

### Volume 1 No 2 • 2 - 8 February 2001

### THIS WEEK:

- Letter from the President: Africa's people central to success of recovery plan
- From the desk of the SG: One more nail in the coffin of apartheid social engineering
- Local Government Elections 2000: <u>The people reaffirm their confidence in the ANC</u>
- Voter turnout: Not surprising, but far from satisfactory
- Coloured voters: Significant gains for the ANC
- Young voters: Voter registration central to youth participation

# Africa's people central to success of

## recovery plan

TWO DAYS AGO, we returned from the annual Summit Meeting of the World Economic Forum (WEF) at Davos, Switzerland.

As usual, our country was represented by a strong delegation comprising the government, business, civil society and the media.

This year, we also had a musical group led by one of our outstanding musicians, Caiphus Semenya, whose performances, arranged by the American jazz legend and friend of South Africa, Quincy Jones, became truly the 'talk of the town.'

Our principal task at the Summit Meeting was the presentation to the world corporate leadership of the concept of and the process leading to the adoption of a Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MAP).

We had to carry out this task together with President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, with the active assistance of Presidents Ben Mkapa of Tanzania and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal.


President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria could not attend as he was paying an official visit to India.

I write this Letter to give some information relevant to the MAP.

During the year 2000, we spent some time meeting the political leadership of the developed world - the North.

Accordingly, in May we met Prime Minister Blair and President Clinton in London and Washington D.C., respectively.

We also met the then Governor George W. Bush in Austin, Texas. In June, we were part of the Berlin meeting on progressive governance. It was also attended by Presidents Clinton of the US, Cardoso of Brazil, Lagos of Chile and De la Rua of Argentina and Prime Ministers Jospin of France, Gutteres of Portugal, Chretien of Canada, Amato of Italy, Simitis of Greece, Clark of New Zealand, Kok of the Netherlands, Persson of Sweden and Chancellor Shroeder of Germany. Prime Minister Blair sent his





apologies.

In the same month, we visited Denmark to participate in and address the meeting of Nordic Prime Ministers.

Again in June, we addressed the meeting of the European Council held in Portugal, which was attended by all the heads of government of the EU. In July, together with Presidents Obasanjo and Bouteflika, we met the heads of state and government of the G7 in Tokyo, and had the opportunity to hold bilateral discussions with Japanese Prime Minister, Yoshiro Mori. While in Tokyo, we also met the President of the World Bank, Jim Wolfensohn.

Later, in Pretoria, we also held discussions with the Managing Director of the IMF, Horst Kohler.

In September, we addressed the UN Millennium Summit and had the opportunity to meet President Putin of Russia, among others.

Before this, we had also interacted with UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, who had committed the UN to co-operate with us as we worked on the MAP. We mention all of these meetings because they enabled us to present to these political leaders the imperative of addressing especially the challenges of African development.

Necessarily, as the current Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement, we also presented the agenda of the countries of the South as a whole.

It was very inspiring to hear the entire political leadership of the countries of the North express firm commitment to the idea of a new and concerted effort to address, among others, the challenge of African poverty and underdevelopment.

At the OAU Summit in Lome, Togo, the African heads of state and government agreed that the Presidents of Algeria, Nigeria and South Africa should prepare the draft of the MAP and circulate it among these heads. Together with our colleagues, as well as the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), we have been working on the first drafts of the MAP.

We thought it appropriate that we should present the "work in progress" to the Davos Summit Meeting, to ensure that the global leadership of the corporate world is also sensitised to the work that is being done to ensure Africa's social and economic recovery.

This is especially important because whatever plans we produce in the end, these will not succeed without the involvement and support of the domestic and global private sector.

We also felt it important that, however preliminary our report, we should bring the private sector on board now, rather than wait for the 2002 Davos Summit Meeting.

However, we made the point clear that we were only at the beginning of the process of the development of the MAP.

Of critical importance also was the point that what was qualitatively different about the MAP, was the fact the Africa's political leadership was taking the responsibility onto its own shoulders to ensure that our Continent actually breaks out of its condition of poverty and underdevelopment.

To achieve this, it is clear that we must ensure that ours becomes a Continent of peace, stability and democracy. The MAP must provide for the measures to achieve these objectives.

As a Continent, we must also pursue the necessary social and economic policies that must lead to a sustained improvement in the standard of living and quality of life of the millions of all our peoples.

At the same time, we have to work to guarantee that the process of renewal represented by the MAP is genuinely based among the people and is not merely a programme of action for governments only.

Among other things, we will have to take advantage of all the comparative advantages we enjoy as African countries, to underwrite the success of our development efforts.

This must include the people, the availability of natural resources, land,



environment and heritage. In this regard, critically, we must break out of the mould of being producers and exporters of raw materials.

The MAP will also have to focus on bridging the digital divide, to ensure that our Continent is not condemned to further marginalisation.

We also have to concentrate on human resource development to ensure that our peoples have the requisite modern skills and the necessary life conditions, such as health, to enable them to be fully productive.

The capacity of our governments to discharge their national and international obligations will also have to be addressed so that they are able to play their role in the context of the process of globalisation.

The MAP will also have to take into account existing programmes of international community, existing decisions such as those relating to the debt question, and all other relevant matters that impinge on Africa's relations with the rest of the world.

Some of the documents immediately relevant to our work include:

- the Skagen Declaration of the Nordic Prime Ministers;
- the Santa Maria da Feira European Council resolution;
- the Okinawa Communique of the G8;
- the Declaration of the UN Millennium Summit;
- the (Tokyo) Ticad II Declaration;
- the Beijing Declaration; and,
- the OAU Lome decisions.

As a movement, we have declared this the African Century.

Together with others on our Continent, we, as the ANC, have raised high the banner of the African Renaissance.

These positions impose particular responsibilities on the ANC to link up with other, like-minded forces on our Continent and the rest of the world, to promote the agenda for peace, stability, democracy, progress and prosperity in Africa.

We must strive to ensure that the ordinary people of Africa adopt this agenda as their own, and conduct mass campaigns for its success.

It is clear that the African masses are ready and willing to assume these positions.

It is also clear that various sectors throughout the Continent, including the organised workers, the rural masses, business people, intellectuals, religious leaders and workers in arts and culture are ready to participate in the campaign for an African Renaissance.

We must use our call for this to be the Year of the African Century to energise these sectors and masses into action.

Our first responsibility is to our own people. We must therefore act accordingly, bearing in mind that what we do locally is directly linked to what happens in the rest of our Continent.

We must also encourage all the sectors we have identified, to interact independently with their counterparts in the rest of Africa and elsewhere in the world.

We are at a particular moment in human evolution when the bulk of the world community, including governments and corporations, understand that they have to act together with us to end the suffering to which the peoples of Africa have been victim for many centuries.

What our global partners ask of us is that, as Africans, we should take charge of our destiny.

We are in the Year of the African Century.

We are preparing to celebrate the 90th Anniversary of the ANC during the year 2002.

As a country, we are preparing to host the UN Conference on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and other Related Intolerances this year. Next year, we will also host the OAU Summit and the Global Conference on



the Environment.

These historic events impose an obligation on the ANC and the rest of our country's democratic movement to discharge their historic responsibility as the leader of the process of social transformation in our country.

We have to advance the programme for the reconstruction and development of our country with the greatest vigour and popular involvement.

The distinguished participants at the Davos Summit expect that we will not fail them, as we have not failed them in the continuing struggle to end the apartheid legacy, and therefore create a peaceful, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic, open and prosperous society.

They are ready to support us if we ourselves are serious about the agenda we have set ourselves.

They are, in good measure, driven by the recognition that all of us belong to a common human society that, sooner or later, must respond to a new internationalism, or ready itself to contend with enormous globalised social conflicts that know no fortresses.

During our last night at Davos, on Monday 29th, the President of the WEF, Professor Klaus Schwab, appealed to the assembled world press - give Africa a chance! give Africa's leaders a chance!

The question we have to answer practically is whether we will do the things we have to do, to enable the peoples of the world to give us that chance! In that sense, the ball is in our court.

Thato Modin.

## FROM THE DESK OF THE SG

## One more nail in the coffin of apartheid social engineering

The local government elections of 5 December 2000 were not only about the people of South Africa exercising their collective will, a central pillar of any democratic society. They were also about driving another nail into the coffin of apartheid social engineering.

The election brought into office local government structures fundamentally different to any that have preceded them. For the first time, local government does not reflect the skewed geography and inequitable fiscal design of a racially-defined South Africa. The new demarcation of outer boundaries of district councils, municipalities, metros and wards aims to support integrated economic development and improved service delivery to all residents. While these new local government structures are better positioned than ever

before to meet the needs of all South Africa's people, the elections indicated that much is expected of the newly-elected councillors.

Following the election, the ANC now controls at least 72 percent of local councils, accounting for around 83 percent of the South African population. This places an obligation on the ANC to lead more decisively and effectively the process of local transformation. It places an obligation on our councillors to interact more closely with the communities they represent, involving them

### FROM THE DESK OF





in council processes and mobilising them to be involved in direct action which changes their lives for the better.

It places an obligation on our councillors to speed up service delivery, implement as soon as possible programmes to ensure all residents have access to the basic amount of water and electricity, and to invest in infrastructure development and maintenance.

It places an obligation on our councils to ensure efficient local government administration, sustainable revenue collection and the deepening of a public service culture of Batho Pele - 'People First'.

While all energies should be concentrated on the challenges of local government, it is necessary to reflect in more detail on the conduct and results of the election itself. Following the election, there was a flurry of suggestions in the media that the ANC has been dislodged from its position as the leading political force in the country. This is not true.

An internal ANC analysis of the election results reveals exactly the reverse, that the ANC has maintained and consolidated its support among the electorate. Among the conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis are that:

- Levels of party support and voter turnout in the 2000 local elections were substantially similar to the previous elections.
- The ANC maintained its dominant position. Even in the face of low turnout no serious inroads were made into its support.
- The most significant swing was the 15 percent towards the ANC in the Northern Cape. This reflects growing confidence in the ANC among Coloured communities, especially in rural areas.
- In terms of overall percentage support the DA made no significant gains over the performance of the DP and NNP separately. Their combined performance in the Western Cape was less than their separate performance in 1995/96.

We include below a summary of key findings of our internal analysis in the hope that it will contribute to a better understanding of the election results and in turn the true will of the people.

Kgalema Motlanthe ANC Secretary General

## LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS 2000

## The people reaffirm their confidence in the ANC

THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS' resounding victory in the 2000 local government elections confirms the confidence of the South African people in the ANC. The ANC was the only organisation to contest all 237 municipalities, winning an outright majority in 162. The ANC's overall share of the vote increased slightly from the previous local election, from 58.8 percent to 59.4 percent.

The ANC controls all municipalities in the Free State, Mpumalanga, North West and Northern Province. It controls all but three in the Eastern Cape and




all but two in Gauteng, while in the Northern Cape it won 22 out of the 27 councils.

The ANC improved its overall percentage vote in the Western Cape achieving a three percent gain from the last local elections. The ANC won control of three councils in the province, compared to the Democratic Alliance's eight, with 14 councils being hung.

In KwaZulu Natal the ANC again increased its overall percentage from the last local elections by 2.6 percent. The ANC controls 8 councils, to the Inkatha Freedom Party's 33 and 10 which are hung.

Significantly, the ANC's closest competitor in terms of popular vote, the Democratic Alliance (DA), won only 17.5 percent of seats and 5 percent of councils.

#### Seats won by parties, 2000 local government elections



This massive support for the ANC in four democratic elections is without parallel in any other country with a democratic system of government. Comparison of the results of the first four democratic elections refutes reports of a decline in the ANC's level of support. On the contrary, it has actually grown steadily.

In assessing trends in overall levels of party support it is incorrect to compare the results of a national election with a local election. Voting patterns are generally different in local and national elections. The overall level of voter turnout and the relative turnout among various sections of the population is not the same. The issues parties ask the electorate to vote on are different, as are the candidates they are asked to elect.

A comparison of overall results in the four elections held since 1994, using proportional representation votes for local elections, indicates no major shift in voting patterns.

Comparison of percentage party support in four democratic elections



	2000 Local Elections	1995/96 Local Elections	1999 National Elections	1994 National Elections
ANC	59.4	58.8	66.4	62.6
DA	22.1	21.5	17.0	22.1
IFP	9.1	8.7	8.6	10.5
UDM	2.6	-	3.4	-
PAC	1.3	1.2	0.7	1.2
ACDP	1.2	0.8	1.4	0.4
UCDP	1.0	-	0.8	-
MF	0.3	0.4	0.3	-
AZAPO	0.3	-	0.2	-
VF/FF	0.1	2.7	0.8	2.2

Compared with the previous local elections in 1995/96, the ANC increased its total votes from five million to 5.3 million.


The DA received two million votes in 2000 compared to the combined vote of the DP, NNP and FA of 2.1 million in the previous local election, which represents a half percent increase in its share of the vote.

A provincial breakdown shows the ANC registered gains in the Northern Cape, with a massive 15.1 percent increase, the Western Cape, Free State, Gauteng, KwaZulu Natal and Mpumalanga.

The ANC's overall percentage declined in the Eastern Cape by 6.9 percent, North West by 2.2 percent and Northern Province by 5.8 percent. In all these provinces the ANC remains in a firmly dominant position. While these declines are cause for concern, they point to the ANC's weakness in mobilising people to vote in areas where they are certain of an ANC win. Significantly, the DA's share of the vote fell by 3.8 percent in the Northern Cape and 1.6 percent Western Cape. This demonstrates the emptiness of the DA's triumphalism in the Western Cape in particular, where the ANC actually gained 3 percent.

#### ANC percentage by province, 2000 and 1995/96 local elections





In KwaZulu Natal, the IFP received 45.6 percent of votes in the 2000 elections compared to 43.8 percent in the 1996 elections. This 1.8 percent increase is significantly less than the ANC's gain of 2.6 percent in the province.

The UDM did not exist in the last local election so its performance cannot be directly assessed. However, in the 1999 national election they received 3.43 percent of the national vote, while in the 2000 election they could only muster 2.6 percent.

Contrary to bold predictions in the media, independents did not emerge as a significant factor in the local government elections. In most areas where those disgruntled with the ANC decided to stand against the movement, they were sorely punished by the vast majority of voters sending a clear message that the unity the people's movement is of greater importance than the complaints of isolated individuals.

The only other notable trends are the small increase for the ACDP and a large decline for the FF, this election being its worst performance to date.

## **VOTER TURNOUT**

## Not surprising, but far from satisfactory

Voter turnout in the local elections, at 48 percent, though not surprising, was unsatisfactory. This compares poorly with the turnout in the 1999 national election at 87 percent, but is similar to turnout in the 1995/96 local elections.

In many democratic countries the electorate does not seem to regard



municipal elections as important as a national election. Indeed, by the standards of western democracies, a turnout of 48 percent is very high for a local election.

Percentage polls for the last four democratic elections indicate the emergence of a similar trend in South Africa. The number of eligible voters and the percentage of registered voters remained stable in the last six years. However, both national elections attracted a turnout in excess of 85 percent, while in both local elections turnout was less than 50 percent.

## 100% 75% 48.07% 48.50% 48.50% 25% 25% 2000 Local 1999 National 1995/96 Local

#### Percentage polls in last four democratic elections

Furthermore, there is a difference in patterns of turnout between various sections of the population in municipal and national elections. Evidence suggests that turnout among white and coloured communities was particularly high compared to a relatively low turnout among Africans. Some commentators have ascribed this a protest against the ANC. It is clear from the data, however, that turnout patterns were substantially similar in both local elections, with low turnout among Africans.

The following factors have been advanced to explain this:

- The historic experiences of black South Africans with apartheid local government are negative. Even since 1995, structural problems have hampered our efforts at transformation and delivery. Whites by contrast have a positive experience of local government, which has been able to provide a range of services and facilities that have greatly improved their quality of life.
- Turnout tends to be higher in more highly contested wards and municipalities. In solid ANC areas, some African voters were complacent in the certainty of an ANC victory. Similarly low turnout levels are recorded in strongly IFP areas.
- The DA's anti-ANC "fight back" messages were effective in mobilising sections of the white community.
- In general, the IEC's infrastructure tends to be poorer in African areas. Partly as a result of apartheid disparities, voting stations are



not as well equipped, logistical problems more likely and queues are longer in African areas. This may have discouraged some voters from participation.

Numerous other factors influenced the turnout dynamic at a local level. Problems with the demarcation process; the poor performance of ANC councillors in some areas; and dissatisfaction with the outcome of the ANC's list process all had an impact. In many areas workers, especially farm workers, were prevented by their employers from going to vote. The ANC is committed to building maximum democratic participation in all spheres of government. Voting is a key element of such participation and low turnout in local government elections, while not surprising, should be a cause for concern for all South Africans.

## **COLOURED VOTERS**

## Significant gains for the ANC

The ANC made significant gains in the coloured community, contrary to suggestions by a number of commentators.

While the ANC lost ground to the DA in the Indian areas of Durban and Pietermaritzburg, this was not the case with the coloured community, where the ANC in fact made several gains.

There was a massive swing, of 15 percent, to the ANC in the Northern Cape, and a significant increase in our overall percentage in the Western Cape. Of the 38 municipalities where Coloured people constitute more than 60 percent of the population, the ANC won an outright majority in 18, the DA won an outright majority in 9 and 11 were hung.

Even in comparison with the 1999 national election the ANC's overall percentage vote increased substantially in most Coloured communities. Therefore, not only did the ANC retain a solid majority within many Coloured communities, but actually managed to draw larger numbers of Coloured voters. While more work clearly needs to be done in the larger urban areas, the rural coloured population is steadfastly behind the ANC.

## **YOUNG VOTERS**

## Voter registration central to youth participation

The ANC's January 8th Statement 2001 notes "the significantly large number of young people who did not participate in the local government elections". While no statistical analysis has been done regarding the age



profile of the voters, the Human Sciences Research Council's exit poll provides some useful insights. According to the HSRC:

- People between the ages of 17-20 constitute seven percent of the population, but only 1.9 percent of registered voters.
- Those in the age group 20-29 constitute 31 percent of eligible voters and make up 27 percent of registered voters.
- While 95 percent of citizens over the age of 30 were registered to vote, only 65 percent of those under the age of 30 were registered.

The HSRC concludes that the main reason for the lack of youth participation was not political apathy emerging on election day, but rather the failure of youth below the age of 20 to register. Registration figures for the 20-29 age group are not low, compared to the 17-20 age group. In general the 17-20 age group are less likely to have acquired bar-coded ID books than older citizens. The need to acquire an ID book could possibly act as a disincentive to registration, making the process more time consuming and expensive.

However, among registered voters, the HSRC concludes that the youth are only slightly less likely to vote than the rest of the population. In general, once they are registered they will vote in similar numbers to other age groups. This does not mean that apathy and depoliticisation are not factors in the youth vote, but simply that the real battle lies in convincing youth to obtain an ID book and register.

## **GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS**

ANC	African National Congress
DA	Democratic Alliance (comprising the Democratic Party, New
IFP	National Party and Federal Alliance)
UDM	Inkatha Freedom Party
PAC	United Democratic Movement
ACDP	Pan Africanist Congress
UCDP	African Christian Democratic Party
MF	United Christian Democratic Party
AZAPO	Minority Front
FF	Azanian Peoples Organisation
	Freedom Front

## **NOTE ON SOURCES**

All data used in this report have been derived from the following sources: **Independent Electoral Commission** (IEC) data, available

at www.elections.org.za

**South Africa Local Government Elections** Update published by The Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA), No 2, 27 September 2000 and No. 7, 19 December 2000. Available at <u>www.eisa.org.za</u>



**Voters' Evaluation of the 2000 Local Government Elections in South Africa:** Report prepared for the IEC by the Group Democracy and Governance, Human Sciences Research Council.

