UMRABULO

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Welcome to the seventh edition of Umrabulo.

Umrabulo was used as term to inspire political discussion and debate on Robben Island. In the true spirit of the ANC, this concept is being revived to assert our fundamental adherence to the necessity for enriched discussion at all levels of the organisation. In this way, the programmes that we implement will be based on a solid understanding of our understanding of our options and our principles.

Contents

The contents of this edition of Umrabulo do not necessarily reflect the policy of the ANC.

1. Introduction

The General Elections of June 1999 resulted in an overwhelming and decisive mandate for the African National Congress, directing *"us to move forward faster with our programme for reconstruction and development so that the goal of a better life for all is achieved sooner rather than later."* We dare not fail.

In this issue of Umrabulo we focus on a discussion that started before the Elections on the *Balance of Forces* - looking back over the last five years and addressing the opportunities and threats likely to face us over the next five years. In the mode of any assessment of the balance of forces, this is an ongoing discussion and we would like to encourage contributions on all elements. The discussion paper also makes reference to a paper published in Umrabulo no. 1 of 1997 - ***Is the NDR still on Track?***

The other three papers in this edition are contributions to an important element of the debate on the balance of forces - namely the strengths and weaknesses of the broad forces for transformation and our organisational approaches in this context. These contributions take forward the debate raised in Umrabulo No. 5 on the implications of a more "civic-orientated" ANC branch.

The paper on the Balance of Forces stresses this when it concludes thus - *"our ability to shift the balance and to make use of the opportunities presented by the last five years, depends on the ANC. It depends on our capacity to be amongst our people, to lead local struggles, to implement the reconstruction and development programme and to represent the aspirations of our people in its morality and lifestyle."*

As we approach the first National General Council of the ANC in 2000, we should remember the words of Cde Nelson Mandela when he handed over the baton of President at our 50th Conference in 1997: *"You, have spoken in the true spirit of the ANC. You were expressing the views of millions of South Africans who see the ANC as the custodian of their deepest hopes for a better life. ...Here are the reins of the movement. Protect and guard its precious legacy. Defend its unity and integrity as committed disciples of change. Pursue its popular objectives like true revolutionaries who seek only to serve the nation."*

ACCELERATING THE PACE OF CHANGE

Assessing the balance of forces in 1999

Why we need to do an assessment of the balance of forces

The single most important political event of 1999 was the General Elections for the second term of a democratic, non-racial government.

Our priorities and program for the next five years should be informed by a common understanding of the balance of forces. As we said in our *Strategy and Tactics* (1997) the balance of forces are ***"critical to defining the tactics the liberation movement should adopt at each stage of transformation."*** This should also inform the specific decisions we take, e.g. on issues such as prescribed assets or changes in policies.

This is also important when we consider the question whether - at a given time - when we implement policies of the ANC or a joint programme of the Alliance, we do so because of constraints imposed by the balance of forces or whether our approach is determined by revolutionary logic.

Approach to input

Our approach will firstly be historical - looking at the key strategic shifts in the balance of forces during the 90's, the era of negotiations and the meaning of 1994.

When we talk about the balance of forces, we refer to the summation of the objective threats and opportunities in any situation at a given time and what our subjective response to it is or should be. Our subjective response is informed by these objective conditions, but we also know that they are not static and can be influenced subjectively.

The era of negotiations

At the start of formal negotiations in 1990, neither the National Liberation Movement nor the Apartheid Regime could claim outright victory. The National Liberation Movement enjoyed support of our people; it enjoyed international support and it had the capacity to intensify all forms of struggle.

The Apartheid Regime, on the other hand, commanded huge resources - military, economic and the state apparatus. Whilst its mass base was divided, its supporters and beneficiaries still had the capacity to resist change. Internationally, there were elements still prepared to assist (at least in secret) to prevent an insurrectionary take-over.

Negotiations were therefore as much a platform to find a resolution to the conflict as it was a terrain of struggle to shift the balance of forces.

The Breakthrough of 1994

April 27, 1994 constitute a historic breakthrough, a decisive departure from a colonial system and the achievement of a qualitative element of the NDR. "Qualitative element" is used, because the **balance of forces** at the time dictated that the path to full transfer of power, let alone the strategic objective of a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society, would be protracted and tortuous.

The **balance of forces** included the fact that our election victory and the formation of a new government strategically complemented our extra-parliamentary power. It represented a strategic defeat for the forces of white minority rule.

The Interim Constitution provided a framework within which we could implement our programs of transformation and we took control over elements of state power. We enjoyed legitimacy far wider than our mass base (or the 63% we won in the Elections) and the masses of our people were not only prepared to defend our victory, but also to reconcile with their erstwhile enemy.

The international community hailed our peaceful transition as a miracle.

Concessions made included the Government of National Unity for five years and the entrenchment of the rights of the old public service, in the judiciary, security forces and parastatals. This meant that we took over an Apartheid machinery that was intact.

The majority of the public service, captains of industry, the media shared the perspective of the former regime and apartheid cover security networks (in and outside the state) remained intact.

We therefore concluded that in 1994 we achieved elements of power, giving us immense possibilities to use the situation as a beachhead to fundamentally transform society.

What has changed over the last five years?

We must look at the balance of forces in relation to the centers of power which are key to our strategic objective of creating a non-racial, democratic, non-sexist and united South Africa.

The Transformation of the State

The first and most visible act of any revolution, is that of the transfer of political power. These entails taking control of the state machinery and introduce new political and social relations. *In [The State and Transformation](#)* (November 1996) we said that our challenges is essentially to replace the Apartheid State with a democratic one.

The final Constitution adopted in 1996 contains the framework for democratic majority rule and the platform to build a truly united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society. Our Parliament enjoys widespread legitimacy amongst all sectors of our society, including amongst the majority of the white community.

We have laid the foundation to change the social basis and orientation of the state from one geared towards the needs of a white minority, towards a democratic state which serves the country as a whole and champions the aspirations of the majority who have been disadvantaged by many decades of undemocratic rule. We began to do that through the adoption of the RDP as a programme of the GNU, through Budget reforms and the introduction of legislation, policies and programmes in all sectors of government geared towards this objective.

This re-orientation has not been without opposition from the forces who benefited from apartheid. This opposition took forms such as the political mobilization of mainly white civil society against such

policies; sabotage of programmes from within the civil service; with-holding of resources by business for social programmes such as housing; deliberate attempts to discourage foreign investors by painting a gloomy picture of the country or the strategy of their political parties (the DP, NP, FF) seeking to block or delay legislation and policies in Parliament.

We have tried to address the compromise of having a provincial tier through the introduction of co-operative governance in the new Constitution. However, we need to evaluate the role and impact of the provincial tier of government.

And, though we have often extolled the importance of local government as closest to the people, this tier remains our Achilles' heel - for both subjective and objective reasons (inadequate resource base, sustainability of services, etc).

We can therefore conclude that the compromises, acted as a constraint, but did not stop us from implementing programmes of transformation.

However, the issues we need to tackle more decisively include the efficiency and the size of the state, the culture of service and work ethic of civil servants, the public debt, corruption, strengthening co-operative governance and the capacity of local government.

Transforming the Security Forces

SANDF: We are concluding the process to integrate the armed forces, and in terms of numbers, the forces reflects (or are close to) the demographics of our country. We have policies in place, which seek to give a new vision to these forces in line with our overall programme of transformation. We can say, without claiming easy victories, that the fact that we rode the Meiring storm without a crisis (which we could not have done in 1994) strengthens our argument about recidivist elements in the army.

However, this does not reflect the totality of the balance of forces. The fact that these forces no longer confront us head-on on issues of transformation, but do so covertly may pose a greater danger to stability.

SAPS: The transformation of the police has been hampered in part by the lack of personnel to occupy key positions. In transforming the police, we had to establish civilian control, change its relationship with black communities, build partnerships e.g. with business and to work in the context of the rule of law and a human rights culture. We had to introduce changes in management style, affirmative action and re-orientated it towards dealing with crime in a co-ordinated and targetted manner through the NCPS.

Despite some rotten apples in the ranks or those bitter against change, the majority of policemen and women want to improve the image of the SAPS and its success rate in dealing with crime.

However, the balance of forces in the police is less favorable than in the army and we should therefore improve the capacity to introduce major changes in the police - whether through regulation, legislation or deployment.

Beyond the formal structures of the security forces, we had limited success in dealing with the covert security apparatus of the old Apartheid Regime. Issues include how to regulate the plethora of private security companies controlled by former security forces and who have an interest in the continuation of the high levels of crime.

This question also relate to the private intelligence agencies staffed by well-trained people from the former intelligence apparatus, supplying information to forces with potential for destabilization and mercenary groups from here involved all over the continent.

Certain incidences of crime are also reflective of counter-revolution, aimed at discrediting government or taking place during certain political contexts e.g. during the TRC hearings. Even from within the diplomatic community there is an emerging conclusion of a link between crime and a political agenda.

We can therefore conclude that overly in this center, the balance has shifted in our favor, but we can't say with confidence that these forces don't have the capacity to destabilize the country.

Transforming the Economy

Firstly, our transition to democracy took place in a world dominated by the system of capitalism and, until a few months ago, a discourse dominated by a neo-liberal agenda.

The globalization of the world economy and with it the increase in influence of multilateral institutions, have had an impact on the sovereignty of countries. The increase in regional economic blocks is a direct result of this development.

The developments of the last few months, the financial meltdown, social democracy dominating Europe, etc have introduced the possibility for conditions more favorable to our transformation agenda than in 1994.

Given the nature of the Apartheid economy we inherited in 1994, we were faced with difficult choices in rebuilding and restructuring the economy. One of the choices we made was to restructure the economy in such a way that it becomes globally competitive. This did result in job losses in certain sectors, but overly most industries are in a better position and are becoming more competitive. Therefore, as the Asian crisis struck, our industries and economy could weather the storm and not face collapse like we've seen in the former Soviet Union or Indonesia.

Despite the changing discourse in the world about macro-economic policies, the discourse in our media and amongst business is still dominated by the narrow interests of business. It took Madiba (*Political Report to 50th Conference 1997*) to use a quote from George Soros, for the South African media to begin to report on his writings and views on these issues. Any new ideas to deal with the problems facing our economy are still construed as against the market and thus the needs of the country.

It is true that there are secondary contradictions amongst various elements of capital in our country. A key problem has been around the issue of allocative capital. Whilst our financial sector is being hailed as modern, there is little progress in terms of investment in social and infrastructure programmes, in SMME's and job creation generally.

It is however a reflection of change in the balance of forces, that the DTI chief director could frankly raised problems we have with the banks in Parliament. This may not have been possible a year ago, and the banks find themselves on the defensive, with public opinion beginning to accept the need for regulation.

However, our macro economic policy has been an area of debate in the Alliance, in particular some of the tactical and strategic considerations and choices. This will obviously have to be an area of ongoing discussions in the movement - whilst implementing our policies, providing for ongoing review of its impact and amending targets where appropriate.

The question of job creation, which was one of our key priorities in the RDP, should and will remain high on our agenda. The consensus reached, concrete projects decided on and the agreement on social plans at the Presidential Job Summit must therefore form a key element of our programme of accelerating change during our second term.

We can therefore conclude that in the economy, the balance has somewhat shifted in our favor in terms of the possibilities of a discourse and a climate more favorable to implement our programmes.

At a programmatic level, we should therefore look at issues such as re-opening the debate on prescribed assets, the pace of lifting exchange controls and the restructuring of the multi lateral institutions and agreements to be more favorable towards the needs of the developing world.

Media, the Public Debate and Hegemony

This area is critical, because even though we may have made progress in material terms, unless the forces for change are able to exercise hegemony, it will impact on our capacity to mobilise society around our programme for change, and ultimately on our ability to effect change and transformation.

We have made progress with the restructuring of the electronic media. Never before in our country have we had such a vibrant sector - ranging from community radio, private and public television stations, etc.

The transformation of the SABC did take much longer than we thought and more needs to be done at middle management level. With regards the print media, the ownership structures remain a problem.

The anger with which the opposition parties responded to the transformed GCIS, is a result of their hegemony in the media since 1994. It thus became a shock for them when for the first time the democratic government in an aggressive and targetted manner communicates directly with the population, without mediation through the media or the opposition.

The movement also needs to look at other elements of the ideological apparatus in society responsible for the promotion and development of ideas. This includes universities, research and policy institutes, culture, etc.

At a broader level, we should also consider the resonance we find in the concept of the African Renaissance, as part of dealing with the issues of national identity, morality and common values.

Whilst as a movement we still maintain the moral high ground on any issue facing the nation, we have not engaged sufficiently with this area, often loosing the tactical initiative.

The International Situation

A number of developments in the international arena contribute to a more favorable environment for our transformation. These include the victory of social democratic parties in Europe and the shifts in the macro economic debate following the meltdown in the international financial markets.

Though we have often been accused of not having a foreign policy, in the international arena we often box above our weight. South Africa has consolidated its position as a force to be reckoned with in the world and as a leader amongst countries of the South.

We have been consistent in placing on the agenda of the international community the issues of a more just and equal world order. This range from our approach to the IMF and World Bank, the Lockerby issue and our stance on Cuba, to our leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement and our promotion of the African Renaissance and South-South co-operation. However, we must admit that the situation in Southern Africa has changed for the worse with the wars in Angola and the DRC, the political instability in Zimbabwe, Swaziland and to some extend Lesotho. We have also seen our influence in the region diminishing with new alignments, especially around the war in the DRC.

We will therefore have to prioritize, in re-affirmation of our 50th Conference resolutions, the promotion of peace, stability and development in the region. Our initiative to define our approach to party to party relations should therefore be seen as part of our attempt to strengthen unity amongst progressive forces in the region and continent. So would our role in SADC and the OAU, and specifically initiatives such as the recent agreement on the Southern African peacekeeping force and the ongoing work towards regional economic integration.

Subjective and Objective Strengths and Weaknesses of the NLM

The subjective element of the balance of forces refer in the main to our ability and capacity to mobilise the motive forces behind our programme and to isolate the forces who are opposed to transformation and change.

The document *From Resistance to Reconstruction. Tasks of the ANC in the new Epoch of the Democratic Transformation.* (August 1994) focuses on some of the key tasks the movement needs to undertake in mobilizing the motive forces and contribute to the shift of the *balance of forces*.

It highlights four specific objectives we should achieve, namely: -

- Hold on to our African support, in particular the rural masses, the urban working class and the African middle class;

- Retain and increase our support amongst the Indian, Coloured and White middle strata;

- Win over the Coloured and Indian sections of the working class;

- Win back support we lost to the IFP in rural KwaZulu/Natal.

In relation to the second task of isolating the forces against transformation, and deprive the forces for counter-revolution of a social base, it meant we had to: -

- Work with the IFP to ensure lasting peace in pursuit of a common objective of transformation which is in the objective interest of our constituencies;

- Engage white South Africans in all their social strata to ensure that most of them pay allegiance to the Constitution and share in the national consensus.

Clearly, our ability to do the above and thus impact on the objective conditions that confront us, depended on our organizational strength, capacity and programme.

Organizationally we are weaker than in 1994 with regards the unity of our structures, operations of our branches, careerism and the potential for patronage, decline of the spirit of service and sacrifice and our ability to engage with and give leadership to communities and civil society generally.

A more in depth analysis of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Alliance and each component part is adequately contained in the discussion paper on the *Programme of Action of the Alliance* (Umrabulo no.6. 1999).

The ANC remains the most important moral voice of the country on almost any question facing the country. Much have been done to improve people's quality of life. However, social distance, our organisational weaknesses and incidences of corruption involving our cadres has weakened our status as the moral voice of our people.

In some sectors, political consciousness is much lower than in 1994. Pointers towards this include the apathy around registration, especially amongst the youth, lack of mass mobilization and a growing culture of self-enrichment at all costs.

Mass programmes such as the one-day wage sacrifice by workers to contribute towards job creation and the initiatives to introduce a national youth service programme, may go some way towards addressing these issues.

At a general level, class alignment in our country is still dominated by the national question. There has been a relative deracialisation of the middle class, but all social and economic indicators points to poverty remaining racially based.

The black working class has made major advances in terms of its working conditions under the democratic government. It has also suffered a number of setbacks, such as retrenchments and the increased casualization of labour, decreasing its objective capacity. Through its organised formations it remain vocal and active in defending its interests.

The new black bourgeoisie remain loyal, in the context of a more conducive climate for capital. However, our weakness as the Alliance to mobilise the motive forces at the most local levels, give leadership to different social sectors and unite them in action, have contributed to the process of fragmentation and often lack of direction amongst these forces.

The Opposition

Given the widespread legitimacy of the 1994 elections and our democratic government, the forces against transformation and change have to assume a legitimate political form - hence the proliferation of political parties.

Clearly, political parties in SA fall into four broad categories:

    a. parties linked to the liberation struggle, and this includes the PAC and BC elements;
    b. parties directly representing a broad spectrum of white interests, be they Afrikaner or English - liberal in origin;
    c. parties relying on the mobilization of regional or ethnic factors for their political subsistence; and
    d. parties informed by a narrow understanding of morality, e.g. ACDP.

The last five years have seen the realignment of forces and the reconstitution of the political battlefield. The first obvious development is the disappearance of homeland parties.

This development was accompanied by the growing rapprochement between the ANC and IFP. This rapprochement included a number of peace initiatives, work in the GNU and the province, the recent Three-Aside and Ten-Aside structures, all of these underpinned by the objective conditions faced by the constituency we share, which are African and rural. This has been against the very grain of the basic and fundamental counter-revolutionary strategy to keep the ANC and IFP apart. It seeks to prevent a strong ANC and South Africa in the world and thus the need for a black counterweight.

Secondly, the NP is continuing to lose ground both in terms of support and the fragmentation of its original ideologically. The DP is emerging as a party that could protect white interests. This in part is an objective consequence of the 1994 breakthrough. Before 1994, the Afrikaner section of the white ruling block exercised its power primarily (but not exclusively as indicated by the conscious program to build Afrikaner capital) through the state and its various organs. This has been significantly eroded over the last five years and is on its way to being further reduced, especially in the parastatals.

The English liberal section of the ruling block on the other hand, always exercised its power primarily through business, capital and the media. That power has not reduced significantly, though it feels threatened.

Thirdly, is the emergence of post-apartheid parties, notably that of the FA and the UDM that are centered around individuals/cliques without any significant historical and social base except opportunism.

While the NP used to rely on white and Coloured working class support, the UDM is clearly mobilizing Xhosa ethnicity and resentment against the ANC as its source of political capital. The fact that the leadership of the UDM is drawn from the old National Security Management System and Intelligence

structures does make the question relevant whether this is the alternative political voice of counter-revolution, replacing the NP.

The NP is destined to follow the fate of its counterparts in countries such as Zimbabwe where Ian Smith could not survive the post-colonial setup primarily because of its association with apartheid. It is not able to attract an African base, whilst loosing its white base to the DP. There are however sectors of the white community who recognized the folly of Smith and his followers - that by existing as narrow white parties, the entire white population became a marginalized minority.

There is also the potential for the NP to loose a good part of its Coloured support in Western Cape with signals that some of its high-profile leaders may cross the floor to us. It is not clear whether this shift is possible with Indians in Kwazulu Natal. However, winning away a significant section of Coloureds from the NP in the Western Cape, will impact on Northern Cape and Gauteng, reducing it to a much weaker national force.

The DP, NP and with an outside chance, the UDM, will battle to occupy the role of official opposition. The UDM's problem is its linkages to political violence, and the DP will have to shed its image of a white, English, middle-class party. Though both the UDM and DP have gained from the decline of the NP, they are yet to register a 10% support in surveys.

All these parties, with the exception of the UDM, are unlikely to make any significant inroads into African communities, because of being rooted in white history and politics.

The opposition knows that it cannot win an electoral battle against the ANC, and has now opted for a number of strategies.

First, is their selective target of certain provinces, especially Gauteng, Western Cape, Northern Cape and KZN, where they think that because of certain demographic and political factors, they can prevent an ANC majority and then impose a coalition government on us.

Secondly, is their concerted effort to penetrate African areas and the ANC itself by attracting elements disgruntled with us.

Thirdly, they portray the ANC two-third majority rule as a threat to our democracy, and, consequently, work to prevent the ANC-IFP rapprochement.

This assessment indicate that there is no single party in this country that can take the ANC toe-to-toe in an electoral battle or in a battle about the fundamental questions facing the country.

The Balance of forces post June 2, 1999

At the time of publication, we had concluded the 1999 elections. The ANC is engaged in a process of making a detailed political analysis of the Elections and its impact on the balance of forces. These are therefore preliminary remarks on this matter.

Firstly, the near two thirds majority we received was an affirmation that the masses of our people continue to see the ANC as the only organisation representing their aspirations and capable of effecting transformation. We not only consolidated our African support base, but also made important inroads into the Colored and Indian communities in Gauteng, Northern Cape and the Western Cape.

The ANC campaign message, elaborated in our *Election Manifesto*, of **"Accelerating change"** found resonance in the hearts and minds of millions of South Africans. They were mindful of the obstacles we faced during the first five years and went to the polls to give us an overwhelming mandate to speed up change.

The DP emerged as the voice of those fighting back against change, emerging as the new party of white South Africans and significantly eroding the NNP's historic support base.

We lost some support to the UDM and UCDP in Eastern Cape and the Northwest, indicating that we have not done sufficient work amongst civil servants and security force personnel from the old bantustan regimes in these provinces.

The election has brought with it expectations of faster change, of ongoing contact with the people and of less tolerance for the social ills of unemployment, poverty, corruption and crime that remain pervasive. For these expectations to be met requires the continued mobilization of the people in governance and for reconstruction and development.

Conclusion

The above reflects the balance in some of the key centers of power. Though we have followed the approach of looking at these individually, the linkages between different components are crucial and some areas have much greater impact on our overall vision.

Our ability to shift the balance and to make use of the opportunities presented by the last five years depends on the ANC. It depends on our capacity to be amongst our people, to lead local struggles, to implement the reconstruction and development programme and to represent the aspirations of our people in its morality and lifestyle.

In debating the issues we raised, we must ensure that we decide boldly on those areas we need to prioritize for programmatic intervention - whether in government or in the organisation.

A radical reshaping of the vision and role of SANCO

Part 1 of a Summarized version of the SANCO Strategy Discussion Document in preparation for the 3rd National Conference of SANCO, April 2000

Introduction and background

This paper emanates from the mandate of the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) held on the 3rd of February 1999. The key objectives were to trace the historical foundation and cornerstones of SANCO. The mandate commanded that we assess the performance of SANCO and to consider options to transform SANCO into a revolutionary social movement that primarily serves its constituency.

There is a contestation of ideas on the history of the civic movement. Some historians argue that the Bambata rebellion was a characteristic of residents' organisations, others that civic organisations were realized after the ANC's Morogoro Conference in 1969. Other historians argue that the high level of civic co-ordination, became tangible only during the 1980s with the advent of civic organisations like Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisations, Soweto Civics, and others.

We shall for the purpose of this paper use the 1997 National Conference as our starting point.

"SANCO has its roots in the radical civics formed as part of the township resistance movement of the 1980s. Let us at the forefront admit that the sweeping political changes were too revolutionary in there pace, and SANCO were caught with its pens down. We have not come to grips with post-liberation politics (neither have we taken appropriate strategic adjustments to understand our role post April 1994.)

We are not an organisation that studies the media and underlines sentences to criticize the next morning, neither do we fold our arms awaiting to praise every action of government. Every move we take is and was judged on its political merit and how it advances the course of the poor.

A sound political judgement should not be superseded by emotional considerations. Content rather than sound have always led SANCO. To be radical and revolutionary does not mean we must be more aggressive, angrier than all existing political lunatics in order to please academia or the ultra left, if it still exists.

The transition to democracy was not easy, and our democracy and political liberation remains imperfect, least of all the economic disparities. These developments are pregnant and complex for us as a civic movement. It is an imperative, now to confront what may inevitably be a suicidal political era for civil society in general, and SANCO in particular." - Mlungisi Hlongwane, President of SANCO, at the SANCO 2nd National Conference, in Johannesburg, 1997.

Understanding the nature of the 1997 Conference mandate and our implementation thereof

Our National Conference in 1997, was lucid and clear in its resolve, it challenged SANCO and its leaders to ***"Build a Revolutionary Social Movement to Conquer the Challenges of the 21st Century."***

SANCO's vision has always been just that, to build a social movement, that would consist of the poor and marginalized of society. It was envisioned, that this movement would use non-violent, but aggressive means of advocacy and pressure on the state and other organs of society, particularly business, so as to accelerate the transformation agenda.

Though SANCO was formed before the apartheid regime was defeated at the voting stations, it nonetheless reasoned, that its purpose and resolve was still valid, even after the ANC occupied the corridors of power in the Union Buildings in Pretoria.

However, it is safe to conclude that its vision of having an all-encompassing movement has never really taken off, due to factors that we shall interrogate in this paper.

SANCO should be tackling issues of national importance, in exactly the same manner as communities tackle issues of services. However, in the changing environment, it has been found wanting. It has not been consistent in taking up issues with the vision Conference resolved, but has only started a process to redress this. However, unlike previous times, when it believed that this could be done in one fell swoop, it has now begun to improve its position in a programmatic way.

SANCO's understanding of the machinations of state and state processes has improved. It has thus embarked on an ambitious, yet realizable, programme of ensuring that the issues it feels more comfortable with are brought back to the national agenda.

Moreover, the issues shall be discussed as defined by SANCO. For instance, the Gauteng chapter of SANCO has launched a five-year programme that starts with calls for the waver of service arrears, and we plan to take this programme national.

The remarkable thing about this programme is that it shall attempt to solve the basic problem in service payment, a problem that has been increasingly ignored because of globalization and liberal pressure. This is the problem of residents not having the means to pay services.

Furthermore, the programme does not offer any soft approach just because the ANC occupies government. It does put pressure on the ANC to either reject or accept this popular call and to explain its decision to business.

One would be safe to assume that this example can be replicated in all other departments of SANCO, though not in the near future due to the lack of capacity.

SANCO is part of the community constituency in NEDLAC. Its lack of capacity has been exposed by its failure to address issues in NEDLAC. This is in contrast to other organisations in this constituency,

mainly NGO's, with debatable pockets of support. The unity of the Community Constituency has thus always been an issue, though never been in the open.

One would expect that SANCO should be able to build its capacity through NEDLAC, particularly in terms of information. However, the mass nature of the organisation does not just allow for individuals to be capacitated, but must include all leaders in SANCO at all levels.

Our participation in the NEDLAC process has revealed that the issue most lacking in SANCO is a cadreship development programme. A cadreship development programme should be regarded as a priority for SANCO for the next three years. The programme must be practical and theoretical. It is also a way to tackle the compartmentalization of the sectoral organisations in the National Liberation Struggle (NLS).

As such, the South African Communist Party, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, and the African National Congress are all expected to contribute towards the programme. The recipients of the programme shall include branch, regional and provincial leaders.

The practical nature of the programme shall include SANCO leaders who shall be expected to use the skills learnt when representing the organisation in multi-party fora like NEDLAC. The main objective of the programme is to ensure that there is no vast gap between the leadership of SANCO and its local levels, particularly in style and content. Furthermore, the number of quality leaders shall be able to quadruple.

Moreover, the programme shall not be inflexible, amounting to brainwashing, but shall remain true to basic tenets of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR).

Development is an enriching process. Yet, it is true that development is ultimately rewarding when the outcomes are improvement in the lives of the poor. We have begun to realize that the process of development provides even greater rewards to individuals. Before, we scream consultant, developers and other service providers, let us examine ourselves even more carefully. Better the devil you know than the devil you don't!

SANCO presents itself as an excellent opportunity for the entrepreneur. We are open to abuse of so-called leaders who are only interested in how much development can line their pockets, than the actual product of development. And, comrades, we can become into an organisation of criminals and opportunists without a strategic vision other than that which assists the financial pockets of individuals. Enrichment, rather than empowerment can always become a self-fulfilling prophecy! And let us be true, to realize, that these situations occur even at branch level.

However, with no cadreship development programme in place, SANCO continues to find and bluff its way, in a manner that does not fit its noble beginnings or its noble objectives.

Strategic options

There are various scenarios and permutations we must examine, internally and externally. Some of these scenarios emerged from senior leadership of the Alliance and others from our own members during the National Office Bearers visits during 1998. Yet others came from various media commentators. The following are some references drawn from the different quarters as referred to.

The document adopted by the Alliance Summit in 1998 - *Unity in Action* notes:

"The ANC branch should function much more as a civic. This is not say that the existing civic movement should be hurriedly dismantled. But in many other situations, the STRATEGIC MOTIVATION (own emphasis) for a SANCO branch and an ANC branch is NOT at all APPARENT."

In this document the Alliance argues that there is no need for a SANCO branch, since an ANC branch can satisfy the civic concerns of the community. It is implied that SANCO as an organisation should

not exist, particularly where there is an ANC branch in a local community. This proposition ignores the role played by the civic movement in destroying apartheid, together with other anti-apartheid forces within the National Liberation Struggle.

In an earlier ANC document published in December 1991 by its Department of Political Education, it had this to say about the approach of the liberation movement to civics:

"The history should not lead us into thinking of the civics as appendages of the ANC. We believe that civics have their own specific character and identity which is different to that of the ANC. Their independence must be jealously protected… This means we have to build strong mass organisations. Democracy has to exist both outside and within the ANC.

The process of dismantling apartheid will go on well into a post-apartheid South Africa. This democratic transformation will need an array of organisations separate from political parties and the state. It is in this context that the ANC strongly urges its members to participate in the building of mass democratic structures."

This document states that the civic movement must be independent so it assist in the building of a better and more equitable society and of a stronger ANC. It recognizes that the transformation of South African society cannot be achieved without the involvement of civil society. Moreover, it goes to the extent of calling for ANC members to participate in civil society in their numbers.

Mojalefa Musi, the National Educator of the South African Transport and Allied Workers' Union, in the Business Day, 21 July 1999, said:

"Opposition parties are not inherently progressive, nor are ruling parties always reactionary. Students of South African history will agree that the network of anti-apartheid social forces was not a happy marriage. There were contradictions and tensions. For this reason, the potential for a serious opposition is possible, given the degree of independent thinking and proactive engagements.

The view articulated should not be reduced to a 'left-wing watchdog' that will stir up cynicism and pessimism. They have to be active agents of transformation of society. The relationship of this type of opposition and the state will be dialectical; its leaders must strike an intelligent balance between complementary and contradiction."

Comrade Musi recognizes that the present government opposition parties shall not be able to catch the public's eye nor do they have the will to call for the radical transformation of South African society. He therefore places emphasis on mass-based, grassroots social movements to support government when anti-transformation forces puts pressure on government.

At the same time, he calls for the same social movements to ensure that government remains on track with regard to the transformation agenda by putting pressure on government if the need arises.

Strategic options for SANCO

Each of the above statements refers to SANCO in one way or another. Every one of the statements poses different challenges for SANCO, its members, and leaders. Each one contains numerous strategic options for SANCO. In our considered opinion, there are probably five (5) options facing SANCO:

Option 1: SANCO becomes a political party

Option 2: SANCO as a watchdog

Option 3: A confused SANCO

Option 4: SANCO as a development agency

Option 5: SANCO as a revolutionary social movement

Now let us attempt to analyze each option, without prescribing any one option.

Option 1: Sanco becomes a political party

SANCO becomes a fully-fledged political party, whilst retaining its historical experience of operating in the realm of civil society. It does not contest all forms of government elections but concentrates on those levels or sections of government where it feels comfortable. The obvious choice shall be that of local government.

What makes this a viable option is the absence of any serious political competitor to the ruling party. The present opposition parties, either emanate as political parties from the apartheid era (NNP, DP), or led by leaders who were "national" leaders during the apartheid era, Lucas Mangope, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Amichand Rajbansi, Bantu Holomisa, or emanate from the struggle against apartheid but not supportive of the Freedom Charter, such as the PAC. Furthermore, the United Democratic Movement, consists of a motley crew of both homeland leaders, individuals from recent NGO's, and disaffected Nats.

The political space for an organisation like SANCO is readily available. SANCO also has to its advantage the appropriate leadership credentials, a large following at a local community level and a pro-transformation agenda. Moreover, recent history has shown that when SANCO leaders contested local government elections in 1995, they won their respective wards, even where the ANC was the dominant party.

The continued tensions between SANCO and the ANC, and the negative media reporting on the ANC in government, has not resulted in the masses voting for another political party, since a viable alternative did not exist.

The staggered election process, of national and local elections, shall ensure that a majority of persons who would have normally voted one party, shall not feel disloyal to their party. They shall be voting at a local level for a perceived powerful alternative. They can be safe in the knowledge that they already voted for their party in the national elections.

Furthermore, SANCO at a national level can still agitate for the necessary change in a normal manner, around issues such as the provision of full services to township residents and greater allocation of the national fiscus to local levels. This will ensure that SANCO leaders at a local level shall be sufficiently protected, by placing blame for lack of delivery at national, where SANCO is not in operation in the government sphere. The forthcoming local government elections, in the year 2000, can be used to test this policy shift.

However, the obvious danger is that it is a small step from contesting local elections to contesting provincial or national elections. The consequence as the process continues, is that SANCO shall no more be a social movement and in fact, SANCO shall no longer exist. It shall become a political party, with all the pressures of being in government.

The need for a social movement of communities shall be taken up by persons who do not necessarily belong to SANCO. In other words, SANCO shall no longer exist as a social movement, and must be willing to pay that price.

Option 2 SANCO as a watchdog

SANCO operates in the civil and political arena, as the classic illustration or caricature of the Western definition or idea of civil society. In other words, it is completely and wholly independent of political parties and government, and is an apolitical watchdog.

The obvious gain is that the funding pool for SANCO grows, both globally and domestically, in that, those in business, politics and social sectors who do not support the ANC, will gladly support an organisation like SANCO, who is willing to *"fight back"* and is *"gatvol."* SANCO's profile shall be dramatically increased in terms of media coverage, because of the sensationalist nature of its content.

However, its actual contribution to the National Democratic Revolution becomes questionable. Fury and sound rather than actual content shall lead SANCO. It shall attract persons who are not necessarily in agreement with transformation as dictated to by the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), but by the individual's political aspirations and hatred for the transformation agenda. SANCO shall no more serve the constituency that formed it.

Option 3 A confused SANCO

SANCO operates in a confusing and haphazard manner, by fooling everybody on its role (including itself). It operates independently, but is comprehensively dependent on the material circumstances or powers that be. Its programme and agendas are thoroughly influenced by the material circumstance and situation.

In this scenario, SANCO moves from one crisis to the next, in the hope it can arrest the situation. However, it shall just be engaging in crisis management, and move further and further away from its constituency, given the heavier weight attached to material circumstances as opposed to the mandate from its constituency. It shall be a matter of time before this SANCO has to choose between Option One and Option Two.

If we are to be clinical in our analysis, we are forced to admit that this scenario accurately describes SANCO at this moment. When our 1997 National Conference endorsed the National General Council resolution on government leaders being allowed to become SANCO leaders, we became swallowed into this unholy scenario.

As such, serving two masters, we emphasise one above the other when convenient. We resolved to be outside of formal structures of the Alliance, and complain when we are not invited to Alliance meetings. We pronounce proudly that we are independent, yet we insist on placing SANCO leaders in the ANC list as SANCO nominees.

There are no real positives from this scenario, other than SANCO existing in name, and for the sake of historic polemic in future debates.

Option 4 SANCO as a development agency

SANCO operates as a self-sustaining, commercially-focussed and mass-based development agency, without any genuine political agenda. It creates a form of exploitative synergy between its role and development programmes that are financially viable.

In this scenario, SANCO's material resources shall increase at a rate superior to its political acumen or power. It shall be able to do away with its resource problems. However, SANCO, shall begin to lose its political authority on issues within communities, and shall only succeed in impressing the business sector.

The greatest challenges in this scenario would be to give direction to this investment and development arm and ensure that we not only provide benefits towards our own structures, but the resources are channeled towards the communities, that should be the main beneficiaries. If we believe that we no longer have political space because of the democratic dispensation, then this option is more viable and attractive.

Option 5 SANCO as a revolutionary social movement

SANCO is an independent and autonomous organ of civil society, implementing its resolutions, guided by its mass base and informed by its historical mandate. It is confrontational and champions the cause of the historically margninalised. It does not digress from the National Democratic Revolution.

This scenario seems, at face value, to be the most positive. It demands that the movement is clear and lucid in its support for certain issues, individuals, organisations, and political parties. Moreover, it has to be doubly clear on its reasons for non-support (alternatively its support for marginal or peripheral views) on issues.

The demands are great on the movement to be strong on principle, and shy away from rhetoric. The work of the organisation shall be time-consuming, elaborate, complex and at times frustrating. Nonetheless, the organisation shall remain true to its founding documents, its constituency and the National Democratic Revolution. Furthermore, this scenario does not allow the leadership to serve two masters, by being both in government and a SANCO leader, since the question of independence becomes central.

Conclusion

All five options provide wonderful ideas on the fate of a movement, unique like that of SANCO. Moreover, within the backdrop of our second national elections, and the looming local elections, SANCO finds itself at a crossroads, which could mean it could choose with relative ease any of the five options.

It will be opportunistic and an error of judgement if we attempt to combine various options or all of them. No combination of these options will be able to satisfy our objectives, which are to eradicate poverty, homelessness, joblessness, landlessness, to consolidate democracy and economic redistribution. These objectives are commonly known as the National Democratic Revolution. We must be clear in our resolve and not confuse our members and fraternal organisations.

Only the National Conference, can lay the philosophical basis for any one of these options or come up with new scenarios. However, the present situation demands that a line of march is taken by the organisation. Otherwise, history will choose for us and we may not be ready to greet and recognise the challenges until it is too late.

* Section 2 of this document, which we will publish in the next edition of Umrabulo, focuses on:

- *• The question of independence*
- *• Analysis of external factors; and*
- *• The balance of forces and analysis of the state.*

THE MDM, CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION:

The challenges of building a popular movement for transformation

by David Makura
(National Executive Committee Member, ANC Youth League)

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to provide a conceptual account of why there are serious weaknesses in the structures of the Congress movement and how such weaknesses can be addressed through new forms of organisation and new content of struggles.

The intention is to undertake an analysis of the organisational form and content of struggles of the grassroots structures (branches/locals) of the Tripartite Alliance and MDM.

The fundamental proposition of this paper is that the lamentable weaknesses of the structures of the Congress movement (Tripartite Alliance and its allied broad democratic movement) derives mainly from organisational forms and content of struggles that are caught between an oppositional and a transformative mode of struggle. We are arguing against a conventional Alliance analysis of the main sources of the current weaknesses of the Congress movement: structures are weak because most capable leaders have been deployed into organs of state. This conventional explanation always accounts for one part of the problem while leaving unexplained the fact that a major weakness of our structures today are that they are modeled along the lines of resistance to Apartheid.

Most of our organisations are finding it difficult to break out of the politics of opposition and move full circle into transformative struggles. This is particularly the case at local level. This is a problem of the form that these local organisations take and the content of their struggles and not simply a vague explanation of lack of leadership and organisational capacity.

There is no denial that the caliber of leadership has declined in most of

our structures. However, the problem with the "lack of leadership" thesis can be self-serving and patronising. We therefore argue that the "lack of capacity and leadership" conventional theory is inadequate as these leaders deployed into organs of state are themselves grappling with the new organisational and political challenges posed by transformation.

In seeking to understand the weaknesses from the point of view of the relationship between organisational form, changed context and content of struggles, we have spent a considerable amount of time on the relationship between the ANC branch and the civics. This arose in the context of the question about SANCO being a fourth Alliance partner and a study of the problems between ANC branches and civic structures since 1990.

We believe and argue that going back to the notion of people's power and giving this notion a new context will help resolve this tension between oppositional and transformative struggles.

Indeed, seeing MDM structures (particularly civics) as organs of civil society rather than organs of people's power is the first obstacle towards the resolution of the tensions. The same applies to seeing the ANC branch as simply a "political" structure that has no civic content and role.

It is problematic to abandon the language of the democratic movement in favor of fashionable phrases that obscure the class content of concepts. For instance, preferring to call ourselves organs of civil society as opposed to organs of people's power.

The national democratic state, like MDM formations, is an organ of people's power. This is the reason why we do not fit the civil society description in the same way that anti-state NGO's do.

The need to transform all organs of people's power is a critical element of social transformation. The challenge is to build and evolve a movement for transformation that is rooted in grassroots organisation.

MDM/organs of civil society as a conceptual problem

We would like to kick-start this engagement by posing as a problem the loose usage of certain concepts which seem to dominate most discussions on the state of the democratic movement today.

Firstly, is it correct to use the term MDM, structures and organs of civil society inter-changeably? What happened to organs of people's power? Is there any politically substantive difference between organs of civil society and those of people's power?

We want to contend that in our movement today, the use of certain concepts as opposed to others, is a deliberate exercise aimed at giving prominence to those categories that masks the class character of our social transformation. In this particular case, concepts such as organs of civil society are preferred from organs of people's power.

In this input, we seek to interrogate the conceptual and practical usefulness or otherwise of the continued usage of the concepts such as "MDM" and "civil society". How do they help us in both deepening our understanding of the tasks of social transformation, as well as in matching such political clarity with concrete plans of action to bring about radical social change?

MDM formations as organs of people's power

We move from the basis that to see MDM formations as organs of civil society rather than as organs of people's power is to go back to the period before the 1950s, when the movement was more of a civil rights organisation than a national liberation movement.

It is important to point out that when we talk of a movement we are not just talking of an organisation or a group of organisations.

A movement is a function of people organised on a sustained basis and united in action behind a coherent political programme. A movement has an identifiable line of march. It has a cohesive leadership. The mass, militant, non-racial and democratic character of united action against apartheid became defining qualities of the Congress Movement of the 1950s. We now know that this character was influenced largely by the formation of the ANCYL in 1944, the Black mineworkers strike of 1946 and subsequent adoption of the 1949 programme of action.

While the use of the word "MDM" is something that emerged in the semi-insurrection period of the second half of the 1980s, we argue that this was more of a continuation of the afore-mentioned qualities of the "Congress Movement" in pursuit of the ideals of the Freedom Charter. These qualities became collectively known as the Congress tradition.

The 1989 MDM civil defiance campaign was a true expression of people's power that was breaking the back of apartheid state power.

The democratic state as an organ of people's power

To us, it is clear why we could not use concepts such as civil society in the 80s. It is mainly because civil society, by definition, would not want to 'dirty its hands' with state power, while on the other hand organs of people's power have always sought to replace the apartheid state with a people's national democratic state.

In pursuit of this objective, civics, SRC's, youth formations, women's organisations, trade unions, community groups, religious groups were all united. While state power has always been a key element of people's power, people's power has never been limited to state power. The democratic state has always been seen as one of the important organs through which people's power be exercised.

The second reason why the concept "civil society" was not appealing, in our ranks, before 1990 is because the debate on the distinction between political/military society and civil society that took place in the Western world would certainly not make sense to a revolutionary movement that was involved in a struggle whose pillars combined political, military, diplomatic and civil facets. Even in the current period where all the MDM formations have a serious interest in whom wields state power and in whose interest such power is exercised, they cannot be defined principally as organs of civil society.

It is therefore still correct to argue that MDM formations remain organs of political society (referred to earlier as people's power)? This is not to argue that structures such as civics, religious groups, sports and cultural bodies, school governing bodies, development forums, RDP committees, water

committees, transformation forums, etc., should be an exclusive domain of the Congress movement. What we need to ensure is that the movement's transformation agenda permeates the social, cultural and economic spheres of society.

The Alliance discussion paper *"**The State, Property Relations and Social Transformation**"*, goes a long way in mapping out a perspective on the political and socio-economic challenges of constructing a national democratic state. As we have argued in this paper, the national democratic state is an activist, developmental state that is itself an organ of people's power. Far from being neutral, it is a people-centred and people-driven state whose agenda is to pursue the movement's transformation objectives. The paper was broadly endorsed by all Alliance partners at the Alliance Summit of October 1998.

Where does the congress movement derive its mass, democratic and movement character today?

It is conventional wisdom that the democratic movement has been severely weakened by the transition process. We are in the midst of a vast transition from popular resistance to popular rule. There can be no denying that most of our MDM structures, both at grassroots and at national levels, are still more oppositional/reactive than transformative in approach to governance.

This includes even the ANC, SACP branches and COSATU locals.They still act more as organs of people's power in the era of apartheid and less as organs of people's power in the era of transformation. They sometimes perceive the local people's state as an enemy. This is very ironic as they act as if they are traditional organs of Western civil society.

The civics, student formations, religious groups and NGO's also vacillate between oppositional and transformative struggles. In difficult times like this, the easiest thing to do is use bad labels against everything we fail to understand and grasp its essence, especially when it comes to new phenomena. The most popular of the labels become counter-revolutionary, ultra-leftist, rightwing or neo-liberal. We are not saying that in all instances these labels do not fit the description. The problem with labeling as a political culture is that it can easily take the place of painstaking thought necessary for every revolutionary.

At the Alliance Summit of September 1997 and October 1998, there were thorough discussions on the state of the Alliance and the organisational challenges facing each partner. There is now broad consensus on the Alliance programme of action articulated in the document titled *"**UNITY IN ACTION - A discussion document on the Programme and Organisational challenges facing the Tripartite Alliance**"*. In this paper we seek to focus more on other MDM formations than on the entire Alliance.

The ANC has evolved over a long period of time to become the leader of our national liberation struggle. This leadership role is a function of both the subjective and objective factors of the national democratic revolution. At a subjective level, the adoption of the 1949 programme of action and the subsequent mass defiance campaigns one most important historical period, seeing its evolvement into a broad multi-class organisation that is biased to the working class and the rural poor.

The ANC's strategic objective is to build a united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous society. The extent to which it will remain committed to the interests of the working class and the rural poor will depend on the role that these popular classes and strata play as the motive forces of social transformation.

The leadership of the ANC of the NDR also derives from this fact that it represents all sections of the oppressed. At an objective level, the leadership of the ANC derives from the tasks of a particular phase of the transformation process. Therefore the mass, democratic and movement character of the ANC is something that has evolved historically. Of course this evolution has not been smooth. At each given historical period there has always been tensions that would raise a lot of questions, particularly in relation to the democratic part of it.

However, that the ANC is a mass movement is confirmed by the fact no other political force in our country represents the aspirations of the majority of the population to the same extent. No other formation of the Alliance represents the diverse interests of the oppressed to the same extent.

Notwithstanding the above strength, we need to point out that one of the key weaknesses of the ANC organisation has been the loss of the front elements of the UDF. During the legal re-establishment of ANC structures in the country after the unbannings, most UDF organisations and activists were not necessarily turned into loyal ANC cadres.

In some sense, the ANC was seen as just the constitutional organisation as opposed to a movement to which all in the MDM belonged. The effects of this are worse at a grassroots/branch level. From the onset, we should have never allowed a dichotomy between political and civic matters. If the ANC branch is to become an organ of people's power, it cannot leave housing, water, sanitation, roads, education, health, local economic development to a SANCO branch.

It is only when the ANC branch can truly be the voice of the community that the truly mass, democratic and movement character of the ANC will be consolidated. This requires that the branch becomes more civic, without seizing to be political. This will represent a significant transformation of ANC grassroots structures into organs of people's power. When this happens, as it is already the case in most squatter settlements in the East Rand township of Tembisa, the need for a civic structures as they currently exist is questionable. We shall return to this later.

Taking stock of developments within the civic movement

In studying the current developments in the civic movement, we have used both our experience as people who have been involved in initiating and launching these structures in the mid 80's and early 90's. We have also gone a step further by visiting and talking to some of the former and current leaders of civics and ANC branches in certain parts of the country, particularly in Alexandra and Tembisa. This has been a very useful experience in revealing both the most progressive as well as the negative elements of local transformation struggles, including the struggle to transform local Alliance structures.

There are three important lessons from both the history and the present challenges facing local civic organisations:

Firstly, we find that prior to the launch of SANCO as a national organisation, and even before the re-emergence of the ANC in 1990, the civic form of organisation, along with other sectoral formations of youth and students, was a central vehicle in locating townships and villages as historical centers for popular mobilization, innovation and resistance against apartheid and white capital.

Secondly, we find that the 1990's brought serious contradictions in the civic organisation. This is because the ANC, which emerged in 1990 as a legal national political movement, had to occupy the same centre, the townships and villages, as that of the local civic organisation. The grassroots organisational relationships between the two organisations came to be addressed "not by one collapsing into the other" as other formations did (e.g. UDF disbanding in favor of the ANC and SAYCO in favor of the ANCYL).

The resolution of relationship between the two was through the "civic" and "political" dialectic that in turn brought the crisis not only of the civic organisation but ANC branch as well. This crisis took various manifestations such as the "fight over the territory", clash of personalities and greater bureaucratization of both structures at a local level.

Thirdly, the crisis was brought to its sharpest level in the run up to the 1995 local government elections. A new emphasis and division of labour began to be pronounced between the "political" of the ANC and the "civic" nature of SANCO. In most parts of the country, two types of tensions emerged.

On the one hand, serious battles raged between comrades as both ANC and civic leaders saw themselves, respectively, as the only legitimate representatives of the "community" and therefore the potential local government leaders. SANCO saw community elections as its terrain as the ANC had stood for national and provincial elections. The ANC saw SANCO meddling in "political affairs" instead of attending to "civic matters". Not only was this division of political and civic matters incorrect, but it was also unhelpful in so far as resolving the fight for candidacy of local elections was concerned. When SANCO national took a decision to support the ANC in elections, those civic leaders who saw themselves as credible community leaders decided to go it alone.

On the other hand, another tension was around those civic leaders who agreed that it was wrong to meddle in politics, because SANCO is a civil society organisation. They argued that SANCO, a residents' organisation, should not take sides in the elections. It should instead call upon all its members to vote for a party of their choice. They argued that, as a civil society organisation, SANCO should focus at ensuring that the local state is seriously "watch-dogged".

This liberal view of the role of civic organisation coincides with a "statist" view of the ANC articulated by those local ANC leaders who saw the ANC branch as a structure concerned only with matters of state rather than attending to problems of the community. It also coincides with an ultra-leftist view that argued for a socialist civic movement that is not aligned to the ANC.

The break-away from SANCO to form NACO by some SANCO leaders in Alexandra, Tembisa and Soweto is a result of this mixture of different ideologically contradictory currents.

The case study on the Tembisa situation, of the local conflict between the ANC branch and SANCO, and quite recently the Tembisa Residents' Association (TRA), is one of the many examples. The study focused on a process of self-constitution of a new community of a squatter area called Winnie Mandela Park where ANC activists have developed a unique and dynamic ANC branch characterized by its rootedness among the community. The organisational form of this branch has resolved the division between political and civic matters. These ordinary working class folks have resolved a major theoretical debate in practice. For them, there are neither "two ANC's" (one in government and the other outside), nor is there an ANC branch that is "political" and not "civic".

These ordinary working class men and women from a squatter settlement have reminded us that the ANC is an organ of people's power that addresses matters of state power and take interest in and is part and parcel of the social, cultural and economic life of community members.

It is interesting to note that the ANC branch in Winnie Mandela organises people around social and economic issues such as local development, crime and job creation, provision and payment of services, etc.

Almost everybody at this squatter settlement belongs to the ANC. The ANC general meeting is attended by up to ten thousand people. Each ward has a sub-branch of appropriately one hundred members. Councilors are active community leaders. The comrades in this community argue that they don't want to launch a civic until and unless there is a clear role defined for it. They want to launch a branch of the SACP because they feel members of the community do not know much about socialism. They encourage all workers to join COSATU unions in their workplaces.

History of the civic movement

The development of the civic movement in our country dates as far back as early 1900s. During those days civic organisation took the form of community groups organised to resist land evictions that were a result of the process towards the passing of the 1913 Land Act. Civic struggles became a prominent feature of the anti-apartheid struggle wherein communities organised themselves to resist evictions and forced removals that became central to the NP's policy of segregation after the passing of the Group Areas Act. These struggles were usually short-lived and would end up being crushed by the regime. This was the case until the banning of organisations in the 60's.

Civic organisation was revived in the 70's with the formation of the BPC (Black People's Convention) when SASO passionately propagated a return to community organisation. This too was short-lived as many organisations were banned in the aftermath of the Soweto Student Uprising of 1976.

With the formation of PEBCO in 1979, a new type of civic movement emerges. This movement takes on the traditions of Congress - mass political work, active mobilization of the community, alliances with students and workers and an articulation of a coherent vision of an alternative social order as espoused by the Freedom Charter. Similar structures emerge later in places like Soweto, Alexandra, Sebokeng, and other black townships and begin to co-ordinate community struggles against black local authorities.

These civics are qualitatively different from pre-1979 ones. They challenged the power of the apartheid state as opposed to just demanding improvements of infrastructure. Hence they earned themselves the title "organs of people's power".

SANCO

The civic movement that exists today under the banner of SANCO, has therefore grown out of the Congress tradition. They a direct product of the struggle against apartheid state power at a local level. They cannot be separated from local government politics. But the fact that they were, like the UDF, created in an era when the ANC was banned, they saw themselves as the ANC in the community.

Hence most civic activists saw the Tripartite Alliance having to deploy cadres to provincial and national state institutions, while local government would be left to them. This perception is a single most important source of the conflict between ANC branches and SANCO structures on the ground. In a situation wherein the ANC is in power in a particular council, a SANCO branch see itself as the voice of the community against ANC councilors who must at all times be proven to have failed so that SANCO activists can become the alternative power.

Whereas progressive civics have evolved historically within the Congress tradition, it seems to us that today the very basis of their existence is to watch-dog, not big capital, but the Congress movement. While most civics claim to be the non-partisan voice of all residents, evidence on the ground suggests they seem to be an alternative political voice to the ANC-led alliance in the community. This is the reason why most outspoken civic activists are people belonging to organisations outside of the democratic movement.

At one level, we need to interrogate the question whether it was proper to try and form a national civic organisation. To what extent has SANCO succeeded in providing a coherent political vision and programme of local reconstruction, development and transformation behind which it could rally communities?

In other words, beyond the semi- insurrectionary activities of the 1980s, can we talk of the existence of a civic movement in the real sense of the word?

As a Congress movement, we need to confront the question whether it was correct to try and launch a national civic organisation as tight and centralized as SANCO is. Can SANCO nationally co-ordinate and catalyze the current contradictory local struggles (both oppositional and transformative)? Should it try to do that? Our experience is that most local struggles are largely spontaneous initiatives of local people.

Their struggles include those against the banks, land occupations, electricity connections, stokvel investments, etc. Usually, the national or provincial SANCO would not have authority over what the local community does or does not do. For us, this is true people's power.

We therefore argue that to try and regulate local struggles in the form that SANCO has done will only result in what we have - a "national" organisation of residents who live and struggle at a local level. On the one hand, we argue that SANCO has failed to be a national organisation with a coherent programme of local transformation. On the other hand, it is a welcome failure because as civic,

SANCO cannot articulate a coherent political programme on behalf of all residents without having to contradict itself.

It is for the above reasons that we do not think that we need a national civic organisation. Even worse, a membership based civic organisation seems to be a serious contradiction in terms. It is for the same reasons that it becomes incorrect to regard SANCO as the fourth Alliance partner, usually referred to as "tripartite plus one".

The way forward

The Tripartite Alliance represents distinct constituencies and each partner brings into the alliance a particular vision that adds value to the whole transformation process. This is the reason why we are also calling for the transformation of the ANC branch.

We need a new type of ANC branch, SACP branch, COSATU local, as well as a new type of local civic organisation as this is the level where we can build people's power effectively. If we succeed in building a different profile of our organisations in the community, we shall come close to building a popular movement for transformation.

The following are the issues around which we can build a different type of ANC and SACP branch:

- Community safety and security, including protection of community infrastructure and resources, women and children through participating in CPFs;
- Participation in school governing bodies, water committees, LDFs and hospitals boards
- Defending vulnerable communities such as squatters, farm workersand migrant workers;
- Fostering community investment, social housing and social insuranceinitiatives such as co-operatives and stokvels which will help to buildand develop the local economy;
- HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns.

The NGO movement and civil society discourse

Most NGO's played a very important role as organs of people's power. Most were launched as conduits of funds or fronts of the national liberation movement. For this reason, NGO's were taken very seriously by the democratic movement and hence we had a lot of key activists deployed in the NGO movement. There are still many of these organisation who are doing critical developmental and transformative work in the areas of primary health care delivery, provision social welfare, delivery of adult education and early childhood education, policy development, youth development, capacity-building, poverty alleviation and women advancement, to mention but a few. Such NGO's need the support of government in terms of resources and political support from the Congress movement.

We should continue to deploy our cadres in these important organs of people' s power. We should take SANGOCO very seriously and ensure that we strengthen ways of programmatic interaction.

On the other hand, there are new type of NGOs emerging in our country. These NGOs are dominated by white middle class professionals who are either liberal or ultra-leftist in outlook.

NGOs have taken a traditional civil society stance that is hyper-critical of the state. The democratic movement should blame itself for abandoning this movement to forces that are hostile to our struggle.

Most NGOs today seem to owe more allegiance to those who pay the salary of their professionals, and those who sponsor any opposition to government in the name of robust civil society. Robustness cannot be judged only in terms of the toughness of the agenda.

The agenda of the Congress movement has always been to ensure that as many people and organisations as possible are drawn to the liberation movement. Most NGO's are committed to advancing the interests of poor and disadvantaged communities.

As already pointed out, most NGO professionals tow the line of funders who always try to control the agenda of local organisations.

They see themselves as spokespeople of our communities. There are few activists of our movement who are working in the current NGO movement. We shall be making a serious mistake if we do not deploy cadres in structures such as NGO's. On the other hand, the movement needs to work closely with SANGOCO and ensure that it becomes an important part of the broad popular movement for transformation.

Conclusion

The unfolding transformation process has not only resulted in a vaguely defined "crisis" of the mass democratic movement. It has also resulted in the dawn of new organisational forms of struggle in South Africa against both the legacy of the apartheid and big capital's attempt to dominate the development debate.

These new forms of working class organisation are often referred to as the social movements: rural women's organisations, land advocacy groups, the ecological groups, homeless people's organisations, anti-poverty groups, groups campaigning against the scrapping of the apartheid debt, etc. Most these movements emerge around a particular issue and may die after the matter is resolved. Their organisational practice and theory is essentially different from the ANC and even traditional mass organisations. Yet this by no means that they are hostile to the traditional mass organisations.

We must work with these formations, learn from them and share with them our own experiences of the history and future trajectory of the SA national democratic revolution.

What role for civil society organisations (CSO's) in transformation

by Ben Turok
(ANC Member of Parliament, National Assembly)

Two recent announcements in Parliament by top leaders are of considerable interest. First, Deputy President Jacob Zuma announced the allocation of a billion Rand for poverty alleviation and Finance Minister Trevor Manuel revealed the allocation of R750 million for NGO's over three years. These are very substantial amounts of money which could make a large difference to the way government funds civil society organisations (CSO's).

Just how significant is this?

I have been keeping an eye on government allocations for some time and have been concerned at the drying up of funds for this sector. We started out very well in 1994 with the allocations of millions of rands for development and for NGO's. But then funding became a trickle with many NGO's closing down. Let me confess that I have been concerned about this. I have a soft spot for the NGO movement. I like the informal style, though I hate the inefficiency of some. I appreciate the commitment to poor communities, I like the values that they brought to their work. I like working with idealistic young people, and I think they make a good counterweight to the bureaucracy you find in some areas of government.

The new South Africa seems committed to giving quite a lot of attention to civil society.
Our **Constitution** says that

"Public Administration must be development-oriented" and *"the public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making"* (195). It also states that *"Transparency must be fostered by providing the*

public with timely, accessible and accurate information." These principles apply to *"every sphere of government".*

Admittedly there is no overt reference to civil society organisations. But Comrade Nelson Mandela and President Thabo Mbeki have been quite explicit about their intentions. They have repeatedly said that they wish to see the active involvement of civil society in transformation and development with a specific contribution coming from the NGO movement.

The ANC has been even more specific. In **Strategy and Tactics** (1997) we find

"Our commitment to open and transparent government, and to ensuring an informed and active citizenry, are more than just high-sounding phrases. They are the life-blood of democratic governance, the core values of people- centred and people driven transformation. We shall therefore continue to strengthen relations between government and civil society organisations, and promote their role in the process of transformation."

In case it is thought that this was a passing phrase, let me quote from another more recent document. In The State And Property Relations (1998) we find "Development is about improving the quality of life, it is about equity and justice. As the RDP document asserts, development entails a growing economy in which redistribution is a critical element. It includes modernisation of the productive forces, and a redefinition of production relations. It includes the preservation and development of human resources in the form of skills-training, job creation and the provision of education, health services, infrastructure, an adequate social security system, and so on. It is about democracy and popular participation."

These statements are quite unambiguous. They are not only the best and most comprehensive definitions of development you can find anywhere, but they also commit the ANC and the government to ensure a serious role for civil society organisations in development.

And yet, and yet. The changes in the role of the Independent Development Trust (IDT) which surely needed transformation, took several years, but led to the loss of valuable expertise and a standstill in very many projects. The Transitional National Development Trust (TNDT) took a long time to be established. It has now created a significant capability but its funding is inadequate. The ultimate vehicle for funding development, the National Develop-ment Agency (NDA) has been long in coming and has yet to be established as a going concern.

In part the difficulties of establishing an acceptable vehicle for transferring state funds to civil society organisations are due to this sector itself. When government proposed legislation to monitor and coordinate the NGO's, it encountered strong resistance.

Organisations like the Institute of Race Relations launched a sustained attack arguing that government wanted to dominate and control the NGO's. Many NGO's were anxious to get more state funding but wanted complete independence to do their own thing. They even resisted the notion of registration which would ensure their financial integrity and enhance donor confidence. As a result, we have ended up with a weak piece of legislation allowing for voluntary registration.

In 1996 an Advisory Committee prepared a report for the Deputy President on the "structural relationships between government and civil society organisations." The report stated that

"Organs of civil society involved in development work remain a rich inheritance … But have often found themselves frustrated by the lack of clear policy and connecting points with Government in general, and by ambiguous and differing government responses to their work and plight." Yet, NGO's and CBO's *"are indispensable to effectively promote sustainable developments."*

As a result of the report government agreed to set up the National Development Agency (NDA) as a vehicle for NGO funding but it was only recently that substantial funds were allocated. The funding crisis finds its origin in the attitude of foreign donor countries which decided in 1994 to switch funding from NGO's to government on the grounds that they wanted to support the new democratic

government to find its feet. Perhaps this was a genuine view on the part of some, with others it was only laying the basis for business deals. In any event government had difficulty channelling this money to the NGO sector, and some of it was never spent.

It is time to review the whole terrain of state-CSO relations thoroughly if we are to avoid the problems elsewhere in Africa. In some countries the NGO movement is growing in power and even challenging government over various policies. In such a climate there is ample scope for opportunists to manipulate communities and public opinion and the outcome of such contests may not always be positive.

Similar reservations also apply to South Africa where some NGO's are imbued with anti-state attitudes rooted in ideology rather than in experience. In other instances friction arises from operational concerns. Some contestations between the state and civil society is perhaps inevitable given the very different arenas they work in and the fundamentally different style of work. But it is also desirable at this stage of our transition that we should strive for the greatest unity of purpose across the nation manifested in partnerships between the state and civil society with the minimum disruption to the delivery of goods and services to the mass of the people.

There are many in government who doubt the capacity of NGO's to do a worthwhile job. A degree of scepticism is noticeable here and there. On the other hand there is now a wide acceptance internationally that in certain instances NGO's are able to deliver services cheaper and more effectively than the state. This is partly because of lower costs structures, but also because they are closer to the people on the ground. Indeed, it is now commonly accepted that if projects are implemented in a top down manner by the state, without the participation of NGO's, they are more likely to fail in their development objectives.

Some indication of government's thinking is provided in the new Municipal Systems Bill. The vision presented is that of *"developmental local government"* and extends the definition of municipality to include residents and communities working in partnership. The Bill creates a bottom-up process of driving development to *"put people first"* and *"empower the poor"*. All this is in order to *"shift from strict representative government to participatory governance".*

These are noble provisions in legislation but it is unclear whether civil society is meant to maintain their own non-governmental structures and whether they will get support. The legislation also does not specify whether NGO's have an additional and separate role in development projects and this will no doubt be raised by them in due course.

This is quite an important issue. The evidence is that, notwithstanding the scope for opportunism and even anarchy, most NGO's do promote good social values such as self-reliance, mutual help and community solidarity. And these are essential to bring the mass of the people into participation in development. These NGO's also provide valuable outlets for the energies of the unemployed and particularly the youth. An HIV/AIDS campaign without such a dimension is unthinkable.

The wider problem of state-CSO relations remains. What institutional framework is needed to put this on a sound basis?

Clearly a funding vehicle such as the NDA is essential, but it is by no means enough. We need to encourage a dialectical relationship between civil society and the state which provides for a degree of distance between the two, so that each can operate in its own way, yet providing institutional arrangement, for coordination so that there is minimal duplication of effort, and to ensure that all are driving in the same direction.

In countries like Sweden and Denmark there is a substantial legislative framework and procedures for dealing with CSO's and with the institutions responsible for foreign aid programmes. South Africa is not a donor country, but we do have a large CSO presence and much of it is concerned with development projects. Should we have additional measures to facilitate their role? More discussion is needed.

THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBALISATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

Lessons for a development approach

by Hoosein Kaigee
(A Member of the ANC in Western Cape)

Manifestations and impact on the developing world

Globalization is one of those words that may mean all things to all people. For some, it is a euphemism for the domination of the developing world, for others it is means a more effective world financial system. Despite these differences in interpretations, globalization is a reality and it is here to stay. Our challenge is therefore how we operate within this system in such a manner that we develop a market economy based on human scale enterprises as opposed to a global economy based on "pure money."

In taking forward this debate, we need to ask some very fundamental questions if we are to achieve a people-centered market economy, as some advocates are now advancing within international finance circles. We need to ask: -

- what is being globalized;
- how accountable and transparent is globalization; and
- To what extent is global diffusion in conflict with the nation state?

In the words of the Honourable Prime Minister Keating, "whether what we have is what we need now and in the twenty-first century." This debate is important for us in the developing world, because we are most adversely affected by the impact of globalization.

The terms global, globalized and globalization have become synonymous with currency. We can cite the $1 trillion of exchange being traded daily on the global financial markets. However, we also live in a world with global symbols and brands: from Michael Jackson to Michael Jordan, from Coke Cola to Levi Jeans. It has brought with it global economic elite's.

- Of the 100 largest economies in the entire world today, 51 are individual transnational enterprises.
- Only 49 of the world's biggest economies are nation-states.
- Mitsubishi, the largest transnational conglomerate in the world, has more total revenue than the 4th most populous nation on the planet, Indonesia.
- Wal-Mart is larger than the economies of 161 countries includ-ing Israel, Poland and Greece.
- Ford's economy is bigger than either Saudi Arabia's or South Africa's.
- Philip Morris's annual sales are greater than New Zealand's GDP; General Motor's is greater than Denmark and Toyota's is larger than Norway's.

Five Trans-national corporations alone control 50% of the global market in seven industries i.e. consumer durable, automotive, airlines, aerospace, electronic components, electrical goods and steel. This form of monopolism has been equaled by a new set of powerful players in the last decade; those involved in financial management in spheres such as equity funds, stock market deals, commercial bonds, and venture capital and pension funds.

Stocks in international bonds have grown sixteen-fold in the past twenty years to 1994 standing at $4200 billion and outstanding international bonds have grown to over $2000 billion. This is the great significance of globalization, when volumes of funds cross borders in the endless and at times ruthless search for highest returns. As one financial planner put it "they act like a herd of maniacs."

David Korten in his book **When Corporations Rule the World** argues that globalization at its current level acts against the fundamentals of the market - *"the growing power of financial markets, even threatens the transnational corporations."*

The essential elements of globalization is integration and the lesser significance of the nation state, in the former instance it means global over national and local, and in the latter, a world without borders. The volume and speed at which capital flows move is beyond comprehension at times. In many instances these capital flows will invest in governments and corporate securities in search of high interest returns, failing to achieve the latter will result in the dumping of the country resulting in the rapid devaluation of the local currency, denting any prospect of growth in the near future. Because of the stealth-like motion of capital flows and nature of globalization, a negative response by a fund manager in one country has a rippling effect in another country.

Speaking at this year's World Econo-mic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, a senior Mexican finance ministry official put the problem of capital flows and globalization so aptly when he said: *"How do I explain to the man in the street, in downtown Mexico City, that his life is being determined by a decision taken in the Duma (Lower House of the Russian Parliament)."*

These are intricacies of globalization in the developing world, and unless we confront the hurdles, our endeavors to free our people from poverty and degradation will be in vain.

Events over the past few months most certainly raised concerns that economic fundamentals are not a panacea against the woes of globalization, however essential it is. The crises in emerging economies over the last few years have its roots fundamentally in the management of the worldís financial system.

The Minister of Finance of India the Honorable Yashwant Sinha stated it so eloquently at the recent Davos conference when he said, *"but we need ruled-based international capital flows, as we have in trading.*

If we continue to have errant and wayward capital flows, we will continue to experience crises. We cannot continue to be affected by someone, somewhere, pressing a button, shifting billions of dollars in and out of emerging markets, with devastating consequences. Otherwise, globalization will become a thirteenth dirty word."

Emerging consensus is that capital flows supervision is critical for the survival of the people-centered and driven market economy in the coming millennium.

Why the crisis?

The issue of understanding the crises is crucial, before one is able to pronounce on the solutions. The Asian contagion has sent shock waves worldwide, resulting in currency depreciation and large scale asset price free falling. Historically, capital flows has never been a threat to global markets in the manner that it has become evident in the 1990's:

- In the 1970's capital flows to emerging economies were a mere $16 billion and annually 0,8% respectively.
- This rose to 1,1% in the 1980's.
- However, in the 1990's the picture changed dramatically. Capital flows nearly doubled from 1990 to 1991, from $71 billion to $157 billion respectively.
- By 1996 the mark of capital flows into emerging economies was $200 billion.

The bulk of these inflows were in Asia, where the fundamentals were right i.e. growth was high, inflation was low, budget surpluses and rising reserves. The inflows were assisted by auxiliary factors such as the removal of exchange controls as well as gradual move to capital convertibility. In most cases these moves were voluntary undertakings by Asian countries. None of the high handed tactics of the IMF i.e. Articles I, II and III were imposed in Asia as was the case in certain developing nations.

A new element to the capital flows market has been the increase in movement of speculators. The dizzy growth of certain asset funds has been phenomenal, aided no less by that mysterious financial vehicle called hedge funds. These financial planners have doubled in recent years specializing in high risk and short term speculations, it is estimated that their asset value in 1998 was at a staggering $400 billion. Essential to their success in emerging markets and in the Asian crises in particular is leverage in certain sectors.

There is no doubt that hedge funds have contributed to the rapid increase in the share of global financial flows that are speculative in nature. The example of global Forex is indicative of the power of capital flows:

- in 1977 global Forex reserves were $266 billion and daily global Forex reserves were $18 billion;
- by 1995 the value of daily Forex reserves dealings were a staggering $1300 billion.

The growth in capital flows continues. As we speak the crises in emerging economies remains unsettled. One thing is certain, we cannot afford another financial crises of this magnitude.

What's to be done?

In defining solutions we need holistic options, taking into account the regulatory nature of the world economy.

The instinctive response to the current wave of crises has been an introduction of some form of exchange control devices. The latter option would be rejected outright by most economist, however MIT economist, Paul Krugman, who himself views exchange controls negatively, sums up the challenge we face in regard to the crises of globalization and currency depreciation, *"What we need is radical solutions... when you face the kind of disaster now occurring in Asia, the question has to be: badly compared to what?"*

This view was supported by IMF Asian Pacific Director, Hubert Neiss who added that short-term capital controls might need to be adopted to avert the kind of contagion problems among Asian economies over the last year.

The direction given by IMF in the wake of the crises has been met with a challenge, namely to support the increase in interest rates, thus keeping capital inside the country and hopeful of enticing new funds. The converse has been argued by some to bring interest rates down thus stimulating real economic growth. The latter argument is inconclusive, as currency depreciation would continue to unthinkable levels, giving rise to hyperinflation. In this regard, our own economic planning under Minister Manual and Governor Stals was correct and is beginning to pay dividends.

The option in reducing future crises will demand creative and bold initiatives, supported by all that have a stake in a sustainable people centered world economic platform. Some of the proposals and indeed challenges listed below needs frank debate within and out of governments, some are radical, thought provoking, but above all they stimulate our ability to find workable solution to life dependable circumstances:

a. Reforms of the international financial system, a view widely supported by a range of formidable economists world-wide i.e. IMF, Vice President, Joseph Stiglitz and Harvard University economist Jeffrey Sachs as well other the NGO movement across the globe;
b. Capital controls, a view held strongly by the Honourable Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir who capped the ringgit after large-scale capital flight and currency depreciation.
c. Nobel economics laureate James Tobin's tax on buying and selling of foreign exchange, primarily designed to act against speculators in the market;
d. The universal co-ordinating of interest rates and exchange control of G8 countries, the brainchild of American University economist Howard Watchel, who says *"this would act as a foundation stone to stabilize all other volatile currencies in the absence of the global fixed exchange rate system."*

e. The idea that Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) currently being drafted include developing nations in the process of developing a single global agreement.

As we can see the road ahead is indeed complex and unsettled. The debate that needs to follow from some of these thoughts requires rigor and balance. We need to ensure that we allow for debate on these economic issues amongst all sectors of society, in the same manner that we encourage debates on political matters. The private/public sector association called for as we enter the new century needs life within the economic domain of society.

Let us remember that the notion of globalization today instills the notion that no country is an ivory tower and that our destinies are eternally interwoven.

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