the mechanisms for planning and coordination, especially of finances. A meaningful role for local government and the IDP (Integrated Development Planning) process are seen as essential tools for ensuring this integration.

Without the resuscitation of rural economies there can be no sustainable growth and development within rural areas. Agriculture, Tourism and Forestry are identified as representing opportunities for rural economic growth.

Access to natural resources, especially land and water, is central to rural growth. Small farmers often better utilise land and spend more within local economies than larger farmers. Thus, giving smaller farmers access to land will be a central part of growing local economies. In the absence of formal sector job creation in rural areas giving people access to natural resources so that they can engage in their own production becomes the only way to give people lives of dignity.

The creation of vibrant small towns servicing the rural hinterland will both support rural development and be a natural result of improved rural development through the provision of services to growing rural economies.

Even with growth not all will benefit, making it essential to continue and improve the provision of social services to the vulnerable in rural areas.

If rural people, however, are not given real opportunities to produce for themselves rural development will be reduced to a welfare programme that is ultimately not sustainable.

For the ISRDS to succeed a number of complimentary programmes need to be in place. Critical amongst these is a comprehensive land reform programme, which has the potential to be a major driver of rural development. Delays or poor management of the land reform programme are identified as having the potential to destabilise and destroy rural development opportunities. Human resource development, income generating projects, social services, affirmative procurement and rural finance are also identified as important complimentary measures needed for the ISRDS to succeed.

The Presidency has provided a vision and framework for rural development.

This has specific implications for local government and local councillors.



The ISRDS emphasises again and again the importance of people's full involvement and ownership of developments. People need to be mobilised not just to benefit from projects, but to be active participants in projects.

The rural person should be a patriot who understands the importance of their contribution to developing the nation and improving the lives of their families and communities.

The administrative procedures of the IDPs create a policy framework, but cannot drive development. It is people's energy that will drive development if it is mobilised and properly channelled. ANC councillors and local leaders are uniquely positioned to play a mobilisation and education role within rural communities. No other organisation has the same level of presence in as many rural areas as the ANC. Education must form a central part of community mobilisation. To play this role comrades must ensure that they are well informed of the legislation and policies that shape the development process. Comrades should be conversant in the constitution, the ISRDS itself and related legislation. They should also be aware of programmes being implemented by different line departments such as the land redistribution policies, poverty relief programmes, agricultural support services and other social services and grants that are available. If well informed, local councillors and ANC leaders can be a powerful resource to local communities.

Women make up the majority of the rural population and without fully mobilising the energy of women rural areas will never reach their full potential. ANC Councillors have a responsibility to ensure that women are primary beneficiaries and leaders within all programmes.

People need to understand the constraints that the government and the ANC in government face internationally, nationally and locally. The public also need to understand the strategies that the ANC government is putting in place to deal with their concerns and bring about development. An informed and organised public can become an ally in development. A lack of understanding leads to unreasonable expectations and frustrated communities who do not appreciate the work that is being done.

NGO and private sector initiatives are often an essential part of community and development activities. They also have skills and resources and as such need to be mobilised to support the development initiatives at local levels.

ANC leaders and councillors need to be seen to be playing a leading role in all major developments. Communities must not only see ANC leaders in the few months before an election, but must feel that the ANC is involved in the daily struggles for improved lives. While being deeply involved and clearly identified as part of the ANC, comrades should be cautious to not be seen as over-politicising development for narrow political ends. This will back-fire especially if it is seen as delaying development processes. Wherever comrades have been seen to be genuinely concerned for the welfare of communities they invariably have community support. It is not necessary to turn every event into an overt political platform.

Councillors also need to be vigilant in ensuring that departmental officials cooperate with the programmes and approaches that are being prioritised by the leadership from the President's office down to local communities. Where civil servants frustrate the programmes and policies of our government, as they all too often have, local leadership has a responsibility of taking up these issues with departmental and other leadership. Too often bad conduct, of even a junior official, has been interpreted by communities as a sign of the ANC government not caring for their plight. This can be avoided if local ANC councillors have the capacity and the knowledge to lead and manage their council areas.

The success of the ISRDS lies not simply in improving the standards of service delivery, but in the extent to which it can ultimately transform rural societies. Of particular importance is economic transformation.

Political structures and power have been transformed right down to the local level. While there is still work needed to consolidate these political gains the struggle now needs to focus on the economic



transformation. ANC councillors need to ensure that the required fundamental changes in economic power do not get thwarted.

The ISRDS is the vehicle through which the ANC needs to be achieving its objectives of transformation within rural areas. If the ISRDS programme is allowed to be directed primarily by bureaucrats or technocrats it is doomed to fail in its attempt to meet the needs of the rural poor and build new rural societies. Only informed and organised communities with dedicated ANC leaders in key positions can ensure its success and the realisation of the full potential of rural communities.

Umrabluo Series on Building the South African Women's Movement

Part 1: The Women's National Coalition

Thenjiwe Mtintso

Introduction

The Women's National Coalition (WNC) Conference that was postponed in December 2000 is due to take place soon. Perhaps this is an opportune moment to briefly reflect on the WNC. Since the adoption of the Women's Charter (WC) in 1994, a question has continued to be raised about the role of the WNC and whether or not we need it.

The question perhaps needs to be rephrased to; 'In view of the challenges that democratic South Africa still faces towards gender equality what kind of struggles do we still need to engage in and what type of organisations do we need to lead such struggles?'

This paper will not attempt to answer even that question but will mainly be a reintroduction of the debate about the WNC, primarily in preparation for that conference but also as a reminder of yet another old debate that needs to be revisited on 'The Women's Movement in South Africa'. A deeper analytical paper is necessary for the broader discussion of where we are in relation to women's emancipation and gender equality.

This introductory paper will focus on the WNC's historical background, the context of its emergence, its original objectives, the driving forces behind its formation and how it has evolved since then. The paper is divided into periods of the development of the WNC and ends with preliminary remarks on some of the available options.

Historical background

Malibongwe Conference

By the middle of the 'eighties it was clear that the old regime could no longer rule in the same way and the mass upsurges bore testimony to that. All over the country resistance had reached its highest levels. Central to this resistance were the women's struggles led by various women's formations especially those aligned to the Congress Movement such as UWO, UWCO, NOW, FEDTRAW etc. Women, both in exile and inside the country, had reached a stage of understanding the notion of a "revolution within a revolution".

At the 1987 Women's Section National Conference there was a resolution for the formation of an umbrella National Women's Organisation against apartheid. This idea was further elaborated at Kabwe with a call for a Bill of Women's Rights that would be similar to the Freedom Charter. A proposal for the drafting of a Women's Charter was later made. All these ideas were further



elaborated at the Malibongwe Conference in January 1990, which brought together women activists from both inside and outside SA. The Malibongwe Conference laid the basis for the launch of the WNC, two years later.

The political climate and challenges pre-1994

The unbanning of the ANC and others, the release of political prisoners and the return of exiles changed the character and form of political struggles in South Africa. The UDF and their affiliated structures were dismantled as ANC structures were set up.

The relationship between the ANCWL and the UDF related women's structures were not without its own tensions. There was concern that the dissolution of the women's organisations and the launch of the ANCWL could lead to the demobilisation of women and the abandonment of women's struggles for gender equality. Lessons from elsewhere had shown a misconception that gender equality was an automatic by-product of national liberation. Feminists, gender activists and women in particular were vigilant against such a possibility in our country.

The debates begun prior to and at Malibongwe became more urgent. The question of commonality and diversity on the "women's question" was raised persistently and with more urgency. The conservatism on 'gender equality' was decried and more worrying was a possibility of the women's aspirations, concerns being pushed to the backburner in the negotiations process. The ANCWL initiated various discussions, workshops, and meetings amongst women of different political tendencies.

The central question was - What kind of new democratic SA did the women want? The response to such a question would elaborate the notions of non-sexism, substantive equality and real democracy for women.

The Women's National Coalition

Pre-1994

These consultations and debates culminated in the launch of the WNC in April 1992 with more than 100 women's organisation from all walks of life as members. Its main objective was to identify and ensure that women's needs and aspirations were codified. Thus it adopted a programme of the compilation and documentation of women's needs, aspirations that would be integrated into the new policies of a free, non-sexist, non-racial and democratic South Africa.

These needs and aspirations were not assumed but were formulated after a two-year long consultation process that culminated in the adoption of the Women's Charter (WC) in 1994. The compilation of and the content of the WC helped the WNC find the new collective identity within diversity and a common ground amongst most, if not all, women of SA irrespective of their race, class, religion, political affiliation, region, language, ethnic origin, sexual orientation and many other women's multiple identities.

The conditions, driving forces and what sustained the WNC

Amongst the conditions and driving forces that helped mould and sustain the WNC in its early years were: -

- The transition period between the unbanning and 1994 was marked by an urgency, mobilisation and commitment by South Africans to move from authoritarianism to democracy. At the centre of this mobilised mass were women.
- Women in SA have always organised and struggled directly against the state and more indirectly against patriarchy. The eve of democracy spurred them on to ensure that a future state would in a very substantive way with regards to gender relations be different from the previous state.

- Women's initial marginalisation from the negotiation process by most of the political parties was a source of anger, energy and coherence amongst women in ensuring that they were not negotiated out of their own future by men, well meaning as they could be. This shared fear of exclusion temporarily created some limited "shared interests" around which there was unity.
- The diversity of women, their needs, perspectives and aspirations forced women to realise the importance and need of finding each other and agreeing on at least the minimum common aspirations to be included in a future dispensation.
- The political climate within SA promoted a general goodwill nationally and internationally and commitment to support such transformation efforts. This resulted in many sponsors' willingness to provide resources.
- The presence, commitment and courage of various women, feminists, gender activists with differing experiences and expertise (formal and informal) was part of the cement that held the WNC together at its formative years. The combination of mass mobilisation, direct political engagement and "gender" education of society and women in particular also gave the WNC the necessary impetus to sustain its unity in action.
- No effort was spared in ensuring that the agenda of the WNC remained on track. Serious attempts were thus made to avoid any unnecessary tensions amongst the broad spectrum of organisations in the WNC.

Why a coalition?

From the onset there was recognition of the diversity of women's aspirations, experiences, their organisations and forms of mobilisation, organising and struggles. This recognition ensured that there was no pretence of universalism that could be accommodated under one umbrella organisation.

The WNC allowed different kinds of organisations including churches, service sectors such as health, welfare etc, and women from different political backgrounds, class, race, and cultural backgrounds to come together in unity for women's emancipation.

A coalition allowed separate identities, independence and interdependence, organisations tackling specific issues determined by their specific material conditions and lived experiences, while simultaneously creating networks, sharing information, skills and resources and uniting in action around those issues which each organisation agreed upon. A coalition allowed pliable and flexible boundaries between which members moved from time to time with integrity, acceptance and respect of each other. It also allowed for autonomous organisations and coordinated programmes avoiding political fragmentation or emphasis on difference while not imposing false universalism or "sisterhood" under notions of a homogenous category "women".

Post-1994

1994 - 1996.

With the national elections in 1994, the political landscape once again changed. The excitement of a new dispensation, the eagerness for democracy, the urgency to transform our society brought with itself a new context, challenges and contradictions. At the centre of these were the political parties to which most of the citizens were affiliated.

The WNC was affected by this strong political centeredness. Some of the Manifestos of the political parties undermined the women's aspirations outlined in the WC. Women in parliament, former members of the WNC disagreed openly on key gender issues.

Women's interests were articulated through the political parties' policies.

Diversity and difference tended to supersede commonalities in the parliamentary sphere - after all these women had been elected on a party ticket and not on a "woman" ticket. Their allegiance and accountability was first and foremost to their political parties. What had always been understood if not always articulated that there were no universal "women's interests" that could be represented by "women" prevailed.

This was to affect not only the women in parliament but also the WNC. The WNC had agreed that women members of parliament would not be elected to office. Whether or not this was a good decision is a moot question, the critical thing is that part of the experience, expertise and profile was somehow lost. However, there were women who tried to give good leadership in the new environment.

Even in this new environment, the WNC managed to maintain its role -ensuring the inclusion of gender rights in the new Constitution and dispensation. Its main focus was on the constitution making process, new legislation and parliamentary processes. It acted as the voice of women in society, consistently making presentation to Parliament, raising critical questions and firmly demanding and mobilising women to continue to fight for their rights and gender equality. Linkages between the WNC and the women in parliament existed, weak as they may have been.

1996 - to date

After the adoption of the Constitution it became clear that there was little to hold and sustain the WNC, as it was originally constituted. Many of the condition that had existed before were changed and once again a new texture of politics emerged presenting new challenges, needs and contradictions.

The adoption of the Constitution with its relatively gendered approach; the setting up of the national machinery with the Office on the Status of Women (OSW) at national and provincial levels, the gender units in each government department, the setting up of the Commission on Gender Equality (CGE), indeed the institutionalisation of the struggle for gender equality is one of the most significant achievements of our democracy.

The presence of a relatively large number of women within the state -whether in government, Parliament, the administration or other sectors is something to be celebrated in our democracy. This was not only the changing of the demographics of these spheres but there were to be qualitative changes as well as institutional changes in these spheres.

However, this presented its own tensions and challenges. To what extent was the relative "engendering" of the state going to demobilise women's struggles and organisations? Were there possibilities of the absorption of feminists gender activists and women into the patriarchal character of the State? Some of these questions were to impact and continue to do so on the role and character of the WNC and indeed on the Women's Movement in SA.

The WNC, during its formative years, sought to unite women who had always been divided by apartheid, race, class, and other social divisions. It sought to build a social movement from diverse groups. This implied that differences were suppressed or avoided. Some of these were to reveal themselves once the initial conditions of ensuring that the project of inclusion of gender concerns in the Constitution and the adoption of the WC were achieved.

While the goodwill that had existed prior to 1994 still exists, it is not necessarily translated into the necessary human and financial resources needed. There are other focal points on which sponsors are concentrating, and these include resources given directly to the state and its transformation programme.

Due to the affiliations to political parties, the glue that moulded women together has been diluted. Additionally, civic organisations, in the environment of democracy have, to a large extent, been trying to find a niche and role for themselves and the women's organisations are no exception. There is thus a relative demobilisation of the forces that united and struggled for democracy. The key challenge continues to be - What is the role of the masses under a democratic state and a government committed to changing the lives of the people? These masses, women included, sometimes seem to be demobilised and see themselves as entirely dependent on the state.

It became clear at the 1997 Consultative Conference that there was no unanimity in the WNC and its regions on what the role and the direction of the WNC should be. The WNC seemed to have diverted



from the role that many assumed it to be - i.e. a vehicle for mobilisation for the rights of women and gender equality. There was lack of trust amongst members and regions especially on the issue of the projects that the WNC was supposed to be running.

Both the 1997 Conference and the 2000 AGM have not managed to deeply analyse the new context, its challenges and therefore the direction that the WNC could take. The decision of the 1997 Conference was that the WNC should continue to be focused on a single specific issue. The issue identified was Women and the Law. This was seen as a continuation of the Women's Charter campaign as well as a tool to focus on the implementation of the programmes outlined in the Convention for the Complete Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Beijing Platform for Action (BPFA) and in other international conventions. The 2000 AGM did not take the WNC any further and as yet there is no clearer vision, role and programme for the WNC. The debate within the Alliance has not yet given any concrete strategic direction on this critical issue.

Whither the WNC?

The difference of opinion on what role if any the WNC can play are a reflection of the varied and sometimes contradictory expectations on it.

Some expected the WNC to fold up with the adoption of the WC. The WC in turn was envisaged as a document around which women would continue to mobilise and unite. There was in some quarters even a hope that the WNC could become the critical centre for a Women's Movement in South Africa in a "semi-permanent" way. And yet others thought the WNC could continue even if in a different form. Different options on the future of the WNC exist a few of which are outlined below. Needless to say, each option has its own permutations or variations.

Dissolution: Amongst the reasons put forward for the dissolution of the WNC are that: -

- The mandate of the WNC was achieved with the adoption of the WC and there is not much that can hold diverse organisations of women together.
- It is causing confusion and diverting women from concentrating on building a grassroots based Women's Movement.
- There is a serious lack of resources - human and material.
- The new context requires different types of women's formations.

Continue: There are different versions to the call for the WNC to continue. Some would see it as the beginnings of a women's movement while others feel it can still have a role to play with a specific focus on some elements of gender equality e.g. women and law, violence against women. Some of the reasons for continuation are:

- The very existence of women's organisations that continue to come together and try to engage with each other on struggles for gender equality is itself an achievement. We cannot afford to destroy what we had built so painfully.
- The networks and infrastructure, limited as these may be, should continue to be utilised. Women continue to need these networks especially those in the rural or disadvantaged areas.
- There is a need for an extra-government/parliamentary women's voice that can act as a pressure and lobby group on gender equality while simultaneously collaborating with the government and gender activists within the state.

The WNC could then be:

- a specific issue-based network e.g. focusing on engendering policy formulation, implementation and evaluation or on research on gender related matters or
- as a network help link its affiliates to each other especially for campaigns that each may be undertaking so as to make these nationwide; assembling and disseminating women/gender-

responsive information. In that regard it could act as some kind of a national resource centre for women's organisations countrywide or

- the Enabling Centre, providing the necessary skills and training for any of its affiliates. Regions would be the regional enabling centres to empower and offer skills to women's organisations locally or
- focus on budget and engendering the budget, including rooting the Women's Budget Initiative amongst the grassroots.

Conclusion

Most of South Africans agree that patriarchy permeates all spheres of life and its eradication requires a protracted struggle at all levels. This then means we need policies, institutions and mechanisms against patriarchy.

Educating, mobilising and organising society is a critical imperative for the achievement of gender equality.

The decision about the future of the WNC can therefore not be left to those who will be attending the Conference. It is a strategic decision that has a bearing on gender equality, indeed on substantive democracy in this country and thus requires participation from all of us.

The State and Social Transformation - Observations on the South African Development State Since 1998

Peter R. Mokaba

Introduction

The discussion papers 'State and Social Transformation (November 1996) and the 'State, Property Relations and Social Transformation' (Umrabulo No. 5, 3rd Quarter, 1998) were amongst the major initiatives to theorise the nature and role of the state post-1994.

These documents located the democratic state that we are building in the context of the strategic objectives of the NDR and the historical relationship between the apartheid state and capital. It discussed the nature and role of the state with regard to the strategic challenge of the current phase of the NDR, which is the transformation of South Africa into a truly non-racial, non-sexist, united and democratic society.

The documents emphasised the need to understand state power (and its various loci) and the centrality of capital in the process of transformation. It formed the basis for discussions within the ANC and the Alliance on the tasks facing the democratic state and the power at the disposal of the National Liberation Movement (NLM) to lead the transformation of the state.

These discussions, building on other policy documents such as the RDP and the experience we gained after 1994, form the basis of our ongoing programme to transform the state.

The purpose of this paper is not to revisit the issues raised before, but to critically assess progress and challenges since we started on the road towards the dismantling of the apartheid state and the building of a democratic state. The paper however, takes issue with some of the theoretical approaches to the nature of the democratic state, in particular our approach to the Developmental State.

The aim of this critique is ultimately to put forward for debate some of the bold measures necessary to improve the actions and operations of the state, so that it can more effectively lead the social and economic transformation of the South African society.

The balance of forces - post 1999

The balance of forces has significantly, but not completely changed in favour of the democratic forces. Certain programmes and policies that were not possible at the beginning of our democracy are now possible and feasible.

The chief indicator of this shift in the balance is the increased majorities that the ANC received in the 1999 national and 2000 local elections. The pace and extent of the delivery of services during the first six years has substantively changed the lives of vast numbers of people. We delivered social services beyond expectations, given the international context and the apartheid social deficit we inherited.

We made progress in the areas of monetary policy, trade, budget deficit, easing balance of payments constraints, debt servicing, inflation, reprioritisation of budget, restructuring of state assets, reforming the tax system and improving on tax collection.

The ANC-led government succeeded in putting us on a long-term growth path in excess of population growth, securing access to new markets; integrating the civil service, transforming public sector institutions and establishing policy frameworks for delivery of social services.

However, in a number of critical areas such as job creation, skills development and improved investment the country's performance has been below par.

We can therefore conclude that although the compromises of our negotiated settlement acted as a constraint during the first five years, it did not stop us from implementing programmes of transformation.

Building the democratic state - key observations about the current reality

Seven years into our democracy, we now have a solid foundation and are challenged to speed up the process of transformation and change. Critical amongst these challenges is the need to take a definitive policy stance with regard to the type of state that South Africa should evolve.

This choice is predicated on what we believe is a correct interpretation and analysis of the tasks and expectations for such a state within our movement and society and the reading of the national and international balance of forces.

It is important for the ANC to make a deliberate choice about the type of state because it will enable us to make proposals for action moving from a common basis.

The earlier discussion documents on the state tended to use terms such as "democratic State", "not minimalist", "a state with transformative and developmental task", "a regulatory and facilitative state," "not an all-powerful instrumentalist state" and so forth. These seemingly contradictory expectations about the state that South Africa should build contribute to confused expectations regarding the role and place of the state in the South African society.

On the one hand, the state is expected to play mainly a facilitating and guiding role, whilst at the same time it is expected to command adequate resources including ownership of critical elements of the productive forces for interventionist purposes. In short, we have been quite eclectic in the way in which we dealt with the construction of the new South African state.

These seemingly contradicting expectations of the South African state are further reflected in the kind of choices that we make (or fail to make). For example, at the same time as we implemented the decision to move away from the transitional politics of enforced government of national and provincial



unity after 1999, we legislate in the Municipal Systems Act for (enforced) Collective Executives and multi-party ward committees involving the opposition at local government level.

We seem to be caught up by our indecision with regard the management of the necessary tension between development and democracy and between economic and social spending. We thus make it difficult for ourselves to find the correct balance and dialectic, prioritisation and coordination between the national goals of economic growth and socio-economic development and of social and political stability. In the process, we often undermine our very efforts to achieve an environmentally effective and sustainable framework for development, distinguished by its ability to put the means of livelihood before the people, especially, the poor.

We decide on speeding up delivery, but insist on lengthy consultative and consultant-driven processes on actions about which there could be no dispute. Is it not common sense that the people, who have the right to meet and associate, need community halls to enable them to do so?

We decide on integrated rural development, but still take decisions that effectively delay or deny effective empowerment for the rural citizens when such decisions amount to locking them out of the main socio-economic system that should guarantee their development in step with the rest of the country. This is so particularly with regard to land ownership through individual title deeds vis-a-vis communal land ownership. We thus lock the rural African citizen out of the general national markets and diminish their rights in comparison to other Africans in the urban centres. The irony is that the whites living within the same rural locality enjoy enhanced and fuller rights in respect of property rights and security of tenure.

This situation prevails in the face of our overriding objectives of rural development and urban renewal, which is to ensure that there is equal and equitable development between the cities, towns and the countryside.

This conceptual eclecticism with regard to the state, also impacts on the capacity of the state to speed up delivery to the masses of our people. This manifests itself and is compounded by important aspects of the apartheid legacy and our transformative agenda that we need to tackle as urgent matters: -

- The inappropriate structure of the state we inherited. The apartheid state was structured to deliver a high level of services to an elite minority and towards the deliberate under-development of and poor quality of services for the vast majority. This legacy still weighs heavily on our current state.
- Minimal expertise of the bureaucracy we inherited and amongst the new recruits to enhance delivery within the state machinery, including project management skills, inability to do rigorous feasibility and cost benefit analysis studies.
- The disjuncture between policy and implementation: Within this bureaucracy, there are serious deficiencies in the planning ability, sequencing of planning and implementation and thus the capacity to translate political mandates (policy) into bureaucratic and developmental action -hence the rollovers. For example, the poverty alleviation funding gets allocated in the budget, in the absence of plans for the utilisation of the allocated funding. Likewise, a political objective for the building a million houses was set by the RDP ministry. This did not take into account prior commitment made by the Apartheid State in this area. Consequently the budgeted amounts for meeting new political mandates were not adequate, since earlier budgets such as the 1994/95 Budget could only pay for old commitments. Another issue is that the pronouncement of political objectives in this regard failed to take into account the necessary planning cycle which involves longer lead times.
- We have also witnessed the Masakhane Campaign floundering because of, among other things, a mismatch between delivery and the campaign objectives.

People found it difficult to begin payments of benefits they have not yet received. In the same vein, instruments like National Empowerment Fund, Umsobumvu, Khula, Ntsika and other have still not produced the desired and planned developmental and political results in the sector targeted. Central to these problems is the fact that coordination of planning, budgeting and personnel still eludes us.



- The spatial distortions of the Bantustan policy, which has resulted in rural wastelands and slums lacking the productive capacity to be sustainable.
- The race and gender composition of the ownership of land, and the tenure relations and role of the institution of traditional authority.
- Lack of timely interventions or unintended consequences of policy decisions: The state has not intervened to prevent the decline of existing urban areas, but instead continues to authorise new development in excess of existing demand for capacity. An example of this is the decline of Johannesburg as a result of authorisation and relocation of development to the North.
- Poor capacity and appreciation of the role and responsibility of local government. In many instances during the transitional period, local governments failed to deliver basic services, were financially unstable, tended to address liquidity problems through the sale of assets and often engaged in ill-informed rezoning of land, including rezoning of high potential agricultural land and environmentally sensitive areas in order to improve their rates base.

The Developmental State - its international evolution and manifestations

Contemporary history records three forms of an (interventionist) developmental State: the states that evolved in the countries of the former "actually existing socialist states"; the welfarist state of Western Europe, the Scandinavian and North American countries and those that evolved in the Asian Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) and Botswana.

Each form arose under specific national and international balance of forces.

All evolved in the international context of the Cold War and an increasing movement of countries towards socialism. Whilst the socialist states were predicated on Marxist economics, the latter two were based on Keynesian economic model of development.

The socialist states evolved and gained strength as a result of the October Socialist Revolution in Russia (1917) and the crisis defined by the Second World War. Although these states shared the Asian NIC goal of accelerated industrialisation, it was assumed that this could best be achieved via state ownership of the means of production. The welfarist state evolved as a result of and was driven mainly by popular demands for increased state intervention in the provision of social welfare.

The Asian Tigers

In the NICs of East Asia, where popular pressure from below was weak or suppressed, state intervention was not about expanding social welfare, but rather about intervening to build the indigenous industrial economic base in countries where capital formation was at a low level and the national bourgeoisie was relatively weak.

The developmental states here evolved in the manner that they did in different countries as a result of a combination of other factors. Among these were the national clamour to survive after the nuclear devastation of Nagasaki and Hiroshima in Japan, the threats to Taiwan by China, the wars of Cold War between North and South Korea, the process of decolonisation, the grinding poverty and the realisation that these were late developing countries that required speed of development.

All developed in the context of a sharpening of contradictions of Cold War where foreign Official Development Aid and Foreign Direct Investments were used as weapons of the Cold War. Massive amounts of aid and investments flowed into the targeted regions, together with technology and technical personnel to bolster regimes. Although many of the recipient states were highly repressive and undemocratic this was not a major consideration for foreign aid and investment in the Cold War period.

It is the latter form of developmental state that has attracted a lot of attention and praise because of its successes. It also tends to find resonance in South Africa, because of the many political, economic, social and historical similarities we share.

Lessons for South Africa

The following are characteristics that historically evolved with regard to this form of developmental state, its role, place in society and structure from which we can learn:

- The state plays a direct role in the economy, premised on ensuring that the resources of the state (human, financial and other) are allocated in support of integrated development and delivery of basic services.
- The state emphasizes the primacy of politics;
- The state is not typically patrimonial;
- The state does not express the politico-bureaucratic characteristics and division of labour of the legal-rational polity as in the Weberian theory.

On the contrary it essentially fuses the political and the bureaucratic excluding any notion of the 'independence of the bureaucracy' promoted also in the Presidential Review document.

- The state is not the agent of the predominant classes in the production relations, nor the products of class balance or stand off as in Marxist theory- hence the state's relative autonomy but not isolation since interest groups benefit from its actions.
- The state boasts the existence of an economic bureaucracy with competence, insulation (not elected and not amenable to special interest pressures) and penetration.
- The state brings together in one Ministry Planning, Budgeting and Personnel.
- The state boasts effective and structured management of non-economic interests.
- In acknowledging the inherent tension between democracy and development the state prioritises development. The legitimacy of the state is based more on ability to effectively deliver to all interest groups rather than on democracy.
- Such a state is led and staffed by a determined developmental elite of senior politicians and bureaucrats close to the executive head of state with greater linkages and intimacy to the bureaucratic (civil and military) and political components.
- It is the responsibility of the state to plan and coordinate spatial and economic development to ensure that there is progressive redistribution of resources and incomes and a more equitable society.

The Programme of the Developmental State in South Africa - South African priorities

Modification of the above characteristics to suit South African conditions should include acceptance of the reality that whilst participatory democracy is important for the delivery of services and growth of the economy, the democratic state has a responsibility to take decisions in the overall public interest with some degree of autonomy. This is the way to manage the tension between the speed of development and the extent of participatory democracy.

Purposeful state intervention is also required in the arena of Black economic empowerment. Until now, the black economic empowerment processes were more of a survival strategy by formerly white companies than a liberation strategic drive towards deracialising property relations. Black economic empowerment proceeded without plans, programmes and monitoring systems. It is not directed or given content by the objectives of the new democratic South African society. In pursuit of this survival strategy, white companies embarked on a programme of identifying and recruiting their 'own' black people without any intention to effectively involve them or change the form and content of the host companies.

There have been claims of ANC-initiated deployments in the private sector, although no such deployment has actually happened and no programme exists for systematically carrying out such deployments. Hence the continuing floundering of black economic empowerment characterised by spectacular collapses of some 'major' projects cloaked as black economic empowerment, dogfights among prospective black participants, corruption and less than meaningful participation.

The state must spearhead an agenda of patriotism, national pride, morality and discipline.



Effective mechanisms to combat all forms of corruption in both the public and private sector (including business and labour) and civil society in general should be developed and implemented with rigour.

It is these urgent priorities that we suggest should inform the structuring, staffing, resourcing, place and role of the new South African state in the South African society, the continent and the world.

The interventions of the state must all be premised on achieving improved levels of economic development and growth. The state must therefore make direct interventions to this end.

- a. The state must lead and spearhead integrated rural development. This will not be attained through dispensations to chiefs but rather through a programme of villagisation, the construction of social infrastructure, full exploitation of mining and related beneficiation opportunities, the development of agriculture, notwithstanding the fact that large parts of South Africa are agriculturally inhospitable.
- b. The state must ensure that the parastatals play a key role in leading growth in the telecommunications and energy sectors and in roads and transport. The direct control of the state implies that these are key levers for the promotion of equity and black empowerment. The state must also ensure that it converts to labour intensive modes of productions where the job multiplier effect could be as much as tenfold the current levels of sustainable jobs. The state must also boldly address the trade-off between wage levels and numbers of jobs.
- c. The state must consider fiscal and non-fiscal incentives to facilitate labour absorption and improve the capacity of better-placed sectors such as telecommunications.
- d. With regard to urban renewal, the state must use regulatory measures, spending direction and directed township and infrastructural development programmes to prevent the generation of new capacity where spare capacity exists and is not productively utilised. The authorisation of development in Midrand for example has inadvertently resulted in the decline of the inner city of Johannesburg. While the current township development programme such as the one unfolding in Alexander must be encouraged. Other areas identified in the President's State of the Nation Address of February 9, 2001 should follow similar approaches with regard to state intervention.

The truth is that apartheid construction did not just pass laws of segregation, but it moved people and used other measures to ensure that such segregation was guaranteed. The apartheid state ensured that most of these people, the majority of whom were Africans and coloureds, are located in areas of low possibilities of development since, among other things, the intention was to sustain them as reservoirs of cheap labour.

To reverse the effect of apartheid social engineering towards integrated and viable human habitats will also take more than repealing of apartheid laws.

It will involve among others appropriate spatial planning which will include, but not limited to, moving people to areas where they can be development in both the urban and rural areas.

The state has a responsibility to ensure that financial and economic tools are incorporated into an amended regulatory framework for the authorisation of development.

- e. The state must continue to provide social services, quality social services and quality social infrastructure. This must be supported by a cohesive national programme based on a single national model for the delivery of free basic services, water, and sanitation, electricity and waste removal. This must be financed by increased user charges for services in excess of basic needs to finance the total cost of service delivery, which has a positive redistribution fact.
- f. The state must move with rapid speed towards strengthening the capacity of the national Ministry of Provincial and Local Government to enable it to act as a national coordinating ministry. Similar steps must follow in the provinces. A relevant transformation monitoring unit coordinating the Alliance interventions in this regard will have to be established as a matter of urgency at the ANC Head Office.

At local government level special attention will have to be given to the detailed structure of that sphere of government, particularly, the important and critical functions of city engineering responsible for planning, treasury responsible for finance, and town secretary responsible for corporate governance. These constitute the engine of local government and its transformation and cannot be left to chance. Structuring and programmes of these areas will determine the extent to which local government is developmental and integrative.

- g. It is within this framework that the South African state should pursue public and private partnerships for development with capital, labour and communities. Such partnership should be founded on the four governance principles of undisputed government authority and leadership; trust; reciprocity of action on the basis, from each according to their ability and competence, and accountability.
 - o Building partnerships with private capital for development and growth: In order for development to be pursued with good quality and speed massive amounts of capital are required. The reality is that nowhere in the world does the state command adequate amounts of capital to deliver the requisite development. Most of the capital is today in the hands of the private sector. There is therefore an inescapable need for the state to act in partnership with private capital based on mutual self-interest. Other amounts of capital, however in smaller quantities, are control by richer states in the form of official development aid. There are also funds in the hands of other civil society organisations such as the trade unions, churches, foundations, NGOs etc. These sources of funds are both local and international. The critical component that we have to attract, however, are international funds that are still not seeing their way through to South Africa.

A task therefore arises as to how these funds can be attracted into South Africa for development purposes. Clearly South Africa can only attract these funds on the terms mutually agreed to with those who control them. There can be no unilateral determination of how such funds should be invested in South Africa or any other country for that matter. In order to attract these funds, particularly, foreign direct investments it is critical that the determinants of foreign flows are and what their composition is. This matter is dealt with below.

These partnerships need to be built with the aim of state's leadership and guidance with respect to investment and sectoral development, cooperation in the delivery of social and economic infrastructure, a structured, programmatic and concerted human resources and skills development and employment programme.

In this context the South African Developmental State must lead and directly intervene in the black, particularly African, economic empowerment efforts on a programmatic basis. It must deliberately select individuals and groups with potential from the African and black communities who should be deployed in various fields in the private sector.

- The state must pursue partnership with labour. It is critical for labour, whether in the civil or general private sector spheres to engage with government as partners pursuing common social, political and economic goals of sustainable development and not just within the narrow framework of employer-employee relationship.
- The above-proposed 'social pact' should include partnership between labour and business that exclude the need for economic disruptions. The 'social pact' in its totality should form the basis and framework for speedy development and the evolution of one South African non-racial, non-sexist and prosperous nation based on non-racial property rights, equitable income distribution, non-racial, non-sexist and viable human settlements in both the urban and rural areas, and the evolution of common patriotism.

For all of the above there should be relevant non-duplicating institutions and mechanisms for implementation, monitoring and evaluation composed of the partners in the 'social pact'. We advocate for an effective national 'social pact', led by the ANC, for change, empowerment and development and for an effective engagement with the region, the continent and the globalising world and towards an end to poverty, under-development, disease and debt.

Programme of the South African developmental state in the context of globalisation

The developmental state's national policy in an era of globalisation will have to entail:

- a. *Reducing poverty and providing safety nets:* Globalisation redistributes opportunities and benefits in a way that can lead to rising inequality.

Policies to reduce poverty and moderate income inequality can counter the disruption from globalisation. Safety nets are needed to catch those hurt by the disruption and to help them move in the new direction. It should also include other policy instruments such as a supportive macro-economic policy environment for poverty eradication; investing in poor people and strengthening of SMMEs. It should also include partnerships with multinational corporations to promote growth for poverty reduction.

- b. *Improving governance:* Globalisation usually weakens the influence of the nation state, but in many ways it demands a stronger state, to help people reap its benefits and mitigate its costs. Better governance is vital not just to ensure the rule of law and protect against international organised crime, but also to maintain and expand social and economic infrastructure.
- c. *Action to stop the race to the bottom:* In a world of cut-throat competition, countries under-bid each other in labour costs, labour standards and environmental protection to produce as cheaply as possible for the international market. With human rights issues a basis for unilateral trade sanctions a more efficient and equitable approach will be to strengthen institutions such as the ILO to support respect for labour rights and to develop similar institutions for international environmental protection.

The developmental state must engage in efforts and action on global debt that today negatively affects the development possibilities of the world's poor.

- d. *Selective support for global technology priorities and managing new technology:* Amongst the issues that we must consider include the oft inappropriateness of labour saving technologies in developing countries, vital technological change as a double-edged sword and its complicated and poorly understood relationship with poverty reduction. However, the benefit of investment in technology can be maximised if accompanied by strong policies to create human capital and foster small enterprises.

Global research and development has been biased towards the needs of the rich countries and now this bias is being accentuated with the shift from publicly financed research towards research by companies keen to appropriate the benefits.

Special attention should be devoted to the scientific and technological revolution in general and the information communication technology (ICT), in particular. The global network economy is upon us where productivity and competitiveness are now the functions of knowledge generation and information processing and where territories and firms are organised in networks of production, management and distribution. For example, in the Microsoft stable, India is the hub for software development, China for hardware development, Ireland and the rest for distribution and America for management.

In this arrangement only "the strategically crucial activities and economic factors" are networked around a globalised system of inputs and outputs, which conditions the fate of economies and jobs. Primary among these are "information, capital markets, science and technology, specialised labour, affluent consumer markets, multinational networks of production and management in manufacturing including industrialised farming, and advanced services, media communication (including internet), entertainment (including sports) and ...global crime". Unskilled labour is, on the contrary, not globalised but localised and regional.

This development in STR has major policy implications for the developing countries and their states particularly in the areas of taxation, jobs, SMMEs, skills development, education and training etc. More importantly are the emerging issues of intellectual property rights as a

challenge to skills transfer and Eco-labelling of products and services. In this regard it is also important to note that the growth of ICT is a function of the growth and development of service industry and that of the global financial markets. These and other developments concerning FDI have serious policy implications.

- e. *Better access to finance for poor countries:* Poor countries cannot participate in globalisation without financial assistance; private capital is by-passing areas of great need especially Africa. Public finance delivered through bilateral and multilateral assistance is not filling the gap.
- f. *Attracting foreign direct investment:* Accordingly, the state will have to take serious cognisance of the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) and ensure that South Africa and Africa are well positioned to attract a better percentage of this.

FDI flows to developing countries have increased since the 1980s. These flows are, however, highly concentrated in a small number of countries. The top ten countries: China, Mexico, Singapore, Brazil, Malaysia, Argentina, Indonesia, Poland, Hungary and Thailand, receive 73% of these flows. In comparison with the developed countries China, is the second largest recipient after the USA - of the total world FDI flows. FDI flows to Africa have declined since the 1970s high to only 3.8% during 1997 of the total to developing regions.

According to UNCTAD, FDI takes place when three sets of determinants are in place. These are:

- The ownership-specific competitive advantage where a firm acquires or creates assets to give it an advantage over local firms.
- The locational advantage in a host country which implies that firms choose different locations to overcome trade restrictions, differences in factor costs or host country policies.

In general there are three mainstream host-country, location-specific determinants:

- iii. the national policy framework such as regulation regarding entry, the structure of the market within which they operate, competitive tax structure, macro-political issues, low political risk for foreign investors, government's stance on privatisation and the willingness to sign international agreements;
 - iv. business facilitation which include promotion efforts, investment incentives of FDI, reducing corruption, improving administration efficiency, after investment services, provision of social amenities that can contribute to the quality of life of personnel; and
 - v. macro-economic determinants which because of the influence of liberalisation and globalisation can now be grouped according to the principle motivations of the transnational companies (TNCs) as: market-driven or market-seeking FDI; resource-seeking or factor-driven FDI which include considerations of the availability of natural resources, the availability of low-cost unskilled labour, the availability of skilled labour, flexible labour markets and the quality of physical infrastructure; and efficiency-seeking FDI which focuses on the productivity of labour, the cost of resources, input costs and the participation of regional integration frameworks, long-term economic growth performance and access to foreign markets by the relevant host country.
- g. *Internalisation:* The greater benefits of firms in exploiting both ownership-specific and locational advantages through internalisation.

Another consideration with regard to the FDI is the evolution of its composition over years with regard to economic sectors. A long-term shift in emphasis has occurred. While FDI concentrated on the primary sector in the 1950s and 1960s it shifted to the secondary manufacturing sector in the 1970s. Within this sector there was also a shift from import-substituting, market-seeking projects that were producing for large and rapidly industrialising markets. It has now shifted to efficiency-seeking projects that produce for the export markets.

A further shift in manufacturing sector saw the concentration of FDI from resource-based industries towards light manufacturing. Since the middle of the 1980s the proportion of FDI in the tertiary sector, especially the service sector has been on the increase signalling that

growth in these service areas of tourism, information technology and telecommunication will dominate the world economies for the foreseeable future. By the early 1990s the service sector accounted for 59% to 55% of the total FDI outflows from most major source countries. In general FDI is increasingly driven by advances in technology and is becoming more capital intensive and less labour intensive.

Policy implications for attracting FDI:

Given the factors analysed above, the South African developmental state should consider the following policy implications concerning the FDI flows determinants to developing countries:

- Maintaining a high and sustainable economic growth rate is critical.
- Since a consistent determinant is the availability of either low-cost unskilled labour or a highly-skilled labour force and since South Africa does not comply with either of these criteria and since there is a strong complementarity between FDI and human capital, a priority should be a high quality education and training.
- Acceleration of restructuring of state assets should receive special attention.
- Government should remain committed to fiscal discipline and macroeconomic stability.
- Since regional integration will be a major explanatory factor of future patterns of FDI SADC's economic and political stability is of utmost importance if the region is to attract adequate FDI for its rapid and sustainable development.
- Positive action to improve South Africa's political risk rating should be taken including crime reduction, good governance, poverty reduction. Labour productivity and stability and continued macroeconomic stability. The locational determinant is the one factor, which the governments of host countries can influence. The above should be regarded as broad guidelines for possible future policy actions.
- Lastly there must be integration of the efforts of the national, provincial and local government. In particular national and provincial government have responsibilities to supervise local government and ensure that service delivery and local economic development have positive cumulative impacts on the national economy.

Constraints towards a more definitive pronouncement of a developmental state policy

Movement towards a more definitive pronouncement of a developmental state policy will be challenged by a number of major constraints that would have to be engaged.

- a. *Lack of capacity of the implementing bureaucracy:* Both apartheid and our initial responses towards transforming the civil service such as the voluntary severance programme and trade union action have left the democratic state in an untenable position with regard to movement towards a more effective, responsive, accountable and efficient civil service. The truth is that the size and the lack of appropriate competence and capacity in the civil service inherited from apartheid are major obstacles towards the establishment of a developmental state. We cannot proceed without retrenchments, retraining and new recruitments. The so-called independence of the bureaucracy must effectively be terminated.
- b. *Accumulation through corruption:* Attitudes of the whites in general and the domestic white capitalist class and the emerging but less patriotic black capitalist class some of whom seem to have embraced corrupt practices and greed as the basis for their development. Their involvement in corrupt practices, some of which are high profile, against the state and the people raises serious questions about the availability and existence of a critical mass of honest and reliable black business around whom there can be rallied the emergence and growth of this class for transformation and development purposes in the short term.
- c. *Attitude and operations of global capitalism:* Both the domestic and global capitalist class are rooted in the anti-statism of neo-liberal ideology.

These would have to be engaged particularly because even the most staunch of these forces cannot intelligently contradict the fact that the markets cannot deal with and end poverty, crime, violence while they also cannot provide out of their own volition infrastructural development.

- d. *The influence of global mass culture:* We will have to contend with the global mass culture driven by information imperialism, the power of advertising and mass communication through radio, television and cinema which promote the consumer ideal for which one is to strive, the dreams one is to have, the books one is to read, the way one is to behave, the style in which one is to dress, to treat one's friends, relatives, neighbours, visitors, strangers, and to react to this or that report of event.

The result is a massive stereotyping of every aspect of the citizen's everyday life, including emotions and mentality. In South Africa these are informed, mainly, by the media which forms part of the most reactionary forces among those offering consistent ideological resistance to transformation. It is a powerful tool of manipulation, information and propaganda. For example, in the 1995 Media and Market Research of Jocelyn Cooper it was indicated that 70 per cent of the people North of the Parktown Ridge get their information from the newspapers only. They normally do not consult other sources of information.

Conclusion

Revolutionary theory is not a product of armchair reflection. It is a generalisation of practice and actual living in all its concreteness and inter-connectedness. It is a projector of our strategy and tactics, a compass and a guiding light. The strength, might and viability of revolutionary theory lie in creativity and ceaseless renewal, and in the immense sensitivity to new phenomena and processes. Dogmatism, stagnation of thought, the force of habit and "arid botanising" are its implacable enemies.

Clearly, the requirements for attracting FDI, effective engagement with technology, particularly ICT have very serious implications for social forces such as labour and communities as well as the sovereignty of states and role of states. The fact that FDI is driven by technology and markets and not labour creating priorities, the fact that ICT in particular has unleashed the process of individualisation of workers and thereby weakening the labour movement tremendously, and the fact that the composition of the labour is itself undergoing tremendous shifts and qualitative changes away from the industrial worker as was the case at the beginning of the twentieth century and the fact that the future world economy seems set to be dominated by the super-service industries of ICT and tourism requires serious attention by all anti-poverty forces the world over. In contemplating policy options it is also important to note that while scientific and technical progress exercises a tremendous influence on all the processes that are going on in the world, on its contradictions, it does not abolish the laws of social development, its social meaning and content.

There are other important policy considerations too. As revolutionary scientists we all accept that nothing is unchangeable except change itself; nothing is immovable except movement. At the beginning of the Cold War most people did not believe that it would end and where some believed it was bound to end, they envisaged a different outcome i.e. the triumph of socialism and not its demise. What then is the future of globalisation? How will it evolve? What are the policy implications?

As pointed out above there is a need for the trade union movement, the student movement, black business, the women's movement and other social forces that stand to gain from the success of this revolution to change their attitudes and own this state and the new dispensation as theirs.

Strike and protest actions that involve vandalism and violent incidents such as the recent burning of Eskom buildings and the stampede at the Pretoria railway station, the recent violence by the protesting school and university students and by the post office workers, taxi violence and violence by some squatter communities in Alexander recently, to mention but a few, cannot be tolerated.

Based on this understanding the task of the ANC-led revolutionary alliance is to ensure that for every action that we expect of the state there should be implemented in broader society supporting and leadership programmes that indeed make this, "the state and the social transformation" the festival of the masses.

Letters to the Editorial collective

M. Nchabaleng, Bushbuckridge: I like the new format of *Umrabulo* and especially enjoyed the debate on allocative capital. I noticed that our President's State of the Nation address to Parliament and Cde Manuel's Budget speech refer to elements of the issues raised here.

However, I'm a bit confused. Do these things - the so-called micro elements in the speeches - constitute a new growth strategy, now that we have stabilised the macro-economic environment as set out in the RDP? I would really appreciate it if you can do an edition on this new growth strategy, like the *Umrabulo* no. 2 on GEAR.

R. Martin, Cradock: The article by Denga is a very useful analysis of the Zimbabwe situation, both with regards the historical evolution of the crisis and the strategic and tactical questions facing the progressive forces in the process of transformation.

Events over the last few months seem to suggest that the progressive forces in ZANU-PF and the MDC continue to make narrow tactical choices about national issues (land, transformation of the judiciary, the media) and in the process further deepening the national schisms in that country.

Whatever international pressures are brought to bear on Zimbabwe, whether from South Africa, SADC or the international donor community, Zimbabweans at the end will have to engage in a meaningful national dialogue to take their country out of the crisis it finds itself in.

There is no doubt that the international isolation of the apartheid regime played a pivotal role in our struggle. However, at the end of the day, it was South Africans - through the ANC and the National Party regime - that had to initiate, negotiate and compromise to have a political settlement that took South Africa to democracy. Are there any signs that such a national dialogue has or will start in Zimbabwe?

K. Shezi, Wits Tech: I read Oupa Bodibe's book review on SASO and SANSCO and immediately went out to buy it. However, I could not find it in any of the Exclusive Books, Facts and Fiction branches or at other bookstores. Can the Editorial Collective help?

EC: The book (*Black student politics: from SASO to SANSCO 1968 - 1990*, Saleem Badat) can be ordered from the HSRC Bookshop, PO Box 5556, Pretoria 0001.