



NATIONAL GENERAL COUNCIL

Midterm Report of the National Executive Committee to the 5th National General Council, by ANC Secretary General, Cde Fikile Mbalula

8-11 December 2025, Ekurhuleni

“The year of Renewal to make the ANC a more effective instrument of the people to achieve the vision of the Freedom Charter: The people shall govern! The people shall share in the country's wealth!”



**MIDTERM REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
TO THE 5TH NATIONAL GENERAL
COUNCIL**

8-11 DECEMBER 2025

Report by Secretary General, Cde Fikile Mbalula on behalf
of the NEC

Table of Contents

OVERVIEW.....	5
ANC Renewal	14
2024 Elections and the GNU	20
Major Global Events and Trends	26
STATE OF ORGANISATION.....	27
ANC Branches and Renewal	29
Organising and Membership	34
Membership System	34
Regional and Provincial Conferences	35
Rebuilding and Renewal of ANC Leagues	38
Rebuilding the PYA	38
Organisational Renewal and Conference Resolutions	38
ANC Quality Membership and Renewal	38
Dispute resolution mechanisms and managing conflicts	40
The ANC Integrity Commission	42
Political Education and Cadre Development	45
Elections and By-Elections Campaigns	69
Policy, Monitoring and Evaluation	74
Gender and Equity Committee	92
Sectoral Work	100
Disability Desk	105
ANC Awards	101
International Relations	106
ANC LEAGUES	132
ANC Veterans League	132
ANC Women's League	142
ANC Youth League	146
MKLWV	146
PROVINCES	154
EASTERN CAPE	154
FREE STATE	161
GAUTENG	165
KWAZULU NATAL	165
LIMPOPO	178
MPUMALANGA	181
NORTHERN CAPE	190
North West	193
Western Cape	198
THE REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE	202
ANC Caucus Report	208
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION COMMITTEE	219
LOCAL GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION	228
Arts, Culture and Sports	247
EDUCATION, HEALTH, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY	252
PEACE AND STABILITY REPORT	258
Archives and Heritage	266
Legislature and Governance Report	267
Social Transformation Committee	284
30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE CONSTITUTION	288

OVERVIEW

Introduction

1. The significance of this 5th National General Council in the life of our movement and our nation cannot be overstated. This year we marked the 70th anniversary of the Freedom Charter, our lodestar for the South Africa we want, that guides the struggles over many generations. We also mark the 40th anniversary of COSATU, the giant federation of workers that led countless struggles for workers' rights, and a reliable ally of all strata of the motive forces of the NDR. Right now, we stand at the cusp of celebrating 114th years of the founding of the African National Congress - the parliament of the people and oldest liberation movement in Africa.
2. 55th National Conference **committed ANC leaders and members once again to Renewal** of the character, values and programmes of the movement, as we face an existential threat. Since then, the **National Democratic Revolution suffered a strategic setback**, occasioned by the results of the 2024 National and Provincial Elections. Across the country, millions of the motive forces stayed at home, young people alienated from electoral politics, signaling their disappointment, not in the mission of the NDR, but in their movement, the ANC that has led that mission since 1912. In the three most populous provinces, KZN, Gauteng and W Cape, home to 57% of the population and 63% of the nation's GDP, the ANC loss significant ground.
3. Building on the discussions in structures and sectors across the country, the NGC provides a timely opportunity for a strategic assessment and honest reflections on this strategic setback and the implications for the NDR and the motive forces, as well as work done by the entire organisation since the 55th National Conference. This should lay the foundation for the NGC to rise on 11 December 2025, with a clear sense of direction for the future of our country and movement.
4. The ANC 55th National Conference, held under the theme “**Defend and Advance the Gains of Freedom. Unity Through Renewal**”, affirmed the strategic objective of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) as:

...the resolution of the three basic and inter-related contradictions of colonialism of a special type (CST) – racial oppression, women's oppression and class super-exploitation. We seek to achieve this through the fundamental socio-economic transformation of South Africa into a non-racial, non-sexist, united, democratic and prosperous society based on the vision, values and principles of the Freedom Charter and the Constitution of our country. Simply put, the ANC's is primarily about building a better life for all South Africans. (22nd National Conference Declaration, 5 January 2023)
5. The African National Congress is a non-racial and non-sexist national liberation movement that has led the ongoing struggle for national liberation and transformation of South Africa for over a century. The historical mission and the specific aims and objectives of the ANC did not change when the ANC came into government in 1994, nor should they change with the 2024 strategic setback. These Aims and Objectives of the ANC are outlined in Rule 2 of the ANC Constitution as follows:
 - a) To **unite all the people** of South Africa, Africans in particular, for the complete liberation of the country from all forms of discrimination and national oppression.

- b) To **end apartheid in all its forms and transform South Africa** as rapidly as possible into a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic country based on the principles of the Freedom Charter and in pursuit of the National Democratic Revolution.
 - c) To **defend the democratic gains of the people** and advance towards a society in which the government is freely chosen by the people according to the principles of universal suffrage on a common voters' roll.
 - d) To **fight for social justice and to eliminate the vast inequalities** created by apartheid and the system of national oppression.
 - e) To **build a South African nation** with a common patriotism and loyalty in which the cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity of the people is recognized.
 - f) To **promote economic development** for the benefit of all.
 - g) To support and **advance the cause of women's emancipation**.
 - h) To support and **advance the cause of national liberation, development, world peace, disarmament, and environmentally sustainable development**; and
 - i) To support and promote the struggle for **the rights of children and people with disabilities**.
6. The strategic objective of the NDR, translated into these Aims of the ANC, frames this Midterm report and assessment of work done over the three years since 55th National Conference. When the NEC began its mandate in January 2023, it was mindful that in 2019 our people once again placed their trust in our movement to honour the undertaking in the 2019 Manifesto that we were entering "a moment of renewal... an opportunity to restore our democratic institutions and return our country to a path of transformation, growth, and development."
7. In the light of this commitment to the people and the mandate of 55th National Conference, the National Executive Committee identified two overarching objectives for its term of office (2022-2027), namely (a) Defending and Advancing the gains of Freedom and the NDR; and (b) Building the Unity of the people, the ANC, Alliance, the mass democratic movement through Renewal.

MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS 2022-2025

8. Recalling the strategic objective of the NDR outlined above, our starting point is to assess progress in our mission of fundamental socio-economic transformation and the creation of a better life for all since the 55th National Conference, which is the period covered by this Midterm Report. We do so by examining the state of the motive forces and the three major legacies of apartheid colonialism and patriarchy that the National Democratic Revolution seeks to overcome: poverty, unemployment, and inequality, together with their racial, gendered, class-based, and geographic dimensions.

South Africa's Demographic changes and Dynamics among the Motive forces

9. By the end of 2022, the South African population, according to Statistics South Africa, stood at approximately 62 million people, rising to 63.10 million in the 2025 Mid-Year Population Estimates. Most South Africans today (57%) reside in just three provinces—Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, and the Western Cape—reflecting persistent patterns of internal migration. These three provinces together also account for 63.5% of South Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), underscoring their central role in the country's demographic and economic landscape.
10. Although the country's youth bulge is beginning to stabilise, the 20.8 million young people aged 15–35 still constitute the largest share of the population (33.1%), followed by adults aged 35–59 at 19.2 million, children aged 0–14 at 16.5 million, and the elderly population (60+) at 6.6 million. Together, these figures illustrate the continued


importance of youth and working-age adults within the demographic profile of our nation.

Figure 1. SA population by Province, 2025

More than half of the population (36 million) live in 3 provinces.

GP remains SA's most populous province

Mid-year population estimates for South Africa by province, 2025




Source: Department of Women, Youth and Persons with Disability, 2025. "Status of Women in South Africa, Reflections through Data and Statistics". 3 November 2025

11. This still-dominant position of youth in our population **underscores their significant role in shaping the nation's social and economic landscape**. The Stats SA report *The Social Profile of Youth, 2014–2024* (February 2025) highlights the following trends:
 - Despite constituting a large share of the labour force, South African youth continue to face extremely high unemployment, rising from 36.8% in 2014 to 45.5% in 2024. This is driven by poor economic performance, low labour absorption, and a structural mismatch in skills. Adults remain consistently more likely to be employed than young workers.
 - As household hunger increased, the proportion of young people living in food-insecure homes rose from 13.5% in 2014 to 15.8% in 2023.
 - Housing conditions for youth improved, with the share living in formal dwellings rising from 79.6% in 2014 to 84.0% in 2023, with the largest improvements recorded in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal.
 - In 2024, 81.2% of youth reported feeling safe during the day, yet fewer than one-third felt safe walking alone at night. Young people aged 16–34—especially young men—were more likely than older adults to be victims of assault, street robbery, and property-related crimes.
 - Youth are staying in school longer, with 75% of this age cohort enrolled in 2024. However, urgent interventions are still required to reduce school dropouts after the compulsory schooling age of 15.
 - Higher education enrolment among young people increased from 11.9% to 13.2%, though still below the National Development Plan target of 16%. Young graduates with tertiary qualifications were the least likely to be unemployed, illustrating the protective effect of continued education.

- Over the same period, TVET enrolment declined from 6.9% in 2014 to 6.1% in 2024, although enrolment in other colleges and ABET programmes increased, albeit not at the levels required.
- Indian/Asian and white youth recorded the highest participation rates in higher education at 45.7% and 31.1% respectively—a stark reminder of the continued need to improve educational access and outcomes for African and Coloured youth.


Figure 2. SA population by Age cohorts, 2025



Source: Department of Women, youth and Persons with Disability, 2025. "Status of Women in South Africa, Reflections through Data and Statistics". 3 November 2025

12. This year marks thirty years since the historic Beijing Women's Conference (1995), an event in which South African women played a pivotal role. The Beijing Platform for Action framed global interventions for gender equality, resulting in progress worldwide. Yet, the 2025 Global Gender Gap Report shows that across 100 surveyed countries, a global gender gap of over 30% persists across economic participation and opportunity, political empowerment, educational attainment, and health and survival. Another UN Women report warns that, at the current pace, the world will take another 70 years to achieve full gender parity. This is unacceptable; more decisive interventions are needed to dismantle patriarchy.
13. Improving the status of women remains a priority of the ANC and is fundamental to building a united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic, and prosperous South Africa. Women now constitute more than half of the population (51.1%) and head 42.3% of households. Female-headed households are more common in rural areas (47.6%) than urban areas (40%), reflecting the lingering legacy of the apartheid migrant labour system and the disproportionate burden of social reproduction borne by women.
14. One of the major successes of our democracy is the decisive gains made on social policy and therefore human development since 1994. In health, we continue to see rising life expectancy, 64,0 years for males and 69,6 years for females in 2025. The interventions on HIV and AIDS made a visible impact. However, a worrying trend, is the rise in HIV/AIDS prevalence amongst women ages 15-49, from 21.3% in 2019 to 23.6% in 2025.
15. The longer life expectancy of women compels us to pay greater attention to the situation of elderly women, given their disadvantaged position in the labour markets and the resultant limitations in preparing for retirement.

16. Since 1994, South Africa has made significant progress with policies to advance gender equality in education. The gender gap is narrowing at all levels, with girls and women now forming a substantial portion of the student population across various fields of study. Notably, the Global Gender Gap Report 2025 (WEF, p. 331) ranks South Africa first in the world for women's enrolment in primary, secondary, and tertiary education. Such progress would not have been possible without the ANC's vision and programmes.
17. Women's labour market participation continues to increase but remains consistently below that of men. Women's unemployment has risen from 27.3% in 2015 to 35.9% in 2025. The four major sectors of employment for women are Community and Social Services, Trade, Finance, and Private Households (domestic work).
18. As far back as 1954, when the Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW) adopted the Women's Charter, the demand for equal pay for equal work has guided the struggle for substantive equality. Yet, seventy-one years later, South Africa ranks 111th globally on the Gender Wage Gap. The pay gap is especially wide in the private sector, regardless of women's educational attainment. Gauteng has the smallest gender pay gap (92.1%), followed by the Eastern Cape (88.9%) and KwaZulu-Natal (84%). Mpumalanga has the widest gap, where women earn only two-thirds of what men earn for the same work.
19. Progress toward women's emancipation continues to be undermined by the devastating scourge of gender-based violence and femicide (GBVF). In September 2019, levels of violence against women and children had escalated to the point of being declared "more than a national crisis." Since then, South Africa has adopted a comprehensive National Strategic Plan on GBVF, amended legislation, established a statutory GBVF Council (still to be appointed), and commissioned extensive research by the HSRC, Medical Research Council, and SAPS through quarterly crime statistics.
20. These studies provide a clear and disturbing picture of the extent and patterns of systemic violence inflicted on women and girls—in homes, workplaces, educational institutions, and public spaces. The reality faced by women in our country is wholly unacceptable.
21. The number of women in the National Assembly now stands at only 171 out of 400 MPs, following the ANC's electoral decline in the 2024 National and Provincial Elections. Women now hold 14 out of 32 Cabinet positions (43.75%), a decline from the 50% representation achieved in the 6th Administration. There are also 18 women among the 43 Deputy Ministers.



Quoted in Department of Women, youth and Persons with Disability, 2025.
 “Status of Women in South Africa, Reflections through Data and Statistics”. 3
 November 2025


22. Although the political economy of South Africa remains shaped by its apartheid-colonial and patriarchal inheritance, the social composition of the motive forces is undergoing significant sociological and ideological changes.
23. Between 1994 and 2025, the working class in South Africa has grown in absolute size and changed markedly in composition:
 - The number of employed people more than doubled from approximately 8 million in 1994 to about **16.8 million by early 2025**. This reflects significant gains in formal labour absorption, accompanied by strong worker rights anchored in the Constitution and labour laws. However, much of this job growth occurred in sectors such as services (retail, security, hospitality), construction, and public services, while traditional industrial jobs declined. Mining and manufacturing shed large numbers of jobs due to mechanisation, global competition, and in some cases mismanagement or labour instability. Public sector employment largely plateaued, apart from growth in social services such as education and health.
 - The rise of the **informal sector and outsourcing** has transformed the nature of work. Many new jobs are insecure, low-wage, and outside the traditional reach of unions—such as outsourced cleaning, transport, and gig work. This has produced a growing stratum of the *precariat* and *working poor*, people who live precariously even when employed, often without benefits or job security.
24. These trends have fragmented the labour movement. Over 31 years, South Africa’s once-united labour movement has become **less cohesive**. COSATU, our Alliance partner, experienced a split as some industrial unions left COSATU to SAFTU. The fragmentation into multiple federations and unaffiliated unions has weakened the collective power of the labour movement. Union density in the private sector has declined, and fewer young workers are unionised (partly because many are in informal or precarious jobs).
25. **Weak workplace organisation and lower union penetration** means the working class is not as organisationally strong as in the 1980s or 1990s. This weakening of labour

movement has broad implications for the NDR: it reduces a key pillar of support for the ANC-led transformation project. The unity of the progressive labour movement in particular and working class in general is critical for the success of the NDR.

26. Meanwhile, the **unemployed** segment of the working class continues to expand due to persistently high unemployment. Millions of working-class people live precariously, without sustainable or predictable sources of income. The jobless - especially youth - face severe hardship: poverty, dependence on social grants or family support, and social marginalisation. Government social security interventions and the broader social wage provide vital relief—such as free basic water and electricity, housing, education, health services, and social grants. However, poor communities remain heavily dependent on the state, and when services fail, the impact is immediate and severe. Their exclusion from formal economic participation also leaves them vulnerable to populist rhetoric and exploitation by criminal networks or demagogues.
27. In rural provinces and peri-urban townships, urbanisation and migration patterns are reshaping the working class. Many families oscillate between rural homes—sustained by pensions and subsistence farming—and urban informal settlements where younger members seek work. This mobility places stress on social cohesion and municipal services. For many years, the rural and urban poor were among the ANC's most loyal supporters because they recognised the ANC as the provider of the limited services they receive. However, this loyalty is now being tested as material conditions stagnate or deteriorate.
28. The **rural population**, especially in former Bantustan areas, remains among the poorest and most marginalised, yet historically forms a strong base of ANC support. While democracy has brought visible improvements - access to clinics, schools, roads, water, and social grants - rural communities still bear the scars of deliberate underdevelopment. In some areas, progress has stalled or reversed. Many rural municipalities are fiscally distressed, unable to maintain services because residents are too poor to pay for them and administrative capacity remains weak. This structural fragility directly undermines the NDR's promise of transforming rural livelihoods.
29. The **land question** remains central to socio-economic transformation. Many rural households still lack secure land tenure or sufficient land to make a living. The rural masses remain very loyal ANC voters. Black farmers now account for around 10% of agricultural output and are increasingly staking their claim as a key sector that can contribute to food security and agricultural exports. The rural masses—still among the ANC's most loyal constituencies—continue to place hope in land and agrarian reform, and in infrastructure investments, to make rural areas productive.
30. **Traditional leaders** remain influential in many rural communities and are integrated into the formal governance system through houses of traditional leaders and municipal structures. They played important roles in the founding of the ANC and in resisting apartheid colonialism. Since 1994, the relationship between the ANC and traditional authorities has generally been cooperative, though tensions occasionally arise—particularly around women's land rights and jurisdiction over development initiatives. As the ANC advances rapid rural development programmes, it must continue strengthening relations with traditional leaders, who remain part of the motive forces of the NDR.
31. One of the indisputable areas of social change brought about by the NDR is the expansion of the **Black middle strata** (or middle class). This was an intended outcome of economic transformation and empowerment policies. A growing middle class supports development by boosting social mobility, consumer demand, investment in education and skills, and promoting greater social cohesion. It also shapes social values, ideas, and cultural norms. The Black middle strata has more than doubled since the advent of democracy. By 2018, roughly half of South Africa's middle-income population was Black (African, Coloured, and Indian), compared to 1994 when it was overwhelmingly white. This represents a profound transformation of the social structure.

32. In the earlier decades of democracy, the ANC won and sustained the support of the Black middle strata as an important component of the motive forces. However, our shortcomings—particularly corruption, poor governance, and the slow pace of economic transformation—have eroded support among the middle strata. Meanwhile, the white middle strata has consolidated its backing of right-wing opposition parties. The ANC must prioritise understanding and engaging the middle strata. Renewal must include developing new ways of organising both the working class and middle strata within the movement.
33. Over the past three decades, South Africa has witnessed significant growth in Black businesspeople as a direct outcome of affirmative action and Black economic empowerment policies aimed at redressing systemic historical injustices. These transformative policies are now under intensified attack. Patriotic entrepreneurs, industrialists, and businesspeople—Black and white—have a critical role in building a growing, inclusive, and transformed economy. They must be systematically mobilised behind the movement’s economic transformation agenda. When organised as part of a broader progressive bloc, the patriotic bourgeoisie can be a positive force for investment, innovation, industrialisation, and skills development—a key partner of the developmental state.
34. The comprehensive **social wage** championed and expanded by the ANC government since 1994 remains one of the most significant achievements of the NDR. It has been a powerful tool in combating poverty, advancing human dignity, and reversing the legacy of apartheid’s deliberate structural underdevelopment. Statistics South Africa’s *General Household Survey 2024* highlights progress in several areas:
 - The social wage includes social security and the comprehensive system of social grants (old-age pensions, child support, disability, and veterans’ grants), the Social Relief of Distress grant introduced during COVID-19 for unemployed persons and subsequently extended.
 - Access to healthcare shows that only 15.5% of individuals have medical aid coverage, with 85% relying on the public health system. Yet more than half of total health expenditure occurs in the private sector, underscoring the importance of implementing National Health Insurance.
 - Access to electricity improved from 76.7% in 2002 to 90.2% in 2024. Almost a quarter of households still rely on alternative energy sources such as wood (7.7%), LPG/gas (7.2%), paraffin (2.2%), and other forms of electricity (4.5%) for cooking.
 - In 2024, nearly nine in ten households (87.7%) had access to piped water on-site, in the yard, or at a communal tap; and 83.1% had access to improved sanitation (flush toilets and VIP pit latrines), up from 61.7% in 2002.
35. Despite significant advances in social policy and the expansion of the social wage, major challenges remain. Persistent structural weaknesses in our economy, combined with the negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine conflict, have reversed some gains. Rising **living costs and worsening food insecurity** now affect millions. Statistics South Africa reports that 27% of households faced moderate to severe food insecurity in 2023, up from just over 22% in 2019. Children are particularly vulnerable, with increasing incidents of stunting and malnutrition. The National Executive of the 7th Administration (2024–2029), led by President Cyril Ramaphosa, has responded with a coordinated national effort to combat food insecurity and malnutrition.

Figure 4.1.1 – Proportion of households experiencing food insecurity in South Africa, 2019, 2022 and 2023



Source: GHS 2019, 2022 and 2023.

StatsSA, *Food Security in South Africa in 2019, 2022 and 2023: Evidence from the General Household Survey*. 27 February 2025. Report no 03-10-28, p5

Tackling Apartheid Spatial Inequalities and Economic Geography

38. In 2023, the Minister of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development announced that the Cabinet of the 6th Administration had adopted the National Spatial Development Framework 2050 (NSDF2050). This Framework is an essential component of our strategic objective to build a united, just, and more equal society—where all citizens enjoy a rising standard of living regardless of their geographic location.
39. The NSDF2050 highlights the persistent stranglehold that the unjust spatial development paradigm, logic, and patterns of apartheid colonialism continue to exert on our efforts to eradicate poverty, unemployment, and inequality. It also draws on the valuable and often difficult lessons learned since the dawn of democracy in our pursuit of national reconstruction, inclusive economic growth, and spatial transformation.
40. These realities were eloquently captured in the 2017 Report of the High-Level Panel on the *Assessment of Key Legislation and the Acceleration of Fundamental Change*, chaired by former President Kgalema Motlanthe, which observed:
“Colonialism and Apartheid have left South Africa with a deeply divided and inequitable distribution of people and economic activity. This spatial inequality traps disadvantaged communities in poverty and underdevelopment, creates inefficient cities and robs poor, rural people of secure livelihoods.”
41. The National Spatial Development Vision therefore seeks to achieve a South Africa “where all our people live in shared and transformed places in an integrated, sustainable and competitive national space and economy.” The Plan aims to realise this vision by strengthening and creating: (a) Urban areas and regions as engines of national transformation, innovation, and inclusive economic growth; (b) Productive Rural regions; (c) National development corridors as incubators and drivers of new economies and quality human settlements; (d) A national spatial social service provisioning model to ensure effective, affordable, and equitable service delivery; (e) In integrated national transport, communications, and energy infrastructure network;

- and (f) A national ecological infrastructure that secures a shared and resilient natural resource foundation.
42. This integrated and differentiated approach of the NSDF2050—linking urban and rural nodes, infrastructure and ecology, and economic and social development—must inform all of our programmes. These include the ANC’s 10-Point Economic Action Plan with its emphasis on industrialisation and infrastructure, the wall-to-wall Local Government Action Plan, as well as programmes for social services, human settlements, and the planning of our post-school and higher education system. The Framework must also incorporate national security and citizen safety. Moreover, while recognising our marine protected areas, it must integrate Operation Phakisa’s blue economy strategy, given the strategic importance of our two oceans as part of South Africa’s territorial integrity and natural endowments.
 43. As we approach the 2026 Local Government Elections, we must ensure that local government—metros, secondary cities, strategic towns, and rural municipalities—plays the strategic role required to transform South Africa, leaving no part of our country behind. Every ANC-governed municipality must demonstrate irrefutable progress in implementing the Spatial Development Framework to ensure that all rural and urban areas possess reliable infrastructure, thriving local economies, sustainable livelihoods, affordable quality services, and shared prosperity.
 44. This National General Council must take tough decisions regarding the calibre of cadres who will lead local government in the coming term, and the firm accountability measures required to implement the District Development Model—so that government plans, budgets, and acts as one seamless whole.
 45. There is no doubt that the transformation journey we embarked upon in 1994 has set our country on a progressive path. While there have been numerous successes and setbacks—many of which are detailed in this and other reports—the National Democratic Revolution continues.

ANC Renewal

The ANC emerged as a product of a historical moment in the evolution of resistance against colonialism, a subjective expression of an objective movement for change. At each stage of the development of this movement, the ANC’s leadership and cadreship were able to adapt to the demands of the moment, mobilise the people and place the organisation at the head of popular resistance. Thus, the organisation developed as a people’s movement in theory and in practice, recognising that a leadership role is earned, and not decreed. In its approach to the country’s problems, the ANC has striven to identify those issues that would result in sustainable solutions, by distilling the essence.

(ANC Revolutionary Movement and Agent for Change, 1st NGC, 2000)

The extensiveness and complexity of the revolutionary tasks at the new stage requires that the Party should mature continuously in political leadership, develop and concretize guidelines, and map out sound solutions to newly arising issues related to socialist construction and national defense. The Party should raise its combativeness and practical organizational ability along with improving the States socio-economic management efficiency. The Party should undertake renewal in many fields: thinking, in the first place economic thinking, organization, personnel work, leadership style and working method. Only when it is consolidated and strengthened politically, ideologically and organizationally can the Party be strong enough to lead the Viet Nameese people to fulfill revolutionary tasks in the new stage.

(Communist Party of Viet Nam. Official Documents of the 6th National Representative Congress, December 1987)

46. The last thirty-five years have been a momentous period in the history of our movement. After its unbanning in 1990, the ANC had to rebuild a mass legal presence in the country after three decades of exile, whilst at the same time negotiating the future of the country, confronting third force violence, and preparing for elections and governance.
47. Having won elections in April 1994 and with a mandate to lead government, the ANC used the transition as a beach-head, to lay the foundations of a National Democratic Society, in the context of sunset clauses and a Government of National Unity (GNU). This includes national initiatives through the Reconstruction and Development Programme to meet the basic needs of the majority - access to education, health, social security, housing, water, electricity, etc. - denied under apartheid; dismantling the patriarchal apartheid colonial state and its legal edifice and beginning the construction of the post-apartheid state; negotiating a progressive Constitution adopted in 1996; establishing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to address past human rights abuses; introducing the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) to stabilise public finances; enacting progressive labour laws, affirmative action and broad-based black economic empowerment; initiating land restitution and reform; creating new provincial and local government systems; and reintegrated South Africa, a former pariah state, into the African continent and the global community of nations.
48. The ANC went on to win large majorities in the next five national elections, as the leading party in government and most municipalities. It secured more than two thirds of the popular vote in 1999 (66.25%) and 2004 (69.69%). In subsequent elections, although our electoral majority started to decline, we still mobilised 11 million South Africans in 2014 (62.15%) and 10 million in 2019 (57.50%) to vote for the ANC.
49. The 2016 local government elections marked a significant turning point, when the ANC lost its majority in the metros of Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela. National voter support declined from 62.93% in the 2011 local government elections to 53.91%. The ANC maintained an outright majority in only three metros - eThekweni, Buffalo City and Mangaung.
50. In real terms, 2019 national election victory of 57.5% signalled a degree of recovery. However, the devastating impact of the global Covid-19 pandemic, the erosion of many social policy gains, deepening unemployment and global instability contributed to the ANC support falling below 50% in the 2021 local government elections and to around 40% in the 2024 National and Provincial Elections. For this reason, the NEC characterised the 2024 elections results as a strategic setback of the NDR.

Imperatives of Organisational Renewal

51. Thirty-one years after the democratic transition, South African society has evolved, in both positive and negative ways – and so has the ANC. The world itself is changing more rapidly than at almost any other time in human history. The ANC requires dexterity, foresight, determination and strategic capacity to respond effectively to an increasingly complex terrain, the challenges of economic development, governance, statecraft and nation-building. To regain the trust of the people and restore its image as a loyal servant of the people, the organisation must confront its current internal weaknesses: weak structures, factionalism, corruption, social distance and growing alienation of the motive forces from their movement.
52. Our organisation needs to be future-fit and future-oriented – draw into its ranks the most talented young people and investing in future leaders based on the demands of the new country and world we now inhabit. While it is important to honour our historical role in the liberation struggle, we must not be trapped in a time warp. The ANC has always been an organisation of the future. Renewal is therefore about

correcting current organisational and ideological flaws, while building new capabilities to lead a rapidly changing society and world.

53. Renewal is neither unique to the current period nor to South Africa. Many long-established movements and parties grapple with the need to renew themselves. For example, the Communist Party of Viet Nam, at its 6th Conference in 1986, identified four lessons for Party renewal: (i) a Party thoroughly imbued with the idea that ‘the people are the roots’; (ii) a firm grounding in scientific reality and objective laws; (iii) the ability to combine national advantages with the opportunities of the times; and (iv) living up to the historic responsibility by a governing party leading the people in revolution. Viet Nam’s 40-year *Doi Moi* programme of renewal has achieved massive industrialisation and inclusive economic growth averaging around 7% per year, lifting millions out of poverty, and raising per capita income from below \$100 to nearly \$5,000. As the Party prepares for its 14th National Congress in 2026, renewal and an ambitious national development remain central to its agenda.
54. Social democratic parties in Europe have gone through similar introspection and re-organisation after serious electoral defeat at the hands of resurgent right-wing forces. Often, parties only manage to renew themselves after suffering major setbacks, driven by necessity to restore public confidence and rethink approaches. The Labour Party’s “Third Way” Reforms were one such experiment in renewal; the debate continues as to whether these reforms were ultimately progressive or regressive.

Framework of ANC Renewal Mission

55. The ANC has undergone many phases of renewal throughout its evolution. Our own history, and that of other movements, demonstrates that renewal is not a short-term project. It must be conceptualised and implemented with utmost clarity and discipline. One objective impediment to sustained renewal in our context is the instability caused by near-constant election cycles—roughly every 18 months—often resulting in changes of leadership in both the ANC and government and causing policy and programmatic discontinuities. We must therefore ensure not only clarity of the renewal vision, but also its sustainability and continuity. Party renewal must be tied to the broader project of national renewal and rejuvenation if it is to have real societal impact.
56. The mission of renewal should therefore be to: (i) root the ANC among the people as their servant, with structures and cadres who possess the capabilities and values to work with them to create a better life for all; and (ii) harness the natural endowments of our country and people to chart a development trajectory that accelerates the resolution of the triple legacies of unemployment, poverty and inequality, and builds a sovereign, united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous South Africa as an African powerhouse.
57. The Renewal Mission requires the ANC to consolidate a programme to:
 - Strengthen and renew its grassroots structures, organisational methods and work among the motive forces, building a broad front for reconstruction and transformation.
 - Strengthen its ideological and governance capacity, economic management, diplomatic leadership, and planning, execution and monitoring capabilities—drawing on the collective wisdom and contributions not only of ANC members but of all patriots and progressive individuals and institutions.
 - Prioritise the development of members and cadres into effective leaders, placing a premium on merit, integrity and competence—a renewed ANC must be the home of the most committed, hardworking, ethical, capable and innovative South Africans, truly non-racial and non-sexist in character and content.
 - Renew its organisational design, methods, culture and communications; ensure financial sustainability; and promote institutional, policy and leadership continuity and accountability.

58. We must be mindful that we embark on this Renewal Mission at a time when the ANC is vulnerable. From within, there are forces who driven by personal gain rather than the people's cause. From outside, domestic and global anti-transformation forces 'smell blood', and stand ready strike, hoping to erase the ANC from the body politic and consciousness of South Africans. This vulnerability can either make us want to retreat, becoming even more inward-looking, defensively lashing out against critiques. Or, we can see the strategic setback that we suffered, as an opportunity for reset.

Renewal Initiatives since 55th National Conference

59. While we must conceptualise a longer-term Renewal Mission, the 55th National Conference gave the NEC a set of short-term tasks: (a) address the deterioration in the political quality of ANC membership; (b) conduct an audit of membership based on agreed objective criteria; (c) develop a renewed vision and leadership; (d) build branches and a new membership system; (e) build the new cadre; (f) build a non-sexist and non-racial movement; (g) fight corruption and organisational misconduct; (h) strengthen accountability and performance frameworks; (i) strengthen election campaign capacity; (j) mobilise and organise the motive forces and sectors; (k) strengthen leadership selection processes; and (l) strengthen the Alliance.
60. The section on the State of Organisation will elaborate in greater detail on the implementation of these resolutions. Here, we highlight a few initiatives which, if sustained, can help secure a turnaround that makes renewal not only irreversible but also tangibly beneficial in the daily lives of our people and in the trajectory of our nation.

Improve the Quality of Membership and Leadership

61. The ANC Foundation Course was developed by a group of ANC veterans and political education facilitators working with the Department of Political Education and Training and the OR Tambo School of Leadership. The decision to launch the course was taken in December 2023 and the programme formally launched by President Ramaphosa on 27 October 2024. Its aim is to ensure that every ANC member of the ANC understands key fundamentals: the ANC's mission and objectives, core values, principles, revolutionary morality and ethics; the history of South Africa and of the ANC; the country and world we live in today; the Constitution and governance; the role of the Branch, and the tasks of every ANC member.
62. Within one year, more than 125 000 ANC members (around 23% of current members in good standing) have participated in the Foundation Course and are at various stages of completion in over 1600 branches across the country. The National Caucus, the NECs of the ANC, ANCVL and ANCWL as well as the PECs/PTTs and some RECs/RTT, are also at various stages of completion. The objective is for all ANC members, including elected leaders and public representatives, to have completed the Foundation Course by 2026.
63. The Foundation course generated considerable enthusiasm in the branches. Where implemented with commitment and honesty, it is already having a positive impact. However, in some areas it has been treated merely as a compliance issue, especially where comrades were focused on meeting conference deadlines. In such instances, there must be a re-run to ensure genuine developmental impact that improves the quality of organisation and leadership to society.

Activist branches and the Branch Functionality audit

64. The role of ANC branches has been elaborated since the 1997 National Conference, and efforts made to explain what we mean by an activist ANC branch, - its community programme of action, community profiling and the roles of BEC and branch subcommittees. of action in the community, doing a community profile, role of the BEC and branch subcommittees. This is also one of the modules of the Foundation Course.
65. In addition, the Policy Monitoring Evaluation and Research department (PMER), together with Organising and Membership Department develop the branch functionality audit, as

mandated by Conference resolutions. The audit was first piloted in 2023, as part of the Sol Plaatje Award process for selecting the Best Performing ANC branch. Participation was not compulsory; branches self-selected, believing they met the activist branch criteria. In the end 144 branches took up the challenge, with a longlist of 20 top-scoring branches from which the finalists and the 2023 Sol Plaatje Award winner were chosen.

66. The Branch Functionality Barometer was refined in 2024 and rolled out fully in 2025, with another pilot in Free State before the NWC visit in March 2025, and a national roll-out in July 2025. Initial uptake was very slow, but once completion became a requirement for branch participation in the NGC, the uptake improved significantly. By the time of the NGC, more than 860 branches had complied, with strong participation by Mpumalanga, N Cape and Limpopo, and poor performance by Gauteng and KZN.
67. It is ironic that some regions which have recently held Regional Conferences, were unable to mobilise their branches - who by definition had to be 'in good standing' for conferences - to complete the branch functionality audit. The BFB must help us to move beyond a culture of "Conference branches", that cease to function once conferences have concluded.
68. The intention of the Branch Functionality Barometer is to build a habit among ANC BECs of reporting on their work, and through the questionnaire and training, to deepen understanding, of what constitutes an activist ANC branch. The ANC Constitution underpins this approach, by defining a branch in good standing not only as one with 100 members, but as one that fully complies with its constitutional responsibilities as the branch.

Monitoring, Evaluation and Accountability Framework

69. In line with Conference resolutions and following the re-establishment of the Policy, Monitoring and Evaluation department at headquarters, the following frameworks have been developed:
 - **ANC Annual Reports:** the Secretary General's Annual report, as required by the Constitution have been produced since 2023, providing an account of work of ANC structures.
 - **Manifesto Monitoring framework:** after the 2019 Manifesto review, which for (conducted as a public process for the first time); the 2024 Manifesto adopted an outcomes-based approach to monitoring our resolutions our commitments. A Results framework was developed and is now used to track implementation of the 2024 Manifesto and other ANC policies, such the Local Government Action Plan (LGAP) and the 10 Point Economic Action Plan.
 - **Accountability Framework:** Adopted by the Policy Committee in 2023, this framework guided the first ANC Leadership Baseline Survey, presented to the NEC in October 2024. There was a strong response from NEC and PEC members, but a significantly low response from REC members—a worrying sign, given their closeness to branches and responsibility for overseeing local government. A subsequent leadership survey will focus specifically on RECs. A second component of the framework targets public representatives. A review of all ANC councillors is underway: submissions from ward councillors have been completed and submissions from PR councillors are expected to be completed by the end of December 2025, with a report to be tabled at the NEC as part of the LGAP report. Reviews of MPs and MPLs from the 6th Parliament were conducted in 2023 with caucuses, and after the induction of all caucuses following the 2024 elections (except in the Western Cape), the first review of the 7th Administration's cohort of MPs and MPLs is underway.
 - **Consequence Management Framework:** The Accountability Framework has been widely welcomed for clarifying the roles of leadership collectives and public representatives. However, the absence of effective consequences for non-performance is a recurring concern and will be addressed urgently. The NGC is likely to express views on the content and direction of such a Consequence Management Framework.

70. The frameworks developed and implemented over the past three years represent an important step forward, but they must be sustained and institutionalised as part of our organisational culture: regularly reporting on and accounting for our work, undergoing peer review, consequences for poor performance, and recognising and rewarding excellence.

Ideological renewal and Renewal of ANC vision

71. The ANC appointed the first Renewal Commission during the 2017–2022 term, with the mandate to develop an ANC Vision 2032, marking 120 years of the movement. The discussion document on this Vision was completed and presented to the NEC and the National Conference in 2022.
72. Given the limited political discussion time at the 55th National Conference, this Vision was not adequately debated. Its recommendations now form part of the proposals on What Is to Be Done arising from the NGC base documents, and Vision 2032 will be made available to NGC delegates to inform commission deliberations.
73. Beyond the Foundation Course, the movement must significantly raise the bar on ideological development and deepen understanding of complex issues such as the economy, social transformation, planning and management, governance, the national question, women’s emancipation, the role of technology, and the dynamics of a rapidly changing world.
74. The re-establishment of the Political Education Department, the strengthening of the OR Tambo School of Leadership, and our participation in the Mwalimu Julius Nyerere School of Leadership are critical initiatives in this regard and should reinforce our broader cadre policy approaches.

Renewal Initiatives since 1994

75. Since 1994, the ANC has initiated several processes to adapt to new tasks and renew itself. The 49th National Conference affirmed that the ANC remains a liberation movement, with dual roles: as a governing party that contests elections and must govern effectively to fulfil its mission, and as “a broad movement with effective grassroots structures, capable of organising and mobilising the broad mass of our people.”
76. The 50th National Conference in Mafikeng in 1997 undertook the most extensive organisational reforms, upon which subsequent NGCs and Conferences have built. Firstly, the *Strategy and Tactics* (1997) document identified five pillars of social transformation—the state, the economy, the battle of ideas, the ANC, and international work—as the primary sites of struggle. Secondly, having noted “deficiencies leading to weak organisational structures, lack of discipline, and the decline of vibrant organisational and political debate”, Conference adopted far-reaching resolutions on organisational democracy and discipline, cadre development, the role of branches, the role of the Youth and Women’s Leagues, the creation of a Veterans League, and the strengthening of communications.
77. The 50th National Conference also resolved to align ANC organisational boundaries with government boundaries to improve coordination; to mobilise resources for ANC sustainability; to mainstream gender equality in the organisation by ensuring that *Strategy and Tactics* is engendered; to adopt a 33% quota for women; to support LGBTIQI rights; and to address fractious leadership contests.
78. The 50th National Conference further defined the role of ANC caucuses in legislatures and councils; emphasised regular engagement between ward councillors and communities; called for the strengthening of participatory governance structures such as CPFs, SGBs and ward committees; highlighted the role of traditional leaders; clarified the relationship between ANC constitutional structures and institutions of governance; and stressed the need for a continuous cycle of policy development, implementation and monitoring.
79. The same 1997 Conference adopted strong resolutions on corruption, characterising it as “undermining the objectives of the NDR”, calling for accountability in public service performance, and insisting that fraud, corruption and misconduct be addressed promptly.

It resolved that “the elimination of corruption be placed high on the agenda of the ANC”, through educating members, firm and prompt disciplinary action for transgressions, and a nationwide anti-corruption campaign.

80. The ANC won the 1999 elections with a commitment to “speed up change”. The 1st National General Council in 2000 was significant in that it focused on the ANC as a revolutionary movement and agent for change—its mission, character, values, the role of its cadres and branches, and the impact of **incumbency**. Its resolutions built on those of the 50th National Conference, and also raised the need for the “modernisation of the ANC” in the context of new information and communications technologies. The 1st NGC explored new approaches to transformation, including the role of allocative capital in boosting investment levels, and posed the question of whether we should simply “maintain and tinker with the so-called modern sophisticated economy and infrastructure that the white man bequeathed us” or seek bold and creative solutions. Following this NGC, the NEC commissioned the seminal document on leadership, *Through the Eye of the Needle*.
81. The 51st National Conference, held in 2002 in Stellenbosch, placed major emphasis on implementing a comprehensive social security system and foregrounding the fight against poverty and unemployment. It signalled some shifts away from GEAR austerity in the context of improved public finances, emphasising infrastructure development as a driver of growth and employment, calling for monetary policy and inflation targeting to be aligned with broader economic objectives, and advocating a single public service.
82. The 2nd NGC in 2005 marked the beginning of an increasingly tumultuous period in the movement. The Council became preoccupied with leadership battles and divisions rather than the state of the transformation project, and these tensions carried into the ruptures of the 52nd Conference in 2007 and beyond. At the same time, Polokwane resolved that renewal be placed at the centre of ANC work in preparation for its centenary five years later, in order to arrest and reverse the danger of revolutionary decline and decay posed by the “sins of incumbency”.
83. A decade later, as the Policy Conference and the 54th National Conference considered the 2017 Diagnostics Report and the discussion paper on Organisational Renewal and Organisational Design, it was clear that matters had deteriorated further. As we approached the 55th National Conference in 2022, there was broad recognition that the ANC was facing an existential crisis which, if not halted, would not only endanger but could derail the National Democratic Revolution.

Conclusion and Recommendations

84. The NEC appointed the 2nd Renewal Commission, which has now begun operating formally. It is tasked with guiding the Renewal Mission adopted by the NGC and with monitoring and regularly reporting to the Officials and the NEC, and ANC structures, on whether progress is being made.
85. The Renewal Mission must permeate every aspect of the five pillars of social transformation in the NDR—the state, the economy, the ANC and the motive forces, the battle of ideas, and international work—in order to place our country firmly on the road to becoming the National Democratic Society envisaged in the Freedom Charter.

2024 Elections and the GNU

Our strategy is the creation of a united, non-racial, non-sexist, prosperous and democratic society. In pursuit of this objective, we shall, at each given moment, creatively adopt tactics that advance that objective. Our fundamental point of departure is that South Africans have it in their power, as a people and as part of progressive humankind, to continually change the environment in which we operate in the interest of a better future.

(ANC Revolutionary Movement and Agent for Change, 1st NGC 2000)

2024 National and Provincial Elections and its aftermath

86. As the ANC, we do not contest elections just to occupy government positions. We do so to obtain a popular mandate and legitimacy to govern and use state power to advance the objectives of the National Democratic Revolution. The revolutionary duty of the ANC is to ensure that state power is utilized effectively to fundamentally transform our society and economy in order to improve the quality of life of all the people, especially those who were oppressed and exploited.
87. Consequently, losing power or performing poorly in elections carries adverse consequences for the progressive forces and the transformation agenda of our country. Without state power, no progressive movement can achieve its vision of fundamental socio-economic transformation, its liberatory ideals and its developmental programme. This is why all political parties, however small, seeks to be of government – to pursue the objectives they outline in their manifestos and constitutions.
88. The electoral setback suffered by the ANC and the democratic movement, began in 2016 with the loss of major metros, accelerating with the emergence of over 80 hung councils after the 2021 local elections, and culminated in the 2024 strategic setback when the ANC lost its outright majority in parliament, Gauteng and KZN.
89. The 29 May 2024 National and Provincial Elections constitute a very significant development in South Africa. They were among the most fiercely contested elections in SA's democratic era. The ANC faced a massive ideological and political onslaught with the objective to remove the liberation movement entirely from all the levers of state power. Defeating the ANC and removing it from government was a campaign objective shared by the right-wing forces globally and domestically, sections of the media and new parties on the right and the left – many created and funded specifically to achieve this goal.
90. This onslaught took place in a context of serious objective and subjective weaknesses faced by the liberation forces. Economic growth over the last twelve years averaged around a pedestrian 0.8%, accompanied by spiralling unemployment and deepening poverty. While progress has been made through the social wage and income support programmes, rising cost of living driven by global shocks and extreme weather patterns, have had a devastating effect on the motive forces, increasing social and economic precarity.
91. For the first time since 1994, the ANC failed to win an absolute majority at national level, securing 40% down from 57% in 2019. The ANC also fell steeply below 50% in KwaZulu Natal (17%), Gauteng (34.7%) and marginally so in the Northern Cape (49.3%). We retained outright majorities in five provinces: Limpopo (73.3%), Eastern Cape (62.8%), North West (58.1%), Free State (51.8%), and Mpumalanga (51%). The Democratic Alliance won an outright majority in W Cape (55%) and MKP a majority in KZN (45.4%). The movement thus lost its majority in Parliament as well as in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal – the largest population centres and key economic hubs. The urban electoral decline first evident in 2016 was even more pronounced in 2021 and 2024.

National Elections Results: May 2024				
				
40.19%	21.8%	14.59%	9.52%	3.85%
			Other 10 Parties	
2.06%	1.36%	1.2%	5.43%	

92. Correctly, the NEC characterized the 2024 election outcomes as a strategic setback. These results represent a profound retreat for the hegemony of the ANC-led Alliance. State power came close to shifting almost entirely out of the hands of the democratic forces. Such an outcome would have been severe for the project of building a National Democratic Society.
93. The country emerged from the 2024 elections fractured and politically strained. A grouping of parties led by MKP made unsubstantiated claims of largescale election fraud and threatened violence should the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) release final results as scheduled on 2 June 2024. They bellowed that the release of the final results would “provoke people” and “start trouble”. An atmosphere of anxiety and potential loomed. Nevertheless, the IEC fulfilled its mandate and announced the results. The ball was now in the court of political parties elected to Parliament to chart a way forward under new political realities.
94. Despite losing its majority, the ANC remained the largest party in the National Assembly. True to its historic mission as outlined in Rule 2, the ANC seized the tactical initiative to stabilize the nation and move it forward. At its meeting on 6 June 2024, the NEC considered a range of options and concluded that urgent steps were required to address **three immediate objectives: a) fostering national unity and stability; b) safeguarding state power to continue advancing the strategic objective of a united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous South Africa; (c) creating space to rebuild public confidence and trust, especially the motive forces.**
95. To pursue these three immediate objectives, the NEC considered four options: (i) going into opposition benches; (ii) a grand coalition with one or two of the bigger parties (DA, MKP, EFF); (iii) a minority government with confidence-and-supply arrangements with various parties; and (iv) an inclusive Government of National Unity (GNU). The NEC decided as follows:
- **Going into opposition:** Rejected. This would be a dereliction of national and revolutionary duty. No serious liberation movement can voluntarily abandon state power when it remains the largest party. In fact, even right-wing parties do not regard opposition benches as the end-goal because they too need state power to advance their right-wing agenda.
 - **Grand coalition with one or two of the bigger parties:** Rejected. Such a model would enable a single party (DA or EFF) to exercise veto power over national policy, placing the ANC at risk of being held hostage to another party’s agenda.

- **Minority government:** Rejected. Although politically “comfortable”, such a government is unstable, prone to policy uncertainty, and vulnerable to collapse. Every parliamentary vote becomes transactional, undermining developmental priorities and planning.
 - **Government of National Unity:** Chosen. The NEC saw an inclusive GNU as the most viable tactical instrument to achieve national unity, stability and policy continuity in the face of fragmentation.
96. Drawing inspiration from past moments of adversity - where the ANC has consistently acted in the best interests of the people and the revolution-the NEC reaffirmed that confronting the 2024 outcome required creativity and boldness. Again, it evaluated the four options and confirmed that the GNU offered the most responsible and revolutionary course of action.
 97. After weighing risks and opportunities, the NEC unanimously agreed that the country required a new type of GNU—with characteristics adapted to the 2024 context—to move South Africa forward. No alternative government arrangement would adequately unite society around a shared national agenda.
 98. The envisaged GNU is a government composed of different parties that agree to work together in the national interest. The NEC chose this path fully aware that bringing together parties with diverse—and in some cases hostile—ideological positions is extremely difficult. Some parties fundamentally oppose the NDR; others openly seek the ANC’s demise. Yet all political actors recognised that the country could not advance without the ANC.
 99. The NEC appointed a Negotiations Team led by the National Officials, mandated to develop clear guiding principles, negotiate with all political parties, craft a minimum programme and modalities for the GNU, and implement the negotiation framework adopted by the NEC in April 2023 in line with 55th National Conference resolutions.
 100. As a result, the GNU Statement of Intent was signed by the ANC and 10 other parties (one later withdrew), and on 14 June 2024, President Cyril Ramaphosa and the Speaker were duly elected. After further negotiations, the GNU Cabinet was appointed on 30 June 2024—just over a month after the election.

The GNU as a tactical intervention

101. The ANC understands the GNU as a tactical intervention born out of the fact that no party was able to win a majority. The GNU is not a strategic compromise, but a direct consequence of a strategic setback. The ANC’s overall strategy and programme have not changed. (See the *2025 NGC Base Document: Balance of Forces and What Is To Be Done*).
102. It is important to emphasise that the ANC never opted for the GNU merely to stay in power at all costs. The ANC strategic objective and programme of the NDR have not changed – the political identity and strategic orientation of the ANC as a movement for transformation has not changed. But tactics change from time to time, depending on objective conditions.
103. From the onset, the ANC understood that coalition governments or unity governments represent the law of dialectics known as “the unity and struggle of opposites”. In other words, they have inherent contradictions and tensions that require effective political and organisational management. The ANC must always manage both the primary and secondary contradictions in coalitions in order to advance the interests of the people.
104. In line with the directive of the 55th National Conference, the NEC adopted a coalition framework in April 2023 that defines the conditions, principles and programme under which the ANC can enter into coalitions. This framework shaped the approach of the ANC to the GNU.
105. As the largest party in Parliament, the ANC is the leader of the GNU and controls most ministries that are central to the execution of the transformation agenda. We cannot

give excuses. The ANC Ministers, Deputy Ministers, Presiding Officers and Chairpersons of Parliamentary Committees are expected to be exemplary – being the most hardworking, responsive and advanced in addressing the pressing needs of society and showing accountability.

Assessment of the 7th administration under the GNU

106. As the NGC convenes, the GNU has been in office for nearly 18 months. At its meeting of 2–4 August 2025, the NEC undertook a comprehensive assessment of the GNU, examining public perceptions, improvements in government performance on core issues affecting the motive forces, and the contributions of participating parties to the 7th Administration.
107. The GNU Statement of Intent articulates a transformation framework aligned with the three apex priorities of the 7th Administration announced by President Ramaphosa at the Opening of Parliament on 18 July 2024:
 - Driving inclusive growth and job creation
 - Reducing poverty and tackling the high cost of living
 - Building a capable, ethical and developmental state
108. The National Executive (Cabinet) adopted the Medium-Term Development Plan (MTDP) for 2024–2029 to implement these priorities. Guided by the outcomes-based approach of our 2024 Manifesto, the MTDP sets measurable targets. A key task of this NGC is to review progress toward fulfilling the commitments made in the 2024 Manifesto, as discussed in the Governance section. The ANC-led 7th Administration adopted the 2025 National Industrial Policy; established a R100 billion Transformation Fund; supported spaza shops and small businesses; implemented the Presidential Youth Employment Initiative; and shifted expenditure toward infrastructure investment (R1 trillion over three years for roads, rail, ports, water, hospitals and student accommodation).
109. The ANC-led 7th administration inherited a stabilized supply of electricity from the 6th Administration, ending load shedding. The electricity availability factor (EAF) improved from 48% in March 2023 to over 70% by October 2025. The key remaining challenges are load reduction and high electricity costs. Significant progress has been made under Operation Vulindlela in addressing longstanding constraints in energy, transport and logistics, border security and immigration, and municipal infrastructure and basic services, including water and sanitation. The 7th Administration is advancing transformative legislation such as the BELA Act, the NHI Act and the Expropriation Act.
110. The 7th Parliament has adapted to the complexity of operating without an ANC majority. Managing Parliamentary Committees has been challenging, but the ANC Caucus is developing new methods for working with parties whose positions differ significantly from ours.
111. The failure to pass the Budget in April provided critical lessons. The ANC has learned to build tactical, issue-based voting alliances—particularly when some GNU partners use Parliament to pursue narrow interests. Overall, the ANC Caucus has succeeded in keeping Parliament functioning effectively, with the cooperation of many GNU and non-GNU parties. The November 2025 Medium Term Budget Policy Statement passed smoothly, with increased allocations to education, health, infrastructure, public employment programmes and the SRD grant, breaking a cycle of austerity while stabilising government debt. There are encouraging signs that the country is beginning to turn the corner: South Africa’s removal from the grey list; improved sovereign credit ratings; lower interest rates; and easing inflation—all of which reduce the cost of capital and the cost of living.
112. However, weaknesses in the GNU threaten the stability and credibility of the 7th Administration:

- Relentless attacks on transformation policies and South Africa's foreign policy stance by the DA, despite their agreement to the Statement of Intent. These attacks have been amplified through global networks, the courts, the media and state roles they hold within the GNU.
 - Conduct by some parties that undermines national interest, public confidence and government cohesion—including inappropriate engagements with foreign state and non-state actors, threatening national security and unity.
 - Weak and fragmented government communications, with no coherent strategy to highlight progress on the GNU's priorities. Public perceptions are often shaped by DA theatrics and manufactured crises, rather than the determined work of the ANC and its partners to advance transformation.
113. Time is not on our side. We must move with the speed of lightning in executing plans so that tangible results are felt on the ground—particularly on inclusive growth, job creation, poverty reduction, combating crime and corruption, and improving service delivery. Ultimately, the GNU will be judged not on plans, but **on execution**. The ANC must master the discipline of implementation during this term so we stop repeating the refrain that “we are good at policy development but poor at implementation.”
114. It is evident that we have defended the democratic gains and set the 7th Administration on a trajectory that advances the NDR's objectives. Had right-wing forces and their breakaway allies succeeded in removing the ANC entirely from state power, we would today be witnessing the reversal of many transformative policies—much as occurred in several metros after the ANC lost power in 2016 and 2021.

Dynamics and Contradictions amongst Parties

115. In the run-up to the 2024 elections, the most intense, coordinated and well-funded campaign was launched to dislodge the ANC from power and install a right-wing, anti-transformation coalition government (the so-called Moonshot Pact). Objectively, this campaign produced a counter-revolutionary convergence between right-wing parties and breakaway parties formed by former leaders of the liberation movement. They shared a common objective: to reduce the ANC below 50% and remove it from government. The electoral setback of 2024 initially gave these forces the illusion that the ANC had reached its end. The ANC's swift tactical manoeuvre to rally parties around an inclusive unity government defeated this pre-election strategy. Their shared goal of eliminating the ANC from governance did not materialise.
116. Despite our subjective weaknesses, we must not underestimate the strong position the ANC holds within the GNU—controlling two-thirds of the ministries critical to transformation and development. The NEC maintains that all ANC Ministers and Deputy Ministers must work decisively and diligently to drive service delivery and transformation. The movement must leverage its tactical advantage as the leading party in the GNU.
117. Over the past year, the ANC has expanded cooperation with parties outside the GNU. We will continue strengthening tactical collaboration with any party willing to work on inclusive growth, job creation, crime prevention, reducing the cost of living, poverty alleviation and improving service delivery—while countering those who seek the ANC's downfall.
118. The ANC remains convinced of the correctness of adopting the GNU as a tactic. The NEC will continue to strengthen the GNU's effectiveness and configuration so that it can deliver on its agreed priorities. Despite the noise and disruptions caused by hostile forces, the NEC's conclusion is that the GNU provides an opportunity to defend and advance the policy agenda of the National Democratic Revolution.
119. Naturally, all parties in a unity or coalition government seek to use their presence in government to promote their policy preferences and broaden their support base. However, we must insist on enlightened self-interest—placing national imperatives

of a stable, effective government above narrow party agendas. The national interest must come first. We are reminded of President Nelson Mandela's words to the 49th National Conference in 1994, reflecting on the first GNU:

"We should accept that it is the necessary thorny crown of leadership that, like a suitor, we have to patiently bring in line elements whose own sense of self-importance lies in making a relationship tempestuous."

Major Global Events and Trends

120. Emerging from the Covid-19 pandemic that gripped the world and South Africa from the end of 2019, the period since the 55th National Conference (2022–2025) has been marked by profound global disruptions and structural shifts that continue to reshape geopolitics, economics, technology and the international governance landscape. For the ANC, the Alliance and the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), these developments form the strategic backdrop against which national priorities, organisational renewal and international engagement must be understood.
121. The world has entered an era defined simultaneously by technological acceleration, heightened geopolitical contestation, climate instability and competing visions of global governance. The rapid advance of artificial intelligence (AI) since 2022 has transformed global production systems, labour markets and economic competition. The scale of computational power required for AI has dramatically increased global demand for energy, critical minerals and rare earth metals, intensifying competition for access to Africa's mineral resources with significant regional and geopolitical implications. At the same time, the convergence of finance capital, big technology and political power has accelerated. Large technology corporations now wield influence comparable to sovereign actors, while financial markets have aligned themselves with this technological consolidation. This has created new forms of global inequality and reinforced the dominance of developed economies within the digital capitalist order.
122. Multilateralism has come under sustained attack, as major powers increasingly undermine global institutions—particularly the UN, WTO and WHO—in favour of unilateral action and exclusive blocs. This weakening of multilateral cooperation has reduced the world's collective capacity to address pandemics, climate change and financial instability. South Africa, led by President Ramaphosa, used its Presidency of the 2025 G20 Summit—held under the theme "Equality, Solidarity, Sustainability"—to make a progressive intervention in this global conjuncture. The theme resonated widely, reflecting global demands for a more just economic order, fairer financial systems and an inclusive digital transformation. The expansion of the BRICS bloc to include additional emerging economies marked another significant development. It reflects growing dissatisfaction with Western-dominated global governance and a collective search for more equitable development finance, trade arrangements and political cooperation.
123. The period has also seen the continued rise of right-wing populism across Europe, North America, Latin America and parts of Asia. Economic stagnation, cultural polarisation and declining trust in democratic institutions have fuelled narrow nationalism, anti-immigration sentiment and attacks on pluralism. These ideological trends have deepened global fragmentation, weakened international solidarity and emboldened extremist groups.
124. A number of regional crises threaten to escalate into broader geopolitical conflicts, including the Russia–Ukraine war, Israel's continued genocidal assault on the Palestinian people despite recent peace agreements, and the intensifying strategic rivalry between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific region.

125. Despite continental commitments to silence the guns, Africa has experienced significant conflicts and instability. In the DRC and Mozambique, insecurity persists in mineral-rich regions. The conflict in Sudan has intensified humanitarian suffering. Tensions in Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Tanzania and Somalia continue to affect East Africa's stability. The Sahel region has seen multiple military takeovers with anti-imperialist orientations. These interconnected developments influence migration patterns, economic prospects and the broader strategic environment for SADC and the continent.
126. The world—including South Africa—has faced intensifying climate-related disasters: heatwaves, floods, droughts and cyclones, disrupting livelihoods and food systems. Financing for climate adaptation remains grossly inadequate, illustrating the decline in global solidarity. At the same time, the global energy transition has accelerated, although unevenly across regions.
127. Notwithstanding domestic challenges, the period has seen notable improvements in South Africa:
 - **The end of loadshedding in 2024** marked a turning point in energy security, driven by expanded transmission capacity, procurement reforms, private-sector participation, and improvements in maintenance and generation.
 - South Africa exited the **FATF grey-list**, reflecting strengthened financial oversight and governance reforms. Credit rating agencies improved South Africa's outlook, citing fiscal consolidation, institutional stabilisation and progress in energy and logistics reforms. Inflation stabilised due to prudent monetary policy and global commodity trends.
 - **Investment levels increased**, particularly in renewable energy, digital infrastructure, mining and manufacturing. Investor sentiment improved as structural reforms gained traction in electricity, rail, ports and water management.
128. These developments can help re-anchor confidence, even as socioeconomic pressures related to poverty, unemployment and inequality persist, and demand urgent, coordinated interventions. For the ANC, the Alliance and the MDM, this global context underscores the necessity of strategic clarity, organisational renewal, strengthened state capacity and principled internationalism.

STATE OF ORGANISATION

The ANC will only succeed in realising its strategic objective of transforming South Africa when it has successfully transformed itself into a renewed, responsive, modernised, well-governed, well-resourced, caring and effective political formation – the central focus of the ANC Roadmap to 2032. Consequently, all ANC structures have to change their focus towards the people we serve and the problems and challenges they face in their daily lives.”

Declaration of the ANC 55th National Conference, 2022

Highlights of the last 3 Years (2022-2025)

129. The ANC Constitution, in its Preamble, recalls that the *“fundamental goal of the African National Congress remains to construct a united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous society in South Africa.”* It further recalls that the historic April 1994 election placed the ANC in a position of responsibility to lead the process of reconstruction and development aimed at eradicating the poverty and inequality created by apartheid and establishing a just and equitable economic and social order.
130. Our state of organisation, and the work of our structures, must therefore reflect our ability to carry out these historic tasks among the masses of our people and within government. In this regard, the 55th National Conference Declaration emphasised that the ANC can only achieve its strategic objective of transforming South Africa if it transforms itself into a renewed, responsive, modernised, well-governed, well-resourced, caring and effective political formation. Conference concluded that *all ANC structures must shift their focus directly to the people we serve and the daily challenges they face.*
131. 55th National Conference furthermore mandated the NEC to implement an immediate **12-month programme** to restore public trust by taking decisive action on key crises and renewing our contract with the people. The elements included:
 - a) **Ending the Loadshedding Crisis:** As mandated by Conference, the 2023 and 2024 January 8 Statements prioritised ending loadshedding. The President declared loadshedding a national emergency; Cabinet adopted the Electricity Action Plan; and a Minister of Electricity was appointed. By early 2024, South Africa experienced its longest uninterrupted period without loadshedding, enabling attention to shift to load reduction, transformer replacements, municipal debt to Eskom, electricity costs and long-term energy security.
 - b) **Local Government and Service Delivery:** Local government remained a consistent focus. The NEC established the Local Government Intervention Task Team (LGITT), which held provincial workshops with Troikas and RECs on back-to-basics interventions and developed a Local Government Intervention Dashboard to monitor nine critical areas. The LGITT engaged ANC caucuses and mayoral committees in struggling municipalities (including Mangaung, Matjhabeng, Maluti-a-Phofung, Makhanda, eThekweni, Buffalo City and Nelson Mandela Bay). The LGITT provided regular NEC reports on the state of local government and, together with the Legislature and Governance Committee, contributed to the review of the Local Government White Paper and the Division of Revenue Act. In September 2025, the NEC adopted a **6-pillar Local Government Action Plan (LGAP)**, followed by a Roll-Call that mobilised **4,804 ANC ward and PR councillors**. The LGAP places strong emphasis on community engagement and resolving service delivery failures. The President delegated oversight of service delivery interventions in government to the Deputy President. At ANC Headquarters, a **Service Delivery War Room** was established, followed by provincial and municipal/metro war rooms and rapid-response units after the adoption of the LGAP. Presidential intervention teams were deployed to assist eThekweni and Johannesburg.
 - c) **Letsema Campaign** As a major national programme to reconnect with communities, ANC structures have undertaken weekly or monthly community work—clean-ups, pothole repairs, soup kitchens—while government relaunched its Izimbizo programme.
 - d) **North West’s Thuntsha Lerole Campaign:** The North West Provincial Government’s initiative, led by Premier Lazarus Kagiso Mokgosi, accelerated service delivery by bringing services directly to communities. Activities included infrastructure maintenance, community engagement, healthcare and local economic development projects. By year-end, the “Thuntsha Lerole Reloaded” campaign had entered its fifth phase.

- e) **Water Crisis Response:** With loadshedding dealt with, attention shifted to the water crisis, emphasised in the 2025 January 8 Statement. President Ramaphosa warned that *“the crisis of water security poses an even greater threat to the quality of life and economic prospects of all South Africans. Indeed, water is life and sanitation is dignity.”* The ANC called on government to implement measures including: Strengthening water boards to ensure secure water supply. Upgrading ageing municipal infrastructure by ring-fencing water revenue for critical maintenance. Implementing a financing framework enabling private-sector participation in refurbishing water infrastructure without relinquishing municipal ownership. Intensifying law-enforcement efforts against sabotage, water-tanker corruption and illegal connections. Accelerating the formalisation of informal settlements, ensuring safe and legal access to water and electricity, and providing free basic services to indigent households. Developing a comprehensive indigent register across all municipalities. Strengthening early-warning systems for extreme weather, improving access to disaster relief and building climate-resilient infrastructure and human settlements.
132. While ending loadshedding achieved clear progress, other programmes and community-outreach initiatives have experienced slow uptake, highlighting persistent organisational weaknesses.

ANC Branches and Renewal


133. In the 113th January 8 Statement delivered at Mbombela Stadium in 2024, President Cyril Ramaphosa outlined the tasks of Renewal regarding rebuilding branches and membership, in line with Conference resolutions. He noted *“Renewal is about the quality of an organisation: the calibre of its membership, cadreship and leadership. Recalling President Oliver Tambo in the 1985 January 8th Statement: “The strength of any organisation lies in the calibre of its individual members and units. In order to advance in keeping with the momentum of our struggle we must improve the quality of and expand the quantity of our membership. We need cadres of unquestionable loyalty, dedication and understanding of our struggle”.*
134. Accordingly, the NEC decided that from 2024, all ANC members—including those in leadership structures (NEC, PECs, RECs and BECs)—must complete a comprehensive **ANC Foundation Course** as part of the revival of a nationwide political education programme. The NEC further directed that a comprehensive **Branch Functionality Audit** must guide the rebuilding of strong, vibrant ANC branches that are dynamically connected to community life and local development needs. Guidelines on **Building Activist ANC Branches** were developed, distributed and incorporated into the Foundation Course and branch induction processes. There is organisation-wide acceptance that activist branches are the key link between the movement and the people—the spaces where ANC members develop and express their activism, advance the mission of a united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous South Africa, and exercise their rights and responsibilities as members.

ANC Branch Functionality Barometer

135. The 54th and 55th National Conferences both resolved that branches must be audited based on their activities in the community, rather than merely on having 100 members. The Policy Monitoring, Evaluation and Research (PMER) unit, together with the Organising and Membership Department, advanced this work by building on the Branch Functionality Barometer developed in the previous term under Organising Manager, Cde Mojalefa Nale. The first Barometer was piloted in 2023 with 144



branches. The questionnaire was subsequently improved, and a snap survey was conducted with Free State branches in March 2025 during the NWC visit to the province. The key finding from this snap survey was that many branches lacked knowledge on how to develop a Branch Programme of Action (POA). This gap informed the development of the ANC Activist Branch Guideline. The full Branch Functionality Barometer rollout began in July 2025, initially targeting regions that had already held conferences or were in good standing in 2025. In October–November 2025, the rollout was expanded to include all branches eligible to attend the NGC.

136. The Branch Functionality Barometer consists of several sections assessing the nature of the branch, its work in the community, political education programmes, and communications capacity. It was issued as an online baseline assessment to be completed by all ANC branches, and it forms part of the requirements for participation in the 5th National General Council (NGC).
137. The preliminary analysis presented in this report is derived from partial data received through the ongoing ANC Branch Functionality Baseline Assessment. At this stage, 811 branch submissions have been recorded. These findings should be treated as provisional and not yet representative of the full organisation until all branches have submitted and the complete national dataset has been analysed. The table below reflects submissions by province as at 1 December 2025:



138. The assessment is still underway, and the numbers continue to rise as more branches complete the tool. The final dataset will stabilise once provinces conclude their internal verification processes. For the NGC midterm report, the organisation will be able to present a preliminary synopsis of the state of branches, including those represented at the NGC.


139. The responsibility for the Branch Functionality Barometer rests with the Branch Secretary and Chairperson, and for the first time we have a sense of the gender composition of ANC Branch Chairpersons and Secretaries. According to the Preliminary data, 58.1% of ANC branch secretaries are male, and 41.9% are women. We are some way from gender equity at this level, Eastern Cape, Gauteng and Northern Cape show stronger female representation compared to the national pattern, whilst Mpumalanga, Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal show the widest gender gaps, with male secretaries heavily outnumbering female secretaries.



140. The national age profile of Branch Chairpersons shows a mature leadership cohort, with limited variation between male and female chairperson. The average age for ANC branch chairpersons is 49.3 years, with female branch chairperson slightly older. Overall, the profile indicates that branch administrative leadership is anchored in an older age group, with very limited representation of younger cadres in chairperson positions. This is a challenge for intergenerational transition, when the median age in South Africa now stands at 28 years.
141. Of the 811 branches that responded, the majority were in rural areas/villages, not surprising given the high number of branches from Limpopo, Mpumalanga and Northern Cape that responded in the first wave under analysis. Branches from townships were the second largest categories, followed by suburbs and mixed, and the lowest response rate from ANC branches in informal settlements.
142. **Membership Trends** (require deeper analysis): The majority of responding branches report stable membership numbers, though with fluctuations across provinces. Youth membership remains significantly lower than adult membership, indicating a generational gap in recruitment and retention. Branch surveyed raised the following as challenges with retaining ANC members (from qualitative responses):
- 52% feel members disengage because the ANC is “not responsive to community issues.”
 - 40% cite factionalism and leadership conflicts.
 - 22% point to poor internal communication.

- 23% indicate infrequent or irregular branch meetings.
- only 19% of branches reported no major challenges affecting membership retention.

Most branches indicated gaps in the process of renewal of Membership, and problems relating to access to the Membership portal.




143. **Functionality of BECs:** Most branches have full BECs in place. Only a limited number are currently operating under Branch Task Teams (BTTs), indicating that the branches that responded are mainly those in good standing, eligible to be considered for NGC attendance. In these branches, BEC meetings are taking place, but the quality and consistency of internal governance systems is uneven. Minute-keeping is weak. Across the Provinces, branches struggled to upload or provide properly structured minutes. This suggests gaps in administrative discipline and record-management. Task tracking and follow-up are not consistent. Many BECs meet but do not demonstrate clear tracking of decisions, delegated responsibilities, or progress reports. This affects accountability and programme execution. As part of the assessment, branches were required to upload at least two recent BEC meeting minutes. A deeper qualitative analysis of these minutes will be conducted. Most importantly, the activism and programmatic effectiveness of the Branches on community issues is very thin – this is the most important measure of the state of the branch.
144. **Branch subcommittees:** the data show that three subcommittees dominate across branches: Political Education, Organizing, and Safety & Security. A notable portion of branches selected “None”, confirming the absence of subcommittee systems in several areas. Beyond these core categories, the dataset includes a long list of other BEC portfolio such as Fundraising, Veterans, Media, Finance, Deployment, Sports, Communications, and others. Each of these appears only once or a handful of times. Their presence indicates that while most branches follow the same structure, there is a scattered set of additional committees reflected in small numbers.
145. **Branch Programme of Action:** 65.2% report that they have adopted a Program of Action for 2025 and 34.8% do not have a PoA in place. While some branches indicate activities such as political education, mobilization, sectoral outreach, Letsema, and community meetings, these practices are not uniform. Variation between provinces is significant; some demonstrate structured PoA activity, while others show minimal

or fragmented implementation. Branches that indicated having adopted a PoA were requested to upload the document, a detailed analysis of these uploads will be undertaken to confirm whether the PoA aligns with the BEC portfolios, whether activities are scheduled consistently, and whether the PoA has been implemented or is only formally adopted.

146. **Membership Induction and Foundation Course:** A large majority of branches have not conducted member inductions in the past 12 months. Where inductions were conducted, evidence is inconsistent or missing. Completion of the ANC Foundational Course for the branches that submitted are limited, with branches indicating that they have not enrolled or completed it, and a few did not know about it.
147. **Branch Election Work:** 82.7% of branches say they have started preparing for LGE 2026, but the activity data shows preparation is uneven. Across all election tasks, branches cluster around “In Progress” and “Not Yet Started,” indicating partial execution rather than full rollout. Street sheet follow-up is active, but completion remains low. Volunteer database updates show high “In Progress” numbers but limited completion. Door-to-door mobilization is happening but still split between “In Progress” and “Not Yet Started.” Sectoral engagement and voter education show the same uneven trend. Youth-focused outreach is one of the weakest areas, with very few branches engaging schools, youth spaces, or first-time voters. Social media and digital campaigning remains low, showing underuse of these. The ID campaign is consistently weak across provinces and requires attention. There is a clear subjective bias risk, where branches may choose “In Progress” instead of “Not Yet Started” to avoid appearing inactive. In the follow-up assessment, branches will be required to upload evidence for each activity so that we can verify the work and zoom deeper into the areas where activity is overstated or unclear.

53. Which Election Related activity has the Branch Undertaken in the past 6 Months



148. The Branch Functionality Barometer gives an indication of the activities and status of this basic unit of the movement. The ANC branches that have community campaigns, who hold regular members general meetings, with political education programmes and good relations with their Ward Councilor who convenes regular community meetings, sees better performance in the elections. The 2024 Sol Plaatje, Charlotte Maxeke and Anton Lembede award winners for Best Performing ANC, ANCWL and ANCYL branches attest to this.
149. The state of branches is directly linked to insufficient national investments in branch development, induction and training, now even during elections campaigns. Many branches therefore do not have the capacity to develop and implement programmes, and to become spaces where members develop politically as activists and cadres. This, coupled with negative practices such as

gatekeeping and conference branches, undermines the standing of the ANC. The initiatives on Activist Branches, the Foundation Course and the Branch Functionality Barometer are therefore critical to turn this situation around.

Organising and Membership

150. This report covers the organisational work undertaken during the 2023, 2024 and 2025 reporting periods. It reflects the broad strategic mandate of the department to rebuild core structures, strengthen membership integrity, consolidate ANC presence on the ground, and re-establish the movement as a credible, people-centred force across all provinces.
151. The reporting cycle coincides with a period of deep organisational renewal, extensive structural reconfiguration and intensified mobilisation ahead of the 2024 NPE, the 2026 Local Government Elections, and the National General Council (NGC). Throughout this period, the department has worked to stabilise provincial structures, restore organisational legitimacy, implement digital reforms to the membership system, support conferences, build leagues and coordinate mass political mobilisation.
152. The Organising and Membership Subcommittee comprises 10 NEC members and the Secretaries General of the ANC Leagues, all of whom actively participate in the Subcommittee's activities and meetings. The Subcommittee adopted a six-month Programme of Action divided into three implementation quarters. It held regular and special meetings as necessary to process programmes and prepare reports for the NEC. Fortnightly virtual meetings became the norm due to challenges in convening physical meetings, and some meetings were postponed or cancelled due to the unavailability of members.

Membership System

153. An achievement of this cycle has been the transition from the old membership system to a new, modernised platform designed to enhance data integrity, eliminate manipulation and support efficient membership administration. The new system allows members to manage their own profiles and renew directly—via online banking and ATMs—thereby reducing gatekeeping and third-party interference.
154. ANC branches now have individual portals that allow them to manage membership profiles and data, and to generate accurate records and reports for ANC meetings and events requiring membership verification. All provinces that convened conferences in 2025 successfully utilised the new system.
155. In 2025, further enhancements were consolidated, including ongoing work with TGO to finalise the Service Level Agreement for system maintenance and banking-interface functionality. Work is currently underway to finalise the contract between the ANC (through TGO) and the service provider responsible for linking the membership system and banking payment platform.
156. The department supported the Women's League, Youth League and Veterans League on membership-related issues.
157. The permanent ANC Smart Membership Card, launched in 2024, continues to be rolled out across provinces. The card securely stores member information and is designed for future functionalities such as loyalty benefits and transactional use in retail spaces. These reforms have stabilised and grown the ANC membership base, reflected in **543,524 members in good standing as of October 2025**, supported by improved verification systems and provincial interventions.
158. The tables below provide a provincial overview, a detailed regional breakdown and the proposed Branch Delegate Allocation. This report is not final, as the Membership

Team continues to process and update payment records across all provinces, which may lead to further changes in the statistics. Weekly updates will be circulated to all Provincial Secretaries to ensure access to the most accurate and current information.

Table. State Of Membership and Branches - Provincial Overview, 1 December 2025, ANC Organising and Membership Department

PROVINCE	TOTAL NO OF BRANCHES	BRANCHES WITHIN TERM OF OFFICE	BRANCHES TERM OF OFFICE LAPSED	NO OF WARDS WITH M/SHIP ABOVE 100	NO OF WARDS WITH M/SHIP BELOW 100	TOTAL M/SHIP IN GOOD-STANDING
LP	568	367	201	508	60	123 299
GP	529	323	206	386	143	79 634
EC	712	408	304	384	328	74 385
KZN	901	00	901	157	744	67 248
FS	320	11	309	284	36	66 404
NW	408	09	399	251	157	45 881
MP	400	303	97	198	202	40 762
NC	232	189	43	190	42	27 105
WC	402	25	377	55	347	18 806
TOTAL	4472	1635	2837	2413	2059	

159. The Membership System is operational and being used for regional conferences. Data migration from Spesnet is complete. The organisation is finalising the Service Level Agreement with Emperio, which will enable an online payment gateway and automated payment updates. At present, the national Membership Team updates payments manually to correct data inconsistencies. Member-reported discrepancies are being resolved through spreadsheet submissions and proof-of-payment verification by the National Team. Work is underway to improve the accuracy of the Membership System and reduce manual processes. The new payment gateway will automate payment reconciliation and significantly minimise discrepancies.
160. The ANC launched its smart membership card on 28 March 2025 at the Birchwood Hotel during an NEC meeting. The rollout is underway, with members actively uploading their photos daily as part of the distribution process.
161. Priority enhancements in progress include: Portal for ANC leagues, and international branches (proposal developed), Biometrics (Fingerprint), Conference/Meeting/Events Registration System and Multiple subscription pay-points.

Regional and Provincial Conferences

162. As part of rebuilding organisational structures, we assisted provinces to prepare for regional conferences scheduled for 2024–2025. Preparations included ensuring that all membership issues were resolved following the termination of the Spesnet and FNB contracts and the development of the new membership system. Membership teams worked with structures to ensure necessary corrections and membership alignment before BGMs commenced.

- **Eastern Cape Province** held six regional conferences: Alfred Nzo, Chris Hani, Joe Gqabi, O R Tambo, and Nelson Mandela, with Dr WB Rubusana and Sarah Baartman planned to convene their conference before the end of December 2025.
- **Limpopo Province** all five regions held successful regional conferences: Sekhukhune, Peter Mokaba, Waterberg, Norman Mashabene, and Vhembe.
- **Mpumalanga Province** convened successfully all three regional conference of Ehlanzeni, Gert Sibande, and Nkangala Regions.
- **Northern Cape Province** successfully held all five regional conferences: Frances Baard, Pixley Ka Seme, John Taolo Gaetsewe, Namakwa and ZF Mgcawu. This followed by a very successful Provincial Conference.
- Gauteng Province held three regional Conferences: Ekurhuleni, Sedibeng and Greater Johannesburg. Greater Tshwane regions will be convening their regional conference by the end of December 2025.
- The provinces of North West and Free State will start convening their Regional and Provincial Conferences between the end of December 2025 and March 2026.
- The NEC has decided that Kwa-Zulu Natal and Western Cape provinces will need a more concerted rebuilding effort in 2026 before we can determine their readiness for conferences, given the scale of the challenges.

Table. Upcoming Regional Conferences in 2026, Organising and Membership Department

PROVINCE	REGION	DUE DATE
Gauteng	West Rand	June 2026
Eastern Cape	Amathole	May 2026
Kwazulu Natal	Tolomane Mnyayiza	April 2026
	Moses Mabhida	December 2026
	Josiah Gumede	December 2026
	Inkosi Bhambatha	May 2026
	Mbuso Kubheka	September 2026
	Mzala Nxumalo	April 2026
	Nokuhamba Nyawo	September 2026
	Musa Dladla	April 2026
	General Gizenga Mpanza	December 2026
	Harry Gwala	April 2026
	Ethekwini	April 2026
Free State	Mangaung	2025-2026
	Lejweleputswa	2025-2026
	Fezile Dabi	2025-2026
	Thabo Mofutsanyane	April 2026
	Xhariep	April 2026

Revival and Renewal of Structures, Conferences and Interventions

163. Throughout 2023–2025, the Subcommittee oversaw extensive organisation-building work, guided by NEC and NWC resolutions. This included: preparing and supporting all provincial, regional and league conferences; ensuring compliance through BGM/BBGM verification; stabilising dysfunctional or lapsed structures in the Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng; and rebuilding the Women's League, Youth League and Veterans League to restore constitutional functionality.

Elections, Mobilisation and Campaigns

164. The department played a central role in electoral mobilisation and political campaigning across the 2023–2025 cycle. Key achievements include: coordinating mobilisation for the 2024 General Elections through the Siyanqoba campaign; volunteer training; deploying national organisers to weak provinces such as KZN, NW and Gauteng; supporting

- manifesto review engagements; leading Right-to-Learn campaigns; and coordinating NEC deployments to priority provinces.
165. The “Register to Vote” campaign was driven by the Mobilisation Team, supported by Provincial Representatives who serve as PEC Heads of Mobilisation/Organising and Membership. Weekly planning meetings assessed progress, with provinces presenting their operational plans and reports. Mass mobilisation of members, capacitation of election structures, and activation of canvassing teams—especially for first-time voters—contributed to a highly successful voter-registration drive. This included popularising Online Voter Registration targeting youth. Current efforts focus on ongoing online registration, with dedicated youth-led teams mobilising new residential areas, student communities, and informal settlements.
 166. Participation in the ANC 2019 Manifesto Review Programme included mobilising members and communities, reinforcing democratic participation, and canvassing for ANC support. Mobilisation efforts led by national and Gauteng teams ensured the successful filling of Dobsonville Stadium despite logistical challenges. Lessons from the launch of the campaign strengthened subsequent mobilisation efforts. Provinces such as the Eastern Cape held Manifesto Review Rallies at all levels—including voting districts—where election campaigning is rooted.
 167. The “Wall-to-Wall” campaign for the 2024 NPE saw the Organising Department working closely with volunteers, Alliance structures, and local teams. Volunteers recruited at VD level were trained as canvassers, though many branches struggled to reach the target of 20 volunteers. NEC deployment at VD level formed part of the turnaround strategy and was successfully implemented during the final campaign phase. Mini-rallies, youth-focused online registration drives, and targeted deployments helped boost mobilisation. However, challenges were noted, including long queues, missing names on the voters’ roll, and incorrect VD allocations.
 168. **KwaZulu-Natal challenges:** Despite strong preparatory work and visible ground support, election-day outcomes diverged sharply from expectations and require further investigation.
 169. **North West:** Organisers were deployed to strengthen campaign coordination and oversee the Siyanqoba Rally.
 170. Preparations for the “Right to Learn” and “Back to School” campaigns for January–February 2024 were undertaken with the PYA, now formally integrated into ANC mobilisation structures. These programmes included ID assistance, NSFAS support and voter-registration drives for young people aged 16–18 years.
 171. **112th ANC Anniversary – Mbombela Stadium:** With a capacity of 43,500 (50,000 including pitch), the event exceeded expectations with approximately 70,000 attendees. Strong regional mobilisation and sectoral outreach contributed to a highly successful celebration. **113th ANC Anniversary – Khayelitsha Stadium:** Preparations began with venue assessments and development of a concept document by PMER. Mobilisation planning is underway with regional targets allocated.
46. **114th ANC Anniversary – North West (Bojanala–Moruleng Stadium):** Organising & Membership has developed a two-phase mobilisation plan:
 - Phase 1 (Oct–Dec 2025): national activation, sector mobilisation and NEC/PEC/REC deployment.
 - Phase 2 (Jan 2026): intensive community mobilisation in Northwest Province.
 172. **Commemorations & Reburials:** Between 2024–2025 the department coordinated major reburials and historical commemorations, including the repatriation of Cde Basil February and reburials of Cde Duma Nokwe and Florence Mophosho. These events strengthen community engagement and reinforce the ANC’s liberation heritage.
 173. **International Solidarity Campaigns:** A major event was held on 6 October 2024 at Regina Mundi to commemorate the October 7 Gaza massacre. More than 3,000 participants were mobilised, with strong support from Gauteng and the Western Cape, which held a substantial solidarity march.

174. **Spaza Shop Crisis Campaign:** Provincial structures launched inspections, community dialogues and township clean-ups. Interventions were coordinated through the SGO with NEC and PEC committees, relevant ministries and mobilisation structures. The campaign continues across all provinces.
175. **100 Days of the GNU Mobilisation:** A major public address was held, coordinated by the National Technical Team, with PMER developing content on GNU perspectives. Approximately 12,000 participants attended.
176. **16 Days of Activism (2024):** Working with the ANCWL, a major march to the Union Buildings was organised, calling for decisive action against GBV, illegal spaza shops and for greater local economic ownership.

Rebuilding and Renewal of ANC Leagues

177. All ANC Leagues are now in good standing with functional national and provincial structures actively participating in election work. All task teams have been replaced by constitutional structures, and all conferences were held within the prescribed timelines.

Rebuilding the PYA

178. Successful interventions resolved leadership disputes in SASCO, restoring a single legitimate leadership. Work is underway to strengthen SAUS in preparation for its congress. An ANC-led joint PYA Workshop is being prepared for the next academic year, focusing on the Right to Learn campaign. Investigations into COSAS found both parallel structures to be illegitimate; both were dissolved and replaced with a Conference Preparatory Task Team tasked with recruitment and rebuilding membership ahead of conference preparations.

Organisational Renewal and Conference Resolutions

179. The 54th National Conference mandated the NEC to develop a process to assess and audit the functionality of structures to build a strong, visible and effective organisation. Working with PMER, we developed a Branch Functionality Audit process and integrated it into the ANC Cloud System. This enabled the revival of the Best Branch Annual Awards, presented at the January 8th 112th Anniversary in Mpumalanga. An awards subcommittee was established to lead the selection process. Organising and Membership also collaborate with PMER on the Leadership Accountability Tool to assess the REC, PEC and NEC. Significant progress has been made.
180. Coupled with the branch functionality audit tool, we conducted an assessment of ANC structures led by the NWC. This assessment helped identify strengths and weaknesses in Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng, North West, Free State and the Western Cape, informing targeted interventions and preparing structures for NWC visits.

ANC Quality Membership and Renewal

181. The 55th National Conference prioritised improving the political quality of membership, focusing on “quality rather than quantity.” It mandated: A membership audit based on objective criteria; Development of political education cells to strengthen ideological, theoretical, policy and organisational capacity; Alignment of the OR Tambo School curriculum with the needs of new ANC members; Recruitment of more young people into ANC structures and leadership to counter perceptions of disconnection from youth struggles.
182. The quality of membership depends on recruitment processes and on how members are integrated into organisational activities so they evolve into activists and cadres. As a mass movement, the ANC needs activist members committed to the mission of social change and justice because:

- Branches must be led by active members who run programmes, subcommittees and community initiatives.
 - Membership must reflect all strata of the motive forces—workers, unemployed, middle strata, youth and women—and all national groups, so their issues shape ANC policy.
 - We require capable members for deployment as public representatives.
 - We need skilled members who can drive transformation across all five pillars of social transformation.
183. Political parties recruit members through outreach, digital engagement, alliances, community participation and diverse membership options. Effective recruitment requires a well-coordinated team, proper resources and strong Youth and Women's League participation.
184. ANC members have constitutional rights: to participate in policy, receive and impart information, elect leadership, critique and propose ideas. Members also have constitutional duties: to participate actively in branch life; understand and advance ANC aims and programmes; deepen understanding of South Africa's challenges; combat harmful propaganda; defend the ANC's principles; oppose racism, sexism, tribalism and all forms of discrimination; and uphold discipline and organisational decisions. The ANC Foundation Course module on the Role of the Member and the Branch therefore expands on the question: *Why join the ANC?* (as illustrated in the slide below).

Why Join the ANC?

Reasons for joining the ANC, according to its principles and history, centre on participating directly in the ongoing process of national transformation and governance:

- **Active Political Participation:** Members have the right to take a full and active part in the discussion, formulation, and implementation of the ANC's policies and programmes.
- **Influence and Accountability:** Members can participate in elections within the party, be elected to leadership positions, offer constructive criticism, and hold leadership accountable.
- **Being an Agent of Change:** Membership offers a structured way to work in communities to address social and economic problems like poverty, inequality, and crime, aligning personal efforts with a broad national movement for change.
- **Defending Democratic Gains:** Members commit to fighting against racism, sexism, and other forms of discrimination, and to defending the constitutional democracy established since 1994.
- **Commitment to a "Better Life for All":** Joining the ANC is presented as an opportunity to contribute to the vision of a prosperous society where everyone, especially the poor, experiences an improving quality of life.

Source: ANC Foundation Course, Module 5. Role of Member and Branch

185. These are the rights and duties of an activist, committed to social change and the mission of the ANC. There is however a tendency, unless we are part of leadership collectives, comrades don't exercise the rights and duties and ANC members, often even amongst experience activists. The Foundation Module also explains the significance of the ANC Oath, which is required to be taken by all members, not once but more regularly to remind ourselves about what we have committed to do when we joined the ANC:



Meaning of the ANC Oath

1. Commits the member to the ANC's foundational ideology and all its key policy documents, serving as the ultimate guide for political conduct.
2. Establishes that service is for the people, not for self-enrichment. This is a direct pledge against using party membership for corruption or personal gain.
3. Requires working through the party's official channels and respecting its internal democracy and elected leadership structures.
4. Emphasizes active participation and discipline, obligating members to contribute their efforts and obey mandates from the organization.
5. Reinforces that the ANC is accountable to the South African people, requiring members to ensure the party remains a tool for public good, not just an internal entity.
6. A direct call for party unity, requiring members to actively fight against internal divisions, gossip, and the formation of disruptive factions.

The principles of the oath apply to all members, but are scrutinized most closely in leaders:

For General Members: The Oath is a guide for daily conduct, requiring active participation, respect for party structures, and a rejection of using membership for personal benefit.

For Leaders: The standards are higher. Leaders are expected to embody the oath's principles in their public and private duties and conduct.

Dispute resolution mechanisms and managing conflicts

186. The ANC introduced dedicated dispute resolution structures and mechanisms at the 54th National Conference, and these structures have evolved and developed over this period, in the main dealing with disputes arising from organisational processes and resolving organisational conflicts.
187. The National Dispute Resolution Committee is the apex structure to give verdicts on disputes, and in the 55th National Conference, the NDCA Appeals Committee was introduced. The NDRC work is in response to disputes lodged, in 2024 because of the elections campaign, no disputes were dealt with.

Operational, Technical Challenges affecting Dispute Resolution Processes

188. The year 2025 saw a number of Regional Conferences and one Provincial conference sitting, and the NDRC working with Provincial Dispute Resolution Committees (PDRCs) listen to the stakeholders involved in the disputes. Following extensive engagements with provincial and regional structures, as well as ongoing cases adjudicated by the National Dispute Resolution Committee (NDRC), several recurring challenges have been identified within the membership, verification, and dispute-resolution systems of the organisation. This NDRC in its report outlined the key issues, their impacts, and the systemic risks they pose to organisational processes such as BBGMs, BGMs, and conferences. It further highlights emerging trends that require urgent intervention by the SGO and Organising Department.
 - a) **Removal of GPS Coordinates Feature from the Membership Scanner:** The GPS location feature has been removed from the scanner system. Previously, it served as

a critical verification tool, enabling dispute structures to confirm that scanning took place at the officially designated venue. Without this feature, it is increasingly difficult to verify attendance and quorum, complicating the resolution of disputes related to procedural compliance.

b) **Delays in the Release of Verification Reports:** Significant delays have occurred between preliminary and final verification reports. In many cases, final reports were issued only days before conferences; in some instances, delays extended up to three months. These delays hinder dispute-resolution processes, leaving structures with insufficient time to address discrepancies. Furthermore, the system does not provide Branch Secretaries with direct access to verification reports—an oversight that prevents branches from determining their verification status promptly after BBGMs/BGMs, contributing to confusion and unnecessary disputes.

c) **Discrepancies in Membership Data and Status:** The NDRC continues to encounter inconsistencies in membership data across provinces, including: Members appearing as inactive in some reports but active in others; Irregular fluctuations in branch membership figures between preliminary and final reports. Such inconsistencies directly fuel disputes around membership eligibility and BBGM/BGM validity, undermining confidence in internal systems.

d) **Abuse of the Appeal Mechanism:** There has been a sharp increase in the number of disputed BBGMs/BGMs. In some regions, nearly half of all meetings are now contested. Heightened internal competition has contributed to the rise of parallel structures—often externally influenced—with competing groups claiming legitimacy from the same meeting.

e) **Repetitive and Cyclical Appeals in the Rubusana Region:** A troubling pattern emerged whereby branches instructed by the NDRC-A to rerun BBGMs/BGMs have complied, only for the same parties to lodge fresh disputes challenging the outcomes of the rerun. This cyclical pattern undermines the authority and finality of NDRC and NDRC-A decisions, burdens administrative capacity, and delays broader organisational programmes.

f) **Capacity Constraints affecting the NDRC:** The NDRC operates with only one staff member who manages a demanding workload including minute-taking, communication with disputing parties, attendance coordination, and documentation. This is unsustainable given the scale and urgency of disputes, contributing to delays and increasing the risk of administrative errors.

g) **Impact on NDRC-A and Conference Timelines:** While the NDRC recognises the essential quality-assurance role of the Appeals Committee, delays in verification reports and growing appeal volumes create systemic bottlenecks. When reruns are ordered, conference timelines are further affected, slowing organisational renewal and leading to a growing backlog of unresolved disputes.

The issues identified highlight systemic weaknesses that compromise the credibility, efficiency, and stability of internal organisational processes.

189. The NDRC heard the following disputes ahead of regional conferences (details in the full report):

Region	No of Appeals received by NDRC	No of Appeals attended by NDRC	Appeals pending finalisation	Outstanding disputes
EC: Alfred Nzo	24	24	00	00
EC: Joe Gqabi	05	05	00	00
EC: Dr WB Rubusana	34	28	06	00
EC: Nelson Mandela	04	04	00	00
LP: Waterberg	28	28	00	00
MP: Ehlanzeni	18	18	00	00

MP: Gert Sibande	07	07	00	00
MP: Nkangala	03	03	00	00
GP: Ekurhuleni	13	13	00	00
GP: Johannesburg	24	22	02	02
GP: Tshwane	37	33	06	04
GP: Sedibeng	11	11	00	00

190. The NEC appointed a task team chaired by Cde Thembi Majola to investigate the dispute concerning the incorrect Limpopo list that was registered with the IEC ahead of the 2024 National and Provincial Elections. The team completed its work and presented recommendations to the NEC for implementation.
191. Following disputes within the PEC regarding the Limpopo regional conferences, a team led by Cde Noxolo Kieviet was appointed to engage structures and hear concerns. The team submitted a report with recommendations to the Officials and the NWC, affirming the validity of the conferences.

Recommendations by the NDRC

192. The NDRC recommends urgent intervention by the SGO and Organising Department in the following areas:
 - Restoring or replacing GPS verification functionality;
 - Ensuring timely and consistent release of verification reports;
 - Providing Branch Secretaries with direct system access to verification reports;
 - Stabilising and auditing membership data across all provinces;
 - Introducing mechanisms to curb repetitive or abusive appeals;
 - Strengthening staff capacity within the NDRC;
 - Establishing timelines that prevent bottlenecks between the NDRC and NDRC-A.
193. The NDRC remains available to collaborate on technical and procedural improvements and to support efforts aimed at strengthening internal organisational democracy

The ANC Integrity Commission

194. The Integrity Commission (IC) is mandated to assist the NEC — and thereby the ANC — to uphold the highest ethical standards and safeguard the organisation from conduct that may bring it into disrepute. The IC's work promotes integrity as a core ANC value and strengthens ethical consciousness among members, particularly leaders. In 2025, the IC held more than 20 meetings, engaged with eleven comrades, and submitted five reports to the Secretary-General.
195. The newly amended Terms of Reference now allow members engaged by the IC to comment on draft reports before finalisation. This ensures that comrades are able to challenge findings and recommendations before the reports are submitted to the NEC. The IC has repeatedly stressed the importance of implementing its recommendations for the success of the ANC's renewal agenda.

Observations on Adherence to Conference and NGC Resolutions

The following matters arose during the IC's work and require the attention of the NGC:

196. **Failure to respect and observe ANC Conference resolutions:** The 2015 NGC reaffirmed the 54th Conference resolution that *“every cadre accused of, or reported to be involved in, corrupt practices must account to the IC immediately or face DC*

processes.” The IC has expressed concern that some comrades do not engage the IC timeously when allegations arise. The IC recommends that Officials take the lead on this matter and direct all NEC members to comply with Conference decisions or face disciplinary action.

197. **Formal responses to corruption allegations:** The IC emphasises the necessity of visible and dedicated anti-corruption programmes. Failure to act decisively will further erode public trust in the ANC. The IC recommends the development of an accelerated anti-corruption strategy with clear timelines and accountability mechanisms. This strategy should be public to reinforce transparency.
198. **Understanding ethics and integrity:** Many comrades engaging with the IC show limited understanding of integrity and ethics. The IC stresses that ethics and integrity must be core criteria for leadership selection and must inform the work of the Electoral Committee. Top leadership must set the tone through ethical conduct. The IC recommends that induction programmes include mandatory modules on integrity and ethics. These values must be embedded when comrades enter the organisation.
199. **Distinguishing disciplinary, court, and integrity processes:** The IC emphasises that integrity operates at a higher ethical threshold than legal or disciplinary standards. The ANC must address integrity concerns long before matters reach courts or disciplinary bodies. As a leader of society, the ANC must hold its leaders to a higher standard. The IC is willing to guide comrades through this distinction. The mantra of *“innocent until proven guilty”* is inadequate for addressing ethical breaches. Using legal technicalities to avoid accountability has brought the ANC into disrepute and should be treated as misconduct.
200. **Money politics is destroying the organisation:** Money influences campaigns, fundraising, and leadership contests. Despite longstanding resolutions, the problem is worsening. The IC recommends urgent development of **ethical fundraising guidelines**, including transparent processes and strict prohibitions on quid pro quo arrangements. The IC reiterates that ethical fundraising must be prioritised. Blurred lines between party and state finances create opportunities for corruption, and individual campaign fundraising invites undue influence. The IC recommends reviewing access to supply chain systems and strengthening the distinction between state and organisational resources. Disciplinary action must follow any violations. Succession processes must be designed to eliminate money politics in leadership contests.
201. **Lavish lifestyles among leaders:** While many leaders view their lifestyle choices as private, they remain public role models. Extravagant living contradicts ANC values and undermines moral authority. The IC recommends lifestyle audits from the President down to all office bearers at national and provincial levels. The IC should process the results to avoid conflicts of interest.
202. **Factionalism:** Contemporary factionalism is rooted less in ideology and more in competition for resources. It is eroding organisational cohesion. The IC recommends a comprehensive strategy to combat factional activity.
203. **Weak communication.** The IC notes that the ANC’s failure to communicate proactively and transparently places the movement on the defensive and allows the media to shape the narrative to the ANC’s detriment. This has contributed to reputational damage.

NEC Decisions on Integrity Matters

204. The 55th National Conference reaffirmed that restoring integrity, ethics, and ANC values is central to organisational renewal. Accordingly, it:
 - Reaffirmed the *Step-Aside* resolution, calling for fair, consistent implementation.
 - Urged the NEC, PECs and RECs to expedite corruption and misconduct cases.

- Directed the ANC to publicly dissociate from those who commit corruption, serious crimes, gender-based violence, or sexual harassment.
 - Resolved that cadres charged with serious offences must voluntarily step aside without being instructed.
205. The NEC appointed the Integrity Commission in 2023, chaired by Rev. Dr Frank Chikane, and jointly reviewed the IC's Terms of Reference. In 2024 the NEC strengthened the ToR further, addressed case backlogs, and the IC assisted with an ethics module for newly elected MPs and MPLs. Provincial Integrity Commissions were suspended in 2024 for vetting and confirmation by the national IC. During this period, all provincial integrity matters were handled by the national IC.
206. Since the 2022 National Conference, the following disciplinary and integrity matters affecting NEC members were processed:
- Acceptance of Cde Senzo Mchunu's decision to step aside following the Madlanga Commission report (Nov 2025).
 - Voluntary step-aside by Cde Thabang Makwetla after appearing in the Palm Ridge Specialised Commercial Crimes Court.
 - Resignation of former NEC member Cde Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula as Speaker of Parliament after being charged (Apr 2024).
 - Step-aside by Dr Malusi Gigaba following charges (Nov 2025).
 - Step-aside by Cde Zizi Kodwa following charges (Jun 2024), followed by the NPA's withdrawal of charges (Oct 2024).
 - NEC members implicated in the 2023 State Capture Commission report were required to appear before the IC; those who failed to do so were referred to the NDC.
 - IC reports and recommendations were presented to the NEC in 2025 following engagements with Cde Thembu Simelane and Deputy President Paul Mashatile.
 - Cde Obed Bapela stepped down as Deputy Chair of the International Relations Committee and faces disciplinary action.
207. Integrity Commission reports are now a standing item at all NEC meetings. The NEC reaffirmed the National Conference decision to conduct lifestyle audits, with modalities to be finalised.

Recommendations by the Integrity Commission

- a) NEC decisions related to IC reports must be shared with the Electoral Committee, which must treat ethics and integrity as key leadership qualities.
- b) The Treasurer-General must train provincial and regional treasurers — including those of the Leagues — in ethical fundraising. Communication must be clear that donations do not entitle donors to favours.
- c) A written **Code of Conduct and Ethics** must be established, with corresponding training for members.
- d) The ANC Constitution must be reviewed and updated to address emerging organisational and ethical challenges.
- e) Understanding and practice of accountability remain weak and require fundamental correction.
- f) The IC notes limited visible progress on organisational renewal. This must be urgently addressed.

Political Education and Cadre Development

208. *“Political Education is the life-blood of any revolutionary movement. We should have a political education aimed at constantly improving the political consciousness, knowledge and skills of our cadres. Every member should undergo a course of basic political education” (ANC Kabwe Consultative Conference, 1985).*
209. The task of the Political Education Subcommittee and the Department to ensure that every member of the ANC undergoes political training and comprehensive ideological development to improve political consciousness, knowledge and organisational skills necessary to enable us to fulfill the aims and objectives of the National Democratic Revolution.
210. Over the past two years, the Subcommittee and the Department have significantly improved coordination, collaboration, synergy and clarity of roles between various role players in the political education and training eco-system such as the OR Tambo School, and Alliance political education and training institutions.
211. The 55th National Conference gave the following directives on **Political Education and Cadre Development**:
 - Tailor the OR Tambo School Curriculum to meet the needs of a new ANC member;
 - Reaffirm the importance of compulsory induction and political schools for all leadership collectives and public representatives;
 - Leadership within the organisation must be predicated on attendance of the OR Tambo School programmes.
 - Establish of political education cells should be established to sharpen the ideological, theoretical, policy and organisational skills of the membership in order that they must excel in their tasks.
212. To give effect to the 55th National Conference resolution, the Subcommittee adopted **Seven Priorities** for Political Education and Cadre Development approved by the NEC:
 - **Priority One:** introduction of a compulsory Foundation Course for all ANC members.
 - **Priority Two:** compulsory induction programme for all elected structures and public representatives within six months of their election or deployment.
 - **Priority Three:** strategic courses and leadership development for branch, regional, provincial and national leadership, including the municipal, provincial and national caucuses.
 - **Priority Four:** policy master-classes on specific governance themes and priorities, for all those deployed in government, working in partnership with the various schools of public policy and governance.
 - **Priority Five:** organisational skills to build the capacity of those elected to lead and ANC staff (e.g. Secretaries, Treasurers, organisers and administrators).
 - **Priority Six:** developing and publishing papers to intervene in public discourse and generate debate in the movement and in society generally as part of the battle of ideas and ideological work. Convene seminars to shape public discourse on matters of public interest.

- **Priority Seven:** joint political schools with fraternal parties and progressive movements in the continent and across the world to build the collective capacity of the progressive forces to wage the struggle for a better Africa and a better world.

The rollout of the compulsory Foundation Course for all ANC members, new and old!

213. The Foundation Course introduced as a direct response to the resolutions of various conferences on the need for compulsory political education and induction for ANC members in general. It was developed in 2023 and 2024 by a team of veterans and political education facilitators. The course was launched by President Cyril Ramaphosa on 27 October 2024 in a hybrid session that was extended by the NEC, PECs and RECs.
214. The Foundation Course is composed of five modules:
 - Module 1: Brief History of South Africa and the key Phases in the History of the ANC;
 - Module 2: Vision and Values of the ANC, Revolutionary Morality and Ethical Leadership;
 - Module 3: Constitution, Governance and the Country We Live In Today;
 - Module 4: The World We Live In Today;
 - Module 5: Role of the ANC Branch and ANC Member.
215. By the end of October 2025, the programme had reached more than **125 797 out of 543 524 members (23%)** in good standing, who are at different stages of completing the Foundation Course. More than **1 627 out of 4 472 branches (36%)** throughout the country have been undergoing training. **Mpumalanga and Gauteng** are the leading provinces on the implementation of the Foundation Course, followed by the **Eastern Cape, Free State, North West and Northern Cape**. Limpopo, KZN and Western Cape are lagging behind on the Foundation Course.
216. **MPUMALANGA:** out of a total of **400 branches, 307** of them have undergone training, representing **76.8% of the branches**. A total of **23,480 out of 40 762 members (58%)** in good standing are undergoing training on the Foundation Course. Nkangala: 105 out of 143 branches undergoing training. Gert Sibande: 115 out of 127 branches undergoing training. Ehlanzeni: 87 out of 130 branches undergoing training.
217. **GAUTENG:** **391 out of 529 branches** are at the different stages of the Foundation course, representing **69.5% of the branches**. A total of **47,530 out of 79 634 members (59%)** have undergone training on the different phases of the course. Ekurhuleni: 100 out of 112 branches undergoing training. Johannesburg: 122 out of 135 branches undergoing training. Tshwane: 78 out of 107 branches undergoing training. West Rand: 33 out of 72 branches undergoing training. Sedibeng: 68 out of 72 branches undergoing training.
218. **EASTERN CAPE:** trained a total of **291 out of 521 branches** that have started with the course, representing 55% of the branches. A total of **20 415 out of 74 385 members (27%)** are undergoing training on the course. Alfred Nzo: 58 out of 106 branches undergoing training. OR Tambo: 142 out of 147 branches undergoing training. DR W.B. Rubusana: 50 out of 50 branches undergoing training. Nelson Mandela: 41 out of 51 branches undergoing training. Amathole, Chris Hani, Sarah Baartman, and Joe Gqabi have done very little branch training and this denies the membership an opportunity to learn and grow.
219. **FREE STATE:** with a total of **329 branches, 147** are undergoing training, representing **44% of the branches**. A total of **10,021 out of 66 404 members (15%)** are at the different stages of training. Lejweleputswa: 8 out of 104 branches undergoing training, leaving out many branches. Mangaung: 41 out of 51 branches undergoing training. Thabo Mofutsanyane: 57 out of 98 branches undergoing training. Xhariep: only 2 out of 23 branches undergoing training and this denies the membership an opportunity to learn and grow. Fezile Dabi: 39 out of 73 branches are undergoing training.

220. **NORTH WEST: 408 branches** and 179 are at the different stages of Foundation Course training (**43% of the branches**). A total of **10 364 out of 45 881 members (22%)** are at the different stages of training. Bojanala: 43 out of 154 branches undergoing training. DR KK Kaunda: 57 out of 76 branches undergoing training. Dr Ruth Segomotsi Mompati: 19 out of 65 branches undergoing training. Ngaka Modiri Molema: 50 out of 103 branches undergoing training.
221. **NORTHERN CAPE** has a total of **232 branches**, **166** branches are currently undergoing different stages of training, representing **71%** of the branches. A total of **6 565 out of 27 105 members (24%)** are undergoing training. **Regional Breakdown:** Francis Baard: 54 out of 57 branches undergoing training. John Taolo Gaetsewe: 28 out of 38 branches undergoing training. Namakwa: only 13 out of 39 branches undergoing training. ZF Mgcawu: 27 out of 46 branches undergoing training. Pixley Ka Seme: 44 out of 50 branches undergoing training.
222. **LIMPOPO** has not done any training for the membership in its **568 branches**. The reason given by the province is that they had plans until the start of the regional conferences. The conflicts and resultant disputes arising from the conferences made it very difficult for political education to take place. Only **2,919 out of 123 299 members** have been trained, mainly composed of the PECs, RECs and Veterans League regions as well as three per branch. This province requires a **massive Foundation Course training in 2026** as most of the branches and the members have not undergone Foundation Course training due to the disruptive disputes that took place in the run-up to and after the Regional Conferences.
223. **KWAZULU NATAL:** only **55 out of 563** branches (from Harry Gwala Region) have started with the course, representing less than 1%. A total of **3,853 out of 67 248 members** have been trained, mainly from Harry Gwala. In Harry Gwala Region, 55 out of 61 branches are undergoing training of the Foundation Course. In other regions, training has been limited to members of the RTTs and BTTs, not the entire membership. This province requires a massive Foundation Course intervention in 2026 as part of the rebuilding, renewal and recovery. Short-cuts will take us nowhere.
224. **WESTERN CAPE** has a total of **343** branches, **91** are undergoing training. The total number of members trained is **651 out of 18 806 members**. It is mainly in **Dullah Omar** where 76 out of 76 branches are undergoing training and **Central Karoo** where 15 out of 15 branches are undergoing training. This province requires a massive Foundation Course intervention in 2026 as part of the rebuilding, renewal and recovery of the ANC. Short-cuts will take us nowhere.
225. More than 80 members of the ANC National Caucus who have undergone training on the Foundation Course. The National Executive Committees of the ANCVL, ANCWL and ANC have also undergone training on the Foundation Course between 29 October and 5th December 2025. All the PECs and PTTs, except the recently-appointed Western Cape PTT, have undergone training on the Foundation Course. All Organisers and Membership Officers have completed training on the Foundation Course. All ANC staff members will start Foundation Course training in January 2026.
226. The NEC of the ANCYL was the first national structure to start Foundation Course training but could not complete it. Due to poor attendance, the classes had to be discontinued. The training will resume when the NEC of the ANCYL shows interest and the required level of discipline.

Policy Masterclasses

227. In addition to the Foundation Course, the OR Tambo School is running a series of Policy Masterclasses as hybrid lectures aimed at deepening understanding and capacity to implement progressive policies. The Masterclass Series focused: Industrial Policy; Trade Wars and People's Futures: Confronting US Tariffs and Building a Just World order from

the Global South perspective; Role of State-Owned Enterprises; Accelerating Economic Transformation: Implementing the ANC's Economic Action Plan" and Beyond Orthodoxy: Economics for Transformation". The last series on the economy will be on Macroeconomic Policy. In 2026, the Masterclasses series will shift from economic policy and leadership to themes on "Developmental State and State Capacity" and "Social Policy".

Induction of BECs, RECs, PECs, NECs and Public Representatives

228. Since 2023, the OR Tambo School, ETU and the Department of Political Education have been enforcing the induction of elected structures and public representatives. We have completed the induction of the Free State PEC, Northern Cape PEC and the RECs of Bojanala, Dullah Omar, Limpopo, Mpumalanga. The political education team has conducted induction for the ANCWL and ANCYL provinces and COSAS NEC.
229. The team also completed the induction of the ANC National Caucus and Provincial Caucuses of North West, Mpumalanga, Limpopo, Northern Cape, Eastern Cape, KZN and Free State. Gauteng and W Cape provincial caucuses have not completed induction.

Training for elected Officials

230. Together with the Office of the Treasurer General, the political education team conducted training for the Provincial and Regional Treasurers on the ANC Financial Policies and Procedures as well as the ethical Fundraising Strategies. Provincial Treasurers were given the task of training Branch Treasurers. Work is underway to develop a training programme for all Secretaries.

OR Tambo School scaling up leadership development and governance training in 2026-2032

231. The OR Tambo School of Leadership (ORTSOL) was established in 2018 as a product of many ANC Conference resolutions since the 1985 Kabwe Consultative Conference. In the past seven years, ORTSOL has piloted the course referred to as the Introduction to Political Studies (IPS) which has been completed by over 60 000 members. ORTSOL has also pioneered the delivery of the Ruth First Youth Development Programme.
232. Given the mandate of the 55th National Conference to "tailor" the OR Tambo School curriculum to address the needs of the new member and new cadre, the strategic intent of the ORTSOL is to boldly upscale its programmes and delivery capacity to ensure that the quality of political education and leadership development across the movement is improved. There is going to be intense focus on leadership and governance training as part of the response to the call for the ANC to govern its affairs well in order to govern South Africa well.
233. ORTSOL is strengthening its governance systems, institutional capabilities and financial sustainability. The NEC gave a mandate to the National Officials to finalise the appointment of the new Board of Directors ahead of the end of the term of office of the 2022-2025 Board. The new Board has now been appointed, chaired by Cde Kgalema Motlanthe, with Cde Mahlengi Bhengu-Motsiri as the Deputy Chairperson. The 2022-2025 Board appointed Cde David Makhura as the new Principal of the OR Tambo School of Leadership.
234. There is better coordination of the political education programmes and collaboration across the entire political education ecosystem of the Alliance and mass democratic movement. The Board is finalising its Ten-Year Strategy and Three-Year Strategic Plan in line with the ambition and vision of "The Decade of the Cadre" adopted in 2012, in the context of the Renewal Roadmap 2032. As part its strategic positioning, the ORTSOL has also to launch its own Leadership Journal.
235. ORTSOL is also in the process of amending its founding Memorandum of Incorporation to enable the School to raise funds after getting a go-ahead from the ANC National

Officials, as the representatives of the Initiator. This will enable the School to build its institutional capacity and financial sustainability.

Mwalimu Julius Nyerere School also scaling up ideological training, leadership development and governance training

236. Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Leadership School (MJNLS) was launched in 2022 as the Joint Political School of the six liberation movements in Southern African – ANC (South Africa), CCM (Tanzania), FRELIMO (Mocambique), MPLA (Angola), SWAPO (Namibia) and ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe). The School is based in Tanzania presented its report to the Summit of the National Liberation Movements in July.
237. The School has been running pilot programmes for the six parties, while building its institutional capacity. Going forward, the MJNLS will focus on ideological training, leadership development programmes and governance training programmes in partnership with national and international party schools. One of the challenges of MJNLS is that it requires financial contributions from the six liberation movements as part of the revenue of the School. Some of the liberation movements, including our own, have struggled to keep up with their financial obligations and this hampers the ability of the MJNLS to meet its academic ambitions.
238. The OR Tambo School of Leadership and Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Leadership School have signed a Memorandum of Understanding to collaborate on leadership development, governance training and the research agenda.

Contributing to the battle of ideas across society and preparing for the NGC

239. The Subcommittee has contributed significantly in developing policy and strategy papers such as the ANC Coalition Strategy, the ANC's GNU Negotiation Strategy, ANC's Perspective on the SACP Resolution on Contesting Elections Independently and regular assessment of the Balance of Forces. The Subcommittee developed the draft NGC discussion paper which was discussed, amended and approved by the NEC as the NGC Base Document. The Subcommittee facilitated and coordinated discussions and mid-term review in preparation for the National General Council.
240. Accordingly, significant work has been done since the 55th National Conference, to revive political education and cadre development as part of the Renewal Project. The launch of a compulsory Foundation Course was part a response to the Conference directive. The rollout of the Foundation Course as a basic course for all ANC members, has generated a great deal of enthusiasm and positive feedback across the organisation. Important lessons have been drawn from the nation-wide implementation of the Foundation Course, especially with regard to the content, delivery methodology and platforms and we are improving as we implement.

Recommendations on Political Education and Cadre development

- a) All ANC members who serve in leadership structures and are public representatives should complete the five modules of the Foundation Course by June 2026.
- b) All ANC members in good standing should have undergone the Foundation Course training by June 2027.
- c) It should be mandatory for all those who are on probation to complete the Foundation Course as part of the minimum requirement to be a member in good standing.
- d) In addition, all public representatives and those serving in the BEC, REC, PEC and NEC should be required to have completed an advanced leadership programme at the OR Tambo School by June 2027.
- e) All those deployed in the government executive at local government, provincial government and national government should undergo executive leadership training programme of the National School of Government and attend the relevant Policy Masterclasses of the OR Tambo School in 2026-2029.

- f) All those elected to specific positions such as Secretaries and Treasurers should undergo training in how to govern the affairs of the ANC and mass democratic organisations well.
- g) The cadre development programme proposed by the ANCVL should be integrated into the political education curriculum of the OR Tambo School.
- h) The ANC should comprehensively support and make use of the OR Tambo School and Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Leadership School to enhance its organizational and governance capacity.
- i) The NEC should undertake a comprehensive review of the ANC Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy in preparation for the 56th National Conference in 2027 – the last time it was reviewed and adopted was after the 1997 National Conference.

Communications, Battle of Ideas and ICT

- 241. The Subcommittee on Communication, Information and Publicity and the Department of Communications, Information and Publicity (DCIP) presents this Midterm Review Report to the National General Council at a time of profound ideological contestation and organisational transition for the African National Congress. This review is shaped by the resolutions of the 55th National Conference, which reaffirmed that the Battle of Ideas is not a peripheral task but a central pillar of the National Democratic Revolution. It is through communication that the ANC interprets reality for society, frames the national narrative, mobilises the motive forces, and provides ideological guidance to the nation. Without a disciplined, coherent, modern and strategically directed communications machinery, the ANC cannot fulfil its historic mission of leading social transformation.
- 242. The period since the 55th National Conference has exposed the depth of the ideological crisis confronting our movement. Conference correctly noted the rise of a conservative and anti-transformation discourse, often masked as constitutional neutrality, but fundamentally opposed to transformations of our society, redress, equality and the restructuring of apartheid's economic and spatial legacy. This conservative bloc has grown bolder and more coordinated, exploiting weaknesses in the state, divisions within the movement, and the anxieties of a society grappling with slow economic growth, unemployment, service-delivery backlogs and social insecurity.
- 243. Compounding this challenge is the dynamic transformation of the communications and media environment. The ANC now operates in a fragmented public sphere shaped by digital platforms, algorithm-driven echo chambers, unregulated influencers, anonymous disinformation networks, and media ecosystems that reward speed, outrage and sensationalism over depth, context and truth. Traditional media, while still influential, no longer sets the terms of national debate. Narrative power has migrated to digital platforms where political identity is contested in real time and where hostile forces deploy misinformation and psychological operations to weaken the ANC's legitimacy.
- 244. This period has also been defined by intensifying social distress. Communities confronted with food insecurity, unemployment, water shortages, energy instability, safety concerns, and service delivery failures experience daily hardship that easily transforms into mistrust of institutions. Counterrevolutionary actors are constantly seeking to exploit the pain of the people, framing the ANC as the cause of national suffering, erasing structural constraints and denying progress made since 1994. This ideological manipulation has become one of the most potent threats to the ANC's relationship with the motive forces.
- 245. Internally, the movement continues to confront the consequences of message discipline, competing centres of communication, misuse of digital platforms and

inconsistent alignment between ANC and government communication. The ANC speaks one message with multiple voices, but if this is fragmented, society cannot hear the movement's strategic direction. Where messengers communicate outside organisational discipline, the coherence of the movement is undermined. The 55th National Conference was explicit: the ANC must restore message unity, centralise communication authority, and rebuild the credibility of its political voice.

246. Despite these challenges, the ANC has also demonstrated resilience consistently in its communication. The 70th Anniversary of the Freedom Charter commemoration revived historical consciousness and reminds society of the values that continue to guide the movement. The Justice to Memory programme reaffirmed the ethical foundations of the ANC. The establishment of communication assemblies, provincial coordinators' forums, the strengthening of the War Room, and the development of digital and multimedia capabilities mark significant steps toward rebuilding the organisational capacity required to lead the Battle of Ideas.
247. The mandate of the Subcommittee on Communication, Information and Publicity (CIP) and the Department is to articulate ANC policies and perspectives on all matters and combat any propaganda that is harmful to the image and standing of the movement. The strategic orientation of the Subcommittee flows from this mandate. It is rooted in the historic mission of the ANC to mobilise, unite and advance the aspirations of the people through a clear articulation of the values of the Freedom Charter, the Constitution of the Republic and the programme of the National Democratic Revolution. Communication is therefore not a technical function of messaging; it is a political responsibility that determines whether the ANC remains the authoritative voice of transformation in society.
248. In line with the 55th National Conference, the Subcommittee is entrusted with the responsibility to: rebuild the ANC's ideological and narrative leadership in society; restore message discipline and strengthen the principle of one central, authoritative voice of the movement; modernise the communications machinery to meet the demands of a rapidly evolving digital era; integrate communication work across the organisation, government and alliance structures; and ensure that all communication advances the transformation agenda and reinforces the strategic objectives of the ANC.
249. Conference further instructed the Subcommittee to develop a strategic communications architecture that links the ANC, government, civil society, progressive business formations, international partners and mass democratic organisations into a coherent ecosystem capable of defending and advancing the project of social transformation. This includes improving coordination across the Department of Communications, Information and Publicity (DCIP), provincial and regional structures, Media Liaison Officers in government, and communications arms across the leagues and the alliance.
250. In the current climate marked by misinformation networks, conservative ideological resurgence, contested governance narratives and declining trust in institutions, the strategic orientation of the Subcommittee places emphasis on: proactive agenda-setting rather than reactive responses; systematic monitoring and research to inform message development; protecting the ANC brand, symbols and historic identity from distortion; strengthening community and grassroots communication as part of rebuilding the bond between the movement and the people; expanding the ANC's footprint in digital spaces where political identity is increasingly shaped.
251. The Subcommittee's mandate is therefore expansive and deeply political. It calls for vigilance, unity and revolutionary discipline in the execution of communication work. It requires the building of capacity, modern tools, and a professionalised communications apparatus that can match the speed, sophistication and coordination of those opposed to transformation.
252. The strategic orientation that flows from this mandate is clear: the ANC must reposition itself as the ideological centre of society; communication must become a decisive pillar

of organisational renewal; and the Subcommittee must lead the reconstruction of a communications machinery that is capable, credible and aligned with the values and strategic direction of the liberation movement. Only through such a strengthened and disciplined communications system can the ANC reclaim its role as the primary interpreter of national reality and the trusted leader of South Africa's transformation journey.

ASSESSMENT OF THE BATTLE OF IDEAS ENVIRONMENT (MIDTERM 2022–2025)

253. The period since the 55th National Conference has revealed, with unmistakable clarity, that the ideological and communications terrain confronting the movement, has entered its most turbulent and decisive phase since the democratic breakthrough. The midterm moment demands that the ANC honestly confront the strategic shifts in public consciousness, the changing architecture of the media environment, and the deepening social and economic pressures that define political engagement in 2025.

A CHANGED COMMUNICATIONS EPOCH

254. The ANC now operates in an environment fundamentally different from the mass democratic terrain that shaped earlier periods of political mobilisation. The diffusion of digital platforms, the rise of decentralised media ecosystems, and the influence of algorithm-driven content have created a public sphere where information circulates faster than organisational processes, where political identity is shaped outside traditional structures, and where hostile networks exploit technological tools to distort reality.
255. This new epoch is characterised by: the collapse of traditional information hierarchies; the proliferation of anonymous accounts capable of mobilising sentiment at scale; disinformation campaigns engineered to target the ANC's legitimacy; an increasingly polarised and impatient national mood; media institutions under financial pressure, reducing depth and investigative capacity; youth-driven digital cultures that treat politics as performance and spectacle.
256. The ANC confronts a terrain in which truth competes with virality, expertise competes with influence, and organisational messages are frequently overshadowed by sensationalised, simplified or hostile narratives. This environment requires the movement to adopt a more agile, disciplined and technologically capable communications posture.

THE RISE OF CONSERVATIVE AND ANTI-TRANSFORMATION NARRATIVES:

257. The 55th National Conference warned that conservative currents masquerading as defenders of constitutionalism are gaining ground, advancing an agenda aimed at delegitimising transformation, weakening the state, and rolling back the achievements of the democratic revolution. This warning is materialising currently.
258. Over the midterm period, we have observed the consolidation of an ideological bloc that promotes: market fundamentalism as the only path to development; privatisation as a universal remedy for state shortcomings; narrow interpretations of constitutionalism divorced from socioeconomic rights; hostility to black economic empowerment and employment equity; defence of apartheid's enduring structural legacy; aggressive criticism of state-led development, BRICS and South-South cooperation and transformative legislation.
259. This bloc's influence extends across mainstream media, NGO platforms, think-tank networks, online commentary ecosystems, and public discourse channels. Its objective is to undermine the legitimacy of the progressive forces, the movement in particular, and delegitimise the democratic state, and further weaken public confidence in

transformation itself. Without an organised ideological counteroffensive, these narratives risk becoming dominant common sense.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DISTRESS AS AN IDEOLOGICAL FAULT LINE:

- 260. The social distress confronting our people has become a central theatre of ideological manipulation. Communities grappling with unemployment, rising food prices, water shortages, energy instability, crime, gender-based violence and femicide, and service delivery failures experience daily hardship that easily transforms into anger and mistrust.
- 261. Counterrevolutionary actors exploit this pain by: casting the ANC as the sole cause of suffering; denying progress made since 1994; erasing the structural legacy of apartheid; ignoring global economic shocks and geopolitical disruptions; portraying transformative state interventions as incompetence; using emotional framing to incite public outrage. This manipulation seeks to rupture the bond between the ANC and the motive forces. It transforms legitimate frustration into ideological hostility and weakens the social base of the movement. The ANC's communication must therefore be empathetic, people-centred and grounded in the lived realities of our communities.

INTERNAL FRAGMENTATION WEAKENING NARRATIVE AUTHORITY

- 262. Conference was explicit that the ANC cannot lead society if it does not lead its own narrative. The midterm period has shown that internal fragmentation manifested through inconsistent statements, undisciplined commentary, unauthorised digital communication and factional leaks which continue to compromise the ANC credibility. This fragmentation produces: confusion within the movement and in society; perceptions of disunity and organisational drift; dissonance between ANC and government communication; delays in crisis response that allow hostile narratives to dominate; erosion of public trust in leadership. A decisive return to the principle of *one movement, one message, many voices* is essential to restore narrative coherence and organisational authority.

YOUTH AS THE CRITICAL IDEOLOGICAL FRONTLINE

- 263. The youth constitute the largest demographic in digital political spaces. Their engagement is shaped by influencers, micro-celebrities, satire accounts, podcasts, reaction videos and emerging cultural narratives, not by traditional political education channels. The ANC faces a rapidly widening communications gap between its structures and the worldview of digitally native generations.
- 264. To win the next generation of ideological leadership, the movement must: build youth-led communication collectives; strengthen digital political education using contemporary formats; integrate youth creators into ANC messaging; re-enter youth-driven discourse with authenticity and relevance. If the ANC Youth League does not occupy this space decisively, hostile forces will shape youth consciousness in ways detrimental to the democratic project.

SHRINKING SPACE FOR PROGRESSIVE VOICES:

- 265. Mainstream media faces financial pressures, reduced editorial capacity and commercial imperatives that prioritise sensationalism over public interest. Community media, once the backbone of grassroots communication, is collapsing across the country due to resource constraints.
- 266. This shrinking progressive space means: fewer platforms amplify ANC achievements; constructive policy debates are replaced by polarised commentary; public-interest journalism is weakened; communities lose trusted sources of information. The ANC

must invest in revitalising community media, expanding its own multimedia capacity, and strengthening relationships with journalists committed to democratic values.

GLOBAL TRENDS RESHAPING DOMESTIC IDEOLOGY:

267. Globally, right-wing populism, nationalism, culture wars, digital radicalisation and geopolitical instability have influenced domestic political discourse. The National Conference emphasised the importance of grounding ANC communication in internationalism, multilateralism and anti-imperialism. The ANC must therefore respond to global ideological shifts with strengthened commitments to social justice and equality; African integration and solidarity; peace-building and progressive multilateralism; transformation of global governance institutions.
268. The midterm period has been defined by: intensified digital contestation; consolidated conservative narratives; deepening social distress weaponised against the ANC; internal communication fragmentation; youth disengagement from formal structures; shrinking progressive media platforms; contested global narratives impacting domestic politics.
269. This environment demands a communications machinery that is modern, disciplined, ideologically grounded, technologically capable and deeply embedded in the lived realities of our people. A transformed communications posture is essential if the ANC is to reclaim ideological leadership and renew its bond with the motive forces of the National Democratic Revolution.

WORK OF THE COMMUNICATIONS, ICT SUBCOMMITTEE SINCE 55TH NATIONAL CONFERENCE

270. Following the mandate of the 55th National Conference, the Subcommittee on Communication, Information and Publicity undertook a comprehensive programme of work aimed at rebuilding the communications machinery of the African National Congress, restoring ideological coherence, and strengthening the movement's capacity to lead the Battle of Ideas. This section reflects on the work executed during the midterm period, guided by the resolutions of Conference and the organisational imperatives of the renewal programme.
271. The work of the Subcommittee and its implementing arm, the Department of Communications, Information and Publicity (DCIP), has been central to defending the movement, mobilising the motive forces, and asserting the strategic direction of the ANC.

CONSOLIDATING THE ORGANISATIONAL CENTRE OF COMMUNICATION

272. One of the clearest directives of the 55th National Conference was the restoration of a central, authoritative communications centre for the ANC. The Subcommittee therefore prioritised strengthening the DCIP as the primary custodian of the organisation's voice. This work included tightening internal coordination, clarifying lines of authority, and developing systems to ensure that official communication reflects organisational positions, not individual views.
273. This effort resulted in a more stable NEC/NWC briefing cycle; improved validation protocols for statements and advisories; strengthened cooperation between the SG's Office, National Spokesperson and the DCIP; clearer communication workflows and interventions between national, provincial and regional structures.
274. These steps mark a decisive break from the era in which fragmented, unauthorised and contradictory communication undermined the ANC's moral and organisational authority. The Subcommittee's efforts have begun restoring coherence and asserting message discipline.

STRATEGIC PLANNING WORKSHOP TO ALIGN COMMUNICATION WITH RENEWAL

275. In line with Conference directives to develop a strategic and modern communications architecture, the Subcommittee convened a high-level Strategic Planning Workshop with national, provincial and regional communicators. The workshop diagnosed systemic weaknesses in the ANC's communications ecosystem and outlined the foundations for a rebuilt, integrated and modernised communication machinery.
276. Key outcomes included: adoption of a unified communications strategy anchored in renewal and organisational rebuilding; development of a framework linking ANC, government, alliance and civil society communication structures; identification of the need for research and monitoring systems to anticipate public sentiment; commitment to strengthening communication in provinces and regions as a strategic priority. This workshop re-established strategic clarity within the Subcommittee and aligned communication efforts with the renewal agenda of the 55th Conference.

PROVINCIAL AND REGIONAL COMMUNICATORS' FORUMS

277. To strengthen communication capacity across the organisation, the DCIP established provincial and regional Communicators' Forums that bring together DCIP structures, Media Liaison Officers (MLOs), and communicators from Leagues and the Alliance.
278. These forums: improved information flow between ANC structures and government communication units; strengthened media monitoring for the movement; facilitated disciplined message alignment across provinces; addressed gaps in provincial communication infrastructure; strengthened coordinated rapid-response mechanisms. This work is essential to restoring the ANC presence in communities and ensuring that provincial and regional structures can speak with coherence and authority.

COMMUNICATION ASSEMBLY TO STRENGTHEN ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITY

279. In response to the 55th Conference directive to build a world-class communication instrument, the Subcommittee convened a National Communications Assembly bringing together communicators from across all provinces, government, and organisational structures.
280. The Assembly identified several critical imperatives: strengthening rapid-response capacity to counter misinformation; building a digital strategy capable of engaging the youth and online constituencies; prioritising content production that reflects the lived realities of the people; ending the culture of negative, factional and unmandated public commentary; promoting a disciplined communication posture in line with the ANC's values; ensuring the deployed cadres communicate on their work in their areas of deployment. The Communications Assembly reaffirmed that communication is organisational work and must be executed with revolutionary discipline.

INTERNAL ORGANISATIONAL COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION

281. The effectiveness of ANC communication in the Battle of Ideas is fundamentally dependent on strong internal communication systems across all levels of the movement. While the period under review has seen significant gains in external communication, internal organisational communication remains uneven and, in some instances, weak.
282. The DCIP has progressively improved the circulation of statements, talking points, briefing notes and alerts from national to provincial and regional structures. However, there is still no fully standardised internal communication architecture that ensures that every branch, public representative and activist receives, understands and consistently applies organisational messages

283. Internal communication currently relies on a combination of emails, WhatsApp groups, virtual meetings, circulars and ad hoc briefings. In many provinces and regions, these systems are not institutionalised, with the result that messages are sometimes distorted, delayed, or selectively shared. This has, at times, contributed to public contradictions, parallel commentary and uncoordinated responses to key developments.
284. Going forward, the DCIP requires a National Internal Communications Framework, outlining clear channels, formats and timelines for sharing official messages and political education content across the movement. A tiered distribution system ensuring that every official national communication is simultaneously distributed to provinces, regions, branches and deployees. Regular internal political briefings to structures following major NEC and NWC decisions, manifesto launches, court judgments and crises, so that all cadres communicate from a common script. Integration of internal communication into the political education programme, so that every message reinforces ANC values, strategy and organisational discipline.
285. Strengthening internal communication will enhance message coherence, deepen cadre understanding of ANC positions and improve the movement's ability to act as a unified, disciplined force in the public arena.

PROVINCIAL AND REGIONAL COMMUNICATIONS CAPACITY ASSESSMENT

286. The effectiveness of ANC communications depends on the strength and consistency of messaging across all levels of the movement. During the period under review, significant progress was made in convening the National Communications Assembly and encouraging provincial communication workshops. However, capacity remains uneven.
287. Some provinces have developed functional communications teams, digital volunteers, community radio relationships and regular briefings. Others have limited staff, weak media relations, and minimal digital presence. In several regions and branches, communications is treated as an add-on rather than a strategic function, resulting in missed opportunities to shape local narratives.
288. The Subcommittee recommends:
 - A National Communications Capacity Audit of all provinces and regions, assessing staffing, skills, infrastructure, media relations, digital capability and political communications understanding.
 - Classification of provinces and regions into tiers (strong, developing, weak), with tailored support plans for each category.
 - A minimum capacity standard for communications structures, including the expectation that every province and region has at least a spokesperson, a media liaison capacity, a digital team, and a link to political education.
 - A system of targeted support and mentorship, where stronger provinces help build the capacity of weaker ones, coordinated by the DCIP.
 - The inclusion of communications capacity as one of the criteria in organisational assessments and election readiness reports.
289. A deliberate, structured approach to provincial and regional communications capacity is essential if the ANC is to communicate with one voice while responding to local realities and struggles.

COMMUNICATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY (GNU)

290. The formation of the Government of National Unity introduced a new layer of complexity to ANC communication. The ANC must simultaneously communicate as the leader of society and the strategic centre of power, as a partner in a multi-party governance arrangement, and as a distinct political organisation with its own identity, history and mandate.

291. This has required careful balancing between promoting unity and stability in the GNU, defending the ANC's policy positions, and challenging narratives from coalition partners or opponents that may misrepresent the movement or distort the record of ANC-led transformation.

292. The Subcommittee and the DCIP has begun to:

- Clarify core ANC messages that are non-negotiable and must shape the overall narrative of the GNU, particularly around the National Democratic Revolution, transformation, socio-economic justice, and a better Africa and a better world.
- Coordinate with ANC deployees in government to ensure that GNU communication does not dilute or contradict ANC policy, and that differences are managed through appropriate structures rather than through public contestation.
- Counter attempts by opponents to erase or downplay the ANC's role in driving the developmental agenda within the GNU.

293. Going forward, the Subcommittee and the DCIP will develop:

- A GNU Communications Guide outlining how ANC leaders and spokespersons communicate about coalition arrangements, governance compromises, and collective decisions without undermining ANC identity and leadership.
- Mechanisms to assert the ANC's narrative leadership within the GNU by consistently linking government programmes to ANC resolutions, manifesto commitments and historic mission.
- A monitoring system to track and counter misuse of the GNU narrative by those who seek to weaken the ANC's standing in society.

YOUTH-FOCUSED COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY

294. Young people constitute a decisive demographic in both the present and the future of the ANC. The period under review has demonstrated that youth political engagement increasingly takes place in digital spaces, through short-form content, influencers, memes and peer-to-peer conversations. While the DCIP has expanded social media and established ANC TV and the ANC Podcast, there is a need for a dedicated youth communication strategy that speaks to the lived realities, aspirations and frustrations of young people.

295. Key elements of this strategy will include:

- Developing youth-centred content formats, including short videos, explainers, animated content and interactive sessions, specifically designed for platforms such as TikTok, Instagram, YouTube and podcasts.
 - Partnering with progressive youth influencers, artists, content creators and thought leaders who can translate ANC policies and values into relatable, authentic language.
 - Intensifying communication on youth issues such as jobs, skills, entrepreneurship, mental health, student funding, crime and substance abuse, showing concretely how ANC-led programmes respond to these challenges.
 - Establishing a Youth Digital Volunteer Network, working closely with the ANCYL and YCL, to help drive online campaigns, narrative defence and community-based communication.
 - Incorporating youth voices in content development, ensuring that young people are not only the target audience but also co-creators of ANC messaging.
296. A strong youth communication strategy will not only support electoral performance but will contribute to generational renewal of the movement and continuity of the National Democratic Revolution.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANC COMMUNICATIONS POLICY

297. In fulfilment of the mandate from the 55th Conference, the Subcommittee is implementing the existing policy and also in the process of revising the ANC Communications Policy aimed at clarifying principles, defining protocols, and strengthening coherence across all levels of the movement.
298. The policy sets out: the principle of a single, authoritative centre of communication; standards for message approval, dissemination and accountability; the strategic role of communication in the National Democratic Revolution; guidelines for ANC, government and alliance communication alignment; expectations for digital conduct and online discipline.
299. This policy is a foundational step toward rebuilding communication discipline and protecting the integrity of the movement.

STRENGTHENING DIGITAL AND MULTIMEDIA COMMUNICATION

300. The Subcommittee, through the DCIP, made significant advances in expanding the ANC's footprint in the digital space. These advances include: improved social media coordination across provinces; increased use of video explainers, interviews, podcasts and digital graphics; livestreaming of ANC events, rallies, briefings and policy dialogues; strengthened digital monitoring and narrative tracking through the Media Monitoring daily. These developments reflect Conference's call for modernisation and recognise the central role of digital platforms in shaping contemporary political identity.
301. The Subcommittee led the implementation of the Justice to Memory programme and the Freedom Charter @70 Campaign through the department, both of which have been central to reconnecting the movement with its historic mission and moral foundations. This work: resurrected the values and principles that guided the liberation struggle; reasserted the transformation agenda driven by the ANC; provided narrative continuity between the past, present and future of the NDR; and countered conservative narratives that distort or erase the ANC's legacy. These programmes have strengthened the ideological posture of the organisation in an era where historical amnesia is deliberately manufactured to undermine the liberation movement.
302. The ANC communication machinery and ANC cadres deployed in government to deliver must be more aligned. This coherence and alignment will enhance our responsiveness and capacity for crisis communication; communication of service delivery interventions at community level; coordination during national emergencies, policy announcements and commemorative events.
303. The work undertaken since the 55th Conference therefore represents a significant, if incomplete, rebuilding of the ANC's communication architecture. It has laid the foundation for a disciplined, coherent, modern communication posture, while acknowledging the ongoing systemic challenges that require intensified focus from the National General Council.

STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ANC MANIFESTO COMMITMENTS (2021 AND 2024)

304. The mandate of the Subcommittee on Communication, Information and Publicity extends beyond internal organisational communication. It encompasses the responsibility to articulate, popularise and defend the programme of the African National Congress as expressed through the Manifesto commitments of the movement.

305. The Manifesto represents the contract between the ANC and the people, and its communication is a political act central to the legitimacy and credibility of the liberation movement. This section provides a detailed assessment of the extent to which the Subcommittee on CIP and DCIP have supported and advanced the implementation and communication of the 2021 Local Government Manifesto and the 2024 National Elections Manifesto.
306. The assessment is grounded in the understanding, reaffirmed by the 55th National Conference, that the ANC must communicate progress, challenges, interventions and policy direction in a manner that builds public trust, counters misinformation, and strengthens the bond between the movement and the people.

COMMUNICATION OF THE 2021 LOCAL GOVERNMENT MANIFESTO

307. The 2021 Local Government Manifesto committed the ANC to improving service delivery, strengthening local governance, fighting corruption, restoring municipal functionality, and prioritising people-centred development. Communication of the Manifesto was essential in reinforcing public confidence in local government and demonstrating responsiveness to the needs of communities.
308. **Progress in Communication of the 2021 Manifesto:** The DCIP strengthened messaging on water, electricity, refuse removal, roads and basic services in municipalities. Provincial communicators increasingly integrated service delivery updates into localised media interviews, community radio and digital platforms. The Subcommittee supported the Service Delivery War Room initiatives by monitoring service delivery and corruption news, communicating interventions and municipal recovery efforts. Multimedia content explaining local government functions, responsibilities and delivery mechanisms improved public understanding.
309. **Challenges and Gaps:** Persistent dysfunction in some municipalities undermined communication gains. Provinces struggled to sustain consistent messaging due to weak local communication structures. Some municipal communications remained technocratic, lacking human-centred narratives. Misinformation about local government failures spread faster than official communication could correct.
310. Overall, communication of the 2021 Manifesto improved gradually, but systemic local government weaknesses limited the impact of messaging efforts.

COMMUNICATION OF THE 2024 NATIONAL ELECTIONS MANIFESTO

311. The 2024 Manifesto marked a decisive moment for the ANC as the movement sought to renew its mandate amidst intensified public scrutiny, a challenging economic climate, and the rise of conservative and anti-transformation narratives. The movement faced a strategic setback that forced tactical retreat to ensure stability of our nation and continued governance to protect the gains of democracy and provide a net for the people. The Manifesto articulated six national priorities and reaffirmed the ANC's commitment to rebuilding state capability, creating jobs, tackling poverty, strengthening democracy, expanding the social wage, and building a capable developmental state. The Subcommittee and the DCIP played a critical role in framing the Manifesto within the broader narrative of renewal and continuity of the National Democratic Revolution.

Manifesto Priority 1: A Jobs Plan for All.

- Expanded use of visual explainers on job creation initiatives. Improved amplification of programmes such as youth employment initiatives, Presidential Employment Stimulus and the Township and Rural Economy strategy. Weekly digital updates highlighted progress in tourism, agriculture, manufacturing and green energy sectors. **Challenges:**

Economic complexity remained difficult to communicate in simple, accessible language. Opposition narratives often overwhelmed ANC messaging on jobs.

Manifesto Priority 2: Rebuilding the Economy Through Industrialisation and Infrastructure

- **Communication Progress:** Strong coverage of Economic Action Plan, black industrialists, masterplans and localisation successes. Livestreaming of infrastructure announcements improved public engagement. Increased messaging on logistics recovery, rail and ports reforms. **Challenges:** Limited provincial amplification of industrialisation projects. Complex infrastructure updates not always packaged for community-level audiences.

Manifesto Priority 3: Tackling the High Cost of Living

- Increased messaging on high cost of living, food price interventions and Competition Commission outcomes. Improved communication on social grants including the SRD grant extension. Strengthened communication on consumer protection and debt relief measures. **Challenges:** Public hardship overshadowed positive messaging efforts. Difficulty in communicating structural drivers of inflation.

Manifesto Priority 4: Investing in People and Basic Services

- Strong coordination through the Service Delivery War Room. Regular updates on water infrastructure, energy recovery, housing and roads. Public education campaigns on NHI, policing reforms, and school infrastructure. **Challenges:** Local communication capacity remained inconsistent. Community frustration often overtook proactive messaging.

Manifesto Priority 5: Defending Democracy, Freedom and Transformation

- Strengthened heritage and historical communication through Justice to Memory and 70th Anniversary of the Freedom Charter. Effective rebuttals of misinformation targeting transformation laws (BELA, NHI, Expropriation Bill) and ANC governance. Expanded storytelling honouring heroes and veterans. **Challenges:** Reactionary narratives continued to dominate social and alternative media through sponsored content. Insufficient mobilisation at branch and community level on constitutional and legislative reforms due to low activism in structures.

Manifesto Priority 6: A Better Africa and a Better World

- Improved messaging on BRICS+, South-South relations, G20, AGOA, peace-building efforts, AfCFTA, Agenda 2063 and African solidarity. Strong coverage of international engagements by the President and the ANC. Strengthened strategic communication in support of Palestine, Cuba and Western Sahara. **Challenges:** Limited public understanding of foreign policy's impact on domestic development. Messaging on international work not fully integrated with domestic priorities.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF MANIFESTO COMMUNICATION

312. The Subcommittee and DCIP have made progress in communicating both the 2021 and 2024 Manifesto commitments. Messaging has improved in coherence, ideological clarity and responsiveness. The movement has begun to reclaim narrative space on key policy areas and has modernised its content production significantly. However, challenges remain: uneven capacity across provinces and municipalities; rapid spread of misinformation outpacing official communication; fragmentation that continues in some structures; and insufficient integration of ideological content with service delivery communication.
313. The midterm moment reveals that while the ANC has made visible progress in communicating its Manifesto commitments, full impact will require intensified investments in digital modernisation, message discipline, community-based communication and improved coordination between the movement and the state. The next period must consolidate these gains and deepen the ideological and narrative framing of the Manifesto as the strategic programme of the ANC and the cornerstone of the National Democratic Revolution.

LESSONS FROM THE 2024 ELECTIONS COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGN

314. The 2024 national and provincial elections constituted a critical test of the ANC's communications machinery. The campaign period provided valuable insights into both the strengths and weaknesses of the DCIP's capacity to wage the Battle of Ideas under conditions of intense contestation.
- Strengths:** The War Room and Service Delivery War Room improved real-time coordination, message refinement and rapid rebuttal to opposition narratives. Increased multimedia content (videos, graphics, podcasts) broadened the ANC's reach beyond traditional rallies and press briefings.
- Weaknesses:** In some provinces and regions, digital capability and message discipline lagged behind opponents, leading to localised narrative defeats. Resource constraints limited the scale and consistency of community-based communication and African-language content. Opponents and alternative media sometimes dominated agenda-setting on issues like corruption, coalition politics and service delivery.
315. Key recommendations arising from this experience are: Establish a Permanent Elections Communications Capacity within DCIP that remains active between elections, building databases, content banks and volunteer networks. Strengthen door-to-door and community media communications, ensuring that face-to-face engagement and local radio remain central to campaigning. Consolidate a Lessons Learned Report capturing best practices and shortcomings, and use it to guide preparations for the 2026 Local Government Elections.

ORGANISATIONAL CHALLENGES, STRATEGIC RISKS AND EMERGING CONTRADICTIONS

316. The work of the Subcommittee on Communication, Information and Publicity unfolds within a complex organisational environment marked by internal weaknesses, structural gaps, external pressures and ideological contradictions. The 55th National Conference warned that without organisational renewal, disciplined leadership and strengthened communication systems, the ANC would continue to lose ground in the Battle of Ideas. The midterm period confirmed the accuracy of this warning. In this section, the report provides a candid assessment of organisational challenges, strategic risks and contradictions that continue to undermine the full implementation of the communications mandate.
317. **Communication capacity across provinces and regions:** While the national office has made significant strides in strengthening message discipline and modernising communication, provincial and regional structures remain uneven in both capacity and functionality. Many provinces and regions lack: full-time, trained communication teams; basic equipment and digital infrastructure; dedicated content production capacity; strategic planning systems; coordinated relationships with local government communicators. This unevenness creates a fragmented communication landscape where progress at national level is not reflected consistently at branch and community level. As a result, anti-ANC narratives often flourish in areas where the organisation's communication presence is weakest.
318. **Communication coordination across the movement and government:** Despite improvements, communication across the ANC, government departments, state agencies and alliance structures remains insufficiently coordinated. Misalignment creates contradictory messages between ANC and government in lower structures; differing interpretations of policy decisions; dissonance between political and technocratic communication; delays in responding to crises or misinformation. This fragmentation weakens the credibility of the movement and reinforces public perceptions of incoherence.

319. **Digital infrastructure and analytics:** The 55th National Conference emphasised the need for modernisation. However, the movement still lacks advanced digital infrastructure to monitor, analyse and shape public sentiment. Major constraints include: absence of a fully operational Digital Command Centre; limited access to analytics tools for monitoring trends and misinformation; inadequate capacity for rapid multimedia content production; insufficient digital training for communicators at all levels. In a political environment driven by digital mobilisation, this constitutes a strategic vulnerability.
320. **Message discipline:** Despite clear Conference resolutions and a communications policy, message discipline remains inconsistent. Some leaders continue to: issue unauthorised statements; leak internal discussions to the media; comment prematurely on sensitive matters; use social media in ways that contradict organisational positions. Such acts undermine organisational unity and authority, create internal confusion, and provide ammunition to hostile opposing actors.
321. **Resource and capacity building:** Communication is a resource-intensive function requiring skilled personnel, equipment, and sustained investment. Several structures lack: adequate budgets for communications work; trained media and digital officers; functional community outreach programmes; capacity for regular multimedia production. These constraints weaken the organisational ability to compete with well-funded conservative and anti-transformation forces.
322. **Ideological integration in communication:** While ideological content has improved at national level, it is not consistently reflected across provinces, regions and branches. Communication often remains reactive instead of strategic; technical instead of political; descriptive instead of educational. This disconnect weakens the ANC's ideological command and limits its ability to mobilise the motive forces around the objectives of the National Democratic Revolution.
323. **Public trust and perceptions of state capability:** Public frustration arising from service delivery failures, unemployment, crime, energy instability and municipal collapse continues to shape attitudes towards the movement. These challenges create an environment where communication efforts struggle to counter negative sentiment. Unless communication is paired with visible improvements in governance and service delivery, even the best messaging risks being dismissed as disconnected from lived realities.
324. **Hostile digital networks and misinformation ecosystems:** The ANC faces sophisticated and digital networks that: spread misinformation and disinformation; manipulate public sentiment; coordinate well-resourced anti-ANC campaigns; produce content faster and at greater scale than the movement can respond. These networks often operate anonymously, without accountability, and with significant funding from conservative political, private sector and international actors.
325. **Community-level communication:** Branches, zones and municipalities remain the weakest link in the communications chain. In many areas, the ANC does not have: functioning communications officers at branch level; consistent community media engagement; consistent public meetings; structured programmes for street and VD level communication; visibility in working-class and rural communities. This vacuum creates space for misinformation to spread unchecked.
326. **Organisational contradictions and internal noise:** Internal contradictions including factional tensions, leadership disputes, uneven commitment to renewal, and competing interpretations of strategic priorities continue to create noise within the movement weakening communication coherence. The 55th National Conference warned that organisational renewal requires "revolutionary discipline, unity of purpose and collective leadership." The persistence of internal contradictions undermines these principles and dilutes the movement's messaging.
327. **Strategic recommendations and interventions on battle of ideas and communications:** The midterm assessment of the communications and ideological

terrain, together with the organisational weaknesses identified in Section 6, makes it clear that the African National Congress must undertake decisive, strategic and disciplined interventions to rebuild its communications machinery and reclaim the political and ideological initiative. The 55th National Conference directed that communication must become a central pillar of organisational renewal and the rebuilding of public trust. The recommendations below therefore constitute a comprehensive programme of action for the next period, to be adopted and intensified by the National General Council.

328. **A single, authoritative centre of communication:** To eliminate fragmentation and restore narrative coherence, the ANC must strengthen the authority of the Secretary-General's Office and the DCIP as the sole custodians of official communication across our structures. Enforce the principle of One Movement, One Message, Many voices across all structures. Ensure all public communication by leaders to be approved through established protocols to ensure message and narrative discipline. Strengthen disciplinary processes for unauthorised or factional communication. Enhance the National Spokesperson's authority and visibility as the public face of the movement.
329. **A digital command centre:** The ANC must modernise its communications machinery to meet the demands of the digital era. A Digital Command Centre will strengthen monitoring, analysis, rapid response and content generation. Invest in high-level digital monitoring tools and analytics software. Build teams dedicated to rapid response, content production, and youth-oriented digital outreach. Integrate narrative tracking, misinformation detection and crisis communication systems. Train provincial and regional communicators on digital warfare and political communication.
330. **Communication capacity in provinces, regions and branches:** The weakest link in the communications chain is at the branch and community level. The ANC must rebuild communication capacity from the ground up. **Interventions:** Deploy trained communicators to provincial and regional offices. Establish functional communications officers in every branch. Provide equipment, templates, branding and messaging toolkits to all structures through the Corporate Identity Manual. Develop a structured programme of community-level communication, including door-to-door materials and ward newsletters.
331. **Expand multimedia production and storytelling capability:** To influence public consciousness, the ANC must produce compelling, people-centred content that resonates across demographics. Scale up production of videos, podcasts, documentaries and digital explainers. Strengthen the ANC Podcast and expand distribution across youth platforms. Build a Creative Content Unit to produce visuals, animations and infographics. Document and popularise service delivery achievements, political education content and organisational renewal narratives.
332. **Rebuild relationships with community and alternative media:** The movement must re-establish a strong presence in grassroots media platforms that historically formed the backbone of people-centred communication. **Interventions:** Provide structured support to community radio and community newspapers. Train local communicators in radio engagements and community outreach. Develop a community media programme that links ANC structures, municipalities and civil society.
333. **Alignment between ANC and government communication:** To avoid contradictions and confusion, communication between the movement and its deployees in the Executive and Legislatures must be seamless. Formalise joint planning between DCIP and MLOs. Develop integrated communication calendars linking ANC campaigns, civic education and government programmes. Ensure that political messaging and service delivery communication reinforce each other. Establish rapid-response teams across the movement and the state.

334. **Ideological content and political education in communication:** To rebuild the ANC's legitimacy and reassert its historic mission, ideological content must be central to communication. **Interventions:** Expand the Justice to Memory and Freedom Charter content streams. Develop political education content specifically for digital platforms. Train communicators in Strategy and Tactics, the Constitution, NDR theory, and ANC history. Ensure that all messaging reflects the values of the Freedom Charter and the Constitution.
335. **Youth-focused communication:** To win the next generation of ideological leadership, the ANC must anchor itself in youth digital culture. **Interventions:** Develop youth-led content creators' networks. Build partnerships with youth influencers aligned to progressive values. Produce content that is visual, concise, relevant and resonant. Expand youth political education through TikTok, YouTube, podcasts and visual storytelling.
336. **Professionalise and modernise communication structures:** The ANC must build a modern communications architecture capable of competing in today's media environment. **Interventions:** Introduce formal training programmes for communicators at all levels. Create permanent, full-time communication posts in provinces and regions. Establish professional standards for media engagement, writing, visual design and digital strategy.
337. **Build a research and message development unit:** A movement cannot lead society if it does not understand it. Research must guide communication. Establish a research unit to track public sentiment, political trends and narrative shifts. Conduct regular polling and focus groups. Develop strategic messaging frameworks informed by evidence and demographics.

OVERALL STRATEGIC OUTLOOK

338. The **NGC** must reaffirm that communication is a strategic instrument of struggle, not an administrative afterthought. The next period requires: disciplined leadership; strategic coherence; modernised communications tools; deeper ideological grounding; and stronger community-level presence.
339. These interventions will ensure that the ANC reclaims its role as the principal interpreter of national reality, the defender of democratic gains, and the leader of the Battle of Ideas in the era ahead.

REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF ANC NATIONAL CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS UNDER THE PURVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES (DCDT)

340. The African National Congress (ANC), has consistently located the digital transformation agenda at the heart of building a capable, developmental state and advancing the objectives of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR). The digital economy is poised to make a transformative impact on South Africa's growth across multiple dimensions. The digital economy is not a luxury is a necessity. Today, technology drives every sector: education, healthcare, finance, agriculture, and governance. It is estimated that South Africa's digital economy could contribute up to 19% of GDP by 2030, creating jobs, fostering innovation, and accelerating transformation.
341. The Department of Communications and Digital Technologies (DCDT) serves as a critical instrument in realising this transformative agenda, tasked with ensuring that South Africa transitions into an inclusive digital economy and knowledge society. Its mandate encompasses:
 - Expanding **universal broadband access** and reducing the cost to communicate.
 - Driving **digital transformation** across the public sector and economy.

- Reforming the **South African Post Office (SAPO)** into a modern, inclusive logistics and digital hub.
- Managing the **radio frequency spectrum** to unlock 4IR and 5G potential.
- Strengthening **digital state-owned entities (SOEs)** such as Sentech, Broadband Infraco, and ZADNA.
- Promoting **digital literacy and skills development** to empower citizens.

342. This mandate is directly aligned to:

- The **55th National Conference Resolutions** (ANC, 2022), particularly under *Communications and the Battle of Ideas as well Economic Transformation*;
- The **2021 Local Government Manifesto**, which emphasised *building better communities and accountable, developmental local government*; and
- The **2024 National and Provincial Manifesto**, which reaffirmed *a people-centred digital economy, job creation, and inclusive service delivery*.

343. Together, these political directives locate the digital sphere as a key site of struggle for transformation, national sovereignty, and socio-economic justice.

IMPLEMENTATION OF 55TH NATIONAL CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS (2022–2024)

Table 1: Status of Implementation of ANC Resolutions within the DCDT Mandate

ANC 55th Conference Resolution Communication & Battle of Ideas)	DCDT Strategic Plan (2022–2024)	Achievements (2022–2024)	Challenges & Outstanding Work
Accelerate spectrum licensing and establish the Wireless Open Access Network (WOAN) (ANC 2022: Communications Resolution 3)	Finalise high-demand spectrum release and operationalise WOAN for equitable access and competition.	Spectrum auction concluded in March 2022 raising over R14 billion ; regulatory framework for WOAN established.	Litigation and market concentration delays; WOAN not yet fully operationalised; emerging players face entry barriers.
Universal broadband and data affordability (ANC 2022: Res. 4)	SA Connect Phase 2: connect government facilities, schools, clinics, and households.	Internet user penetration reached 74.7% (approx. 45.3 million users) in 2024 (Trade.gov, 2024).	Rural and township connectivity still limited; data costs remain high for low-income users; infrastructure vandalism delays rollout.
Transform SAPO into a digital platform for inclusive economic participation (ANC 2022: Res. 6)	Restructure SAPO as a digital services, e-commerce, and financial inclusion hub.	Business rescue plan adopted; digital hub model developed; partial integration with government services.	SAPO remains financially distressed; delays in implementation threaten service delivery footprint.
Consolidate and strengthen digital SOEs (ANC 2022: Res. 8)	Rationalise Broadband Infraco, Sentech, and ZADNA; establish synergy for rural broadband rollout.	SOE review underway; partial integration achieved in shared infrastructure projects.	Duplication of mandates persists; weak governance and financial sustainability.
Drive digital skills development and capacity building (ANC 2022: Res. 10)	Implement Digital Skills for All Programme with DHET and DBE.	Youth digital literacy initiatives launched by Nemisa - 1542 learners were trained in creative media short courses between 2022 and 2024. 254 creative media learners participated in learnerships. 152 155 learners trained in basic digital literacy 16 613 people trained in digital entrepreneurship to support MSME development.	Infrastructure and connectivity in rural areas. Funding constraints which impact capacity.

344. Summary: While key gains have been achieved — notably the spectrum auction and the expansion of broadband access — progress remains uneven. Institutional weaknesses,

budget constraints, and market monopolisation continue to limit the pace of transformation envisaged by the 55th Conference.

STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ANC MANIFESTO COMMITMENTS (2021 & 2024)

Table 2: Manifesto Commitments vs Implementation Progress

Manifesto Commitment	Progress and Achievements	Gaps / Challenges
“Every South African connected to affordable broadband by 2025.” (ANC 2024 Manifesto: Pillar 2)	Connectivity at 74.7% (2024); mobile penetration > 90%.	Rural and poor communities still excluded; affordability gap persists.
“Reform SAPO to deliver accessible services to all communities.” (ANC 2021 Manifesto: Priority 5)	Business rescue plan and digital transformation framework in progress. Business Rescue process also coming to an end with a board and executives set to be appointed in 2026.	SAPO viability remains uncertain; operational restructuring incomplete.
“Develop skills for the digital economy and 4IR.” (ANC 2024 Manifesto: Pillar 3)	Digital skills and coding introduced in schools; partnerships with SETAs and universities.	Limited rural coverage; underfunded programmes.
“Build a capable state that delivers e-government services.” (ANC 2024 Manifesto: Pillar 1)	E-government portal under development; some services digitised.	Fragmented implementation; uneven coordination across departments.

345. **Assessment:** The 2021 Local Government Manifesto grounded digital transformation within the Batho Pele and DDM frameworks — locating connectivity as a service-delivery enabler. The 2024 National Manifesto elevated this into a macroeconomic and developmental pillar, calling for a people-centred digital economy to drive job creation, lower costs of living, and empower youth. However, delivery gaps persist due to weak intergovernmental coordination and SOE inefficiencies.

POLITICAL ANALYSIS: STATUS, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Dimension	Political Analysis and ANC Strategic Interpretation
Transformation of the Communications Sector	The digital economy remains highly concentrated in private hands. The ANC’s resolution for a <i>state-led developmental digital infrastructure</i> must therefore be operationalised through stronger state capacity and social compacts (ANC, 2022).
Socio-Economic Inclusion	While broadband access has expanded, the digital divide reproduces class, race and spatial inequality. A transformative digital strategy must consciously address <i>access, affordability, and skills</i> to advance the NDR’s goals (ANC, 2024).
State Capability and Governance	Persistent governance instability in SOEs undermines implementation. The ANC must reassert political oversight and developmental discipline within DCDT entities to ensure alignment with movement priorities.
Public Confidence and Renewal	Citizens’ frustration with service delivery delays erodes trust. Accelerating visible, people-centred outcomes in communications to restore confidence in ANC-led government.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NGC

346. **Leverage state capabilities and investment for greater impact:** There are instances where the Government of South Africa has developed strategic telecommunications capabilities, albeit in a segmented and uncoordinated manner leading to duplications and inefficiencies. Government investment towards Technology development and connectivity should be coordinated better at the national and across the 3 spheres of government to minimise duplications and maximise investment impact. A decentralised approach to managing the essential capabilities such fibre networks, satellite and other terrestrial capabilities is disadvantaging the state from efficiently and speedily connecting its government institutions and the public.

Recommendations: that the technological and telecommunications capabilities held by the State-Owned companies be coordinated, consolidated and leveraged for greater impact and fast tracking of digital services for Government and the public. Eskom, Sentech, Transnet, BBI and Telkom capabilities should be streamlined to enabled effective digitization.

347. **Infrastructure funding and continuous technology development:** Technology is often a timebound capability where evolution is inevitable. In any successful economy, Research, Development and technology replacement plays a vital role towards a sustained socioeconomic impact and technological relevance of the country. Therefore, it is unavoidable that technology development and next generations capabilities will require fiscal support. Without fiscal support or technology development and funding of strategic future proofing projects, economic growth and the development of the state will remain slow. South Africa is currently missing an opportunity of leveraging benefits of a fully connected society where majority of government services and transactions could be online, mainly due to slow development. The opportunity cost of this reality is delay in public services, maintained costs to the public due to travel and time and low investor appetite. Strategic telecommunications capabilities such as connectivity networks, Satellite and data centre will continue to position and differentiate successful countries from others.

Recommendations: Funding remains vital for the development of a digitally connected and technologically sovereign country. Therefore, a development funding mechanism should be established to enable continuous development of state capabilities. The USAF fund should be expanded for the attainment of broader objectives and impact.

348. **ICT policy reforms for development :** The ANC champions transformation and inclusion. Our founding principles demand that economic progress benefits all South Africans, especially those historically excluded. ICT policy is now central to this mission. Our ICT policies, while progressive, face implementation challenges: Fragmented regulatory frameworks and overlapping mandates slow progress. Delays in spectrum allocation and infrastructure rollout hinder connectivity. Lack of harmonization with continental frameworks limits cross-border digital trade. If we fail to act, South Africa risks falling behind in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, widening inequality, and losing competitiveness in global markets.

The ANC must champion a comprehensive review and alignment of ICT policy and regulation to: Modernize laws for emerging technologies like AI, cloud computing, and fintech. Enable investment through clear, predictable regulatory frameworks. Promote collaborative regulation, engaging industry, academia, and civil society. Ensure transformation is irreversible, embedding B-BBEE principles in the digital economy. Unlock regional digital trade opportunities. This is not just about technology it is about economic sovereignty, social justice, and national development.

349. **Human capacity development for a capable state:** Human capital development in ICT involves building skills, knowledge, and capabilities to leverage information and

communication technology for personal, organizational, and national growth. It is crucial for economic competitiveness, enabling digital transformation through training, education, and access to technology. This includes developing technical skills promoting digital literacy, and fostering a culture of continuous learning in a rapidly evolving digital world. Key components include skills development, digital literacy, education and training, infrastructure and access as well as strategic leadership. This capacity development is critical for:

- **Economic Growth:** ICT-driven human capital development can boost economic growth by enhancing productivity and competitiveness.
 - **Digital Transformation:** it is the key to successful digital transformation, as it provides the necessary workforce to drive organizational and social changes.
 - **National development:** In many regions, ICT acts as a tool for human capital development, which is critical for poverty reduction and achieving sustainable development goals.
 - **Bridging inequalities:** By providing access and skills, human capital development can prevent digital transformation from exacerbating existing inequalities.
350. Not investing in ICT human capital development leads to missed economic opportunities, lower productivity, and increased inequality. It results in a skills gap where a workforce cannot leverage new technologies, hindering innovation and economic competitiveness, and preventing the realization of the full benefits of ICT infrastructure investments. It hinders national development as nations often have:
- **Inability to keep pace with global trends:** A country without a skilled ICT workforce will fall behind in a world where digital transformation is a key driver of progress.
 - **Poor return on investment:** Both public and private investments in **technology** and infrastructure are less effective if the human capital to support them is lacking.
 - **Hindered structural transformation:** For the digital economy to drive **structural** transformation and address issues like poverty and inequality, it requires a fundamental shift in human capabilities.
351. Without investment in this human capital, the potential for radical improvement is lost. **Recommendations:** increased investment in infrastructure development, funding and coordination to develop human capacity in the digital age.
352. The ANC 55th National Conference located the communications and digital technology sector as a strategic terrain in the battle of ideas and the quest for socio-economic transformation. The work of the DCDT since 2022 reflects measurable gains — yet the revolutionary task of building an inclusive, people-centred digital society remains incomplete. The movement must, therefore, intensify oversight, consolidate the developmental state, and marshal all organs of people's power — from branches to Parliament — to ensure the realisation of the ANC's historic mission in the digital age.

Elections and By-Elections Campaigns

353. The elections research presented to the 55th National Conference signalled a clear warning: had elections been held in 2022, the ANC would have received just 33% of the popular vote, improving slightly to 38% by March 2024. The actual 2024 NPE results confirmed this trend. There are several critical lessons arising from the 2024 election results, particularly our failure to secure a decisive victory that would have enabled an ANC-led government without coalition constraints.
354. It is now common cause that at the centre of our failure to secure an overwhelming victory in 2024 were, among others: the infiltration and influence of the MKP, which affected KZN, Gauteng and Mpumalanga most severely; the state of the economy; persistent service delivery challenges; demobilisation of the motive forces in traditional base areas; and poor voter turnout. This reality compels the organisation to return to the drawing board, re-strategise and craft mechanisms to rescue itself. There were also subjective factors that contributed to our inability to secure an outright victory in the 2024 NGPE.

Review of the 2024 Elections Campaign

355. The 2024 National and Provincial Elections were the seventh democratic, non-racial and non-sexist elections in our country, taking place 30 years after the transition to democracy. A strategy workshop was convened immediately after the 55th ANC National Conference, during which internal ANC electoral research was presented for the first time in plenary. The research showed that, for the first time in our history, the ANC was in real danger of losing its majority at national level, as well as in KZN, Gauteng, and potentially in the Free State and North West.
356. The 55th Conference Organisational Renewal Resolution directed the following regarding the 2024 National and Provincial Elections Campaign:
- The 2024 national and provincial elections would be an important milestone as we celebrate 30 years of democracy. All indications were that these elections would be particularly challenging, given our electoral decline since 2004.
 - Voter concerns centred on poor performance of government and perceptions that the country was moving in the wrong direction. Core supporters felt the ANC performed poorly on the economy and combating corruption because “we are a house divided.”
 - The NEC therefore needed to establish the machinery for the 2024 elections as one of its first tasks after Conference, including ensuring sufficient capacity for communications, mobilisation, training, resources and voter education at all levels.
357. To address challenges facing the ANC and government, the 55th National Conference declaration instructed:
- The building of an outward-looking ANC with a clear programme to serve the people. All ANC structures must shift their focus towards communities and their daily challenges.
 - Building dynamic ANC branches that actively engage communities, ward committees, local forums and organisations.
 - Strengthening branches to monitor local services, prevent corruption and poor service delivery, and support advice offices and contact centres for public access to government services.
358. Strategy development, resource mobilisation and training were identified as key preparatory steps for setting up election structures. With a new NEC and the national electricity crisis, preparations took time, resulting in strategy workshops only being held in May 2023. Weak branch structures compelled a decision to intensify training across all organisational levels. The National Elections Strategy Workshop for NPE2024—followed by provincial workshops—agreed on the following campaign phases:

- **Laying the Foundation:** May–September 2023
 - **Engage Voters:** October 2023 – February 2024
 - **Mayihlome:** March–May 2024
 - **Siyanqoba and Election Day Preparations:** May 2024
359. The 2024 campaign included build-up activities in Mpumalanga leading to the successful 112th anniversary rally at Mbombela Stadium; targeted interventions to support campaigns in KZN and Gauteng; the February 2024 voter registration drive and online voter registration; a proactive communications and social media campaign; a 40-day battle plan during the Mayihlome phase; and extensive Election Day preparations to ensure high turnout.
360. The ANC launched its Manifesto—anchored on six priorities for the 7th Administration—at Moses Mabhida Stadium on 24 February 2024. Thereafter, ANC structures took this programme to every city, town, village and ward in an extensive voter outreach effort.
361. Communities engaged openly with ANC volunteers, expressing concerns, frustrations and anger about slow progress in improving their lives, declining service quality, loadshedding, unemployment, rising cost of living and weak governance. Many complained that they only see the ANC during elections, that branches are not active in solving day-to-day issues, and about unbecoming behaviour of some leaders.
362. The 29 May 2024 election results saw the ANC lose its absolute majority nationally, with a 17% decline from 2019. We also lost majorities in Gauteng and KZN. While the MKP captured a portion of the ANC vote, the primary issue was voter abstention—particularly in traditional ANC strongholds. National turnout was low at 58.64%.


National results – voters roll growth of 2,4m ANC vote decline of 5m over 10 years						
NATIONAL VOTES	2024 ANC Votes	2019 ANC Votes	2014 ANC Votes	Decline 2014-2019	Decline 2014- 2024	% Decline 2014-2024
E Cape	1,130,010	1,399,455	1,587,338	-187,883	-457,328	-25.3%
Free State	439,700	570,980	721,126	-150,146	-281,426	-33.8%
Gauteng	1,463,758	2,413,979	2,522,012	-108,033	-1,058,254	-26.4%
KZN	619,531	2,026,069	2,530,827	-504,758	-1,911,296	-54.3%
Limpopo	1,061,696	1,163,091	1,202,905	-39,814	-141,209	-9.9%
Mpumalanga	598,952	918,756	1,091,642	-172,886	-492,690	-42.7%
North West	523,203	633,223	763,804	-130,581	-240,601	-26.9%
N Cape	196,146	239,221	278,540	-39,319	-82,394	-20.7%
W Cape	424,756	659,548	737,219	-77,671	-312,463	-15.7%
Overseas	1,532	2,153	1,508	645	24	0.1%
Total	6,459,284	10,026,475	11,436,921	-1,410,446	-4,977,637	-31.0%
Registered voters	27,782,081	26,756,649	25,388,082	1,368,567	2,393,999	

363. Although the voters' roll increased by 2.3 million over the last decade, ANC support fell by 5 million votes between 2014 and 2024. The sharpest declines were recorded in KZN (-54.3%), Mpumalanga (-42.7%) and the Free State (-33.8%), with an overall national decline of -31%.

Critical Weaknesses in the NPE2024 Campaign

364. We did not adequately factor in the declining ANC vote trends in by-elections to shape our election strategy. We also practised denialism—both of the research findings and the impact of poor delivery in government. Despite four consecutive Conferences warning of electoral decline, we failed to improve service delivery. Poor governance and weak delivery remain our Achilles' heel, with insufficient oversight from the ANC and inadequate response from ministers, premiers, mayors and departments. The public lost patience and trust.

365. Leaders and branches remain detached from communities. The Organising Department is not yet adequately equipped to build strong, rooted branches capable of serving and leading communities. Many councillors are unclear about their roles and are not active in improving service delivery. Accountability—both to the organisation and to communities—is weak or absent.



366. The agree voter-centred strategy and campaign plan were not effectively implemented, as resources were absorbed by January 8th celebrations, the Manifesto launch, Manifesto Review and Siyanqoba rallies—activities that largely “preached to the converted.” In August 2024, the NEC received an in-depth assessment of the NPE2024 campaign, highlighting immediate strategic tasks, trends in by-elections, persistent on-the-ground challenges, and key recommendations for the 2026 Local Government Elections (LGE).

LGE2026 Election Strategy and Immediate Tasks


367. The Elections and Campaign Unit hosted a National Election Strategy Workshop on 11–12 April 2025 in Ekurhuleni, attended by all nine provinces and 52 regions. The delegation included all Election Management Team units (Organising & Membership, DCIP, Finance, Education & Training, Political Education, Research & Policy, Monitoring & Evaluation), the Leagues, Metropolitan Troikas, Big City Troikas and Cloud Coordinators.
368. The workshop identified several critical factors that contributed to the ANC’s significant decline in the 2024 general elections:
- Research shows that over 4 million ANC voters stayed home compared to 2019. LGE2021 results did not recover this lost support.
 - Poor or absent service delivery was a major contributor to the 2024 decline.
 - The campaign failed to persuade voters; election structures were built on weak organisational structures (BECs).
 - The aerial campaign—traditional and social media—lacked compelling content, especially for young voters.
 - Internal divisions and factionalism contributed to falling below 50%. Many comrades and councillors did not participate meaningfully in the campaign.
 - We failed to register enough first-time voters and did not recover those who defected or abstained.

- Volunteers were not adequately trained to communicate the 30-Year Review and Manifesto.
369. The workshop directed the organisation to implement a four-phase campaign:
- **Phase One:** Laying the Foundation
 - **Phase Two:** Mayihlome
 - **Phase Three:** Siyanqoba
 - **Phase Four:** Call to Vote / Election Day
370. In Phase One (Laying the Foundation), the immediate priority tasks included: Conducting Provincial Strategy Workshops in all provinces, followed by Metro and Big City or strategic town workshops. Eight provinces have completed workshops; the Western Cape remains outstanding due to conferences and resource constraints. Only North West has completed all regional workshops. All provinces have established election structures at provincial and regional level, except the Western Cape. KZN and Gauteng still need to finalise LETs and BETs due to ongoing reconfiguration. Urgent tasks include appointing full-time coordinators for 205 LETs/ ZETs, 4,500 BET coordinators, and 23,000 VD coordinators. Training at least 200,000 volunteers—primarily for door-to-door work—and fully capacitating 23,000 VD coordinators, 4,500 BET coordinators and approximately 250 LET/ZET coordinators by January 2026.
371. Rebuilding branches with clear outward-looking programmes and implementing a Foundation Course to strengthen ANC capacity to work with communities, engage, represent and serve—creating a competent volunteer corps for LGE2026.
372. Registering approximately 4.5 million first-time voters, registering potential ANC supporters in correct voting districts, and locating the 4 million voters who abstained in 2024. Target every ANC voter, particularly traditional supporters, to raise turnout to at least 60%. Re-engage older voters through targeted sectoral programmes. To raise registration, support and turnout, five factors are essential:
- A well-oiled ANC election machine capable of reaching, registering, engaging and turning out ANC voters.
 - Improved voter mood through credible communication on the economy, service delivery, corruption and a hopeful future.
 - Visible and sustained action on service delivery, particularly water, sanitation and energy.
 - Selection of the best possible candidates who inspire trust and reflect ANC values.
 - An Election Fundraising Team dedicated to securing resources, with allocations ring-fenced for each campaign phase; and a national budget covering research, training, volunteer support, media, materials, events and voter mobilisation.
373. The turning point in public sentiment depends on visible, credible action by the ANC-led GNU in addressing service delivery failures. The performance of deployees across all spheres of government is therefore crucial. Voter mood cannot improve without demonstrable intention and action to fix problems. Those failing to perform must be held accountable.
374. The Mayihlome Phase begins in January 2026. Our projections require that all election structures be established and trained by the end of January to enable ground forces to launch a voter-centred, contact-based campaign.

By-Elections

375. The ANC contests every by-election as if it were a normal local government election, both to defend and improve participation in municipalities and to keep our campaign machinery sharp. Three hundred and ninety-one (391) by-elections have been held since the 2021 Local Government Elections (LGE2021). By 7 November 2025, the ANC had won just below 41% of the wards where by-elections were held, including some gains from the DA and other parties, but suffered a net loss of 44 wards to the opposition over this period. Over half of the wards lost since LGE2021 were to the IFP (20), 23% to the EFF (9), and the remainder to Others (7), the DA (1) and MKP (8).

376. A positive sign (too few yet to be a trend) since the 2024 NPE is that voter turnout in ANC areas, particularly in E Cape and Mpumalanga and a lesser extent North West are recovering.
377. There were 69 municipal by-election held between January and 5 November 2025, the ANC contested all these by-elections both where it was in control and where opposition were in control. Out of 69 by-elections held, the ANC managed to defend 35, won 4 wards and lost 11 wards. The DA has also suffered losses due to PA taking some of its stronghold wards, the MKP has also taken some ANC wards . At least until the 5th November 2025, the ANC is sitting at 39 wards which means it won just above 53% of the by-elections held this year.



378. In the 8 by-elections that took place on the 26 November 2025 we lost ward 17 in Mandeni, KZN to MKP, the DA retained ward 90 in JHB, we won ward 7 in Hantam Namakwa in the N Cape, and lost Siyancuma Ward 5 in Frances Baard to an independent candidate.
379. In overall analysis, Limpopo and Eastern Cape continue to defend the ANC in all by-elections especially where the organization enjoys traditional support. Northern Cape is fighting back, with some wins and some losses, especially to the PA. The remainder of the provinces are grappling with by-elections, with an exception of Free State and North West because both held fewer by-elections.

Threats and Challenges

380. There seems to be so many community forums which have shown appetite to contest during the by-elections and it is clear that they are testing the ground for LGE -2026. The SACP continues to contest by-elections especially in Limpopo, there are also interest to contest in North West, Mpumalanga, and KZN and this is a challenge which need to be addressed by leadership before the LGE-2026 processes.
381. Internal challenges as a result of Regional conferences underway are a big threat in the organization, in some regions election structures have not been appointed because comrades are preoccupied by conferences.
382. Lack of funding of the campaigns continues to be a huge threat if not given sufficient attention. An immediate financial support of Research, ANC Cloud, Training and workshops

is urgent as in yesterday; we cannot afford to run a healthy and progressive campaign without proper funding.

383. Poor service delivery intervention will further decline the ANC support if not addressed. Need to deal with big issues on water, sanitation and power – our govt should drive intervention and relief in disasters and this must be seen to be done.

Recommendations:

384. Implement the Local Government Action Plan (LGAP), and fast-track service delivery by fixing the low hanging fruits, especially challenges such as sewerage spillages, water pipe burst, electricity load-reduction, pot-holes etc.
385. Set up team of campaign fundraisers at national and provincial level. Raise funds and develop funding proposals, open an election account. Mobilize and distribute resources for campaign from national to branch level as early as possible, the procurement of election material should be concluded at least by the beginning of 2026 to allow space for distribution to branches.
386. Embark on a candidate selection process well in time, at least six months before the voting day, this will allow comrades to heal and begin to work together towards one purpose; and it will also allow the organization to make up for those who might have defected to other organizations.
387. Urgently to conclude the outstanding provincial and metropolitan strategy workshops.

Policy, Monitoring and Evaluation

388. The Policy, Monitoring, Evaluation and Research (PMER) Subcommittee continues to pursue the mandate of the 55th National Conference, which placed Monitoring and Evaluation as a critical element of organisational renewal. Conference directed the movement to strengthen planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation across all structures and resolved that the Renewal Programme must be grounded in a clear M&E framework with defined timeframes and measurable outcomes. This has guided the Subcommittee's work.
389. The Subcommittee plays a coordinating role for policy development, monitoring and evaluation, to ensure that conference resolutions, Manifesto commitments and Programmes of Action remain aligned with the ANC's overall mission, renewal objectives and organisational mandate, guided by the organisational values and responsibilities expected of a liberation movement that must lead society and organise the motive forces.
390. The 55th National Conference recognised the weaknesses confronting the movement: uneven implementation capacity, instability in service delivery, declining coordination across spheres of government and a sharply contested political environment. Conference warned that these weaknesses, if not addressed with discipline and coherence, would continue to undermine the ANC's organisational standing and its ability to drive transformation. This recognition elevated the centrality of PMER as the structure responsible for strengthening planning, monitoring and evaluation across the organisation.
391. In direct response to this instruction, the NEC established the Policy, Monitoring, Evaluation and Research (PMER) Subcommittee in 2023. The Committee is chaired by Deputy Secretary General, Cde Maropene Ramokgopa, who is also responsible for Planning Monitoring and Evaluation in government, and deputy chair Cde Dr Joe Maswanganyi. Cde Fébé Potgieter was appointed as Head of Policy and Research, and managing of the PMER department. Its

purpose is to give effect to Conference resolutions by developing an integrated monitoring system, strengthening organisational planning, building research capability, and ensuring consistent reporting across structures. The establishment of the Subcommittee was therefore a deliberate organisational decision to correct the weaknesses Conference had identified.

392. The 2024 National and Provincial Elections represented a major turning point in the balance of forces. The ANC suffered a significant electoral setback, losing its majority nationally for the first time since 1994. This outcome laid bare the urgency of the weaknesses Conference had highlighted and underscored the need for a far stronger internal monitoring and accountability system. The electoral loss reinforced the importance of a unified centre that can track implementation, identify risks early and guide leadership with reliable analysis rooted in the conditions facing communities.
393. The formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) after the elections further shifted the terrain. Governance responsibilities are now shared with parties that do not necessarily share the ANC's mission and outlook. This arrangement has introduced a more complex and contested environment - in the executive and legislatures - requiring tighter internal coordination and discipline, sharper political oversight and more consistent monitoring to ensure that the ANC programme is not diluted and that its commitments remain on track.
394. The state of the motive forces makes the demands on the organisation unmistakably clear. Communities want consistent service delivery, socio economic development that improve the quality of their lives, visible and reliable deployees, timely communication, and proof that the ANC is working to build a better life for all. Their confidence depends on whether organisational decisions translate into real outcomes. This places pressure on the movement to intensify monitoring across all strategic priorities, act early when problems emerge, and ensure that commitments are carried through.
395. In this context, the Subcommittee has positioned itself as the central coordinating point for policy, monitoring and evaluation. It leads the development of core policy instruments, supports the refinement of policy positions across NEC Subcommittees and provides strategic oversight to ensure that Conference resolutions, Manifesto commitments and Programmes of Action remain coherent, people-centred and aligned with the renewal agenda. The Subcommittee has also played a key role in shaping the strategic direction of the ANC Makgotla and all the ANC strategic Policy events.

IMPLEMENTATION OF 55TH CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS

396. The PMER Subcommittee executes its mandate through the PMER Department which is the engine that operationalises the work of the subcommittee. The Department has developed a set of workstreams that give structure, discipline and strategic focus to the implementation of Conference resolutions. These workstreams enable the department and the subcommittee to respond to the shifting balance of forces, guide policy coherence across the organisation and support the broader ANC renewal programme. Through the Department work streams, it has been able to develop monitoring tools and frameworks, increased coordination with subcommittees and provinces, has managed to strengthen the ANC internal research capacity, monitor service delivery, consolidate organisational data and support escalation and intervention where required.
397. The PMER work is divided into two workstreams: Research and Policy and the second Monitoring and Evaluation. The following section provides a progress update on each workstream, outlining the key activities undertaken, and systems developed.

Research and policy workstream

398. The 55th National Conference directed the movement to rebuild the ANC into a learning, analytical and strategically coherent organisation capable of providing leadership to society. Conference emphasised the need for evidence-based planning, strengthened policy capacity, deeper ideological grounding and a more responsive organisational centre.
399. The PMER Research Workstream is therefore a core expression of these mandates. It anchors the ANC's capacity by generating the evidence required to strengthen political leadership, shape policy positions, monitor implementation and guide organisational decision-making. This workstream ensures that ANC decisions are grounded in real conditions, credible data and clear analysis of trends shaping the balance of forces.

Elections Research

400. Over multiple cycles, the ANC's Election research has proven instrumental and accurate, providing the organisation with data on voter behaviour and shifting community sentiment, reliable short-, medium- and long-term electoral trend analysis, insights into provincial and regional dynamics, identification of high-risk and high-opportunity areas, grounded assessments of ANC performance and credibility in communities, and early-warning indicators of organisational decline or recovery.
401. Since the 55th conference we have conducted 5 major research surveys which look at government performance and part image of the ANC. The most critical research we conducted was in support of the 2024 ANC Elections campaign from May 2023 to July 2024. The research tracked the following key issues throughout the campaign namely: Mood indicators, Party image, Government support, Brand indicators of the ANC, Segmentation of ANC support, Visibility of the ANC campaign, The image of leadership.
402. All research findings were shared with ANC officials, NEC and all PECs. A comparative analysis of the 2024 elections results has been segmented at National, Provincial, Regional and local level. All information has been uploaded on the ANC cloud system so as to enable our structure to conduct in depth analysis of their permeances and to assist in strategizing for all monthly by elections.
403. Tracking research to inform Messaging, Look and Feel: During the campaign research tested messages to develop possible slogans and broadcast messages that can be leveraged across various communication platforms: Out of Home (OOH), TV, Radio, Print, Digital, Social Media and Public Relations. This was done in partnership with the PR firm and DCIP with the aim of narrowing things down to a single slogan and core narrative summary for the ANC elections campaign. This was done through a series of 13 focus groups. The research covered both metro and non-metro (including some rural); old and young, male and female and a mixture of class/living standards. The group recruitment criteria consider the options people are contemplating in their areas. The findings from the study resulted in the formulation of the slogan "Let's do more, together" for our ANC Elections campaign. The exercise further strengthened Core Narrative, Value Proposition, Message Statements, Slogan and Creative Executions
404. **Election research and Changing Balance of force:** South Africa is experiencing a decisive shift in the political landscape, one that has direct implications for the balance of forces confronting the ANC. The movement's dip below the 50% electoral threshold has compelled the formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU), a development that both constrains the ANC's transformative agenda and opens space for anti-transformation tendencies to reassert themselves.
405. The following are some of the critical issues facing the ANC as per the elections research:
 - ◆ GNU: The current political configuration constrains the ANC's ability to clearly articulate its achievements in government. Competing narratives within the GNU dilute the ANC's message and blur accountability, creating space for opposition parties to claim successes or exaggerate failures.

- ◆ Low Voter Registration and Turnout in ANC Strongholds: Traditional ANC voting districts, especially in rural areas, are experiencing declining voter registration and turnout. This undermines the ANC's historic base and weakens mobilization efforts in long-loyal communities.
 - ◆ Collapse of Youth Participation: Youth voter registration and turnout are at historic lows. Young people increasingly feel disconnected from politics, perceiving that their participation has little impact. This threatens the ANC's generational renewal and long-term survival.
 - ◆ Declining Support in Urban Areas and Metros: The ANC continues to lose ground in metros and large towns, where service delivery expectations are higher and opposition parties are gaining credibility. Losing urban centres is particularly damaging, as these areas shape national sentiment and influence middle-class, professional, and youth opinion. The township vote in urban areas, especially in metros, has since 1994 dropped across all combined metros. This is a worrying trend, indicating that the ANC must work hard to reclaim this lost electorate. In terms of vote numbers, the ANC received over 10 million votes in 2019, but only 6 million in 2024.
 - ◆ Low Confidence in Local Government: Public trust in local government remains extremely low. Municipalities are seen as dysfunctional, corrupt, and unable to deliver. Even ANC supporters associate the party with collapsed infrastructure and failing services.
 - ◆ The ANC must work hard at addressing the most urgent issues fixing the economy, tackling crime and corruption, and improving service delivery at the local government level. The focus must be on achieving better services, consolidating and reassuring existing ANC support, winning back lost voters, and attracting new ones. Efforts should target reducing inequality, poverty, unemployment, and the cost of living.
406. **By-elections Tracker:** The research team tracks the ANC's performance in the monthly by elections and produces a consolidated By-elections Tracker for the Elections Management Team. The By Elections Tracker is updated monthly to the cloud system for easy access for all our structure.
407. **Elections research planned:** As we prepare for the 2026 local government elections the research unit will be conducting more extensive work at the following: Baseline research that looks at Government performance and party image. Research testing messages to develop possible slogans and broadcast messages that can be leveraged across various communication platforms Out of Home (OOH), TV, Radio, Print, Digital, social media and Public Relations. This process will involve working closely with the ANC Department of Communication Information and Publicity (DCIP)
408. **Explore ANC commissioned opinion polling:** The objective is to develop and implement a polling system that enables the ANC to: Continuously monitor the party's public image and reputation among different demographic and geographic constituencies. Evaluate perceptions of government performance, especially at the national, provincial, and local levels. Identify emerging issues and voter concerns to enable proactive responses, interventions and policy adaptation. Support internal strategy development with reliable, real-time data for campaign planning, messaging, and crisis management Track the effectiveness of public engagements and key service delivery initiatives.

Policy Briefs and ANC Submissions

409. The Research Unit developed a series of internal Policy Briefs aimed at strengthening evidence based decision-making across the movement. The Policy Briefs served as a concise, issue-focused documents that provide the ANC with analysis, context and guidance on specific policy questions or emerging developments. Their purpose is to equip the PMER

and the NEC, Subcommittees and organisational structures with timely, accessible and well-researched information that can assist and sharpen political positions and inform programme implementation.

410. The PMER also work with other NEC subcommittees and Offices on specific ANC written submissions on matters before Parliament. The following are some of the Policy Briefs and Submissions developed or in progress by the PMER Department:

- **QLFS 2024 Focus on Youth unemployment trends (2025):** An overview of the employment trends for South Africa for 2024 and a specific focus on youth employment including labour market absorption, NEET trends, possible interventions for youth employment.
- **Impact of Fiscal Drag (2025):** The brief explores the concept of fiscal drag in lieu of the unchanged Personal Income Tax brackets over the past 3 financial years. It explores the effect of the static brackets on consumers in reference to inflation related salary increases.
- **State Owned Enterprises (2024):** Asses the performance of major SOE's in South Africa
- **State Owned Enterprises Bills (2025):** Assessing the SOE bill against ANC resolutions and provides commentary on the bill as whole.
- **Small business Licensing Bill (2025):** Commentary on the BLB, inclusive of explanatory notes and templates for ANC caucuses to comment on the bill.
- **Cost of Living Competition Commission report (WIP):** Assesses the effect of increasing prices of goods and services on the different income groups in South Africa. It also looks at progress in terms of the ANC's manifesto priority of reducing the cost of living.
- **Political Parties Budget Process Comparison (WIP):** Noting the contentious budget process in 2025, the brief looks at different models by political parties with regards to inputs for the national budget.
- **International Trade (2024):** Assessing the performance of SA's international trade
- **Income and Expenditure Analysis (2024/25):** Analysing the Stats SA income and expenditure report to understand what different economic groupings are earning and how they spent their incomes.
- **PPFA Resolution on Regulations (2024):** work with TGO and Study Group on ANC written and oral submission to the Portfolio committee
- **Electoral Reform Panel (2024/2025):** coordinate with L&G, Elections and Constitution and Legal Committee to ensure ANC written and oral submission, as well as participating in the ERP conference on Electoral Systems
- **MTBPS Departmental performance against APPs (2024, 2025):** Compare performance against ANC Manifesto commitments, based on KPI's listed in the Adjusted Expenditure report.
- **G20 (WIP):** impact of G20 on economic policy debates in South Africa
- **EU-SA trade (WIP)** Analysing trends

Research projects

411. PMER is undertaking two longer Research projects on the following, to be completed by the end of 2026:

- a) **Youth Unemployment and labour market study:** The study seeks to critically analyse the root causes of youth unemployment over the past 30 years (1994-2024), assessing the impact of policy interventions and sectoral trends. It will explore employment patterns, barriers to workforce entry, opportunities within the township economy, informal sector, and emerging industries shaped by technological advancements. Furthermore, the research will incorporate

stakeholder insights and perceptions including industry experts, South African youth and government institutions to develop evidence-based solutions for sustainable youth employment. By addressing these systemic challenges, the study aims to contribute to policy reforms, economic growth strategies and collaborative efforts between the government, private sector, and civil society to enhance youth employment prospects in South Africa.

- b) **Study on Leadership diversity in ANC Branches:** The study investigates how the composition of leadership within ANC branches shapes recruitment practices, organizational performance, and member perceptions. It begins by situating ANC leadership within broader sociological and political recruitment theories, noting that the movement's historical identity as a broad-based liberation organization requires branch structures to mirror the communities they serve. The research responds to contemporary challenges where many branches display limited leadership diversity and inconsistent recruitment approaches, which undermine cohesion, fairness, and public legitimacy. By examining whether leadership diversity, capability, and experience influences who joins the ANC and how effectively branches function, the study aims to generate empirical evidence that supports the movement's renewal agenda. It seeks to understand historical and contemporary links between leadership dynamics and member mobilization, while identifying barriers to inclusive leadership. Ultimately, it aims to inform strategies that strengthen unity, broaden participation, and enhance the ANC's community presence.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION WORKSTREAM

Service Delivery Monitor and War room

- 412. The Service Delivery Workstream gives practical effect to the 55th National Conference directive that the ANC must confront service delivery failures as a central threat to organisational credibility and the strength of the motive forces. Conference recognised that declining municipal performance, weak responsiveness and persistent infrastructure breakdowns were eroding trust in the movement and weakening the relationship between the ANC and communities. Communities have continued to raise concerns about poor municipal responsiveness, infrastructure decay, corruption-related failures, and weak follow-up mechanisms. These issues have eroded confidence in both government institutions and the movement, reinforcing Conference's call for decisive service delivery interventions, stronger coordination, and improved oversight across all spheres.
- 413. The Workstream therefore exists to provide a structured and evidence-based mechanism to track service issues and guide timely escalation and intervention through the ANC. A defining feature of this Workstream is that it is citizen-facing. This means it provides communities with direct access to the ANC's monitoring system allowing communities to report service failures, lodge concerns and raise unresolved issues through simple and accessible platforms, an e-mail address, WhatsApp numbers and we are awaiting the application for a toll-free Hotline number.
- 414. The Workstream consolidates information from ANC branches, regions, provincial offices, community forums, media reports, PCOs and public submissions. All matters are logged, processed and escalated to the appropriate political or administrative governance level, working closely with provincial and regional secretaries, Troikas and national sector departments where required. This makes the Workstream a critical bridge between communities and the movement aiming to close the gap between what people experience on the ground and how the ANC responds. Work previously conducted through the Local Government Barometer continued under PMER, with tools refined and rolled out to ANC structures through virtual and physical engagements.

Service Delivery Operational Activities (April 2023 – November 2025)

415. The National Elections workshop in preparation for 2024 NPE identified service delivery as a key component of the ANC's elections strategy, given that increasingly little distinction by voters is drawn between local and national issues in these campaigns. The workshop identified a menu of basic services, delivered by local, provincial and national government, which form part of the social wage and meeting basic needs. The Service delivery unit in PMER started operating in April 2023, as part of the National Elections infrastructure to monitor and refer, give feedback on service delivery issues raised.

MENU OF BASIC SERVICES MONITORED (2023-2025)	
Electricity: Loadshedding, load reduction, transformers	Education and Training: schools, NSFAS
Water	Health
Sanitation	Migration issues
Refuse removal: clean communities, parks, cemeteries	Social services: grants, children, disability, orphans, elderly
Roads, potholes, accidents, public transport	Cost of Living & Poverty, Hunger and food security
Housing, Human settlements	SME's, township economy
Community safety, crime, corruption and GBV	Youth development, sports, recreation, culture
Job creation	Women's empowerment
Economic development, cost of doing business	ICT
Disaster issues	Citizen documents: IDs, birth, death, marriage certificates

Ad-Hoc Service Delivery Strategy LGE 2026

416. The ANC Veterans League (VL), following the NPE2024 outcomes, observed growing service delivery concerns. Public dissatisfaction with response times and the resolution of issues. Rising urgency to reinforce ANC structures for better grassroots engagement. The VL proposed an ad-hoc team to support the Policy Monitoring, Evaluation, and Research Unit (PMER). Purpose: Strengthen capacity ahead of the 2026 Local Government Elections. Focus: Drive proactive resolution and oversight of the community challenges
417. Public Hotline: we are working towards the establishment of a Service Delivery and Corruption Hotline. Aimed at collecting, analysing, and escalating service delivery and corruption issues. Operates as an early-warning and feedback tool for ANC structures and communities. Hotline Scope and Functionality: Receives calls from: General public and escalate, follow-up and give feedback to ANC structures and local forums
418. ANC Today Communications: Through the DCIP service delivery email, and 2 WhatsApp numbers were published for citizens to share their service delivery and corruption issues. This enhances the visibility of the service delivery intervention work
419. Weekly Monitoring & Coordination: the unit holds weekly meeting to Review trends and high-impact issues. Track referrals and outcomes Coordinate response between ANC and government departments Give updates on Service Delivery Hotline: Operational Status and monitor provincial issues.
420. The ANC Service Delivery Hotline and War room was approved and designated to operate from the 11th Floor of the headquarters. ETU has trained a cohort of call

centre agents, equipping them with the essential technical, communication, and case management skills to handle service delivery complaints professionally and efficiently. This training has strengthened the Service Delivery Call Centre's capacity by ensuring agents are competent, confident, and aligned with the operational standards of the War Room.

421. The Service Delivery Unit currently has seven (7) interns and three (3) full-time staff members in the team. The Unit is still waiting for the toll-free number to be finalised and in the meantime continue to focus on the core work of the war room: Responding to emails and WhatsApp messages related to service delivery issues. Escalating matters to provinces and other relevant institutions. Consolidating all issues and sharing them with LGI for further intervention.
422. The establishment of Provincial and Regional Service Delivery War Rooms has progressed following the Secretary-General's approval of the formal submission. The approved proposal, which included detailed Terms of Reference (ToRs) outlining the War Rooms' structure, mandate, and operational framework, has enabled the rollout to commence across provinces. This rollout marks a critical step in strengthening coordinated provincial responses, enhancing real-time escalation mechanisms, and improving the overall effectiveness and visibility of service delivery interventions nationwide.
423. Service Delivery Issue Collation and Escalation: Since April 2023, PMER has been receiving and collating service delivery complaints from: ANC members. Ward structures, Community forums, Municipal residents, Councillors, War Room structures (2024 elections period) and the Media. All issues are escalated to the relevant provincial offices, deployees, and sector departments, including DWS, COGTA, Human Settlements, and Eskom. However, to date, although a substantial number of the escalated issues have been formally resolved, and no written feedback has been received on closures. This remains a key organisational risk.

Core Service Delivery Issues Reported:

- ◆ Basic & Higher Education (NSFAS, school enrollment): All provinces
- ◆ Crime: All provinces
- ◆ Electricity blackouts: All provinces
- ◆ Infrastructure
- ◆ Illegal dumping (Environmental Contamination): All provinces
- ◆ Pit latrine toilets: KZN, & LP
- ◆ Bucket system toilets: EC, GP, FS & NW
- ◆ Unclean Communal toilets (informal settlements)
- ◆ Sewer spillages: All provinces
- ◆ High mast lights that are not working: All provinces
- ◆ Unfinished roads: All provinces
- ◆ Dilapidated bridges: EC, LP, NW & KZN
- ◆ Damaged roads since the 2022 floods: EC & KZN
- ◆ Water shortages: All provinces
- ◆ Incomplete housing projects, and a shortage of housing (RDP) : All provinces
- ◆ Governance Non-payment of service providers
- ◆ Recreational Facilities: All provinces
- ◆ Drugs – All province
- ◆ Bogus agents illegally selling people's properties: GP

424. Referrals of service delivery issues as received: At the level of the PMER service delivery Unit, issues are referred to relevant departments, entities and municipalities for

attention. The service delivery war rooms (local, regional, provincial, plus at the caucus level) are key to attending to these issues. Escalation to LGI plays an essential role in speeding up the resolution of problems as received. Challenges: updates on escalated issues are extremely slow, both from LGI and the provinces. This continues to affect ability of the Unit to provide timely feedback to citizens. An initial response time of 7 days is given to respond with how each issue would be addressed, but that turnaround time is not being met.

425. Observations on Reported issues: Road infrastructure and lighting failures dominate service delivery concerns. Water supply interruptions keep recurring. Illegal electricity connections highlight broader challenges in integrating informal settlements. Community frustration often stems from repeated unaddressed billing irregularities. Ward councillor engagement gaps, not knowing how to report issues of resident with council. Repeated community complaints regarding roads, streetlights, and sanitation remain unresolved for years. Safety and environmental maintenance gaps exacerbate community risk, especially for youth and pedestrians. Longstanding unresolved complaints reflect administrative and municipal inefficiencies. Health infrastructure gaps (clinic staffing and fencing) affect community safety and service quality. Waste removal failures and illegal animal shelters contribute to environmental hazards Risks: Communities losing confidence. Political risk increases where issues remain unresolved Duplicate interventions waste resources. Historical infrastructure failures require massive investment

Issues impacting service delivery:

426. Infrastructure maintenance: Roads. Failure to fix potholes. Failure to fix robots, lights, and road markings. Deteriorating infrastructure or completely no roads, particularly in rural areas.
427. Power failures (not load shedding) caused by overloading of power transformers affects their capacity to provide electricity. This prolonged overloading reduces the lifespan of the transformer, which eventually starts to fail. This is mainly attributed to developing areas reliant on existing infrastructure, which was developed with a limited capacity of the area at that time.
428. Ageing infrastructure: Consistent water pipe bursts, which lead to water supply interruptions, leading to sewer spillages and blockages affects effective sanitation systems, leads to contamination of water as experienced in Emfuleni Municipality.
429. Corruption: Project funds depleted before completion of work, leading to incomplete Infrastructure and substandard facilities; no service rendered at all. Appointment of unqualified service providers and entities to embezzle funds, in most cases by inflating project costs Marginalised communities reliant on public services and the impact of corruption disrupt and undermine the provision of services to them.
430. Political interference: attempts to influence decisions regarding appointments (be it personnel or service providers) or resource allocation, which in the end leads to misappropriation of funds. The cumulative effect of this a decline in the quality and efficiency of service delivery that eventually impacts negatively on the lives of the citizens and, in the process, hinders development.
431. Vandalism: Vandalism of existing infrastructure hinders service delivery. Halls, Libraries, road signs, etc., that are supposed to serve communities are vandalised by the same community members who are supposed to be helped. This affects pension payouts, learning and adherence to road laws. Provision of security is essential in all buildings, and effective traffic service patrols. (municipal by-laws). Incomplete projects are especially vulnerable to vandalism and illegal occupation.

432. Non-payment of services: Non-payment of municipal services by our communities also hampers service delivery as it reduces or decreases revenue capacity available, thus limiting funds for maintenance and infrastructure development. When a municipality lacks enough revenue, it often resorts to cutting costs or delaying maintenance, which leads to a decline in the quality of services provided.
433. The Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) provides a framework for financial management and accountability within municipalities, ensuring resources are used effectively to support service delivery. Key to that framework is the emphasis on the need for public administration to be accountable and transparent in the execution of its mandate to deliver services. Guided by many legislations and laws and performance contracts, the ANC should be able to enforce strict compliance with all deployed cadres to deliver the required services as stipulated by their conditions of employment and contracts. Consistent return of funds to treasury in many cases by either municipalities or Provincial departments have highlighted an exposed lack of capacity, particularly to spend by our deployed cadres and thus affecting the delivery of services and disadvantaging communities of services they needed.

ANC BRANCH FUNCTIONALITY BAROMETER (BFB)

38. The 55th National Conference reaffirmed that renewal must begin at branch level, directing the organisation to rebuild activist, democratic, politically grounded branches capable of organising communities, leading campaigns, and driving the National Democratic Revolution (NDR). The 2024 Organisational Diagnostic Report also further identified widespread dysfunction in branches: irregular meetings, inactive BECs, shallow internal democracy, weak community presence, absence of programmes, gatekeeping, and branches that exist only for conferences.
39. 55th National Conference resolutions emphasised that branches must: Function as centres of community development. Build and lead sectoral and community campaigns. Maintain active programmes of action. Strengthen internal democracy and eliminate gatekeeping,. Ensure regular reporting, planning, and political education.
40. The Branch Functionality Barometer (BFB) is the tool developed to support and implement this mandate. It provides a structured, standardised system for assessing the functionality, activism and organisational health of ANC branches as the core units of the movement The work is jointly led by: The PMER Subcommittee and Department,(responsible for the development of the monitoring system, analysis and consolidation of a Report) & The Organising & Membership Subcommittee and Department, responsible for ensuring branch activation and competition of functionality assessments, political support and overall branch rebuilding Both Subcommittees have received detailed presentations on the Barometer, and have guided the work and implementation in relation the BFB.
41. The BFB is comprised of the following Sections to assess functionality:

Section	What it Assesses
1. Branch Demographic Profile	Location, wards & voting districts; type of community (rural, township, urban, informal); context in which the branch operates.
2. Membership Profile	Size of membership and active participation; youth & women representation; diversity of members (workers, professionals, sectors); gap between paper vs active members.
3. BEC Functionality	Leadership status (elected vs task team); frequency of BEC meetings; functioning subcommittees; .
4. Programme of Action (PoA)	Existence of adopted PoA; evidence of implementation (activities, campaigns, reports); follow-up on progress.
5. Community Work & Councillor Assessment	Visibility and accountability of ward councillor; ward profiling; IDP participation; identification of service delivery challenges; mobilisation and community campaigns.
6. PCO Engagement (MPs/MPLs)	Relationship with Parliamentary Constituency Office; visibility of MPs/MPLs; branch participation in PCO programmes; branch initiative to provide accountability platforms.
7. Election Work	Preparations for 2026 Local Government Elections; voter registration; street sheets; volunteer mobilisation; youth & women outreach; door-to-door campaigns.
8. Communication	Use of WhatsApp groups; flyers, posters & loudhailing; newsletters/bulletins; local radio; digital/social media engagement.
9. Relationship with REC	Assignment and assessment of REC deployees; attendance at BEC/BGM; branch requests for REC support; participation in regional programmes.
10. Overall Branch Status & Challenges	Branch self-assessment (fully functional / struggling / not functional); top challenges (resources, lists, participation, unity); training/support needs (political education, mobilisation).

42. **BFB Weighting & Scoring Framework:** The BFB is designed as a 100-point weighted tool. Each branch is scored across ten sections, with higher weights given to areas that most directly determine whether a branch is alive, programmatic, and effective as a Basic Unit of the ANC. Allows for fair and comparative assessment across all provinces and regions. Weighting is more on the core political work (Program of Action, Service Delivery activism, Election readiness):

Section	Weight (%)	What We Measure
1. Programme of Action (PoA)	20%	Adoption, implementation, and reporting of a living PoA. .
2. Service Delivery & Community Engagement	15%	Mobilisation on water, electricity, housing, sanitation, unemployment, etc.
3. Election Work	15%	Readiness for 2026 LGEs: voter registration drives, canvassing, street sheets, youth mobilisation.
4. Membership Profile & Activity	10%	Accuracy of membership, proportion of active members, youth/women representation. Recruitment strategies, membership retention methods, ANC supporters engagement
5. BEC Functionality	10%	Stability, leadership renewal, quorum, subcommittee activity, internal unity.
6. Councillor/PCO Engagement	10%	
7. REC Engagement	5%	Relationship with Regional Executive Committee deployees.
8. Communication & Digital Tools	5%	Use of WhatsApp, flyers, loudhailing, newsletters, bulletin boards, radio.
9. Governance & Compliance	5%	Reports submitted to REC, adherence to guidelines, frequency of BGMs/BECS.
10. Demographic Profile	5%	Representation of community realities, inclusivity of women, youth, workers, and other sectors.

43. Piloting the BFB Phase: The BFB was first piloted in 2023, for the purpose of the Sol Plaatje Best Branch Award. A further pilot was done in the Free State ahead of the ANC National Working Committee (NWC) Provincial Visit in March. The pilot enabled us to have a glimpse profile of branch functionality. The pilot highlighted inconsistent BEC meeting patterns, administrative and secretary capacity gaps, weak adoption and formulation of Branch Programmes of Action, limited political education and induction, poor documentation and record-keeping by branches, uneven governance and service-delivery interface, strong reliance on informal communication channels. These insights shaped the further refinement of the baseline BFB and guided national readiness ahead of the rollout.
44. Progress to Date: After its development and pilot phase, the BFB was rolled out nationally in a phased approach across all provinces and then to all branches in good standing. Uptake and completion rates were initially slow, which highlighted capacity constraints and uneven implementation at branch level. This led to a revised approach that places stronger responsibility on ANC Regional Secretaries working together with Regional Organisers as the main drivers of implementation. It was also agreed that, following the compulsory baseline assessment, the BFB will be completed quarterly by all branches. Organising and PMER will intensify the rollout in early 2026
45. Regional Secretaries and Regional Organisers have to now form the operational backbone of the BFB implementation. Their responsibilities would include: driving branch compliance with quarterly submissions (aiming for 70% compliance rate across all Regions every Quarter in 2026); providing administrative support to Branches; identifying branches requiring political or organisational intervention; ensuring two-way communication between branches and the Region; Supporting sustained implementation and rebuilding of Branches ahead of the 2026 Local Government Elections.
46. Completion of the BFB is one of the official mechanisms for branches to participate in the 2025 National General Council (NGC). Branches attending the NGC must have completed the Baseline Assessment. Completion of the BFB baseline is also one of the requirements for the ANC Sol Plaatje Award, as it forms part of the criteria used to determine the best-performing ANC branch each year.

Development of ANCWL and ANCYL Barometer Versions

47. PMER also worked closely with the ANC Women's League and ANC Youth League to develop their own versions of the Branch Functionality Barometer. Both Barometers follow the core architecture of the ANC BFB; Reflect League-specific mandates and programmatic priorities; and align with each League's constitutional responsibilities; Follow the same reporting rhythm for national consolidation
48. The PMER team provided technical support in tool development, structuring of indicators and reporting categories appropriate to the League structures and programmes, alignment with the ANC's organisational renewal framework, guidance on evidence requirements and reporting formats Ongoing work is continuing with the ANCYL and ANCWL to fully operationalise the BFB.

2026 Key Tasks to Strengthen BFB Rollout and Implementation:

49. Strengthen capacity at regional level, with Regional Secretaries and Organisers driving Quarterly submissions and follow-up. Intensify support to branch secretaries to improve record-keeping, documentation and reporting discipline. Continue to

provide targeted guidance and training and technical support to WL and YL structures to ensure smooth rollout and consistent participation. Build a predictable quarterly reporting rhythm across all provinces so branches internalise monitoring as part of normal organisational life.

50. Improve verification processes to ensure all submitted reports are complete, credible and supported by evidence. Strengthen coordination between PMER and O&M to ensure that monitoring outcomes translate into organising interventions.
51. Begin identifying patterns and early-warning signs from the first set of Quarterly reports to guide NEC, PEC and REC interventions. Leverage BFB trends for early preparation for the 2026 Local Government Elections, identifying strong and weak areas for targeted mobilisation.
52. Build capacity for provinces to run their own internal review sessions based on BFB findings. Strengthen the digital and administrative infrastructure required for long-term sustainability of the system.
53. Maintain patience with the process, recognising that the organisation is still in the teething stage, while also acting with urgency given the political pressures facing the ANC.

Leadership Accountability Frameworks

54. The 55th National Conference reaffirmed that organisational renewal requires a disciplined, accountable and politically coherent leadership corps across all levels of the movement. Conference was explicit that weaknesses in leadership conduct, poor coordination of organisational work, weak visibility of deployees, and inconsistent execution of ANC programmes had contributed to declining public confidence and weakening organisational capacity. Delegates directed the movement to strengthen accountability mechanisms for all leaders from NEC to PEC and REC including Public Representatives (MP's, MPL's, Councillors) and to ensure that leadership responsibility is tied to clear expectations, measurable performance and consistent reporting.
55. It is within this mandate that the Leadership Accountability Framework was developed as a structured instrument to assess, monitor and guide the performance of ANC leaders and Public representatives. The key Assessment frameworks developed are
 - MP/MPL Assessment Framework
 - NEC/PEC/REC Assessment Framework
 - Ward and PR Councillor Assessment Framework

ANC MP and MPL Assessment Framework

56. The 55th National Conference directed the ANC to establish a uniform, proactive and measurable accountability system for all public representatives. At the end of the 6th Administration in 2023, the organisation conducted a once-off assessment, which limited the ANC's ability to track performance, correct weaknesses early, and enforce discipline throughout the cycle.
57. Drawing from the shortcomings revealed in that end-of-term review: poor attendance, weak oversight, limited constituency work, ineffective communication

and inconsistent discipline the PMER Department has now designed a standardised MP/MPL assessment system for the 7th Administration.

58. This new adopted approach introduces an annual, continuous assessment process that begins with a baseline for the 2024–2025 period and continues throughout the term of the 7th administration. It is built to strengthen accountability, improve performance monitoring, and reinforce the link between ANC public representatives and the communities they serve. Guided by the Leadership Accountability Framework, the department developed the MP/MPL Baseline Assessment which will be rolled out at the end of 2025 to, structured into seven sections that combine quantitative and qualitative elements to assess: Legislative and portfolio committee work. Oversight and political accountability. Constituency and community interface through the deployed PCO. Sectoral work. Communication and Public Engagement. ANC organisational responsibilities. Personal development. Self-reflection and Plans for 2026
59. To ensure verifiable reporting, the Department developed a standardised Portfolio of Evidence (PoE) Template for all deployees. The PoE template: Defines compulsory categories of evidence. Aligns Proof of documentation with the seven assessment areas listed above
60. This assessment cycle has the potential to strengthen accountability of ANC public representatives and work of the ANC in legislatures in the following ways: Establishes uniform tasks and discipline across Parliament and all nine Provincial Legislatures for ANC deployed cadres. Builds a culture of continuous monitoring rather than last-minute evaluation. Supports Chief Whips and caucuses with structured data for intervention. Reinforces the link between caucus work and Manifesto implementation. Connects deployees more directly with communities, branches and the motive forces.

ANC NEC/PEC/REC Assessment Framework

61. The 55th National Conference directed the movement to strengthen leadership accountability, tighten organisational discipline and reassert collective responsibility across all structures. Conference was firm that leaders must account for the work entrusted to them, remain rooted in branches and communities, and uphold the values and organisational culture of the ANC. To give effect to this mandate, the Department developed unified Leadership Accountability Framework to guide how NEC, PEC and REC members report, participate and carry out organisational responsibilities
62. The 2024 baseline assessment was the first step in activating this framework. The baseline provided a movement-wide starting point: a clear picture of how leadership collectives are functioning, where strengths are located, and where organisational gaps require attention. This establishes the foundation from which annual assessments will now follow, ensuring that accountability from leadership collectives become part of the organisation's regular rhythm of work for the remainder of the term.
63. The baseline was structured around the core pillars of the Leadership Accountability Framework and assessed leadership responsibility in nine key areas:
 - Leadership Profile and Deployment Responsibilities: Clarified each leader's deployment, branch anchoring, and subcommittee membership to ensure accountability flows from the correct organisational location.

- Participation in Organisational Structures: Assessed attendance, participation and contribution to NEC, PEC, REC and subcommittee meetings giving effect to Conference's concern about uneven engagement and weak discipline.
 - Branch Work, Mass Work and Community Interface: Measured leadership visibility through branch activities, sectoral engagements, political education, campaigns and mass work, reflecting Conference's call to rebuild the motive forces.
 - Implementation of the ANC Programme of Action: Evaluated leaders' roles in advancing the POA, supporting renewal tasks and driving organisational priorities within their areas of responsibility.
 - Elections and Mobilisation Work: Captured involvement in voter registration, community engagements, communication and mobilisation
 - Governance Responsibilities (for Deployees): Assessed alignment with the Manifesto, responsiveness to service delivery concerns, departmental performance, budget execution and oversight obligations.
 - Communication and Public Engagement: Measured how leaders use public platforms, communicate ANC policy, engage communities and respond to societal concerns.
 - Personal Development and Ideological Grounding: Recorded participation in political education, skills development and academic programmes as part of rebuilding cadre capacity.
 - Self-Reflection and Framework Improvement: Enabled leaders to reflect honestly on their performance and propose improvements for future assessment cycles.
64. Institutionalising Annual Assessments: With the baseline completed, the Framework now moves into an annual cycle in which NEC, PEC and REC members will account for their work each year. This ensures continuous, structured accountability across the term; clear tracking of individual and collective progress; stronger organisational discipline; improved alignment between deployment and performance; deeper integration between the Framework, the POA and leadership responsibilities. This cycle strengthens the movement's strategic centre and deepens renewal at all levels by ensuring leadership accountability is consistent, measurable and embedded in the organisation's day-to-day work.

ANC Councillor Assessment (2022-2025)

65. The Councillor Assessment forms part of the ANC's broader Accountability Framework, strengthen oversight of deployees and ensure disciplined, community-centred leadership at ward level. In line with this mandate, the PMER Department undertook a comprehensive Councillor Assessment covering the work of ANC Ward and PR Councillors for the 2021–2025 term. This assessment is the first structured organisational review of councillor performance in the term and serves as the ANC's foundational report on councillor activity, service-delivery responsiveness, organisational discipline and community interface.
66. The assessment is based on a detailed instrument developed by the organisation and administered to councillors across municipalities. The Ward Councillor Assessment examined the full scope of a councillor's responsibilities since taking office in November 2021. The assessment focused on the following key areas:
- Biographical and Deployment Profile: Captured the Basic details including term in office, leadership roles in council, municipality and district, qualifications, and employment background.

- Service Delivery Conditions and Ward-Level Performance: Condition of water, sanitation, electricity, roads, refuse removal, housing and community safety in the ward since 2021. Their own actions to address these issues. Ward-based projects included in the IDP, status of implementation, and reasons for delays.
 - Infrastructure Projects and Delivery Blockages: Councillors were required to list completed, in-progress, delayed, or abandoned infrastructure projects since 2021, and provide reasons for delays.
 - Community Participation, Engagement and Safety: The section covered Frequency of community meetings, Imbizos, dialogues. Existence and functionality of ward committees and meeting frequency. Collaboration with SAPS/CPF, crime trends, and community safety initiatives since 2021.
 - Relationship with the ANC Branch: Councillors rated the quality of engagement with the ANC Branch, including, Reporting to BEC and BGM. Branch support for programmes, interventions, and escalations.
 - Overall Governance, Oversight and Accountability: Attendance at council and committee meetings including Reading and preparation of documents, Reporting back to communities on budgets, IDPs, decisions., Ethics/governance training and actions against corruption.
 - Sectoral Engagement and Ward-Based Stakeholder Work: This section focused and assessed Frequency and quality of engagements with women's groups, faith-based organisations, business forums, sports and cultural groups, etc
 - Personal Performance and Attributes: This section assessed Cllr Knowledge of council rules, Oversight role. Service delivery responsiveness, Community visibility and communication Discipline (caucus & branch)
 - Vision, Challenges and Capacity Needs: This was an Open-ended reflection on Challenges faced, Support needed, Vision for the ward, Lessons and feedback to strengthen local ANC governance
 - ANC Prospects Towards LGE 2026: Their own assessment and based on their performance as ward Cllr the likelihood of the ward voting ANC in 2026, Whether their work has strengthened or weakened ANC support and overall suggestion on What must be done to improve ANC performance in the ward
67. The results of this assessment are currently being analysed and will be consolidated into a Draft Report to be presented to the NEC in early 2026 to support and guide organisational interventions ahead of the 2026 Local Government Elections.
 68. Ahead of this assessment, Chief Whips submitted reports on Caucus Functionality, giving the ANC deeper insight into caucus discipline, attendance, committee participation and overall cohesion inside municipalities. These reports strengthened the assessment process by providing a complementary institutional view of councillor performance.
 69. The next cycle of the assessment will focus on the Local Government Action Plan, which was adopted after the 2025 Councillor Roll Call. This ensures that the assessment becomes more targeted, with councillors accounting directly for the priority tasks set out in the Action Plan guided by the 6 Pillars of the Action Plan, and the activities thereof.

ANC Manifesto Development and Monitoring

70. The Committee and department played a coordinating role in the conceptualization and development of the 2024 ANC Manifesto. The 2024 ANC Manifesto was

developed through an extensive participatory process, reflecting on lessons from the 2019 Manifesto and 30 years of ANC governance experience.

71. Key Steps in the 2024 Manifesto Development Process included: a comprehensive of the 2019 Manifesto incorporating insights from NEC sub committees, Caucus, and internal and other research. Expanded the Manifesto Review process through public engagements across all provinces. Development of the Manifesto which culminated in the presentation of the 2024 Manifesto Framework to the ANC NEC and the establishment of a Manifesto Technical Drafting Team, comprising members from the ANC, its Alliance partners, and the Leagues. Consultations with NEC subcommittees, provincial structures, and sectoral groups such as the Institute for Economic Justice during the drafting of the Manifesto. Integrated findings from election research and focus groups. Drew on the 30-year review and challenges.
72. The manifesto drafting process culminated in the ANC 2024 Manifesto, which is anchored by six key priorities for 2024–2029:
 - Priority 1: Put South Africans to work through a Jobs Plan That Will Ensure More South Africans Work
 - Priority 2: Build our Industries to achieve inclusive growth
 - Priority 3: Tackle the High Cost of Living and Support incomes
 - Priority 4: Invest in our People and Meet basic needs
 - Priority 5: Defend Our Democracy and advance Freedom
 - Priority 6: Build a Better Africa and a Better World

ANC Manifesto Outcomes Monitoring Framework

73. A key addition to the 2024 ANC Manifesto was the introduction of a comprehensive ANC Manifesto Outcomes Monitoring Framework designed to ensure accountability and track the effective implementation of manifesto commitments. PMER developed this framework to strengthen oversight, improve transparency, and evaluate the actual impact of manifesto priorities, moving beyond mere outputs.
74. The PMER formed part of the drafting of the Statement of Intent for the 2024 Government of National Unity (GNU), ensuring that it is firmly rooted in the priorities of the ANC's 2024 Manifesto. This was critical in addressing the strategic setback of the 2024 election results while safeguarding the country's transformation agenda, which the ANC has championed over the last 31 years through the implementation of progressive policies. The Statement of Intent was crafted to align the deliverables of the GNU with the ANC's core commitments to transformation, equity, and nation-building.

ANC Local Government Action Plan (LGAP)

75. Working jointly with the Local Government Intervention Task Team, the PMER helped develop the Local Government Action Plan, adopted by the Special NEC in September 2025 ahead of the ANC Councillor Roll Call. The Action Plan responds to the persistent service delivery failures, weak community interface, and municipal instability highlighted at the 55th National Conference. It provides a single, organisation-wide programme to stabilise municipalities, improve basic services, strengthen community engagement and restore public trust. The Action Plan is anchored around six core pillars

76. Following adoption of the Action Plan, the PMER and the LGI developed the Local Government Action Plan Monitoring Framework to guide the tracking and implementation across provinces and municipalities. The Monitoring Framework includes: Specific indicators aligned to each Pillar and Action Area of the Action Plan. Defined responsibilities, showing exactly which structure or functionary is accountable for each activity. Reporting frequency for every activity under each Pillar, ensuring consistent monitoring across the system. Identified data sources used to verify the information submitted and confirm progress. A baseline as at 30 June 2025, giving the organisation a concrete starting point to measure improvement or lack thereof. Targets set for each activity under each Pillar, allowing performance to be assessed against clear expectations. Recorded achievements for Quarter 1 of implementation. Recorded achievements for Quarter 2 of implementation. the ANC Makgotla and all the ANC strategic Policy event

Work with other Subcommittees and other tasks

77. The PMER collaborated with other Committees and Departments on:
- ◆ 70th anniversary of the Freedom Charter: developed Concept note, working together with DCIP publication of the e-book on Reflections on 70 years of the Freedom Charter,
 - ◆ The National Dialogue ongoing work and Concept Document on the ANC Position to the National Dialogue
 - ◆ Participated in the National Strategy Workshop for Local Government 2026 for LGE2026, national strategy workshop
 - ◆ Preparations for NGC: monitoring report on implementation of 55th Conference resolutions, and drafting of the NGC Base document.
 - ◆ Engagement with Afrikaner groups on the BELA ACT, and with our representatives to the GNU Clearing house subcommittee on BELA.
 - ◆ Local Government Intervention Task Team and Legislature and Governance subcommittee on the submission of review of Local Government White Paper

Gender and Equity Committee

78. The Gender and Equity Sub-Committee is established in terms of Rule 12.2.6 of the ANC Constitution, which empowers the National Executive Committee (NEC) to establish permanent or ad hoc committees and to delegate powers and functions to them. The Sub-Committee's mandate is to:
- Contribute to the formulation and implementation of the ANC Programme of Action;
 - Undertake research and evidence-based policy development;
 - Monitor and evaluate the implementation of ANC policies and their impact;
 - Provide strategic guidance to employees and structures;
 - Coordinate across the Alliance and Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) formations;
- and
- Encourage a social compact between government, labour, business, and civil society on gender issues.
79. The Committee has undertaken several activities as part of its programme of action:
- a) Induction Workshop:** Held on 20 May 2023, the workshop outlined the mandate, structure, and programme priorities of the Sub-Committee. Presentations were made by the Department of Women, Youth and Persons with Disabilities, the Commission for Gender Equality (CGE), and Cde Bheki Cele on GBVF and safety.
- b) Women in Diplomacy Dialogue:** Hosted in collaboration with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) and the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), the Dialogue provided a platform for women diplomats, policymakers, and academics to reflect on women's participation in peacebuilding and international relations. The Dialogue underscored South Africa's commitment to a gender-inclusive foreign policy and the advancement of women's representation in multilateral forums.
- c) Webinar on the Gender Pay Gap:** Held under the theme *"The Gendered Pay Gap in South Africa: Policy Lessons from Women Workers' Experiences"*, and organised jointly with COSATU (NALEDI) with support from FES. The webinar unpacked structural inequalities in pay and labour practices, with participation from trade unions, academics, and government representatives.
- d) International Day for Rural Women:** Celebrated in Mothlakeng, North West, in partnership with Kgoshigadi Sedumedi and the Rural Women's Movement. The event recognised over 500 rural women leading community cooperatives and ECD initiatives, and included presentations from SETAs and the IEC on economic empowerment and voter participation.
- e) "30 Years of Women" Webinar:** Held on International Women's Day (11 March 2024) under the theme *"30 Years of Women's Struggle in Democracy"*. Cde Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma delivered the keynote address, joined by gender researchers and activists. The webinar reflected on democratic gains and the unfinished agenda for women's economic justice.
- f) Raising a Boy Child Programme – Flagship Initiative:** Launched by President Cyril Ramaphosa in KwaZulu-Natal on 25 November 2023, the programme addresses GBVF, suicide, and social ills affecting boys. It promotes positive masculinity, respect for women, and non-violence. Provincial rollouts began in Mpumalanga in November 2024 and continue across other provinces.
- Tourism and Heritage Expo:** Held in Mpumalanga in 2024, the Expo explored tourism and heritage as vehicles for women's empowerment. Gogo Esther Mahlangu was honoured for her legacy. The event featured women entrepreneurs, SANParks, SAHRA, and South African Women in Tourism.

g) August Women's Dialogue: Held at the Birchwood Hotel, Gauteng, and attended by diverse women leaders, activists, and academics. Speakers included Cdes Gwen Ramokgopa, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, Aaron Motsoaledi, Buti Manamela, Reginah Mhaule, Polly Boshielo, and Prof Puleng Lenkabula.

h) 16 Days of Activism for No Violence Against Women and Children: The Sub-Committee coordinated a national Programme of Action that included GBV workplace dialogues, men's discussions, and traditional court engagements. The campaign was implemented collaboratively, including in Mpumalanga.

i) Provincial Capacity Workshops – 2025: A series of virtual and physical workshops were held to strengthen provincial Gender and Equity Committees, promote gender mainstreaming, present the latest research on the Status of Women, and build capacity for programme implementation and reporting.

j) The Role of Traditional Leadership in the Fight Against GBVF: This critical dialogue, hosted in Polokwane in August 2025, engaged traditional leaders, women's movements, youth formations, and the criminal justice sector to address the intersection of culture and GBVF. Supported by CONTRALESA, the dialogue formed part of the broader *Raising a Boy Child Programme*, focusing on prevention, accountability, and restorative cultural practices. The dialogue reaffirmed the role of traditional leaders as partners in combating GBVF and promoting community-based gender justice initiatives.

Partnerships and Collaborations

80. The Sub-Committee has cultivated and deepened strategic partnerships that strengthen its research, advocacy, and programme delivery. The strategic partnership with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) has been instrumental in advancing the Sub-Committee's mandate on evidence-based policy and gender justice. FES has supported multiple initiatives, including:
 - Research collaboration on women's participation in international relations;
 - Co-hosting the Women in Diplomacy Dialogue to promote gender-responsive foreign policy;
 - Technical and conceptual support for the Gender Pay Gap Webinar; and
 - Thought-leadership contributions to policy dialogues and feminist economic debates.
81. Through this partnership, the Sub-Committee has strengthened its intellectual base, widened access to research networks, and aligned domestic gender advocacy with global feminist frameworks.
 - Other key collaborations include:
 - **DCIP:** Media mobilisation, branding, and digital communications support;
 - **Sectoral Outreach Sub-Committee:** Collaboration on electoral mobilisation and community engagements;
 - **Civil Society and Academia:** Partnerships with CONTRALESA, IEJ, SAWID, IGD, the Rural Women's Movement, Women in Business and Tourism networks, Disability and Men's Organisations, and universities.
82. Together with PMER, the Committee is collaborating with EISA on a **Gender Audit Project for 2025/2026**. These relationships have collectively enhanced programme visibility, policy coherence, and the inclusivity of the ANC's gender agenda.
83. Challenges remain, including limited participation from other work streams at Headquarters, insufficient administrative and financial support for sustained programming, and the need for deeper integration of gender perspectives across all ANC Sub-Committees.

84. Between May 2023 and October 2025, the Sub-Committee revitalised the ANC's gender justice agenda, building bridges between the movement, civil society, and international partners. Its collaboration with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) emerged as a cornerstone partnership, enriching the Sub-Committee's research base, strategic reach, and impact. Through programmes such as *Women in Diplomacy*, *Raising a Boy Child*, and *30 Years of Women*, the Sub-Committee continues to position gender equity at the heart of democratic transformation.

Recommendations:

- (1) Mainstream gender and equity imperatives across all ANC programmes.
- (2) Strengthen administrative and logistical support through the Office of the Secretary-General.
- (3) Enhance provincial accountability through structured monitoring and reporting.
- (4) Sustain flagship initiatives such as *Raising a Boy Child*.

ANC Sectoral work

85. The character of the ANC as a national liberation movement is reflected through its relationship with broader mass organisations, rather than merely as a party in government. Sectoral work is recognised as one of the most powerful instruments for restoring the ANC's legitimacy as a leader of society. Through visible engagement in communities—during hardship, celebration, loss, and struggle—the ANC is demonstrated not merely as an election machine, but as a caring, people-centred revolutionary movement. It must be emphasised that communities have not lost faith in the ANC's values, but increasingly lose confidence when the movement becomes distant, unresponsive, or absent.
86. Strengthening sectoral work is a crucial pillar of renewal. It seeks to reconnect the ANC with the motive forces in their organised formations and thereby bridge the gap between the movement and the people it serves. It enhances the organisation's ability to make informed policy decisions, improve service delivery, and advance the strategic objectives of the ANC. By focusing on different sectors of society, the ANC is better positioned to formulate responsive policies, conduct effective oversight over government programmes, and promote governance rooted in the lived realities of communities.
87. In the current era of organisational renewal, sectoral work is regarded as far more than a programme area; it is the heartbeat of reconnection with society. Renewal requires accountability, visibility, inclusivity, adaptability, evidence-based decision-making, and innovation. Sectoral work is the mechanism through which these renewal pillars become real in the daily lives of the people. It ensures that the ANC remains rooted where it matters most: in the lived experiences, struggles, and aspirations of South Africans..
88. Sectoral work deepens the relationship between ANC structures at branch, regional, and provincial levels and the communities they serve. It equips the movement with direct insight into the pressing needs of the people and enables the development of targeted, community-driven solutions. This approach ensures that policies are grounded in the everyday experiences of South Africans and aligned with the broader vision and values of the ANC.
89. Strong emphasis is increasingly being placed on ensuring that sectoral work becomes fully embedded at the level of every ANC branch. This integration is essential to guarantee that grassroots organisations, local constituencies, and diverse social sectors are woven directly into the ANC's organisational machinery. When sectoral participation is centred at branch level, community stakeholders become the driving force behind localised interventions that address the day-to-day needs of the people. This approach ensures that the ANC's renewal agenda is not conceptualised at a distance but is lived and experienced within communities.
90. To achieve this, the ANC is required to evolve its strategies and tactics in reaching out to ordinary South Africans—adopting more agile, responsive, data-driven, and community-grounded methods that reflect changing social dynamics and lived experiences.
91. Through sectoral outreach, engagement, and coordination, the ANC's contributions to legislation, governance, and oversight are strengthened by ensuring that party priorities are effectively translated into government action. This includes tackling persistent challenges such as poverty, unemployment, inequality, gender-based violence and femicide, and inadequate access to quality education and healthcare. It also provides an opportunity to advance economic transformation, social development, and inclusive growth.

92. Sectoral work also plays a key role in building and maintaining strategic relationships with stakeholders such as labour unions, diverse groups and societies, students and youth, women, civil society organisations, business leaders, traditional leaders, religious communities, people living with disabilities, LGBTI communities, and others.
93. Sectoral engagements serve as platforms for continuous dialogue and co-creation with diverse communities. As illustrated through the engagement with the Nama Royal House, these platforms allow historically marginalised groups to express grievances, articulate aspirations, and receive concrete responses from the movement.
94. To institutionalise and intensify this work, ANC structures at all levels must focus on interventions that promote long-term relationships with all sectors, deepen organisational memory, and advance the ANC's strategic goals and conference resolutions. This requires a strong grasp of each sector's challenges and opportunities, proactive stakeholder outreach, and a firm commitment to community-based solutions. When properly coordinated, sectoral work becomes the connective tissue between the ANC's renewal agenda, community aspirations, and the movement's long-term survival.

ANC sectoral activity dashboard

95. As part of modernising and strengthening this work, a centralised online sectoral dashboard has been developed by the ANC to track sectoral work across provinces, regions, branches, and constituency offices.
96. Through this dashboard: Real-time branch-level activity will be captured; Sector desks will be able to upload engagements, resolutions, and follow-ups; Leadership will be provided with visibility over grassroots engagements; and Alignment with organisational renewal and accountability mechanisms will be strengthened.
97. A critical purpose of the dashboard is to ensure that sectoral activities are tracked at the most local level—the branch—where the daily realities of communities are encountered. Through consistent branch-level reporting, the dashboard will integrate community organisations, grassroots constituencies, and diverse social sectors directly into the ANC's operational machinery. This function strengthens sectoral work as the engine of localised interventions, enabling branches to respond to community issues with greater accuracy and accountability.
98. The dashboard was formally presented during the national sectoral workshop, where Heads of Sectors from provinces and regions were in attendance. Their input was received on the design, functionality, and operational use of the dashboard. This engagement formed a core part of the roadmap towards the official launch of the tool, ensuring alignment with the practical requirements of ANC structures responsible for sectoral coordination.
99. The dashboard is currently undergoing testing, refinement, and improvement to ensure full integration into the ANC's broader enterprise architecture. Once finalised, it will represent a major step towards data-driven, transparent, and modernised sectoral coordination—enabling deeper insight into grassroots realities and enhancing the organisation's ability to evolve its strategies and tactics for community engagement. In addition, the dashboard is expected to play a central role in institutionalising evidence-based planning as part of the ANC's election strategies, ensuring that campaign interventions, mobilisation efforts, and sectoral priorities are informed by accurate data, localised reporting, and measurable community needs.

100. Furthermore, the dashboard will assist in building a comprehensive contact database of all sectors across communities. This database will serve as a vital repository of information, capturing the ANC's stakeholders in every locality. By maintaining an accurate and up-to-date directory of community partners, sectoral leaders, organisations, and constituencies, the dashboard will enhance the organisation's ability to implement targeted interventions that respond to specific community needs with greater precision.
101. In addition to its reporting functions, the dashboard will embed a structured monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mechanism within sectoral work. Periodic reports will be generated at branch, regional, and provincial levels, allowing trends, challenges, and progress to be analysed over time. Matters falling within the purview of ANC deployees in government will be formally referred for action, follow-up, and oversight. This referral process will strengthen accountability across the political-administrative interface, ensuring that community issues are escalated, addressed, and monitored to finality.
102. Sectoral interventions are intended to be strategic, coordinated, and focused on restoring community trust, improving service delivery, and regaining lost ground. ANC branches are encouraged through sectoral work to participate in ward committees, particularly where councillors are not from the organisation. Sector programmes must be prioritised as part of mobilisation, campaigning, and rebuilding strategies.

Sectoral Engagements

103. Sectoral engagements and outreach efforts were pivotal to ensuring the success of the historic and unifying January 8 rally in Khayelitsha, Cape Town. The goal was to mobilise and engage sectoral communities, align sectors and stakeholders, and create a cohesive programme that embodies the values, aspirations, and objectives of the ANC. Shared achievements were celebrated, challenges were reflected upon, and sectors and communities were galvanised to drive forward the ANC's vision for a united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic, and prosperous South Africa.
104. Engagement occurred with specific sectors of society — youth, women, organised workers, farmworkers, fisheries, stokvels, funeral parlour owners, informal settlement dwellers, traditional leaders, the boy child, disability sectors, LGBTQ communities, and low-income households — to mobilise support for the ANC, respond to concerns, and promote the movement's work in the province. Relationships and trust with these sectors were prioritised. This approach reflects the principle that people are already organised; the ANC's role is to meet them where they are, understand their issues, and align their struggles with the movement's renewal agenda.
105. Efforts to build strong relationships and trust with different communities and sectors in the Western Cape were continued. With the appointment of the PTT, it is submitted that outstanding follow-up engagements be undertaken to fulfil commitments made to the people of the Western Cape. A detailed post-January 8 report is available.
106. Throughout the year, meetings were held with various sectors — progressive pastors, disability organisations, students, taxi drivers, LGBTIQ+ communities, business sectors, inter-faith leaders, lawyers, traditional leaders, and national groups.
107. ANC National Officials have been conducting sector work aligned to grassroots realities, mobilising diverse constituencies in their day-to-day responsibilities.

108. The engagement with the Nama Royal House was particularly significant. It highlighted the urgency of recognising Indigenous leadership, addressing unresolved historical grievances, and ensuring that the ANC demonstrates sensitivity to communities whose marginalisation is deeply rooted. An urgent engagement between ANC Officials and the Khoi and San leadership has been recommended.
109. Several sectors have critical issues requiring prioritisation in the 2026 POA, including people living with HIV, taxi drivers, progressive professionals, traditional healers, students, and the religious sector.

Other work by Task team

110. National Dialogue: Preparations were undertaken for the launch of the National Dialogue, setting the sectoral tone for upcoming provincial conventions. Civil society engagements are already underway in several provinces.
111. LGE2025: Work has begun on developing a sectoral strategy for the upcoming Local Government Elections. A concept note outlining the approach has been drafted.
112. National Workshop: A successful two-day national workshop was convened, bringing together all provincial and regional sector heads. Each region and province has appointed heads of sectoral work as part of their organisational structures. The workshop report and recommendations are available.
113. Programme of action adoption: A sectoral POA was adopted, outlining activities and programmes planned until December. Some programmes were not implemented due to resource constraints. Efforts will be made to implement them when the 2026 programme is adopted.
114. Joint Programme on Teenage Pregnancy and Substance Abuse: A joint programme with the Social Transformation Subcommittee has been initiated, focusing on teenage pregnancy, alcohol abuse, bullying, substance abuse, child rape, and related issues. The planned national campaign is particularly urgent as these challenges escalate during the festive season.
115. Regular monthly meetings have consolidated reports and activities from provincial structures. Provinces have demonstrated innovation and commitment despite limited resources.
 - **Eastern Cape:** Choir competitions
 - **KZN:** Road safety prayers and matric support
 - **North West:** Widely coordinated outreach
 - **Northern Cape:** Disability and National Groups coordination
 - **Limpopo:** Moral regeneration dialogues
 - **Free State:** Youth, business, and roundtable engagements
 - **Gauteng:** Taxi industry engagements
 - **Western Cape:** LGBTI outreach
 - **Mpumalanga:** Underpaid workers engagement
116. These engagements show that sectoral work continues to evolve and innovate, even with minimal financial support — demonstrating the commitment and resilience of ANC cadres.
117. Sectoral work, while central to the ANC's organisational renewal and community engagement mandate, continues to face several challenges that affect its

effectiveness, consistency, and long-term impact. These challenges require structured, coordinated, and sustainable solutions to ensure that sectoral work becomes fully institutionalised across all levels of the organisation.

- a) Sectoral work is implemented unevenly across branches, regions, and provinces. Some structures demonstrate strong programmes and community engagement, while others lack functional sector desks or fail to sustain sectoral activities throughout the year. Proposed solution: A uniform implementation framework should be introduced, outlining minimum standards for sectoral activity at branch, regional, and provincial levels. This framework should be supported by periodic reporting through the digital dashboard and strengthened by targeted capacity-building initiatives for structures that require support.
- b) Information from sectoral engagements is not consistently channelled into government processes, resulting in slow or fragmented responses to community needs. Proposed Solution: A formalised referral pathway should be established through the dashboard's monitoring and evaluation mechanism. Issues raised during sectoral engagements should be automatically flagged for relevant deployees, tracked to finality, and reported back through periodic dashboard-generated reports.
- c) Most sectoral work is conducted with minimal financial and logistical resources, placing strain on structures and limiting outreach activities, especially in remote and under-resourced communities. Proposed Solution: A sustainable resource mobilisation strategy should be developed, drawing on contributions from members, partnerships with local businesses, and coordination with civic organisations. Cost-effective methods — such as use of community halls, volunteer mobilisation, and integration with existing community events — should continue to be encouraged.
- d) Many branches engage communities only during campaigns or isolated events, rather than institutionalising continuous engagement with community organisations, faith networks, youth formations, professional sectors, and local civic structures. Proposed Solution: Each branch should maintain an active stakeholder directory through the dashboard, ensuring that local organisations and constituencies are permanently integrated into branch planning, mobilisation calendars, political education programmes, and monitoring activities.
- e) Sectoral programmes are often designed without sufficient use of data, localised reporting, or impact analysis, resulting in interventions that do not always align with the lived experiences of communities. Proposed Solution: The digital dashboard should be utilised to institutionalise evidence-based planning, providing branches and higher structures with real-time data on sectoral participation, community concerns, stakeholder activity, and geographical trends. This data should inform election strategies, mobilisation programmes, and targeted community interventions.
- f) Sectoral activities are not consistently communicated to communities, resulting in limited awareness of ANC interventions and missed opportunities to demonstrate the caring, proactive character of the movement. Proposed Solution: Communication strategies should be aligned with sectoral programmes, using both traditional platforms (community radio, local newspapers, public gatherings) and digital tools (social media, WhatsApp groups, youth platforms). Credible community leaders and sector representatives should be engaged as local messengers to enhance trust and visibility.
- g) Follow-up on community issues remains inconsistent, with limited mechanisms to verify whether commitments made during engagements have been fulfilled. Proposed Solution: The dashboard's monitoring and evaluation module should be used to track commitments, interventions, and referrals. Standardised M&E

- templates should be introduced to ensure that progress is reviewed monthly at branch level and quarterly at regional and provincial levels.
- h) Convenors and sector heads operate without sufficient training in community engagement, conflict resolution, data interpretation, or cross-sector coordination. Proposed Solution: A structured training programme should be established for all sector convenors, covering political education, sector-specific knowledge, research skills, digital dashboard usage, and community facilitation. Training should be institutionalised as an annual programme led by national and provincial sectoral structures.
 - i) Engagement with stakeholders such as traditional leaders, youth formations, LGBTI organisations, disability structures, and community forums is sometimes episodic rather than long-term and strategic. Proposed Solution: Stakeholder engagement should be formalised through long-term partnership frameworks. Memoranda of collaboration, joint community programmes, and structured feedback processes should be adopted to ensure continuous engagement and shared accountability
 - j) Information gathered during sectoral activities is not consistently integrated into election strategies, leading to campaigns that may not fully reflect local community issues. Proposed Solution: The dashboard's evidence-based planning function should be used to align sectoral insights with campaign messaging, mobilisation routes, door-to-door targeting, and voter engagement strategies. Sectoral feedback should be incorporated into manifestos, local campaign plans, and community outreach programmes.
118. The ANC's sectoral programmes have reaffirmed the organisation's commitment to its founding principles and the betterment of South Africa. Through effective sectoral coordination, mobilisation has been strengthened, inspiration has been generated, and unity has been fostered among communities in preparation for a transformative year ahead. The issue of resource mobilisation for sectors is critically important. Sectoral coordination, if properly resourced, has the capacity to assist the ANC in regaining lost ground and reaffirming its leadership role in society.

Disability Desk

119. The ANC Disability Desk was formed by ANC members in the sector , who came together indicating the need for an organised presence in the movement, not just at national levels but also in provinces and lower levels. It is not a formal structure, like for example the Young Women's Desk or the LGBTQI Desk, who are recognised and are involved in ANC activities. This lack of recognition creates challenges for ANC members in the sector, since they are not often invited to participate in ANC activities, and therefore venues and activities do not cater to the need of various disabilities.
120. It is therefore recommended that
- a) The ANC affirms the principle that persons with disabilities must represent themselves in all structures of the organisation.
 - b) The ANC Disability Desk, its coordinators, committees, and instructors must be empowered to participate fully and directly at branch, regional, provincial, and national level structures.
 - c) All ANC structures—including Branches, Zones/Subregions, Regions, Provinces, the Leagues, and Alliance partners—must provide full political and operational support to the Disability Desk. This includes administrative support, accessibility accommodation, financial allocation, organisational integration, and recognition.

- d) The NGC must publicly endorse, pronounce, and formalise the ANC Disability Desk as a constitutional and permanent structure of the organisation. This pronouncement must compel all structures to implement and respect the Desk at every level.
- e) A minimum 7% representation quota for persons with disabilities must be adopted across all ANC structures and deployment lists. This should apply to: BECs, RECs, PECs, National structures, Leagues, Legislative and governance and to Candidate lists. Enforcement must be monitored and reported annually.
- f) The Disability Desk should work with political education on a programme to educate society about ANC policies and attitude about disability rights and strengthen advocacy for social, economic, and political inclusion.
- g) The ANC must ensure universal accessibility in all its programmes, events, and consultation with structures of the Disability Desk at various levels.

ANC Awards

- 121. Awards in an institution are a means to recognise excellence, and to set the standard for the institution. The ANC's first recorded award was Isithalandwe/Seaparankoe, at the Congress of the People in 1955, to Nkosi Albert Luthuli, Yussuf Dadoo and Bishop Trevor Huddleston. In 2000, following the 1st National General Council, the ANC Annual Achievement Awards were introduced, for the best performing ANC branch, Women's League branch, Youth League branch and group of ANC local councillors.
- 122. The 53rd National Conference of the ANC in 2012, Manguang also resolved to introduce a Veterans Long-Service Award. This Award has never been bestowed, and the Awards Committee in this report makes recommendations in this regard. The mandate of the National Awards Committee of the NEC is therefore to coordinate the work around the ANC Awards, make recommendations to the NEC, including on new categories of Awards.

Isithwalandwe-Seaparankoe

- 123. Isithwalandwe-Seaparankoe is the highest honour awarded by the ANC to those who have made an outstanding contribution and sacrifice to the liberation struggle. Isithwalandwe, literally translated, means "the one who wears the plumes of the rare bird" and was traditionally bestowed only on the bravest warriors of the people, on those who distinguished themselves in the eyes of all the people for exceptional qualities of leadership and heroism.
- 124. At the time when the current Awards Committee was appointed after 55th National Conference in 2022, the ANC had bestowed this highest honour on twenty-nine (29) outstanding individuals, eight of whom are women (see below).
- 125. The Committee following its appointment in 2023, discussed the approached to Isithwalandwe-Seaparankoe and made recommendations to the NEC. The NEC adopted the recommendations of the Committee and on the occasion of the 113th Anniversary of the ANC, three outstanding cadres were awarded in January 2025, in Khayelitsha, Cape Town: Dr Tlou Theophilus Cholo, Cde Mandu Mildred Ramakaba-Lesiea and Cde Nkosinathi Benson Fihla. Since Dr Cholo was unable to attend the Anniversary event due to ill-health, President Ramaphosa presented Isithwalandwe-Seaparankoe to him officially on the occasion of Dr TT Cholo's turning 100 years, in

October 2025. On 22 May 2025, Isithwalandwe-Seaparankwe Mam Gertrude Ntiti Shope joined the ancestors, at the age of 99 years. Below is the full list of Isithwalandwe-Seaparankoe bestowed 1955-2025:

ISITHWALANDWE/ SEAPARANKOE	YEAR	ISITHWALANDWE/ SEAPARANKOE	YEAR
Nkosi Albert Luthuli	1955	Wilton Mkwai	1992
Father Trevor Huddleston	1955	Joe Slovo	1994
Yusuf Dadoo	1955	Ray Alexander Simons	2004
Moses Mauane Kotane	1975	Thembisile Chris Hani	2008
Govan Mbeki	1980	Ruth Segomotsi Mompati	2014
Bishop Ambrose Reeves	1980	Gertrude Ntiti Shope	2014
Lilian Ngoyi	1982	Denis Goldberg	2019
Oliver Reginald Tambo	1992	Sophie De Bruyn	2019
Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela	1992	John Nkadimeng	2019
Walter Sisulu	1992	Winnie Madikizela-Mandela	2019
Helen Joseph	1992	Ahmed Timol	2019
Ahmed Kathrada	1992	Albertina Sisulu	2019
Harry Gwala	1992	Charlotte Maxeke	2019
Elias Motsoaledi	1992	Mandu Mildred Ramakaba-Lesiea	2025
Andrew Mlangeni	1992	Nkosinathi Benson Fihla	2025
Raymond Mhlaba	1992	Dr Tlou Theophilus Cholo	2025

126. Isithwalandwe-Seaparankoe is not awarded annually, but at intervals, when it recognises a particular cohort of veterans and the contributions of their generation, including cadres from previous generations.

ANC Achievement Awards

127. The ANC Achievement awards were initiated in 2000 - and affirmed by subsequent Conferences - to promote a greater focus on the organisational task of building branches, strengthening local government and work of the Leagues. The awards aim to highlight the features of strong branches and councils and to reward best practice within the movement. The awards are named for outstanding cadres of the ANC, whose individual qualities of commitment and selflessness are an example to every ANC member. During their lives, each of these people made an immeasurable contribution to the struggle for freedom and a better life.

128. The following awards are the current ANC Achievement Awards:

- a) Sol Plaatje Award for the best performing ANC branch
- b) Charlotte Maxeke Award for the best ANC Women`s League branch
- c) Anton Lembede Award for the best ANC Youth League branch
- d) ZK Matthews Award for the best performing group of ANC councillors

129. The Committee started its work in 2023, noting that there was a hiatus in the Achievement Awards, reflective of the state of the movement during the intervening periods. The committee therefore made recommendations for the Awards to be revived, and in January 2024, on the occasion of the 112th Anniversary of the ANC in Mbombela, Mpumalanga, these Annual awards resumed.

130. The Awards Committee linked the awards to organisational building and renewal, as well as strengthening local government. On an annual basis, the Committee reviewed the Rewards criteria and process, and made recommendations on how to strengthen the awards. In the ANC branch awards of the last 2 years, the criteria focused on activist ANC branches with programmes and campaigns, and roots in the community. It is notable that these branches consistently performs well in elections

131. Call for Nominations for the 2025 Achievement Awards, to be bestowed at the 114th Anniversary celebration in North West in January 2026 have gone out, and nominations are being received and processed by the Committee. The Awards Criteria and Winners 2000-2024 are attached below:

Table ANC AWARDS, 2000-2024

YEAR	ANC AWARD WINNERS AND RUNNER-UPS
Sol Plaatje Award – For Best Performing ANC Branch	
2024	Winner: Ward 29 branch, Collins Chabane, Vhembe region, Limpopo 2nd place: Ward 08 Dr JS Moroka, Nkangala Region, Mpumalanga
2023	Joint Winners: Ward 29 branch, Collins Chabane region, Limpopo Ward 66 Ekurhuleni, Gauteng 2nd Place: Ward 12, Umjindi, Mbombela, Ehlazeni region, Mpumalanga
2009	Winner: Havana City Branch, Diepsloot, Johannesburg Region, Gauteng.
2008	Winner: Morogoro Branch in Limpopo. 2nd Place: Busa Branch in Mpumalanga.
2007	Winner: Magonare Branch, Ngaka Modiri Molema region, North West. 2nd Place: Montshiwa Branch, Central region in North West
2006	Winner: Bram Fischer Branch, Johannesburg Region, Gauteng. Second Place: Rosedale Branch, Siyanda Region, Northern Cape
2005	Winner: Moretele Ward 7 Branch, Bojanala Region, North West. 2nd Place: Johannes Maseng Branch, Siyanda Region, Northern Cape.
2004	Winner: Moretele Ward 7 Branch, Bojanala, North West 2nd Place: Johannes Maseng Branch, Siyanda, Northern Cape
2003	Winner: Ivory Park North Branch, Johannesburg, Gauteng 2nd Place: Mzukisi Skweyiya Branch, Amathole, Eastern Cape
2002	Winner: Ben Tshipi Branch, Siyanda, Northern Cape
2001	Winner: Mthetho Ntlanganiso Branch, Cape Town, Western Cape 2nd Place: Ivory Park North Branch, Johannesburg, Gauteng
2000	Winner: Galeshewe Branch 2, Northern Cape 2nd Place: Jane Furse Branch, Limpopo

YEAR	WINNERS AND RUNNER-UPS
Charlotte Maxeke Award – For Best Performing ANCWL Branch	
2024	Winner: Reatlegile ANCWL Branch, Ward 18 Greater Taung, Dr Ruth Mompa Region, North West 2 nd Place: Milo Malatjie ANCWL Branch, Ward 13 Polokwane, Peter Mokaba, Limpopo
2009	Winner: ANCWL Ehlanzeni Region Ward 17, Nelspruit, Mpumalanga.
2008	Winner: ANCWL Sihlangu Makhubela Branch in Limpopo
2007	Winner: ANCWL MB20 Branch, Ehlanzeni region in Mpumalanga. 2 nd Place: ANCWL Chris Hani Branch, Bohlabela Region in Mpumalanga
2006	Winner: ANCWL Ward 56 Branch, Ethekwini, KwaZulu Natal 2 nd Place: ANCWL Ward 20 Branch, Ehlanzeni, Mpumalanga
2005	Winner: ANCWL Tirisano Branch, Bojanala Region, North- West Province. 2 nd Place: ANCWL Thembeke None Branch, City of Cape Town Region, Western Cape.
2004	Winner: ANCWL Tirisano Branch, Bojanala, North West 2 nd Place: ANCWL Thembeke None Branch, Cape Town, Western Cape
2003	Winner: ANCWL Kabokweni Ward 21 Branch, Ehlanzeni, Mpumalanga 2 nd Place: ANCWL Samora Machel Branch, Cape Town, Western Cape
2002	Winner: ANCWL Albert Luthuli Branch, Johannesburg, Gauteng
2001	Winner: ANCWL Mlambo Ohlaza Branch, Namaqua, Northern Cape 2 nd Place: ANCWL Moses Kotane Branch, Cape Town Metro, Western Cape
2000	Winner: ANCWL Katlehong Branch, Gauteng

YEAR	WINNERS AND RUNNER-UPS
Anton Lembede Award – For Best Performing ANCYL Branch	
2024	Winner: Zandile Sibeko ANCYL branch, Ward 76 Selopo Thema, Ekurhuleni, Gauteng 2 nd Place: Lebogang Lichoane ANCYL branch, Ward 39, Thaba Nchu, Mangaung, Free State
2009	Winner: ANCYL Ward 27 Mabhinki Branch, Lower South Coast Region, Kwa-Zulu Natal
2008	Winner: ANCYL Boboyi Branch in KwaZulu Natal. 2 nd Place: ANCYL Margate Branch in KwaZulu Natal.
2007	Winner: ANCYL Ike Mapoto Branch, Capricorn Region in Limpopo 2 nd Place: ANCYL Ward 22 in Bushbuckridge, Bohlabela Region in Mpumalanga
2006	Winner: ANCYL Percival Jas Branch, Francis Baard, Northern Cape 2 nd Place: ANCYL Ike Maphoto Bendo Branch, Capricorn, Limpopo
2005	Winner: ANCYL Hector Petersen Branch, Lejweleputswa, Free State 2 nd Place: Matjwane Seroto Branch, Fezile Dabi Region, Free State
2004	Winner: ANCYL Hector Petersen Branch, Lejweleputswa, Free State 2 nd Place: Matjwane Seroto Branch, Fezile Dabi Region, Free State
2003	Winner: ANCYL Thabo Mbeki Branch, Lejweleputswa, Free State 2 nd Place: Thomas Sindane Branch, Ekangala, Mpumalanga
2002	Winner: ANCYL Ivory Park Branch, Johannesburg, Gauteng
2001	Winner: ANCYL Matsulu Branch, Ehlanzeni, Mpumalanga 2 nd Place: ANCYL Ivory Park North Branch, Johannesburg, Gauteng
2000	Winner: ANCYL Kwa-Mandlenkosi Branch, Beaufort West, Western Cape

YEAR	WINNERS AND RUNNER-UPS
ZK Matthews Award – For Best Performing ANC Council	
2024	Winner: Polokwane Local Municipality, Limpopo Joint 2 nd Place: Ehlanzeni District Municipality, Mpumalanga and Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, Gauteng
2009	Winner: City of Johannesburg, Gauteng.

YEAR	WINNERS AND RUNNER-UPS
2008	Winner: Bophirima District Municipality in North West. 2nd Place: Musina Local Municipality in Limpopo
2007	Winner: Bophirima District Municipality in North West. 2nd Place: Steve Tshwete Municipality in Mpumalanga.
2006	Winner: Ethekewini Metro Councillors, KwaZulu Natal 2nd Place: Nelson Mandela Metro Councillors, Eastern Cape
2005	Winner: Ekangala District Municipality, Hlanzeni Region, Mpumalanga 2nd Place: Matsopa Municipality, Motheo Region, Free State Province.
2004	Winner: Ekangala District Municipality, Hlanzeni Region, Mpumalanga 2nd Place: Matsopa Municipality, Motheo Region, Free State Province.
2003	Winner: Buffalo City Councillors, Eastern Cape 2nd Place: Ekurhuleni Metro Councillors, Gauteng
2002	Winner: Rustenburg Councillors, North West
2001	Winner: Letsimeng Councillors, Free State. 2nd Place: Richmond Councillors, KwaZulu Natal
2000	Winner: Durban Metropolitan Councillors Joint 2nd Place: Zastron District Councillors, North West and Ngwaritsi-Makhuduthamaga Councillors, Limpopo

Recommendations on New Awards

132. The Awards Committee recommended to the NEC in December 2024 that it considers additional categories of Awards. The NEC agreed and tasked the Committee to develop a concept note on these new Awards, for recommendation. The Awards Committee developed the Concept paper as below:
133. In the review of the Awards by the NEC Committee in 2024, it recommended the following additional Awards, for consideration by the NEC:
- Albertina Sisulu-Frene Ginwala Award for the best performing ANC Legislature Caucus (national and provincial)
 - Walter Sisulu Long service Award for outstanding service to the ANC and people;
 - Phinda Ndwandwe Award for young departed patriots who made an immeasurable contribution to the country; and
 - Ruth Segomotsi Mompati Award for the Best performing ANC region.
134. The Awards Committee developed a Concept note with motivations and detailed criteria for each of the above recommended new awards. It is recommended that the NGC approves these new awards, for inaugurated in 2026.

International Relations

135. After the 55th National Conference, the NEC took a decision to elevate the coordination of international relations to one of the full-time National Officials, First Deputy Secretary General, who chairs the International Relations Subcommittee. The International Relations Subcommittee drives the implementation of the ANC's policy on International Relations and International Solidarity campaigns.
136. In a period characterised by rising geopolitical tensions and global uncertainty and volatility, the IR Subcommittee has been very busy since the 55th National Conference. It developed a paper "The world we live in today and the ANC's international relations" which was presented to the NEC and approved as a framework to guide our movement in navigating the current shifting global balance of forces. This paper was used by the Department of Political Education to train ANC members as part of Module 4 of the Foundation Course. This report summarises the work done by the Subcommittee and make recommendations to the NGC on IR matters.
137. The world we live in today and the manner in which the ANC should engage with the rapidly shifting global environment should be informed by and be grounded in its historical experience and founding principles. Every day we witness new developments that reshape international power relations, challenge existing structures and demand that we, as a movement, continuously analyze it. The course of our history - from our very formation - has taught us that political transformations on the global stage inevitably influence our domestic realities. This part of the Report aims to analyze briefly the global forces that impact our lives and to articulate how best to align our international relations perspective, taking into consideration our values, principles, responsibilities and our aspirations for a Better Africa and a Better World.
138. In pursuing our international relations objectives, the ANC is informed by amongst others, the Freedom Charter wherein we stated that: "there shall be peace and friendship... a world in which there is respect for the right to national sovereignty of all nations and the pursuit of world peace and friendship and not wars." These principles are founded on, amongst others, the African Claims as adopted in 1943 and subsequent National Conference resolutions and policies that have reinforced our role on the international stage.
139. As the ANC, we must always ensure South Africa's national interests are at the heart of our work. Yet these national interests are fundamentally based on a better Africa and a better world; a world free from colonialism, apartheid and imperialism. Therefore, the ANC remains committed to the founding values of our struggle which includes, amongst others, a united non-racial, non-sexist, national democratic and prosperous

The Centrality of International Relations to the work of the ANC

140. It is imperative that ANC members across all branches, our Alliance partners and the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) appreciate the centrality of international relations in advancing the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) and advancing the long-held idea of a better Africa in a better world. Indeed,

international relations will continue to play a central role in enabling South Africa's development, affecting all policy areas of the ANC.

141. The ANC holds firm in its progressive internationalism, as anchored in the pursuit of global solidarity, social justice, common development and human security among others. It notes that progressive internationalism envisages a non-racial, non-sexist, united, democratic and prosperous country. It also requires bold and militant advocacy of fundamental transformation of the global balance of forces, a radical restructuring of global governance and a progressive global movement.

ANC Framework for International Relations

142. The ANC's international relations is shaped by established principles which have evolved since its formation in 1912. These include:
 - Pan-Africanism: a philosophy that emphasizes the unity, dignity and shared destiny of African peoples, both on the continent and in the diaspora.
 - Anti-imperialism: a steadfast commitment to resist all forms of neo-colonialism, unilateralism and domination by external powers.
 - Human Rights and International Law: universally recognized moral principles or norms that establish standards of human behavior and are often protected by both national and international laws which in themselves are a set of rules, norms, legal customs and standards that states and other actors feel an obligation to observe in their relations.
 - International Solidarity: standing in solidarity with oppressed peoples worldwide, championing social justice and working towards a world order rooted in equality.
 - Peaceful resolution of conflicts & multilateralism: that war is not the only resolution to conflict but that negotiations and engagement may lead to the resolving of tensions and disagreements, herein lies the role and opportunity for the community of states to lead rather than individual states pursuing their own agenda.
 - Non-Alignment: international policy of the promotion of decolonization, disarmament, opposition to racism and opposition to apartheid-colonialism as well as espousing the 1955 Bandung Conference Principles.
143. Concretely, in the ANC, these principles are operationalized through five pillars of international relations: Building a better Africa and a better World; continental, international solidarity and campaigns; party-to-party, intra-party and multi-party relations; transformation of global institutions; and policy development.
144. In tandem with the ANC's overarching framework, the South African government's foreign policy focuses on: The African Agenda (AU Agenda 2063); Strengthening SADC and regional integration; Human rights; South-South and North-South Dialogues; and, Peaceful resolution of conflicts.

Geo-Political State of Southern Africa

145. Our current approach to international relations within the Southern African region and the continent of Africa is informed by our historical experience and relations with the Frontline States that were forged during our protracted years of struggle for liberation against colonialism and apartheid. Without the support and sacrifice of these liberation movements, our primary sister parties within the Frontline States, our liberation would not have been possible. This Report

will detail later the priority given and efforts made in respect of these liberation movements.

146. In the Southern African region, we are not immune to storms. Mozambique faces terror attacks linked to extremist networks, prompting military interventions from the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The unilateral sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe continue to strain that nation's economy and hamper broader regional cooperation and integration while the calls for political reform and dialogue in eSwatini highlight persistent cracks in the veneer of regional stability.

The African continent: ongoing struggles and emerging opportunities

Continental Unity and the African Renaissance

147. We recall the words of our President Oliver Reginald Tambo when he said: "it is our responsibility to continue to ensure that Africa remains a continent of hope, not despair, of democracy, not repression, of development, not destruction". Since its formation, the ANC has recognized our destiny is bound to that of the African continent as a whole. Our Pan-Africanist ideals found expression in our support for the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), later becoming the African Union (AU). We remain committed to the AU's founding objectives, which include strengthening unity, solidifying, sovereignty and accelerating socio-economic integration and development within the continent. This constructive collaboration underpins our efforts to build a "better Africa": consistent with AU Agenda 2063 and the African Union's strategic framework for transforming the continent into a global powerhouse. Our foreign policy highlights the necessity of coordinating diplomatic efforts across national, provincial and local government levels, ensuring that provinces, municipalities and state agencies speak with one voice in advancing South Africa's national interests and also contributing to the unity of Africa.
148. However, the overall political and economic landscape remains fraught. The 2008/09 global financial crisis and the recent COVID-19 pandemic have compounded Africa's structural challenges: widespread poverty, inadequate healthcare, poor infrastructure, high unemployment and social unrest. Far from being insulated, the continent bears a disproportionate burden when global markets falter or external powers exert influence.
149. The intensification of conflicts in places like the Sahel and the noticeable turn of these countries away from the former-colonial master's traditional dominance, reflect an Africa in transition. While these changes are sometimes accompanied by instability and are unconstitutional; they also open opportunities for genuinely Pan-African solutions. The ANC and South Africa must proactively seek to contribute to the resolution of conflict within the continent through continued engagements with the hotspot countries in conflict such as Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, the Tigray region in Ethiopia and the eastern DRC. South Africa's destiny is inextricably tied to that of the continent. How the ANC responds to these various emerging challenges and political developments remains critical.
150. Parallel to its involvement in BRICS, South Africa plays a unique role in the G20 as the only African country in this premier forum for international economic cooperation. Encouragingly, the African Union was granted full and permanent membership in 2023, ensuring that Africa's collective interests feature in G20 discussions on economic stability and development financing. South Africa's theme for this year's G20 - "Solidarity, Equality, and Sustainability" – aimed to rally not just

African states but all progressive forces in the Global South and North around pressing issues such as climate finance, bridging digital divides and achieving inclusive growth.

151. Significantly, the AU – and by implication Africa's – inclusion in the G20 highlights the prospects of our continent. By 2040, i.e. 15 years from now, Africa will have the largest workforce on the globe. The continent's rich soil does not only bed its vast and critical minerals needed for today's hardware for digital technology but also possesses the plantations needed for our nourishment.
152. It is within this context, among other factors that the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) becomes a cornerstone agreement to galvanize intra-African trade, reduce dependence on Western economies and bolster manufacturing. For the AfCFTA to succeed, however, we must collectively guard against replicating the Global North-South divide within Africa itself. South Africa, as one of the continent's more industrialized nations, has a responsibility to advocate for frameworks that genuinely uplift lower-income states. We must be able to mobilize our own capital and encourage international investors to establish local factories and processing plants throughout Africa rather than simply extracting raw materials.
153. As seen in the Sahel states, in the immediate aftermath of the coups, a strategic priority for the continent is to ensure that Africans retain control and derive maximum benefit from our mineral deposits, agricultural prosperity and the vast human resources. Reduced reliance on Western or any external financing helps relieve the inevitable political conditions that form part of the concession agreements. Despite this, local capacity-building and governance reforms are pre-requisites to harnessing these resources effectively.
154. Improved security coordination on the African continent is vital. African states need robust institutions - like a strengthened AU Peace and Security Council, bolstered by sub-regional blocs like SADC, ECOWAS, EAC, among others - to address cross-border challenges such as terrorism, arms trafficking and human trafficking. A more assertive Africa will not only repel external interference but also lay the groundwork for lasting stability and prosperity.

Unresolved crises: migration, conflict and instability

155. Africa continues to struggle with unresolved crises that dampen prospects for economic development and social stability. These include but not limited to:
 - mass migration: fueled by a lack of economic opportunities, protracted conflicts and environmental stresses, thousands of young Africans risk their lives crossing deserts and seas;
 - resurgent violence: from the Sahel region to the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) militia groups, cross-border crime networks and weak governance have made insecurity a hallmark in several states;
 - foreign interference: external powers continue to project influence on African conflicts, often by bankrolling armed factions or manipulating local politics; and,
 - receding democratic governance dividends: perceptions of citizen disillusionment with expectations accruing from democratic dividends hence leading to mass migration in search for greener pastures.
156. In regions such as the Sahel, popular support for military coups underscores disillusionment with established systems which perpetuate colonialism. French troops have been expelled in certain areas after decades of post-colonial presence and new alliances are forming – for example like the Alliance of Sahel States - that challenge the authority of institutions like the Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS). The ANC should adopt a lens and modalities through which to engage with leaders of African states in conflict.

Specific Hotspots

157. The Horn of Africa: The Horn of Africa is engulfed in strife. The Sudan civil war rages on while South Sudan may be heading towards a civil war. The Somali crisis continues while tensions in Ethiopia's Tigray region is of great concern, which could also threaten relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea. When these developments are not urgently addressed by Africans, foreign powers intervene, inflame the situation further as they pursue their respective national interests and agendas. These states grapple with weak institutions rooted in their formative independence periods. Key questions around nation-building, forging cohesive national identities and clarifying national interests were postponed or left unresolved. This vacuum has opened the door to foreign powers fueling resurgent civil wars as well as ongoing armed conflict; each pushing their own strategic agendas.
158. Eastern DRC: The DRC, larger than Western Europe by land mass, sits on vast mineral wealth yet endures chronic political instability. Rebel movements such as the M23 and the complexities of the peacekeeping forces of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) underscore the difficulty of maintaining security. South Africa contributes troops through the SANDF but faces immense logistical and political challenges in this difficult and vast territory. The decision by SADC to withdraw its troops due to the ceasefire and allow the Luanda process to unfold towards the resolution of the conflict still has to yield positive results.
159. Morocco and the issue of Western Sahara: The Saharawi people remain deprived of their right to self-determination as Morocco resists past AU and UN resolutions, perpetuating a decades-long stalemate. Compounding challenges across North Africa, Morocco's alliances with global powers - alongside Israel's growing presence on the continent - diminish the role of progressive states. These shifting dynamics erode the collaborative spirit and unity essential for continental development. However, Morocco, like its bedfellow Israel, continues to extend its influence on the African continent, infiltrating African institutions and has even sought to influence the newly formed Alliance of Sahel States.

A Brief Survey of Our World

Changing geopolitical environment

160. Globally, the world is in the throes of a poly-crisis, characterized by instability, conflict, injustice and insecurity. Old alliances and institutions face new tests and fresh coalitions are emerging in response to economic, political and technological changes. Historically, the end of the Cold War saw the unchallenged rise of Western hegemony, accompanied by a deep faith in unipolarity; a world dominated by a single power center led by the United States of America (US) and its close allies. However, we now observe an accelerating shift towards multipolarity, signaled by the resurgence of powers such as China and Russia, the rising economic clout of emerging markets, middle powers and the visible fragmentation of Western consensus.
161. Even so, attempts at unilateralism continue to persist, undermining the multilateral system. We see international law and the role of the United Nations frequently questioned or in some instances circumvented or ignored by powerful states. This dynamic has led to a widespread erosion of trust in global governance bodies, a proliferation of tensions in places such as Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa, and an urgent need to reimagine how all states - big and small - can function

cooperatively within a fair, just and stable global system. In this context, the countries of the Global South push for a more multi-polar, multi-cultural and multi-civilizational world order away from the current unipolar disorder. The ANC embraces multipolarity in the global system of governance.

Humanitarian Crises and Conflicts

162. However, we also live in a time of glaring contradictions. Never before have we had more advanced technology, rapid digital communication and extraordinary global interconnectivity like this era. Yet, daily headlines reflect harsh realities, albeit exaggerated at times:

- the crises in the Horn of Africa, eastern DRC and the SAHEL, underpinned by weak governance and unconstitutional changes of government denoting popular coups, highlight the need to strengthen the AU and guard against its hijacking by external forces;
- the obliteration of Gaza and continued turmoil in the West Bank, putting the Palestinian question front and center in discussions of international justice;
- tensions across the Atlantic, showcasing deepening rifts between the US and the European Union, alongside diminishing influence of the EU in world affairs;
- the complicated rapprochement between Russia and the US, overshadowed at times by renewed Cold War-era animosities, yet punctuated by cooperation on limited fronts; and,
- the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) and other advanced technologies, which simultaneously promise unprecedented economic transformation while, in many cases though, exacerbating existing inequalities.

163. The United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, at the UN Summit of the Future in September 2024, underscored staggering statistics which pointed out that the richest 1 percent of the global population owns over 40 percent of all global assets and one third of the world's poor find themselves worse off than they were three years ago, even as the wealth of the richest continues to multiply exponentially.

164. These disparities manifest on the ground in the shape of acute social crises: unemployment, hunger and rampant inequality. They also contribute to conflicts over resources, spark mass migration and weaken faith in government institutions. It is increasingly evident that our global economic structures, largely shaped by the neoliberal order that emerged after the Cold War, are failing to provide equitable development.

Western Europe and North America: A shifting political landscape

Rise of far right-wing movements

165. At the same time, progressives in Europe and North America face their own brand of tumult. The proliferation of far right-wing populism has destabilized once-stable social democratic and centrist governments. Nowhere is this more evident than in the US. These movements often channel frustration over the consequences of fiscal austerity and economic inequality into anti-immigrant sentiment, racism, sexism, xenophobia, homophobia and all forms of discrimination and intolerance as well and economic protectionism. They challenge international norms, strain relationships with developing countries and disregard the principle of shared responsibility for global problems.

166. The recent global electoral calendar entailed high-profile elections that have seen a consolidation of the center right and growth of far-right political parties not only in Europe but in the rest of the globe as well. These elections which have seen the

establishment of Right leaning governments have brought about changes in foreign policies, impact international trade standards and military alliances. Thus, shifts in leadership in respective countries could alter their stance on international agreements and collaborative projects which would consequently impact global markets and international relations.

International trade and US-China trade war

167. There have been growing concerns about the impact of globalization on governments' ability to regulate in the public interest and meet the objectives set in the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO, including promoting full employment and sustainable development in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development. Compounding this is the seismic shifts taking place in a world increasingly dominated by two rivalry of the global powers, the US and China, and the new frontier of globalization which is the cyber world.
168. We have also seen the ascendancy of President Donald Trump to the White House for a second time re-entrenching populism and an "America First" philosophy that have reverberated through global institutions. It is unlikely that this phenomenon developed overnight and is a trend that will probably remain with the international community for a while, even after a Trump presidency. This phenomenon and its impact on American life has led to the withdrawal of the US from key international agreements, including the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change as well as the creation of multiple trade wars, transactional diplomacy and threats directed at nations deemed insufficiently aligned with U.S. interests. The Trump 2.0 foreign policy, unlike the first Trump administration is more focused, coherent, uncompromising and underpinned by an ideology. If anything, while US influence and hegemony may have been in decline thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the emergence of the Trump phenomenon has simply accelerated this decline.
169. The rivalry between the United States and China has far-reaching consequences. While often branded simply as a "trade war," it encompasses disputes over intellectual property, technology transfer, 5G networks, AI supremacy, currency wars, among others. The U.S. approach, especially under an "America First" doctrine, has seen sanctions used liberally. This has drawn criticism from the wider international community for ignoring established rules and norms. Meanwhile, China's rapid economic growth and technological advancement unsettles the established global order. The prospect of China surpassing the U.S. as the largest economy is fueling anxieties in Western capitals and intensifying the friction between these two giants.

US approach to international trade and implications for South Africa

170. As a response to its decline, the US is moving away from the multilateral trading system (MTS) and multilateralism more broadly as it tries to remove the shackles of the rules based international system. Yet, at the same time, the US remains heavily reliant foreign markets and on South Africa for the following minerals, in particular: palladium, platinum (60 percent) and chrome (80 percent) which is critical for steel manufacturing. The imposition of a 25 percent tariff on steel and aluminum was an opportunity for negotiation given their dependence on South Africa. Our country also supplies 70 percent of radio isotopes imported into the US, critical for cancer treatment. We must be able to leverage these resources.
171. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) does remain important to keep but not at whatever cost. Some products remain vulnerable such as catamarans, autos and chemicals, among others. If South Africa is excluded, AGOA loses significant meaning as a program for Africa, as our country is the most significant user and other African countries export to the US through South African value-chains. US companies based in

South Africa as well as farmers will therefore also be negatively impacted by exclusion from AGOA.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion and the global balance of forces

172. A major expansion occurred in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004, with seven new Central European members, including the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, joining and therefore further extending NATO's influence towards Russia. The recent inclusion of Finland (2023) and Sweden (2024) underscores the West's commitment to securing regional influence in Northern Europe, once again pushing NATO and its members closer to Russia but must also alert the ANC to the shift in the domestic politics of Nordic countries.
173. For non-aligned nations and much of the global south, NATO's expansion symbolizes the continued push by Western forces to shape world affairs unilaterally and, it may even be suggested, be a desperate attempt to remain hegemonic. South Africa, which has consistently championed the UN's authority in global conflict resolution, is thus confronted with a strategic imperative: how do we maintain a balanced and principled foreign policy stance in a world where big power blocs expand their military and economic footprints?
174. One of the most consequential crises of recent years, especially the period under review, has been the war in Ukraine, a conflict that began in earnest in 2014 and significantly escalated. NATO's continued eastward expansion, coupled with Russia's assertive posture, has resulted in a confrontation that transcends Ukraine's borders, imposing global ramifications.
175. For South Africa, the war underscores the complexity of adhering to a non-aligned posture. While many Western voices demand condemnation of Russia, our history and principles lead us to seek peaceful resolutions and dialogue. Together with other African states, we have put forward a Ten-Point Plan to mitigate and eventually resolve the conflict, even as local populations grapple with the rising costs of fertilizer, fuel and other essentials.
176. Some of the previously non-aligned forces have turned to the right, for example Finland and Norway, while others have chosen to be ambivalent as in the case of India. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit was hosted and chaired by Uganda in January 2024 and efforts are underway for the Global South to speak in one voice and reinvigorate the NAM and the voice of the global south.

BRICS Plus and the emergence of a multipolar world

The significance and challenges of BRICS Plus

177. This Report will address the ANC's relations with BRICS Plus countries' political parties with which it has had engagements and working relations. However, BRICS Plus has become emblematic of shifting global power. In 2023, during the Johannesburg Summit, BRICS underwent a historic expansion. This move signaled BRICS's openness to an inclusive approach. By uniting countries with diverse political systems and cultural backgrounds but shared aspirations for equitable development, BRICS Plus underscores the practical possibilities of multipolar governance. These nations, home to vast populations, have proven attractive to foreign investment and have invested heavily in critical technologies. Since its inception, BRICS has sought to challenge the long-established Western-led economic system dominated by institutions like the World Bank and the IMF.
178. Among the most significant outcomes of BRICS summits has been the initiative to conduct inter-member trade in national currencies rather than defaulting to the U.S.

Dollar. Russia, for example, linked its payment systems with China and India, bypassing SWIFT and alleviating some of the immediate impacts of Western sanctions. Alongside the BRICS Development Bank in Shanghai and its regional branch in Johannesburg, these moves symbolize a concrete challenge to the post-World War II Bretton Woods order. The BRICS New Development Bank's goal of lending 60 percent of its loans in local currencies is also commendable in a changing geopolitical landscape.

179. From a purely economic standpoint, the rising share of BRICS Plus in global GDP is impossible to ignore. This changing reality has occurred alongside the relative decline of the G7. BRICS Plus has emerged as a formidable bloc advocating for multipolarity and economic equity. With new members joining in 2023 and 2024, BRICS now represents a combined GDP of \$30.2 trillion.
180. BRICS Plus has steadily increased its share of global GDP from 21.37 percent in 2000 to an estimated 34.92 percent by 2024 while the G7's share has declined from 43.28 percent to around 30.05 percent over the same period. This growth underscores the rising influence of emerging economies, positioning South Africa strategically within BRICS Plus as an advocate for a balanced global order.
181. At the same time, the G7 has grappled with internal challenges - such as Brexit in the UK and political as well as economic slowdowns in Japan - that undermine the G7's once unchallenged influence. These developments validate the ANC's stance that a multipolar order at best or fora such as the G20 or G77 plus China at worst may be fairer and more conducive to sustainable and inclusive growth. As a political movement committed to anti-imperialism, the ANC views the diversification of economic power centers as an opportunity to reduce reliance on Western capital and expand genuine South-South solidarity and cooperation.
182. Yet the question remains: Is BRICS Plus a platform for political change in the global community or merely an economic bloc used to exploit and achieve the national interest of individual member countries? For while much effort has been made to explore the economic opportunities, individual BRICS Plus nations have taken certain political postures at times not only as to how they relate to each other but also at other times in relation to serious geo-political questions e.g. reform of the UN and on Palestine. These challenges, together with other issues, have now seemingly been intensified with the expansion of BRICS and must be navigated by the ANC.

Latin America and the Caribbean

183. Historically, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) have endured waves of external interference, from colonial exploits to U.S. dominance in the 20th century, and now face increasing courtship by emerging powers like China and Russia. Nations like Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico aim to navigate these influences while addressing internal pressures for equitable development. Socialist and left-leaning governments find themselves tested by economic crises and powerful local elites yet in certain instances have advanced progressive reforms that resonate with many countries in Africa and Asia.
184. By studying LAC experiences, especially where they align with Pan-African goals, South Africa can better craft its strategies, forging alliances on trade, technology transfer and sustainable development that circumvent overreliance on Western or singular hegemonic systems.
185. Latin America has become a major contributor to the progressive forces with 12 out of 19 countries having elected left leaning presidents and Colombia having elected their first left- wing president in the country's history. The ANC watched the electoral outcome in Venezuela with much anticipation and hopes for stability and continuity in fostering the long- standing relations that have been created with the country under the leadership of President Nicolás Maduro. The strengthening of progressive forces globally brings confidence in the relentless pursuit of realizing the National Democratic Revolution in South Africa.

The genocide in Gaza: A moral imperative but also lessons from Washington

186. The humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Gaza and parts of the West Bank, and Israel's continuous bombings coupled with U.S. support, have led to staggering casualties—over 70 000 Palestinians killed, including over 20 000 children, with countless more injured or imprisoned. The infrastructure in Gaza, including schools and hospitals, lay in ruins, flouting international conventions and the very ethics upon which bodies like the Red Cross are founded. The crisis has disproportionately harmed women and children. Despite condemnation from various international actors, there has been insufficient momentum to halt the brutal crackdown.
187. In a bold step, South Africa invoked the Genocide Convention, requesting the International Court of Justice to investigate Israel for possible genocide or complicity in genocide. This action places South Africa at the forefront of global moral leadership. How do we build on this leadership? South Africa should reflect on the next steps and consider working with other strategic partners while allowing the ICJ process to unfold.
188. At the same time, the apartheid state of Israel has not confined its response to Gaza since 7 October 2023. Israeli attacks have targeted Lebanon, Syria, and occasionally Yemen and Iran; enflaming an already volatile region. The US has fortified its naval presence in support of Israel, funneling substantial funding into the Israeli military with minimal oversight. This scenario exacerbates the risk of a wider conflagration that could drag in multiple international and regional powers.
189. The crisis of the Middle East partly reflects shifts in US strategy with each new presidency and thus an overall failure of US leadership in the region. While President Joe Biden upheld many interventionist frameworks, focusing on supporting Israel and maintaining robust alliances through NATO, President Donald Trump charted a path that sometimes seemed contradictory: reducing U.S. military footprints yet abruptly withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal during his first term.
190. With Trump's return to the White House, we are seeing a more blatant "transactional" approach that might yield new alignments and possibly intensify conflicts, especially around hotspots like Gaza, Syria and Iran with a growing presence/military influence of Israel in African continental affairs.
191. Unlike the view some parties and voices in South Africa wish to portray, for the ANC and South Africa discerning the direction of US policy, not only in the Middle East but all its policies, is not just an academic exercise but rather it shapes and affects both our domestic policy and foreign policy - it affects both the climate within global fora like the UN Security Council, G20, and other multilateral institutions.

Countering far right-wing movements

192. In recognizing the influential role that far right-wing forces, at home and abroad, have come to play and whose agendas undermine South Africa's diplomatic efforts, we must be able to engage audiences and communicate clearly our policies on land reform, human rights or our stance on Palestine particularly. These policies may then even find resonance within some Western circles.
193. A multi-pronged approach is therefore vital: Strategic engagement: in certain cases, dialogue with adversarial groups may defuse hostility and correct misconceptions; Proactive communication: setting the record straight before false narratives gain traction; and coalition-building: working with progressive civil society organizations, both domestically and internationally, to present a united front against disinformation.
194. The effectiveness of our foreign policy depends, in large measure, on the strength of our diplomatic missions. Inefficiencies or resource misallocations in embassies can weaken South Africa's voice. A comprehensive review is thus underway,

examining where we maintain embassies or consulates, how they are staffed and whether they serve strategic national objectives effectively.

195. In addition, commemorations and symbolic events can reinforce our diplomatic ties. The upcoming centenary celebration of Fidel Castro provides an opportunity to reaffirm publicly the bonds of friendship forged with Cuba and many others in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Reminding the world of these historical alliances resonates deeply, especially with other progressive movements seeking collaboration in technology, healthcare, and education.

Gender and age dimensions in global politics

196. As seen in Gaza and throughout these geopolitical shifts, women remain disproportionately affected by violence, economic marginalization and social upheaval. Progress since the Beijing Declaration has been uneven and advocates for a "feminist foreign policy" highlight a need to include women's perspectives and leadership in decisions on governance and conflict resolution.
197. At the same time, the impatience and dissatisfaction of young people across gender lines are expressed in social movements worldwide. They demand not only job opportunities and better education but also a say in shaping public policy. The ANC, historically a champion of grassroots mobilization, recognizes that a progressive youth movement is indispensable for charting pathways to a multipolar world that values equity and social justice.

The road ahead: maintaining our revolutionary spirit and progressive principles

198. We are at a critical juncture as a movement. Technological disruptions, climate change, growing multipolarity and the re-emergence of far-right wing nationalist populism globally creates a tapestry of uncertainty. The ANC, in line with its revolutionary heritage, must remain steadfast in its commitment to Pan-Africanism, anti-imperialism, human rights and the rule of law, international solidarity and social justice, the peaceful resolution of conflict, multilateralism and non-alignment.
199. In the face of rising unilateralism led by the US, we must guard the principle of national sovereignty and the rights of oppressed peoples to determine their own futures. The question we must continually pose is: are we still that revolutionary movement? Our history answers loudly in the affirmative but words should be matched by decisive action.
200. A multipolar, multi-cultural and multi-civilizational global order, in which all nations and peoples are equally respected, represents a cornerstone of our policy vision. Such an order diminishes the capacity of any single power to dictate terms unilaterally, thereby creating space for Africa and the Global South to articulate our visions without fear of coercion or sanction.
201. While we must hold firm to our ideals and principles, we must also be tactically agile and engage pragmatically with global powers. Whether it is balancing relationships with long-standing Western allies or forging deeper ties with emerging economies, the national interest demands at times a strategically and tactically measured approach without compromising on our core principles. This includes forging strategic alliances within BRICS Plus, the G20, and the AU, as well as maintaining open channels with nations whose policies differ significantly from our own.

Contributing to a better Africa and a better world

202. When engaging political parties or organizations from the global community and African continent, the Subcommittee does not delineate between party-to-party relations, creating a better Africa or even creating a better world for that matter. For example, when it meets FRELIMO it meets with them on a party-to-party basis but also

with the view of creating a better Africa, as the ruling party of Mozambique, and, yes, by extension a better world. The Five Pillars of the ANC International Relations resolutions therefore cannot be separated from each other. They are ultimately linked to each other.

Building a better Africa

203. The balance of forces on the African continent and the Southern African region continues to be intricately linked to the conduct of the governing parties in the region. Just as the strengthening of historical relations among liberation movements in Southern Africa is important for the region's dynamics, their evident weaknesses also explain such dynamics as slow implementation of regional aspirations.
204. The pursuit of a prosperous and peaceful Africa and Southern Africa remains strategic and principal. To this end, the commitment to strengthen the African Union (AU) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) as platforms for a progressive African agenda is key. This has given rise to efforts to reform the AU, strengthen the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) agency, implement the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and achieve the African Agenda 2063. The signing and formal launch of the AfCFTA marks a major milestone towards a R50 trillion market for intra-African trade and investment.
205. The ANC has sought to address weaknesses in galvanizing the region and continent to maintain a progressive posture on the international arena, which is visible when examining various country positions on Israel's observer status at the AU and the occupation of Palestine, on Western Sahara and the role of Morocco and on the invitation of the United States' Africa Command to set up office in Zambia. This unfortunately places progressive internationalism on the back foot and in need of reinvigorating. The ANC thus sets itself the strategic task of working with others on our continent to strengthen the progressive, Pan Africanist forces to help ensure the achievement of the goals set in Agenda 2063.
206. Our approach to continental integration must also strengthen the links with the African diaspora as the 6th region of the AU, which should continue unabated, especially given the International Decade for People of African Descent (2015-2024), which was proclaimed by the UN General Assembly in a Resolution adopted on 23 December 2013.
207. Concerning peace and stability in Africa, so far, the continent has made little progress towards addressing the two goals of silencing the guns and preventing the guns from opening fire. This has led to persistent conflicts in Nigeria, Somalia, Mozambique involving jihadists, Libya, Chad, Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan and Ethiopia rooted in the challenges of nation building and managing diversity.
208. The ANC-led government participated in deliberations that resulted in AU-UN seventh Annual Conference (November 2023) underlining the importance of effective conflict prevention, peace-making, peace operations, peace building and sustainable development efforts to support objectives of member states to achieve peace and stability on the continent and attain the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Agenda 2063. The UN Secretary-General and the AU Chairperson reiterated their call to reform the international finance architecture so as to increase Africa's ability to address effectively the challenges of the 21st century and for Africa to have a strong voice in the reform discussions. The ANC through the Government of National Unity (GNU) must encourage the continuity and adherence to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Agenda 2063.
209. The ANC-led Government of National Unity must continue to support the African Union's plans to establish the African Rating Agency as an independent agency of the Union with the aim of assessing the risk of lending to the various countries. At the

same time, the Subcommittee is also closely monitoring the developments within the African Development Bank.

210. The escalation of tensions between the DRC and Rwanda are cause for concern, especially given the political and economic resources invested into the peace process by South Africa. Given the DRC's membership in both SADC and the East African Community (EAC), South Africa must remain engaged through various departments such as DIRCO, Defense, Police and trade, industry and competition. Indeed, growing tensions between Rwanda and the DRC may necessitate a greater engagement by South Africa with the two countries and members of SADC and the EAC. The ANC will continue to complement these efforts through party-party relations.
211. The ANC has a long and historical relationship with Algeria, even post-1994. Issues of international solidarity, with the people of Western Sahara as well as Palestine are engaged. Cooperation with the Algerian embassy concluded that a number of high level delegations visits must take place between the two countries, economic diplomacy, especially in respect of renewal and traditional energy, agro-processing, mining and trade, the encouragement of business-to-business exchanges and the resumption of a direct flight between Johannesburg and Algiers must be pursued.
212. Efforts are also underway to strengthen the relations with fellow BRICS Plus member on the continent, Egypt. Cooperation on issues affecting peace and stability on the African continent as well as the world, for example but not limited to solidarity with Palestine and the humanitarian crises in the Gaza as well as water security in North Africa as well as developments within the Sudan, are being pursued. Given the BRICS Plus partnership, a number of proposals were made including establishment of a South Africa-Egypt Business Council to encourage economic diplomacy and urgently increase the trade between the two countries to more than the current U\$200 million, cooperating on resolving the issues in Palestine, the Sudan and water security in the north of Africa, the need to strengthen party-to-party relations as well as the respective women and youth structures in each of the countries to engage each other so as to strengthen people-to-people relations.
213. The global spread of right-wing extremism has displaced social democratic and centrist forces in Western Europe and North America. It has helped to sharpen the differences between the Global North and the Global South in international fora on anything from multilateral trade to climate change and global governance to multilateralism. It is important to note that the consolidation of the right wing is not only a phenomenon of the Global North but has also made inroads in parts of the Global South.
214. South Africa's leadership of BRICS 2023 led to a successful BRICS Summit themed BRICS and Africa: partnership for mutually accelerated growth, sustainable development and inclusive multilateralism. BRICS members, under the leadership of South Africa, invited additional countries to BRICS grouping and achieved unprecedented expansion from five to ten with effect from January 2024. The following countries were added: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Indonesia and the United Arab Emirates. A discussion must be held on the nuances of the advantages and disadvantages of the expansion of BRICS. An equally successful and well attended BRICS Political Parties Plus Dialogue was also held in Ekurhuleni with eagerness from many parties in attendance to hold bilateral engagements parallel to the main event.
215. A critical discussion on BRICS Plus and whether our country has reaped the 'BRICS dividend' must be undertaken. For example, the Deputy President's visit to China was closely followed and the ANC is grateful that some serious concerns were raised by the Deputy President especially in respect of the trade deficit which has increased 10-fold in China's favor. Another example is since South Africa has joined BRICS, our imports from China has increased by 94 percent whereas their imports from our country has only increased by 46 percent. Therefore, while diversification of markets and finished goods

and services is critical in the face of trade wars, we must also tread cautiously and critically ensuring a better deal for our country.

216. The ANC's relations with the Russian Federation are most exemplified through its party-to-party relations with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and United Russia. However, one project that was undertaken between the Embassy and the ANC was an Exhibition. Working with the Subcommittee, Archives Subcommittee as well as Arts and Culture Subcommittees, the ANC, together with the Russian Embassy, hosted an exhibition on the history between the ANC/MK and Russia. The exhibition was held on 8 to 12 September 2025 in Cape Town and 23 October 2025 in the Media Centre at Chief Albert Luthuli House.
217. During the period under review there was an escalation, and subsequent de-escalation, in the tensions between India and Pakistan. The ANC lent support both to India and Pakistan while emphasizing the clause of the Freedom Charter, whose 70th anniversary we celebrate this year, that "there shall be peace and friendship!" as well as the right of each state to national sovereignty.
218. As with the embassy of the Russian Federation, the ANC's relations with the Embassy of the People's Republic of China is most expressed through its party-to-party relations with the Communist Party of China (CPC). However, the embassy regularly invites the ANC to participate in most of their major engagements. For example, the ANC annually attends the national day celebrations as well as participated in its Dialogue of Civilizations as well as the 80th anniversary of the Victory in the Chinese People's War.
219. The ANC attended the national day of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Much more effort must be placed in solidifying this strategic relationship.
220. South Africa, under the ANC-led government of national unity, has contributed immensely towards peace during the period under review, starting from the coordination of the African Peace Mission by African Presidents to mediate in the Russia/Ukraine conflict and encouraging African countries to remain non-aligned.
221. Our government also continues to call relentlessly for ceasefire in the conflict between Hamas and Israel and joined Bolivia, Bangladesh, Comoros and Djibouti in referring the unacceptable loss of life and human suffering to the International Criminal Court. The Sherpa's of BRICS met in November 2024, with the new members also invited to discuss the Middle East deteriorating situation.
222. The US remains a site of struggle for the ANC, to improve our relations with that country and its people, and this started even before the second Trump administration. Unfortunate remarks were made by the former US ambassador who was appointed before the dawn of the second Trump administration. The ANC has engaged the embassy and other American stakeholders on its 55th National Conference resolutions on international relations and foreign policy.
223. The ANC continues to monitor the developments in Washington D.C. especially in respect of the drafting and processing of the US-South Africa Bilateral Relations Review Act of 2025. The bill primarily problematizes South Africa's foreign policy and secondly wishes to order the US Department of State to conduct a review of the relations between our two countries. The ANC has and continues to engage American stakeholders to ensure clarity in issues of national sovereignty and independence of foreign policy.
224. The ANC continues to work with Scandinavian countries especially Norway and Sweden. Both these countries appreciate the diplomacy of peace pursued by the ANC as well as how these countries manage governing coalitions. There is common agreement in the need to fight poverty, inequality and to invest more in social transformation. There is also agreement on the need to pursue institutional reform in global multilateral institutions such as UNSC.
225. The ANC successfully cohosted a colloquium on progressive internationalism together with the Fredrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) as one of the events commemorating the

70th anniversary of the Freedom Charter and its progressive principles. Young people were included given that it was youth month.

Continental, international solidarity and campaigns

226. Palestine and Israel: The ANC continues to advance the Palestinian cause here in South Africa and abroad. Given the events of 7 October 2023, the freedom and liberation of Palestine has once again become center stage. Often together with the Alliance, the ANC has participated in a number of Days of International Solidarity with the Palestinian people while the ANC has also organized and been involved in a number of marches and pickets. For example, a Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) delegation was present at the commemoration of the 75th anniversary of the Nakba held in Cape Town.
227. As per the 55th National Conference resolutions, the ANC has engaged with more than four delegations from the PLO during the period under review while continuing to support legal efforts at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ANC has been supportive of China's effort to bring together the various factions in Palestine to garner unity while mobilization towards solidarity, global public opinion, including in Europe and the United States, continues to shift towards expressions of solidarity for Palestine. This has recently led to a number of states recognizing the state of Palestine.
228. Western Sahara: The ANC continues to lend support to and advances the cause of the people of Western Sahara. Our movement works closely with the ambassador of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and enjoys strong working relations with the embassy as well as raising the cause and working with other role-players such as the Algerian embassy and the National Liberation Front (FLN) of Algeria. The ANC's campaign and support of Western Sahara is expressed in the main through its support of Polisario Front and its projects. The ANC was represented at the 50th anniversary celebration of the founding of the Polisario Front.
229. Cuba: The ANC reaffirms its commitment of solidarity with Cuba, its support for the continuity of the collaboration with the Cuban people and the rejection of the US blockade. South Africa, as a matter of principle, and in solidarity with the government and people of Cuba will always vote in favor of the important annual UN Resolution calling for the end of the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the US against Cuba. Both countries also maintain excellent cooperation in the multilateral arena through mechanisms such as the Non-Aligned Movement, the Group of 77 and the United Nations system. The ANC must systematically reflect on the implications of the AfriForum case preventing South Africa's development cooperation and solidarity support towards Cuba. The ANC continues to enjoy a strong working relationship with the Cuban government and embassy.
230. The highlight in Cuban solidarity for the period under review was the sixth African Continental Conference on Solidarity with Cuba held in Mpumalanga in January 2024. In pursuit of the Cuban solidarity, the ANC with the Alliance, the Cuban Institute of Friendship with the Peoples and the Friends of Cuba Society, hosted the Conference which included 22 political parties and 53 Friendship Associations with Cuba from 22 African countries and other regions present. Under the theme, Africa's Global Commitment to the Cuban Revolution, the Conference considered several topics related to the intensification of African solidarity actions against the inhumane and illegal 61-year-old blockade of Cuba, against US occupation of Cuban land at Guantanamo Bay and for the Cuban right to national sovereignty and ending external foreign interference.
231. Venezuela: The ANC has shown its solidarity for Venezuela and has engaged the government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The ANC, together with the United

Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), continues to ensure strong government-to-government relations between South Africa and Venezuela, the need for enhanced economic cooperation, continued international solidarity against US driven unilateralism, knowledge exchanges and collaboration in areas such as energy, mining, and science and technology. The ANC enjoys a good relationship with the Embassy of Venezuela and will continue to lend support to the country.

232. Iran: In the wake of the unjustified bombardment of Iran by Israel and the USA, the ANC re-affirmed its support for fellow BRICS Plus member, Iran, but also re-affirmed the principles of the Freedom Charter i.e. respect for the sovereignty of all states, equality of all states and the resolution of international disputes through negotiation not war.
233. Africa Day Campaign: The ANC held a national Africa Day event at Freedom Park. As a measure to get provinces involved in international relations work, Africa Day events were also held in Gauteng and Western Cape. The ANC was also invited by and attended the Africa Day lectures by the Thabo Mbeki Foundation, especially the one in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The ANC must continue to promote Africa Day and encourage its branches to host social events that will foster people-to-people relations. However, this is also one of the ways in which provinces can become more involved in international relations.

Party-to-party, intra-party and multi-party

234. The ANC places much emphasis on party-to-party, inter-party and multi-party relations and hosted the liberation movements and fraternal parties during the 2024 elections. While the focus remains on the strengthening of the relations with the liberation movements, great strides and effort was made in other instances as well, especially with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (Polisario (Polisario), Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), Sinn Fein, Botswana National Front (BNF), National Resistance Movement (NRM), National Council for the Defense of Democracy - Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS), Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), United Russia, Workers Party of Brazil (PT), Indian National Congress (INC), Communist Party of China (CPC), the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SSDP) as well as the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD).
235. The highlights for party-to-party relations and multi-party relations, for the period under review, was the successful hosting of the BRICS Political Party Dialogue held in 2023 and the Liberation Movements' Summit held in 2025.

Liberation movements

236. The ANC successfully hosted the Liberation Movements' Summit. The theme for the summit was: Defending the Liberation Gains, Advancing Integrated Socio-Economic Development, Strengthening Solidarity for a Better Africa. In the lead-up to the summit engagements also occurred between the Leagues as well as the spokespersons of the respective Liberation Movements. The Liberation Movement Summit stems from the 55th National Conference instruction to strengthen the bonds between the Liberation Movements.
237. The Liberation Movement Summit in South Africa follows the 11th meeting of the six sister Southern Africa Liberation Movements in Victoria Falls in March 2024. This meeting was convened following the meeting in Tanzania on the occasion of the Annual General Board Meeting of the Julius Mwalimu Nyerere Leadership School and was convened under the theme: Unity, Collaboration and Solidarity in Defense of Our

Liberation Gains Against Neo-Colonialism. The meeting reflected on the political and economic situations of Angola (MPLA), Mozambique (FRELIMO), Namibia (SWAPO), South Africa (ANC), Tanzania (CCM) and Zimbabwe (ZANU PF) as presented by their respective secretaries general. The meeting recognized the challenges that threaten the very existence of Liberation Movements of Southern Africa including activities to destabilize and subvert the interests of liberation movements in order to advance the imperialist agenda of Western countries and other hostile forces. Amongst the critical issues raised in the discussions were strategies and tactics to position the Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Leadership School as the apex institution to advance a progressive cadreship development agenda with the aim of empowering nationalist and Pan Africanist leadership. The adopted Constitution of the Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Leadership School re-affirmed the Secretaries-General of the six sister liberation parties as the trustees of the institution and therefore the ultimate legal custodians. The Liberation Movements committed themselves to support fully the institution financially, as per the relevant and stipulated obligations agreed to by the six sister parties and communicated through the School Principal.

Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)

238. The ANC continues to strengthen its ties with Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). The ANC attended the Congress of the CCM earlier in 2025 wherein which it paid tribute and honor the role played by CCM and the people of Tanzania in hosting the ANC during its exiled years, training its cadres and while appreciating President Hassan's leadership especially in nurturing the new generation of CCM cadres. Some of the key observations of the CCM and their conference were the depth of 13 million membership, i.e. a sure focus on quantity and quality of members, manifesto discipline and the strong correlation between the CCM manifesto and government policies and programs, party innovation for example whereby the hybrid (virtual and physical) holding of meetings has been institutionalized through CCM's constitution and the central and critical roles played by women and young people in the congress programming. The ANC also joined CCM in their campaigning activities for their elections held at the end of October 2025. CCM invited the ANC to witness their campaign activities in the lead-up to the general election on 29 October 2025. The purpose of the visit is also for the ANC to share our experiences in organizing and conducting campaigns, as part of the continued exchange of ideas and practices within our democratic processes.

Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO)

239. The ANC sent a congratulatory video to FRELIMO on their 63rd anniversary of founding and the 50th anniversary of the independence of Mozambique. There are ongoing engagements between the ANC and FRELIMO. The ANC has also established a working relationship with FRELIMO in respect of the two organizations building party branches in South Africa and Mozambique, i.e. FRELIMO and ANC respectively.

People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)

240. The ANC continues to engage the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Central in these engagements are the strengthening of the historical and fraternal relations amid the changing geopolitical landscape. The ANC is also working with MPLA to implement the Memorandum of Understanding, "Road to Independence", signed between the governments of South Africa and Angola. Among others, the MOU envisages the repatriation of the remains of fallen heroes and heroines, monument and memorial recognizing the contribution of the people and government of Angola in the fight against apartheid and the development of a documentary of the battle of Cuito Cuanavale.

South West African People's Organization (SWAPO)

241. During the period under review, the ANC mourned the passing of the first president of an independent Namibia, Comrade Sam Nujoma, and the late Namibian president and president of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), Comrade Hage Geingob, who were both instrumental in advancing the ethos and values of anti-colonialism, anti-apartheid and Pan-Africanism. A bilateral between the two organizations was also held and there are ongoing engagements with SWAPO.

Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)

242. The relationship between the ANC and the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) holds historical and political significance. The ANC recognizes the sovereignty and self-determination of Zimbabwe while also encouraging democratic governance, respect for human rights and inclusive economic development. The ANC and ZANU-PF continue to engage in regular exchanges, fostering cooperation in various fields, including political, economic, and social matters. This relationship serves as a testament to the ANC's commitment to regional solidarity, Pan-Africanism and the pursuit of shared goals for the advancement of both South Africa and Zimbabwe. The ANC was invited by ZANU-PF to be part of the observer mission for the elections held in Zimbabwe in 2023. The ANC team observed that the economic situation in Zimbabwe has improved and ZANU-PF is in the process of rebuilding the economy and professionalizing the party. After enduring sanctions for more than 20 years Zimbabwe has started employing different methods with the intention of circumventing the effects of sanctions. The ANC then honored an invitation by ZANU-PF to attend the inauguration of President of Zimbabwe and a bilateral between the two parties was held on the sidelines. The ANC conveyed a congratulatory message to ZANU-PF for holding a successful and peaceful elections that were not marred by violence while there was appreciation that the elections were not easy. ZANU-PF expressed its gratitude for the support that the ANC has shown throughout the campaign and appreciated that the party had been vocal on its alliance with ZANU-PF as that was a great moral booster for the supporters.

Reburial processes

243. The liberation movements have indicated their discomfort with the reburial process undertaken currently by South Africa: our heroes and heroines are their heroes and heroines. These struggle icons are African struggle icons and a part of the liberation history of the countries where they are buried. The ANC has started a discussion within its ranks and structures to address these sentiments raised by our sister liberation movements and it is important that these processes be accompanied by political education.

Working with other political parties

244. The ANC together with its Leagues visited the camps in Western Sahara and was hosted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (Polisario Front). Polisario has shown interest in cooperating with the ANC on political education. Working with its embassy in South Africa, the Algerians and FLN, the ANC is advocating for the re-introduction or re-enforcement of the UN Special Envoy on Western Sahara as well as broader civil society mobilization in respect of Western Sahara through the convening of a Friends of Western Sahara Solidarity Conference.
245. As per the 55th National Conference resolutions, the ANC has intensified its broad-based mobilization of progressive forces and society in solidarity with the people of Palestine but also engaged with more than four delegations from the Palestinian

Liberation Organization during the period under review. As the PLO commemorated 75 years of Nakba in Cape Town, the ANC mobilized communities and actively participated in the events, pledging ongoing support to the Palestinian struggle. A PLO delegation was also able to attend the Liberation Movement Summit as well as visits to KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. In this way, we not only strengthened our solidarity with the Palestinian people but we were also able to start activating the international relations work of provinces.

246. The ANC has also strengthened its relations with the Communist Party of Viet Nam (CPV) for the period under review. High-level delegations from the CPV visited the ANC and met with the National Office-Bearers (NOBs) in 2023 while this was followed later by a visit from the mass mobilization department of the CPV to share experiences on strategies for mass mobilization as the ANC prepared for elections in 2024. The two parties continue to engage at a high-level which included a telephone call between the two the leaders and high-level visits. The ANC visit to Viet Nam saw the signing of a MoU between the two parties which reinforced cooperation across various key areas.
247. A working visit was held by the ANC to Sinn Féin for engagements on mobilizing all progressive forces in the light of the current turbulent geopolitical climate and to advance the ANC's policy of progressive internationalism, as instructed by the 55th National Conference. The engagements also entailed an assessment of both Ireland and South Africa and their respective 'unity processes'. Among others, it was resolved that the ANC and Sinn Fein should finalize the drafting and signing of a MoU, develop a program of action emanating from the MoU and collaborate on international solidarity work for Palestine, Western Sahara, Cuba and Catalunya.
248. Great strides have been made in respect of the ANC and the Botswana National Front (BNF). Bilateral engagements with the high-level delegations of BNF and the ANC have occurred in both Botswana and at Luthuli House. A draft MoU between the ANC and BNF has been sent to the BNF for consideration while the ANC was represented at the BNF Conference in July 2025. This representation was preceded with an ANC political education delegation visit to Botswana to engage comrades from BNF while a proposal was also made of a joint NEC meeting between the ANC and the BNF.
249. The ANC was represented at the National Resistance Movement National Delegates Conference in Uganda held in August 2025; a conference where President Yoweri Museveni was re-elected as the national chairperson of the NRM and which endorsed him as the party's candidate for upcoming general elections scheduled for January 2026. Some of the lessons learnt, in attending the conference, were NRM having a membership of 13 million people making it one of the largest political organizations on the continent, herein lies some lessons that the ANC can learn from in terms of member management, grassroots discipline and mobilization. The political communication emphasized: stability, pan-Africanism and continuity. The two parties will cooperate on elections strategy, cadre development, ideological training and mobilization of young people and women.
250. Preceding their conference in August 2025, the ANC attended and presented a message of support at the 20th anniversary celebrations of governing of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy - Forces for the Defense of Democracy in Burundi. The ANC and the CNDD-FDD signed a MoU committing the organizations to cooperation in a number of areas.
251. Collaboration with the NEC Subcommittee on Political Education in hosting groups of comrades from South Sudan and a follow-up visit to that country yielded a MoU between the ANC and SPLM.
- 252.
253. Collaboration with the same subcommittee was also then pursued in respect of training the United People's Democratic Solidarity leaders from the DRC on elections and party building as they prepared for national elections during December 2023.

254. The ANC enjoys strong relations with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and United Russia. A number of high-level roundtables and conferences were participated in. Both the CPRF and United Russia have shown interest to enter into a MoU with the ANC.
255. The Workers Party of Brazil (PT), the current governing party in Brazil, have indicated their desire to strengthen party-to-party relations with the ANC. In particular, both parties have identified economic diplomacy as a key focus area and the two parties having to support this focus through their cooperation. The Sao Paola Forum was particularly identified as a potential source for this economic diplomacy.
256. Following a successful engagement between the ANC and a delegation from the Indian National Congress (INC), the INC also reached out to the ANC following the congress of the Swedish Social Democratic Party held at the end of May 2025. Even though the INC engagement with the ANC centered on the then escalating tension with neighboring Pakistan, it was an opportunity for the relationship between the INC and ANC to be re-kindled and strengthened.
257. The relationship between the ANC and the Communist Party of China (CPC) continues to be strengthened through ongoing engagements, exchanges and events. During the period under review, the NEC undertook the 16th study tour since undertaken in 2008. The current MoU between the CPC and the ANC expires in 2025. Exchanges and visits from both sides included various seminars and workshops attended by NEC members, representatives from provinces and the Leagues. The topics of these seminars and workshops included, among others, media, security, the Global South, the economy, poverty alleviation, Chinese modernization and dialogues among civilizations.
258. The ANC attended the congress of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) in December 2023 in Berlin. High-level engagements have taken place between the two organizations in order to strengthen relations, promote shared progressive values between the two countries and to work for a more just and peaceful world. A proposed MoU between ANC and the SPD has been finalized.
259. A critical instrument in the ANC's work on party-to-party relations is Memoranda of Understanding. Together with the Department of Policy, Monitoring, Evaluation and Research (PMER) in the ANC, the Subcommittee has embarked upon a review of MOUs between the ANC and sister parties, governments and non-governmental organizations. There are two envisaged phases to the review. Phase One (completed): the creation of a register of all MOUs entered into, the formulation of a template for MOUs, done primarily under the leadership of PMR, and, the signing of MoU's for immediate signature. Already the MoU's with CPV and CNDD-FDD has taken place whereas the one with SPD will be signed later in the year. Phase Two (next phase): an evaluation of past MOUs, to understand which areas worked and which areas of the MOU did not or were not implemented, guided by the Working Paper on "the ANC's Approach to Party-to-Party Relations/Multi-Party Relations", whether to initiate a new MOU with the party/government/organization and/or other new MOUs with sister parties, especially those ones of historical significance e.g. Communist Party of Cuba, Fatah (Palestine), among others, and especially political parties on the African continent.
260. The signing memoranda of understanding must be able to assist in the renewal and rebuilding of the ANC as well as ensure that members of the ANC benefit from their clauses. It is therefore critical that continuous monitoring but also information sharing to sister departments and provinces as well as the Leagues and Alliance partners be implemented by the Subcommittee. Besides FRELIMO, National Resistance Movement in Uganda, CNDD-FDD in Burundi, Sinn Fein, SPD which is mentioned earlier in this report, the Subcommittee can also report that we are working on a MoU with United Russia party. However, the Subcommittee relies on the Leagues, other Subcommittees and Departments to make use of these MoU's and ensure that these documents become alive.

Transformation of global governance institutions

United Nations

261. The 55th National Conference resolved that "the ANC must develop more concrete proposals on UN Reform, including revisions to the Ezulwini Consensus." A discussion document has been developed on this topic. During the period under review, the global events that have occurred and the devastatingly inadequate response from the UN has confirmed the ANC's resolution that UN reform is an imperative. It has simply become more difficult to address the development challenges, as outlined in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), with the unresolved conflicts in Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan, Somalia, Libya but to mention a few. The colloquium on progressive internationalism hosted by the ANC touched on issues of the transformation of global governance institutions. The Subcommittee agreed that there needs to be a reflection by the NGC on and, if needs be, re-evaluation of our alliances (e.g. BRICS Plus) which aim to pursue UN reform. While the reform of the UNSC remains critical, we must remember that the Ezulwini Consensus called for a wholesale reform of the UN system.

G20

262. South Africa successfully lobbied for the African Union to be admitted to the G20 as a member and that was attained in India during the period under review. The African Union's full membership of the G20 will be important to enhancing African agency in global politics and the ANC, working with other progressive non-state actors, will continue to support the AU to ensure it uses its membership of the G20 to drive Africa's strategic priorities.
263. South Africa served as host and held the presidency of the G20 in 2025 and certainly used the opportunity to allow for Africa to influence the international agenda, emphasizing issues such as global peace, sustainable livelihoods and inclusive economic growth.
264. In the light of our successful G20 presidency, the first on the African continent and especially the climax of the Leaders' Summit, recognition must be given to the ANC's ability to pursue progressive internationalism and its ability to convince other world leaders, who may be more on the political Right, to adhere to these principles and values. South Africa's successful hosting of the G20, throughout the year, and the final Declaration speak to the ANC's progressive internationalism and our ability to once again position South Africa as providing leadership globally.

POLICY DEVELOPMENT ISSUES

265. Hitherto this Report has highlighted some of the positives and opportunities created by the international relations policy positions of the ANC as well as some areas that need attention and refining. Given the hosting of the BRICS Political Party Dialogue, the Liberation Movement Summit, the Colloquium on Progressive Internationalism, the International Relations Retreat as well as other engagements and events, the policy positions and principles of the ANC continue to be re-affirmed: a better Africa and a better world, campaigning and solidarity, mobilizing through party-to-party relations as well as ensuring the reform of global institutions to strengthen multilateralism.

Gender and International Relations

266. During the period under review, the ANC collaborated with various think tanks and non-governmental organizations. There is an agreement of exploring civil society driven mediation efforts driven by women and youth in particular and that a visit to conflict affected countries must be facilitated including Russia, Ukraine, Sudan,

Palestine, and Israel. The NEC Subcommittee on Gender invited the Subcommittee to address their colloquium on women in diplomacy.

Sustainable World Peace

267. A partnership was set in place between the ANC and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign affairs on collaborating on areas of peace building, democratic governance and international cooperation. There was an agreement that there must be a campaign to seek a peaceful solution to conflict and also collaborate on the efforts to save the children and women on both sides of the conflict.

Economic Diplomacy

268. A discussion document on South Africa's economic diplomacy in the changing global environment has been developed. The 55th National Conference also instructed an assessment of the status on the role and contribution of embassies in facilitating trade and investment as well as ensuring regular diagnostics and audit on trade and investment done. The 55th National Conference also called for the strengthen of the activities and programs of the trade missions in embassies as well as for the expedition of the formulation of policy on economic diplomacy. Therefore, an assessment of South African embassies is currently underway.
269. The ongoing discussion on the diversification of our trading partners and markets and the urgent need to implement vigorous economic diplomacy has been the focus of the Subcommittee. The Subcommittee has raised the question of economic development in all of its engagements held with international partners especially on the African continent. Economic diplomacy must become mainstream in our international relations work. It is also within this context that the Subcommittee continues to view the United States as a site of struggle wherein which we need to engage urgently non-state as well as legislative actors. At the same time and within this same context, the Subcommittee emphasized the importance of ensuring the success of the National Dialogue linking national interest with foreign policy/international outlook.

Capacity Building and Empowerment for International Relations

270. The Subcommittee hosted a successful international relations retreat. The retreat considered ideas that have informed and influenced the evolution of the ANC's international relations since its founding to contemporary ideas shaped by changing domestic and international balance of forces. This will assist in understanding the existing internal capacities of the organizations and its various structures tasked with navigating the political terrain in a post-election era that has brought forth the necessity for political parties to work together as per the mandate given by voters. The Subcommittee has also identified some organizations which we can collaborate with in order to enhance our work. One such organization is Friedrich Erbert Stiftung (FES) which has been embarking on a 25-year review of ANC International Relations together with the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD).
271. The ANC continues to strengthen its relationship with FES. The two organizations agree that it is important for the voice of progressive forces both in the North and South to unite in pursuit of similar objectives in global affairs. The FES also partnered with the ANC to host the Colloquium on Progressive Internationalism and the Women in Diplomacy Dialogue. The ANC continues to participate in FES engagements not only in the region but globally as well.

Building Internal Capacity and Coordination

272. As resolved by the 55th National Conference, the NEC/Political Head of International Relations at Chief Albert Luthuli House is now full-time and a National Office-Bearer: the first Deputy Secretary-General.
273. The 55th National Conference of the ANC also endowed upon the Subcommittee the responsibility to ensure that members of the ANC are provided with educational, instructional and empowering opportunities in general and in international relations in particular. The Subcommittee continues to facilitate educational and skills training abroad for members of the ANC and for ANC staff.
274. The Subcommittee functions well and continues to meet monthly. The Subcommittee also has a working relationship with other Subcommittees including, but not limited to, Peace and Stability, Political Education, PMER, Organizing and Mobilization, Campaigns and Economic Transformation, Arts and Culture, Archives and Heritage, Communications as well as the Leagues and Alliance partners.

Alliance Program on International Relations

275. The Subcommittee works well with Alliance partners (SACP, COSATU, and SANCO) and these are represented on the Subcommittee and attend our meetings. This cooperation plays a pivotal role in the international relations endeavors of the ANC significantly contributing to the party's overarching foreign policy aims, international solidarity and diplomatic initiatives.

Establishment of ANC International Branches Abroad

276. A foundation for a strategy to develop branches abroad was laid during the National Elections 2024 campaign. As mentioned earlier, working relations with sister parties also now entail looking into the establishment of international branches in those countries.
277. Although structures exist in some parts of the world, the NEC is yet to formally recognize and authorize the branches. ANC international structures need to be adequately established and implemented before the next National Conference and General Elections to secure a formalized ANC international network of party members and improved election outcomes.

Conclusion

278. The current geopolitical space the ANC inhabits is replete with contradictions, crises and opportunities. Despite the considerable challenges—the intensification of great power rivalries, the threat of renewed imperialism and the structural inequalities that hamper international solidarity, the ANC remains confident in its capacity to navigate these treacherous waters guided by the spirit and principles of progressive internationalism. The ANC's strength has always been in its ability to adapt to changing conditions while remaining anchored in the principles of progressive internationalism that define it, namely, Pan-Africanism, anti-imperialism, human rights and the rule of law, the peaceful resolution of conflict, international solidarity and non-alignment.
279. The tasks before the ANC are formidable. It must ensure that its engagements with BRICS, the G20, and the African Continental Free Trade Area yield tangible outcomes for South Africans and our continent at large. The ANC must lead in strengthening African unity, reversing economic dependency and neutralizing the influence of external actors seeking only to extract and exploit. Solidarity campaigns with Western Sahara, Cuba and Palestine should go hand in hand with renewed efforts to resolve conflicts across our continent, whether in Sudan, South Sudan, the DRC or Mozambique. Our diplomatic missions require a fresh infusion, clarity of purpose

- and efficiency to counter misinformation and maintain a steadfast presence in key global capitals.
280. Ultimately, the ANC's commitment to a fairer, more just and more inclusive global community demands that we stand resolute against resurgent forms of colonialism and imperialism. By empowering its cadres with robust political education and effectively communicating our policies to both local and international audiences, we will ensure that the ANC remains a moral and political force capable of influencing the international stage.
 281. The ANC must act now. The world will not wait for it to catch up. The ANC and South Africa must harness our collective energy to redefine the rules of engagement, champion the rights of marginalized nations and protect the agency of states to determine their own futures. In doing so, we will ensure that South Africa's voice - a voice forged in struggle, sacrifice and the enduring hope for a better humanity - continues to resonate in the corridors of power. And as it fights for justice abroad, it must renew our people's sense of purpose at home: creating the conditions for economic prosperity, social equality and an enduring culture of human solidarity.
 282. The road is long and the challenges are immense. Yet, as it has demonstrated time and again, the ANC's legacy is one of resilience and transformation. Let this moment of global uncertainty become an opportunity: to reaffirm our revolutionary mandate, to lead Africa towards true autonomy and unity and to shape an international landscape that upholds the dignity of every human being. In our hands lies the power to continue this struggle for generations to come, to ensure that we leave behind a world defined not by domination and greed, but by mutual respect, collective progress, and the unwavering pursuit of freedom and justice.

"South Africa will never again be a pawn of the powerful. We shall engage the world on the basis of our principles, not their pressure."

- President Thabo Mbeki

Recommendations

283. Based on the Report above and with the instructions of the 55th National Conference Resolutions in mind, the Subcommittee therefore wishes to make the following recommendations:
 - a) Enhance political education: that political education must ensure expanded training, guaranteeing that cadres understand the rapidly shifting global landscape and how it impacts the National Democratic Revolution.
 - b) Refine public engagement strategy: launch a dedicated international relations communication plan to counter misinformation, collaborate with civil society and media to disseminate consistent, fact-based narratives on South Africa's foreign policy as well as assess whether SA should not in addition to existing channels of diplomacy. Whilst exploring alternative communication channels, South Africa should continue the call for a return to established diplomatic protocols.
 - c) The ANC to educate our people and many others across the African continent and globally as well as lobby our leaders and institutions about South Africa's efforts and contribution towards the peaceful resolution of the Sahrawi-Morocco conflict.
 - d) Strengthen solidarity campaigns: coordinate support for Palestine, Cuba and other global struggles and balance activism with diplomatic imperatives to maintain constructive international relationships.
 - e) We should recall many efforts that our country made to contribute towards the peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, such as the Spear Dialogue, the

Skweyiya-Pahad diplomatic shuttling and shuffling in the Middle East amongst others, and build on these i.e. how do we take them forward?

- f) Promote intra-Africa trade: actively pursue AfCFTA implementation, industrialization, resource control and advocate for frameworks that ensure equitable gains for all member states.
- g) Strengthen diplomatic missions: conduct an efficiency audit of embassies, prioritize strategic regions, and allocate resources to maximize global impact.
- h) Coordinate international events: use commemorations (e.g., Fidel Castro's centenary) to cement ties with progressive allies and celebrate historical collaborations.
- i) Strategic economic modelling for South Africa: there is need for greater coordination and economic modelling to ensure South Africa's continued economic prosperity. The Economic Transformation Subcommittee and deployees in government must work closer with the Subcommittee to discuss vulnerability indices and replacement strategies. Such coordination must also involve the security cluster.
- j) National interest and continental development: in a changing geopolitical landscape, the importance of pursuing the national interest in line with principles of solidarity and humanitarianism remains imperative. This must continue to emphasize the importance of regional and continental development, including the implementation of the Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement, which should be regularly assessed on a quarterly basis. There is also a need to continue to deepen the national democratic revolution and to give urgent attention to the African standby force. South Africa must also work closely with African counterparts to develop and create the conditions for the growth and development of African entrepreneurs who can be equal to their global counterparts.
- k) Strengthening ANC's international strategy and engagement: the ANC should reassert its values and historical role in international affairs, including incorporating lessons and its experience from pre-1994 efforts. It must aim to improve public diplomacy and interaction with the world, involving business, cultural assets, and civil society while leveraging on its liberation heritage.
- l) Addressing internal ANC weaknesses and combatting racism: it is recommended to heavily mobilize civil society, including the White community, to respect the Constitution of the Republic and reclaim the ANC's influence during the Freedom Month of April. Secondly, it is recommended that the Government of National Unity (GNU) must address partner reliability especially in the face of American-led attacks on South Africa. The National Dialogue is an opportunity to unite South Africans and discuss international relations and the continued fight against racism at home and abroad. The ANC should thus not retreat on its NDR objectives such as building non-racialism and equity through legislation.
- m) Navigating global political landscape: the discussion focuses on the current global political landscape and its implications for South Africa. There is a need to be vigilant about the rise of right-wing forces both internationally and domestically. It is important to develop diplomatic strategies to navigate the current political climate, especially in relation to the United States, while maintaining South Africa's interests and values.
- n) Enhanced strategic engagement with Middle Powers: South Africa should enhance its engagement with middle powers from the Global North and Global South to safeguard multilateralism and global governance. It will also be important to work closely with the EU as it also faces uncertainty on its political and economic relations with the US. High vigilance will be needed in enhancing and monitoring the EU-SA/Africa relationship in a changing geopolitical landscape.

Such efforts will effectively initiate a process of cooperation amongst "willing and committed multilateralists" to forge a process that will isolate the unilateralists.

- o) Trade strategy with the US: monitor and analyze rather than engage the US when the Trump administration measures have not settled. Careful thought must be given on proactivity and anticipated implications for SA's efforts within the continent given the strategic importance of Africa to the long-term development objectives of South Africa must be considered whilst advancing a sectoral cooperation deal rather than one based on tariffs that promotes mutually beneficial outcomes and addresses South Africa's strategic vulnerabilities and supports our long-term development goals.
- p) South Africa should consider the leverage it has and how it can position itself in the new emerging global order, given this growing protectionism in the United States. It is important to consolidate the domestic market for exporters that may be "losers" in global markets – public procurement can be an important policy tool and South Africa should also consolidate the African market through the AfCFTA and leverage the opportunities entailed therein, a targeted diversification strategy is critical, especially for the products vulnerable under AGOA. It may be important to use upcoming international events such as the BRICS Summit to discuss with like-minded countries the growing protectionism as well as how to increase intra-BRICS trade.
- q) South Africa contributes towards regional peace-keeping missions and is commended for these noble efforts towards regional peace and stability. The ANC should always be alive to the challenges that come with such commitments and should be deliberate in contributing in public discourse to formulate a positive narrative around the importance of engaging in such Pan-African efforts despite inevitable loss of human life in the "battlefield" outside of South Africa's borders.
- r) The ANC should formulate a strategy around how it will be engaging in these processes of the elections of leadership of regional and global bodies. It is vital that such an important institutional aspect should not be left until the last minute. We should as an organization and an active member state formulate our principled position and approach to elections and hit the ground running.

ANC LEAGUES

ANC Veterans League

Introduction

284. This report summarises the Performance of the ANC Veterans' League (VL) during its current term of office which commenced in July 2023. Annexures to the report set out the details of the performance of the VL for the period from Page 50 onwards. The report concludes with recommendations in preparation for the National General Council (NGC) in December 2025. The VL is insistent that these recommendations be discussed, enhanced, adopted and implemented in order to realise ANC Renewal to Advance the Freedom Charter as envisage in the NGC Base Document. These recommendations are contained on pages 10 – 14.
285. Clause 7.7 of the ANC Constitution provides for the establishment of the ANC Veterans' League (VL): *The ANC Veterans' League shall be open to all ANC members 60 (sixty) years of age or older, who have served the ANC and the movement over an unbroken period of 40 (forty) years. It shall operate on a national and provincial basis. Its objectives are to ensure that veterans make a full and rich contribution to the work of the ANC, to the movement and to the life of the nation. The ANC Veterans' League will function as an autonomous body within the overall structure of the ANC, of which it shall be an integral part, with its own Constitution, rules and regulations, provided that these shall not be in conflict with the Constitution and policies of the ANC.*
286. The term of office of the ANCVL NEC elected at the 2nd National Conference of the expired in October 2022, and at the time the VL was dysfunctional. A Veterans' League (VL) National Task Team (NTT) was appointed on 4 November 2022 by the ANC NEC in the run up to the 55th Conference of the ANC in December 2022, after the term of the ANC VL NEC lapsed. The mandate of the NTT was to: Prepare for the ANC 55th National Conference; Clarify eligibility criteria for membership and include all ANC members over 60 years old and with unbroken service of over 40 years ; Set up organisational structures; ad Develop and implement a Roadmap to VL National and Provincial Conferences by the end of July 2023

VL Representation at ANC 55th National Conference, December 2022

287. Following the appointment of the NTT, the VL was represented by 25 voting delegates and 10 non-voting delegates at the 55th national conference. The critical input of the delegation focused on the importance of restoring public confidence in the ANC and the state of the ANC. Inputs were made on Renewal of the ANC, and a Programme of Action. The outcomes of the national conference and the ANC NEC Lekgotla inform the programme of

political and organizational work of the ANC VL through its Committees and Provincial structures.

3rd National Conference of the VL, July 2023

288. Following the ANCVL 2nd National Conference in 2017 there was no systematic process of identifying qualifying members of the ANC VL on a rolling basis as they qualify, based on reaching 60 years of age and 40 years of unbroken service to the ANC and the Movement and ANC membership in good standing. This was aggravated by the period of the COVID 19 pandemic where organisational work of the ANC was severely affected.
289. In preparation for the 3rd VL National Conference on 28 to 30 July 2023, a clarion call was made to members qualifying as members of the VL to come forward and participate in the structures of the VL and by the time of the VL National Conference 2 340 members were verified, organised in 75 branches at regional level across the country. Out of the 9 Provinces, the Northwest Province had convened its Provincial Conference in March 2023 and the remaining Provinces, with the exception of Gauteng and KwaZulu Natal, successfully convened a Provincial Conference and elected a PEC.
290. As set out in the introduction of the Report and Resolutions of the ANC VL 3rd Conference (Annexure B):
"The 3rd National Conference was not merely a gathering of individuals but a convergence of principles, experiences, and dreams that encapsulate the essence of the African National Congress. As we chart a path forwards, we are reminded of our solemn duty to reinvigorate and rebuild the very foundation of our organization, to restore public confidence, and to usher in a new era of unity and renewal."
291. Following the Conference, a Programme of Action was developed and adopted at a Lekgotla of the VL NEC in September 2023 for the term of office of the NEC. (Annexure C). The theme of the 3rd National Conference of the VL, which took place from 28 to 30 July 2023, was *"Renewal of the ANC to advance the National Democratic Revolution"*. The Conference Declaration is the departure point for the priorities of the VL which are focused on three pillars (Annexure A)
1. Organising the Veterans League
 2. The Renewal of the ANC
 - a) Political education and cadre development
 - b) Holding political leadership and deployees accountable
 - c) Addressing integrity, ethics and corruption
 3. Towards the 2026 Local Government Elections: making service delivery a priority
292. The VL is currently fully functional throughout the country, playing a leading role in the renewal of the ANC to "Advance the Freedom Charter". The institutional memory of the membership of the VL is critical in asserting the aims and objectives, and character of the ANC, as well as defending the unity and integrity of the organisation.

STATE OF ORGANISATION OF THE VL

Current membership and organisational structures of the ANCVL

293. Since the 3rd National VL Conference in 2023, the VL has established a presence throughout the country with representation in all Provinces and Regions. Branches are established at Regional or Sub-Regional / Zonal level. Where the numbers of verified members of the VL are more than 50 in Sub-region, more than one branch is established corresponding to a cluster of ANC branches. The VL has an elected Provincial leadership in 7 of the 9 Provinces. The Gauteng Provincial Conference is scheduled for 5 to 7 December 2025 and the KwaZulu Natal Conference will only take place after branches in the Province are properly constituted.

NEC, NWC and VL Committees

294. The Year Planner of the VL provides for meetings of the Constitutional structures of the VL as provided for in the VL Constitution. In addition, the VL National Office Bearers meet fortnightly to process decisions of the VL NWC and NEC . The VL has 8 committees which meet and report monthly to the VL NWC and quarterly to the VL NEC.
- (i) Organising and Membership
 - (ii) Renewal, Political Education and Cadre Development
 - (iii) Communications Committee
 - (iv) Elections & Campaigns Committee
 - (v) National Awards, Isithwalandwe & Wellbeing of Veterans
 - (vi) Adhoc Committee: Reburials
 - (vii) Adhoc Committee: ANC NGC
 - (viii) Adhoc Committee: ANC Constitutional amendments
295. Members of the VL NEC are also deployed to represent the VL in the subcommittees of the ANC NEC when they meet.

VL Membership

296. Membership of the ANCVL has almost doubled since the time of 3rd National Conference of the VL with 3 945 verified members, a further 2 375 pending verification and/or in the process of renewing their membership. In total we have 6 320 veterans on our database.
297. The VL has resolved to recommend an amendment to the ANC Constitution to provide for Honorary and Lifelong membership to be granted to all ANC members over the age of 80 with 40 years of unbroken service without a requirement to pay a membership fee. This would afford recognition to those who have served the ANC for their entire adult lives and who, while they may be in a position and can be encouraged to contribute financially to the ANC, find the navigation of the ANC online membership system technologically challenging.
298. The current provision in terms of Clause 4.3 of the ANC Constitution to grant Honorary membership to individuals who do not qualify as members could be replaced by granting Auxiliary membership status.

Branches

299. Members are organised into VL branches corresponding to an ANC region, sub-region or cluster of branches. In regions where there are not 10 or more verified members of the VL, members in the region participate in the work of the VL in a neighbouring sub-region. This means that the VL now

has a presence in every ANC region across the length and breadth of the country. There are 50 launched VL branches and 107 branches still to be launched when members have completed the compulsory Foundation Course.

Regions

300. There are 10 Regions where the membership numbers warrant it, and the VL NEC has approved the launch of Regions: 2 in Eastern Cape, 1 in Free State, 3 in Gauteng, 1 in KwaZulu Natal, 2 in Mpumalanga and 1 in Western Cape.

VETERANS LEAGUE AND CAMPAIGNS

The 2024 Provincial and National General Elections

301. Informed by the prediction of a massive loss of confidence of the electorate in the ANC, the focus of the VL participation in the 2024 Elections Campaign was: Visible participation in the elections programme of the ANC as members of ANC branches and ANCVL branches signalling the support of ANCVL members for the renewal of the ANC as a contribution to restoring public confidence in the ANC. A timetable of activities to be initiated by the ANCVL, supported by all structures of the ANC focusing on older persons. Contributing to campaign messaging to inspire public confidence.
302. The election outcome remains worrying as the current Government of National Unity arrangements reflect the will of only 40% of the electorate, given that 60% of the electorate chose not to vote. The net result of this is that only approximately 16% of the electorate voted for the ANC. In its report, the VL assessed and made recommendations on major root causes of the dismal performance (Annexure D)
- a) Selection of candidates, the list process
 - b) Credible, ethical and incorruptible leadership
 - c) State of organisation
 - d) Attitude and behaviour, rights and responsibilities of members
 - e) Management of organisational discipline
 - f) Service delivery
 - g) Voter education and electoral reform.

Special campaign to regain the confidence of the people in the ANC and reposition the ANC as a leader of society again

303. Following the assessment of the National and Provincial General Elections 2024 and the ANC Elections and Campaigns Strategy Workshop, the VL has adopted a special campaign as part and parcel of the ANC Renewal Campaign for the upcoming Local Government Elections 2026 .
304. This special campaign has resulted in the establishment of an Adhoc Committee in the ANC SGO, on Service Delivery challenges in government

which has seen the setting up of a Call Centre, Hotline and WhatsApp number for service delivery challenges and anonymous reporting of corruption. The official launch will take place in October 2025 by the ANC Secretary General. VL also actively participates in the Local Government Intervention Task Team dealing with rapid response on service delivery.

Communications

- 305. The VL has a Communication sub-committee made of NEC members and other veterans. They have focused on arranging webinars, commemorative events, articles for ANC Today and the mainstream media, and the collection of oral histories. Webinars have been held monthly or every second month on topical issues such as the budget and local government, which are attended by about 120 veteran league members and others.
- 306. The Veterans League in partnership with COSATU arranged an event to celebrate the 70th anniversary of South African Congress of Trade Unions, SACTU. Cde Sydney Mufamadi gave the keynote address on the event which was held on 5 March 2025.
- 307. An intergenerational dialogue involving 70 leaders from the Veterans League and the youth formations of ANC YL, COSAS, SASCO and the Young Women's Desk of the ANC Women's League was arranged to commemorate 70 years of the Freedom Charter on 28th June 2025.
- 308. Articles commenting on key issues are published regularly in ANC Today. ANC Today also ran a series where veterans were interviewed about their experiences of the Freedom Charter.

The Imperative for Renewal of the ANC and Five Pillars of Renewal

- 309. The VL has taken upon itself the urgent challenge of renewing the ANC. This need was identified in three successive national conferences of the ANC – 2012, 2017 and 2022. These conferences resolved that Renewal must be a priority “for the long-term strategic survival and success of the ANC and the National Democratic Revolution.” The latest national and provincial election results of 29 May 2024, in which the ANC was only able to amass 40% of the vote, thereby losing the ability to govern the country alone, were the worst since the dawn of democracy. This was an indication that the Movement is on the precipice teetering towards oblivion, unless the renewal project is immediately and earnestly implemented.
- 310. The Veterans League developed the Base Document on Renewal wherein the 5 pillars of Renewal of the ANC are set out: (Annexure E)
 - a) **Compulsory political education for all members:** A systematic programme of political education and development of new cadres at all levels of the ANC and the broad democratic movement, starting with the Foundation Course for all members.
 - b) **A new approach to recruiting members:** Like any live organisation, being a member of the ANC must regularly be subjected to a renewal

process. This means that each member must ensure that they meet the minimum criteria to remain a 'member in good standing'. The ANC's seminal document "Through the Eye of a Needle" must be used as a mechanism to test the standing of the member. This step is necessary because all leaders of the ANC are the products of the organisation's structures.

- c) **Rethinking the role and structure of the ANC Branch to reconnect with the people:** the ANC Branch must be the principal vehicle through which ANC members lead the efforts of communities and citizens in advancing community development and service delivery.
 - d) **Place the Ethics and Integrity agenda at the centre** of the ANC's organisational and governance work to reclaim moral authority that was so key in the struggle for freedom. This is only possible if the ANC can adopt an uncompromising attitude to corruption and all forms of misconduct.
 - e) Reassert and practically demonstrate its unwavering commitment to the principles of unity, non-racialism, non-sexism, democratic and prosperous society.
311. It is logical that these five pillars should be implemented from the most basic organ of the organisation, i.e. the ANC branch.
312. The work of the Renewal Commission led by the ANC President is crucial, as is the work of a National Renewal Implementation Team which must interface with Provincial Renewal Implementation Teams in each Province. The VL has been at the forefront of initiatives driving the political and organisational renewal of the ANC. The VL has worked closely with comrade David Makhura, the Head of the ANC Political Education Programme, to finalise the Renewal Base document and develop the content and roll-out the 5 modules of the compulsory Foundation Course. Experienced VL members are assisting with the roll-out of the Foundation Course to all members of the ANC.

RELATIONSHIP WITH MOTHER BODY

313. ANC hosted a Summit of the Liberation Movements of Southern Africa 25-28 July 2025 in Gauteng attended by the Presidents and SGs of the ANC, MPLA, SWAPO, Frelimo, Zanu PF and Chama Cha Mapinduzi. Senior statesmen Cde former President of Frelimo, Joachim Chissano and former President Thabo Mbeki also attended. The Declaration emphasised regional unity, economic inequalities and transformation, youth empowerment and gender equality, peace and stability. The ANC Leagues were full participants in the Summit.
314. On 8 January 2025, three veterans received the highest honour from the ANC at its Celebrations on 11 January in Cape Town. The awards recognise individuals who have made outstanding contributions and sacrifices to the liberation struggle in South Africa. Isithwalandwe Seaparankoe award was bestowed on veterans Dr TT Cholo, Nkosinathi Ben Fihla and Dr Mama Mandu Mildred Ramakaba Lesia.
315. The VL is represented in structures at all levels of the ANC and an active participant in all political and organisational programmes of the ANC. It must be noted that it is the first time in decades that the ANC has three fully functional Leagues - Youth League, Women's League and Veterans' League.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NGC

316. The ANC VL in preparation for the NGC has:
- a) Distributed the NGC Base Document to its structures
 - b) Convened an Ad-hoc Committee to prepare for the NGC
 - c) Convened an Ad-hoc Committee on constitutional amendments, which has made proposals for a politically conscious, activist membership and organisational renewal as well as proposals to democratise the process of choosing ethical leaders and public representatives.
 - d) Hosted an online roundtable on 26 October 2025, attended by 340 comrades to discuss and debate key issues raised in the NGC Base Document, including assessing the current conjuncture, the nature of the motive forces, the national question and the state of the ANC.
 - e) Hosted an online roundtable together with the MKLVW on 16 November 2025, attended by 367 veterans, to specifically discuss proposals arising out of the discussion on 26 October 2025 and from the VL committees for submission to the NGC.
317. The key conclusions from the webinars can be summarised as follows:
- a) To address the current conjuncture and existential crisis facing the ANC, cautious reform and half-hearted measures will not lift us out of the current situation. A profound and decisive transformation of the country and the ANC is required.
 - b) The changing composition of the motive forces, as well as lost opportunities to mobilise young people, women, and the rural masses, has led to a decline in voting support. The ANC needs to go back to the basics, work on the ground and focus on sectoral issues and campaigns to reconnect to our people
 - c) The need to unite the South African nation behind the progressive ideals of the Constitution in the face of ethnic mobilisation in some provinces and the loss of support among minority communities. More must be done to push back against attacks on the ANC's transformational agenda.
 - d) It is in the lived experience of our people that they will be convinced that the ANC is serious about renewal. The renewal efforts have not yet gone far enough to reverse the ANC's fortunes, and we need to be wary of renewal being reduced to slogans and cosmetic changes. There is a need to deepen and extend efforts to modernise the ANC, including by amending the ANC constitution.
318. Further to the webinars and the work of the VL committees, a discussion document was approved by the VL NWC containing proposals to improve the functioning of the ANC. which requires a politically conscious activist membership, participating in branches and forums, configured to strengthen and renew the ANC.
319. The proposals in Annexure 1, summarised below, and the reports of the webinars in Annexure 2 and 3, will be finalised at a VL NEC meeting on 29 November 2025.
320. **On Political education:** Political education needs to be continuous, more robust and relevant. Participating in political education must be a

requirement to ensure a politically conscious membership and a prerequisite for leadership roles at all levels of the organisation. The rollout of the Foundation Course needs to be continuously reviewed to enhance the content, methodology for different cohorts and audiences of membership, and nature of assessments.

321. **On Membership:** To embed a culture of activism in the communities in which members live, in the workplace, and in areas of professional and social involvement, the VL has made detailed proposals to tighten membership criteria and set out the responsibilities that comrades must meet to remain members, including a requirement for each member to attend at least one ANC meeting a year and report on their involvements annually.
322. This includes strengthening the membership oath requiring members, at the time of joining and renewing, to comply with updated criteria for membership, set out their motivation for ANC membership and accept that membership will be revoked in the event of any false declarations. The VL is also proposing that:
 - a) Members over the age of 80 who are verified members of the ANCVL with 40 years of unbroken service be granted Honorary Life Membership status, contributing according to ability, and exempted from the requirement to pay a membership fee.
 - b) Members who broke their service and have rejoined the ANC should be required to complete an induction programme and be required to meet any requirements to serve in a leadership position as if they were a new member.
323. **On Branches and other local structures:** To accommodate and grow our influence amongst key motive forces, while ward-based branches must remain the basic unit of organisation and remain compulsory, the VL is proposing optional membership of defined sectoral forums focusing on policy issues and common-interest forums to enhance participation. All these structures should be outwardly focused and have a detailed programme of action, including a plan for stakeholder participation and engagement.
324. The compulsory **ANC Branch** should, with flexibility appropriate to the branch, be organised into sub-branches at the VD level, and with committees appropriate to address community issues. The ANC branch would have the exclusive role of nominating a ward councillor.
325. A **Sectoral Forum** should harness the knowledge base of membership for policy formulation, implementation and monitoring and evaluation. The PEC should recognise the sectoral forums, correspond to the demarcation of a province, region or sub-region and correspond to the NEC policy committees. The sectoral forum Programme of Action should include a plan for engagement with ANC supporters and role players in the relevant sector, and all sectoral forums should be convened by the responsible NEC committee at least 6 months before the convening of an NGC or National Conference to contribute to ANC policy for the relevant sector

326. **A Common Interest Forum**, recognised by the PEC, should be established to facilitate participation in ANC programmes, for example, in remote workplaces and educational institutions, and in gatherings for shared social and faith-based interests. Each common-interest forum should have representation at RGCs and PGCs, but should not have the right to nominate for leadership positions to avoid overlap with branch nominations.
327. **On Ethical leadership:** In recent years, the ANC NEC has introduced lifestyle audits, step-aside provisions as well as the Integrity Committee to address members who bring the organisation into disrepute. If unethical and immoral conduct in the ANC is not addressed, public confidence in the ANC will not be restored.
- Firstly, on the step aside provisions, the VL has consistently called for a review of the step aside resolutions so that leaders who have brought the organisation into disrepute step aside even if they have not been charged.
 - Secondly, the ANC Constitution limits the Integrity Commission's mandate to addressing unethical or immoral conduct. Its mandate is separate from that of the National Disciplinary Committee (NDC) and the National Disciplinary Committee of Appeal (NDCA). The VL is of the view that the terms of reference of the Integrity Commission should be reviewed to entrench the independent authority and decision-making powers of the Integrity Commission. Their decisions should be binding and not subject to change by any other ANC structure. Suppose the ANC NEC believes that the Integrity Commission is exceeding its mandate. In that case, action should be taken against the structure, including replacing its members rather than changing individual decisions that it may have made.
 - Thirdly, while the commitment to vetting and lifestyle audits has been made in the ANC, the VL is calling for attention to the effective operationalisation of these commitments, including the establishment of infrastructure and standards for what must be considered, so that vetting does not become a further tick-box exercise.
328. **On Clean elections within the ANC:** There was overwhelming feedback from VL members about the problems of money and factions at the branch level, leading to inappropriate leaders being elected or nominated. The VL has made detailed recommendations relating to campaigning, funding of candidates, transparency and an independent elections committee guided by the following principles:
- a) To be selected, candidates must show the necessary skills and competencies to perform well in the position and a commitment to serve the people.
 - b) Campaigning for elections must be fair.
 - c) An electoral system must be understandable and accessible for all members.
 - d) The system should not be too time-consuming.
329. **On Public representatives that represent the best of society:** With due regard to the ANC's loss of hegemony, the VL is calling for processes when we nominate candidates for public office that enable the best of our community or sectoral leaders to become our public representatives.

330. **On Structure of government:** The imperative for the ANC in government is to improve state performance and capability. This requires decisive action on issues that ANC conferences have either debated extensively or resolved but not implemented. High on this list for consideration is the structure of government including reducing the number of provinces, having one tier of local government, reviewing wall-to-wall local government, instituting a single public service, and reducing the number of cabinet ministers.

ANC Women's League



BACKGROUND

- 331. The African National Congress Women's League (ANCWL), established in 1948, has always been the backbone of the liberation movement and a catalyst for women's emancipation. Women activism predates the League through formations like the Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW) in 1954 and the 1956 Women's March, which embodied resistance to the apartheid state and patriarchy.
- 332. The mandate of the ANCWL is grounded in the National Democratic Revolution (NDR), which recognises patriarchy as a structural pillar of inequality that must be dismantled for South Africa to achieve full liberation. The NDR centres women's emancipation as a strategic objective, not an add-on. The ANCWL has historically shaped national policy through: Constitutional gender equality protections. ANC's 50/50 representation policy. Key legislation on sexual offences, domestic violence, maintenance, and gender equality. Advocacy for women's inclusion in political, economic and social transformation
- 333. The NGC, as a mid-term organisational review, offers the ANCWL the platform to evaluate progress and strengthen gender transformation towards the 2027 National Conference.

THE 13TH ANCWL NATIONAL CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS:

- 334. **GBVF as a National Priority:** The 13th National Conference of the ANCWL adopted resolutions that reaffirmed and expanded the League's mandate. Key pillars include Expanding shelters, psycho-social support, and community mobilisation. Declaration of GBVF as a crisis and its classification as a National Disaster is a step towards combating the scourge. of . Recognising GBVF as a national crisis requiring coordinated state response. Strengthening demand for no bail, harsher sentencing, and rapid prosecution for GBVF crimes.
- 335. The declaration of GBVF as a national disaster by the President during the G20 Summit is a major milestone influenced directly by the advocacy of the ANCWL. Awareness has grown, the NSP has been institutionalised, and specialised courts are emerging. Yet implementation remains slow and uneven. Police response is inconsistent, investigations are delayed, dockets go missing, and survivors struggle to access justice. Shelters and psycho-social support remain inadequate, particularly in rural municipalities.
- 336. The NGC must reaffirm the ANCWL's 13th Conference stance: no bail for GBVF perpetrators, life sentences for rape and femicide, and the rollout of dedicated GBVF courts to fast-track cases. A ring-fenced GBVF Emergency Fund, expanded shelters, police accountability mechanisms and coordinated interdepartmental efforts are essential to give meaning to the national disaster declaration.
- 337. The NGC must impress on the enforcement of legislation that seeks to combat online GBV, where cyber bullying and online sexual harassment continue to discriminate women, children and vulnerable groups.
- 338. **Economic Emancipation of Women:** Full participation of women in strategic, high-growth sectors (energy, mining, ICT, agriculture, maritime, defence). Enforcement of set-asides and quotas for women-owned enterprises in public

procurement. Support for township and rural women economies, with localisation and village development at the centre.

339. **Feminised Poverty:** South Africa continues to battle profound levels of feminised poverty, with African women, particularly in rural villages and townships — remaining the poorest demographic. While important strides have been made through social grants, expanded public employment programmes and entrepreneurial support for women, poverty remains structurally gendered. Women struggle to access productive assets such as land, markets, modern tools, finance, and infrastructure that would allow them to expand economic opportunities and build generational wealth.
340. Unpaid care work continues to limit women's economic mobility, trapping women in low-wage labour or informal work without protection. Rural women remain constrained by poor roads, inadequate healthcare facilities, limited access to water for agriculture, and weak market linkages.
341. The NGC must therefore reaffirm the ANC's commitment to gender-responsive budgeting, land reform quotas for women, and blended finance solutions for women-owned cooperatives. Building infrastructure in rural areas — including roads, storage facilities, clinics and trading hubs — is central for dismantling feminised poverty.
342. **Economic Exclusion Of Women:** Although women have benefited from certain agriculture, entrepreneurship and social development programmes, economic inclusion remains limited in the most strategic sectors of the economy: energy, mining, ICT, maritime, logistics, defence, manufacturing and agro-processing. Procurement systems still largely favour established players, while women-owned businesses struggle to scale due to limited access to capital, technology and markets.
343. To advance the ANCWL's 13th Conference resolutions, the NGC must reaffirm reinforcement of policies on set-asides and quotas for women-owned enterprises in state procurement and strategic value chains. Industrial parks and hubs dedicated to women must be developed, and financing from IDC, DBSA and SEFA must be restructured to benefit women entrepreneurs. Training programmes for women must include STEM, mining engineering, maritime careers, coding, robotics and the green and blue economy.
344. **The Gender Pay Gap:** Although constitutional and labour protections exist, the gender pay gap continues to disadvantage women, especially Black women and women with disabilities. Some progress has been made through sectoral determinations and corporate pay reviews, but the wage gap persists across both public and private sectors. Mandatory gender pay audits, pay transparency, and stricter enforcement of equal pay for work of equal value are essential. Raising wages in female-dominated sectors, particularly domestic work, retail and the care economy — is fundamental to closing the gendered income gap.
345. **The Care Economy:** The care economy remains one of the most undervalued pillars of society, despite being the backbone of families, communities and national productivity. Women overwhelmingly shoulder the burden of unpaid childcare, eldercare, disability care and household labour. While the shift of ECD into the Department of Basic Education and improvements in domestic worker wages represent progress, the care economy remains invisible in national planning and undervalued in the labour market. To unlock women's full economic participation, care work must be professionalised, community childcare facilities subsidised, and care labour recognised within macroeconomic frameworks. Municipalities must integrate the care economy into Local Economic Development (LED) strategies, ensuring that community-based childcare centres and care co-operatives receive funding and formal recognition.

346. **Health & Reproductive Justice:** Support for universal access to health through the National Health Insurance (NHI). Strengthening maternal health, SRHR services, mental health and chronic care with a gendered focus.
347. **Health Inequalities and Accelerating the NHI:** Significant progress has been made through the expansion of community health workers, improved maternal care in certain provinces and the passage of the National Health Insurance (NHI) Bill. However, women, particularly those in rural areas — continue to face long distances to facilities, inadequate SRHR services, long waiting times and limited mental health support. Women with disabilities remain severely disadvantaged due to inaccessible infrastructure, transport barriers and limited assistive services. Accelerating NHI implementation with a deliberate gendered focus is essential. The NHI must prioritise reproductive health, maternal care, mental health, community health workers, mobile clinics and universal access for rural women and women with disabilities.
348. **Organisational Renewal & Women's Leadership:** Enforcement of the 50/50 gender parity policy across all spheres. Acceleration of women representation in Cabinet, DGs, Premiers, MECs, Mayors, Municipal Managers, SOEs and regulators. Leadership pipelines for young women and women with disabilities. Strengthening capacity and funding of the Department of Women.
349. **Women with Disabilities:** Inclusion in economic programmes, leadership pathways, GBVF services, health access, and public infrastructure planning.
350. **Youth and Girl-Child Empowerment:** Prioritising education, safety, access to digital skills, STEM, sports, arts and leadership programmes for girls. Expeditious roll-out of basic education to both the girl and the boy child on the dangers of early pregnancy, substance abuse and integrating GBV education into mainstream curricula.
351. **Crime and Safety:** Crime continues to undermine community stability, disproportionately affecting women and children. Some municipalities have established community safety forums and firearm controls have improved in pockets, but illegal firearms, trafficking networks and violent crime remain widespread. The ANCWL supports a 10-year moratorium on firearm licence issuance and the strengthening of intelligence, border management and forensic capabilities. Women-led community safety structures should be expanded and formalised.
352. **Strengthening the ANCWL as an Organisation:** Capacity building and political education for structures. Growing membership and strengthening branches. Ensuring organisational discipline, unity and renewal.
353. **Leadership, Representation and 50/50 Enforcement:** The ANC remains among the few liberation movements globally with strong female leadership representation. However, significant gaps persist in senior state positions — including Directors-General, Mayors, Municipal Managers, CFOs, SOE boards and regulatory authorities. Women with disabilities are almost entirely absent from high-level governance structures. To correct this, the NGC must commit to a constitutional amendment to enforce 50/50 representation across all public institutions — national, provincial and municipal. The Department of Women, Youth and Persons with Disabilities must receive increased funding to track compliance, monitor leadership data and hold departments accountable. Leadership pipelines for young women and women with disabilities must be institutionalised. The ANCWL urges the NGC to consider our resolve to contest strategic leadership from the structures of the organisation at all levels. Women leadership is of vital importance to change the patriarchal outlook in our structures.
354. We appreciate the review in the Local Government Guidelines, we further lobby the NGC to enable a policy framework that seeks to balance gender representation as texted in Rule 6 of the ANC Constitution in support of its full implementation during Ward Councillor nominations.

355. **Rural and Township Economies:** While township revitalisation programmes and agricultural support have benefited some rural women, structural barriers persist. Township spaza shops are dominated by undocumented foreign nationals, LED strategies remain poorly implemented, and rural women lack access to land, tools, market linkages, storage, and infrastructure. The NGC must prioritise localisation strategies that empower township and village women to produce for local markets. LED strategies must include clear quotas for women-owned businesses, while enforcement on business licensing and immigration must protect local economies. Village-based cooperatives must be supported as engines of sustainable growth, with electricity, water, equipment and market access ensured.
356. **International Relations:** The ANCWL have been consistent in advancing international peace and sovereignty of nation states, whilst strengthening relations with former liberation movements in the African continent, and we actively participate in continental collaborations, and we urge the ANC to continue to necessitate our representation in geo-politics. We further lobby the ANC to urgently look into the current developments in the Palestine matter as the political climate takes positive developments.

CONCLUSION

357. The ANCWL, guided by the NDR and the 13th ANCWL Conference resolutions, submits that women's emancipation remains the cornerstone of South Africa's democratic project. While progress has been made since 1994, the pace of transformation remains too slow. Feminised poverty, GBVF, the gender pay gap, structural economic exclusion and leadership underrepresentation demand urgent, coordinated and decisive action.
358. The NGC must adopt strong, enforceable directives to accelerate gender transformation, strengthen institutions, and position women at the centre of governance, the economy and community safety. Women's liberation is not peripheral to the NDR — it is its foundation. The future of the movement and the nation depend on how boldly we act now.


ANC Youth League

Introduction

359. The 26th National Congress of the ANC Youth League held in July 2023, was a historical milestone for the movement as a whole, as it saw an end to nearly a decade of interim structures. The 26th National Congress was imbued with the quest for Radical Policy Shift; as such it emerged with the continuum of the demand for Radical shift in the Social and Economic Policy of the ANC and Government in South Africa and the African Continent. The Congress was marked by a dynamic continuum of the generational mission of Economic Freedom adopted by the 24th National congress of the ANCYL.
360. The 26th National Congress demanded key interventions in the following key Economic and Political areas:
- Acceleration of Import Substitution Industrialisation.
 - Introduction of Export Ban or Quotas for Critical Raw Materials and metals.
 - Reviewal of the Industrial, Macro and Micro Economic policy.
 - Strategic Nationalisation for Industrialisation.
 - Expropriation without compensation for socialization.
 - Prioritisation of Political Education and Ideological training in the rank and file of the ANCYL.
 - Land reform and land tenure rights.
361. On organisational interventions the 26th National Congress introduced a new official position of the 2nd Deputy Secretary General, who is now responsible for Policy, Monitoring, Research and Evaluation; and also amended the term of office for the Youth League NEC to four years, the PEC term of office to thirty-months and the REC term of office to two years.
362. Congress resolved that all branches should establish Voting-District (VD) based sub-branches and for a comprehensive renewal of the ANCYL as an organisation, in order to restore its relevance, vibrancy and effectiveness in championing the interests of young people. Congress further noted the need for a strong and united PYA to advance the interests and aspirations of young South Africans, with regular joint meetings and campaigns. The ANC Youth League is on course to revive itself after almost a decade of absence.
363. Over the past fifteen years, the ANCYL faced significant challenges of infiltration, comrade buying, ideological distortion, and political diversion to deliberately disconnect it from the broader youth populace through false portrayal of wealth, meanwhile everyone is aware of your social status or class position as long as there is a funder regardless of their goal to undermine the revolution's cause.
364. In affirmation of African Claims of 1948, which alluded that *"The struggle is on right now and it must be persistent and insistent. In a mass liberation movement, there is no room for divisions or for personal ambitions. The goal is one, namely, freedom for all."* The ANC Youth League also allude that the goal is Economic Freedom and Social Change, Now and Not Later.
365. Therefore, massive political education and ideological training within the ranks of the ANCYL, will serve as a renewal mechanism to develop a well-informed and politically conscious cadre of the youth league. As a preparatory school of the ANC, the ANCYL to must enhance the capacity and skills of its leaders and members through targeted leadership development programmes, mentorship initiatives and the promotion of ethical and effective organisational practices.

366. The ANCYL resolved to initiate a comprehensive review of its structures, constitution and organisational processes in order to identify areas of weaknesses, streamline decisionmaking processes and ensure efficient and accountable functioning. The Congress resolved that the NEC must establish an ANCYL Research and Policy Institute, which will provide a platform for research and policies that address the specific needs and concerns of the youth in South Africa.
367. The Freedom Charter remains a living document and not just a vision of the past, but a battle plan for the future. Tje ANCYL recommit itself to the struggle to realise its demands in full, with a renewed sense of urgency, militancy and clarity. Each of the Freedom Charter clauses speaks directly to the realities we face today. The Freedom Charter remains the guiding programme of the ANC Youth League and the National Congress resolutely reaffirm and reassert our unwavering allegiance to the immortal principles enshrined within the hallowed pages of the Freedom Charter. This sacred covenant remains the compass that directs our path towards Economic Freedom in our lifetime.
368. The organisation and movement at large requires disciplined, intellectual, militant and politically conscious leaders who are committed to achieve fundamental social change for the benefit of all young people and the working class. With that said, what then is the state of organisation since the 24th National Congress and the 2nd National General Council?
369. Below is the painful statistics of the bloated youth unemployment, presenting a picture as though we are a country at war. This is why young people in our country pin their hopes and aspirations in the ANCYL to change this painful picture of a generation that is going to waste. Out of school, out of work during the prime time of their lives.

Figure. Youth unemployment by Province, 2014 and 2024



370. The 21 million youth ages 15 to 34 years are the primary constituency of the League, with 35% of them unemployed in 2024, and including 4.3 million young people not in education, employment or training (NEETs).

State of Organisation

371. The ANCYL is currently in a stage of rebuilding and renewing its structures. The rebuilding process entails two fundamental aspects: the autonomy of the ANC Youth League and positioning the ANC Youth League to be the voice of the youth of South Africa. More importantly, it aims to capture the imagination of our masses and reimagine our society under the premise of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR).

372. The NDR serves as the foundation of our ideological posture as the ANC Youth League and the ANC. It is important that we operationalize it to fit the context of our society in the 21st century and provide the line of march for the future of our society. In other words, we must place the NDR at the centre of the current social formation.
373. In order to address the challenges identified, Congress resolved to urge all ANC YL structures and members to fully commit to the renewal process, and to actively participate in the rebuilding and reinvigorating of the organisation, in order to realise its full potential as a powerful force for the empowerment and transformation of South Africa's youth.
374. The ANC Youth League NEC committed to tackling and addressing challenges that hinder organisational renewal, such as corruption and factionalism. Strict accountability measures are implemented through Political Management meetings, and transparency be promoted in decision-making processes.
375. The total ANCYL membership as of August 2025, stands at 366 393. The number of branches in good standing since the 26th National Congress have declined, with data per province as below:

State of ANCYL Branches: 2023 and 2025

PROVINCE	POTENTIAL BRANCHES	YL BRANCHES IN GOOD STANDING 2023	YL BRANCHES IN GOOD STANDING 2025
Eastern Cape	709	529	394
Free State	322	271	201
Gauteng	529	413	416
KwaZulu Natal	934	582	641
Limpopo	568	549	497
Mpumalanga	400	352	317
North West	408	312	320
Northern Cape	232	151	163
Western Cape	406	11	00

376. The ANCYL NEC and NWC met as per the constitutional requirements, and also convened a number of special sessions. The NEC also held two makgotla, on 12th August 2023 and 24th February 2025, which focused on the ANCYL Programme of Action (POA) and a Governance Strategy to be implemented by all young comrades deployed into strategic positions in government. The NWC visited YL structures in all provinces as part of the rebuilding process during 2023 and 2024.
377. The NEC sub-committees have been established, with some working relatively well, and some bordering on being dysfunctional.
378. Out of the nine (9) provinces, only one (1) province has a PTT, namely the Western Cape and eight (8) provinces have PECs: Eastern Cape, Free State, Gauteng, KwaZulu Natal, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, Northern Cape and the North West Province; all with active programmes. 36 out of 52 regional executive committees are in good standing, with the remaining 16 still having RTTs.

National General Council

379. The ANCYL convened its NGC in October 2025, the resolutions of the YL NGC will make an important contribution to the ANC NGC deliberations.

ANCYL Programmes

- 380. The YL NEC was inducted in July 2023 after its Congress, with the induction facilitated by then OR Tambo School of Leadership Dr David Masondo and cde David Makhura Subcommittee chair, focusing on the history, vision, mission, organisational culture and policies of the League.
- 381. The ANCYL participated in the ANC NPE 2024 Elections campaign across all provinces. It advocated for a quote for youth on all ANC lists, and managed to have young people under 40 as public representatives, who are also given responsibilities in the various spheres of government: National Parliament: 30 MPs (19%); Provincial Legislatures: 25 MPLs and 165 Local Councillors
- 382. The ANC Youth League engaged young people during this period in Mandela Day activities in 2023; annual Back to School and Right to Learn Campaigns; Hiking, Cycling and Walkign Sundays in Free State; 79th and 80th Anniversaries of the ANCYL; relaunch of Hlomelang Journal of the ANCYL; Symposium on Industrialisation; ETU training workshop on youth elections participation; Economic Freedom March to JSE; Annual Peter Mokaba Lecture; picket at Chamber of Miners against retrenchment of workers in 2025, working with NUM; participation in the ANC Foundation course, though was abandoned due to poor participation; and other cadre development programmes.
- 383. The ANCYL President also convenes a monthly President's Jazz Hour with the aim of narrating the movements history through storytelling, poems and music. It has been held in 7 out of 9 provinces with the exception of the Northern Cape and the Western Cape. The speakers, who are mainly ANC uMkonto weSizwe Liberation War Veterans and ANC Veterans share their reflections on the liberation struggle and the ANC post democracy, as well as recommendations on how the ANCYL can practically engage in advancing the NDR while championing the youth's interests.
- 384. The ANCYL met with President Cyril Ramaphosa to take forward its suggestions on Economic Freedom and Youth empowerment; and also met Ministers of Finance, Small Business, Employment and Labour and Public Works on government programmes to address the youth unemployment crisis.
- 385. The YL also met with the VL on joint programmes of cadre development and mentoring.
- 386. As part of the process of championing youth interests, the NWC in 2024 convened a series of meetings with stakeholders in various sectors including SAFA, SARU, CONTRALESA Youth Wing, SADTU and NEHAWU just to mention a few. The purpose of the meetings was to establish good working relations with the institutions or organisations and identify possible programmes of collaboration and partnership for the benefit of young people.

ANCYL administration

- 387. The ANCYL operates on the 7th Floor at Luthuli House and its staff comprises of three (3) full-time officials, the National Spokesperson and National Organiser who execute their duties on a full-time basis and eleven (11) full-time staff members in different units/departments.

Progressive Youth Alliance

- 388. The Progressive Youth Alliance is made up of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL), the Young Communist League of South Africa (YCLSA), the Congress of South African Trade Unions Young Workers (COSATU YW), the South African Students Congress (SASCO) and the Congress of South African Students (COSAS). The ANCYL has close relationships, including common programmes with the PYA.

Umkhonto We Sizwe Liberation War Veterans (MKLWV)

1. INTRODUCTION

The Umkhonto weSizwe Liberation War Veterans (MKLWV) submits this report to the National General Council (NGC) of the African National Congress (ANC) as its first formal account of organisational progress since the launch of the unified structure in East London in April 2022. The East London All-Inclusive Conference, convened under the authority of the ANC NEC following the disbandment of MKMVA and the MK National Council, provided a clear mandate for unity, renewal and welfare, economic empowerment and the restoration of the heritage and legacy of Umkhonto weSizwe. The report summarises the work done, accomplishments, challenges, the state of relations with the NC and government and presents key recommendations going forward.

2. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

2.1 Mandate from the East London All-Inclusive Conference

The East London Conference (2021–2022) directed that former MK combatants be united under one legitimate structure; that clear constitutional, welfare, economic and heritage mandates be set; and that MK cadres play their rightful role in ANC renewal. The Terms of Reference the following outlined key priorities:

- Unite and renew the community of former MK combatants.
- Establish a new constitutional structure aligned with ANC constitutional values.
- Advance social welfare and socioeconomic empowerment.
- Drive heritage, legacy and the preservation of MK history.
- Prepare for full participation in ANC structures and national policy processes.

3. WORK DONE SINCE THE LAUNCH OF MKLWV

3.1 Establishment and Governance

MKLWV was formally registered as a Non-Profit Company and set up ten subcommittees covering coordination, policy, welfare, economic empowerment, peace and security, commissariat, heritage, fundraising, women's matters and communication. A National Interim Committee representative of all detachments—including Luthuli, Young Lions, Internal Machinery and SDUs—was established. All provincial structures have been launched; however, uneven progress remains due to inconsistent ANC and government support.

3.2 Programme Implementation

3.2.1 Renewal and Unity Work

MKLWV has prioritised non-factionalism, discipline, and organisational renewal aligned to ANC renewal. Provincial reports reflect efforts to rebuild unity despite hostile conditions created by parallel structures and lack of recognition in some provinces.

3.2.2 Welfare and Social Support

The Social Welfare Committee has engaged the DMV and Parliament regarding:

- Delays in pensions and benefit payments.
- Housing and medical care failures.
- Burial support failures.

However, DMV dysfunction continues to severely undermine this work

3.2.3 Economic Empowerment

Progress has been made, including:

- Recognition of Military Veterans as a designated group under the Public Procurement Act (2024).
- Establishment of the Military Veterans Development Agency (MVDA) as a delivery vehicle for
- enterprise development. This requires support as it promises to unite veterans
- Engagements in agriculture and the built environment

One of the strongest areas of progress has been agriculture, driven entirely by veterans' self-initiative. Agriculture has unified many veterans and demonstrated their commitment to self-reliance.

Key milestones:

- o Over 120 business plans submitted to DALRRD. (Although the process stalled, especially during the split of the 2 departments.
- o Secured off-take agreements for specific commodities.
- o Land partnerships with traditional leaders, yielding over 3000ha for MV projects.
- o Establishment of veteran cooperatives across provinces.

These initiatives have been driven largely without government support.

3.2.4 Heritage and Legacy

Plans and projects for a comprehensive MK heritage programme, including museums, digital archives, documentaries, VR experiences, and repatriation of remains, were developed in the MKLWV Strategic Plan (2022).

The Repatriation and reburial program began in earnest in 2024. MKLWV has been participating and leading in the repatriation and reburial of many of our comrades in exile. Working with ANC and government the program involved coordination activities in South Africa, Zambia and in Zimbabwe. MKLWV appreciates the support given by the ANC in this program

4. KEY ACCOMPLISHMENTS

1. Unification of MK structures into one legitimate national body, endorsed by the ANC.
2. Establishment of 10 subcommittees, ensuring professionalisation and structured work.
3. Fought for the recognition of Military Veterans as one of designated economic group, unlocking procurement opportunities.
4. Launch of the MVDA, a major institutional achievement.
5. Agriculture-led empowerment, including off-take agreements and land partnerships with traditional leaders.
6. Provincial groundwork has been done and all provinces have fully functional structures.

5. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ANC

There is strong willingness on MKLWV's side to support ANC renewal, political education, community mobilisation and nation-building programmes. MKLWV's relationship with the ANC has however been characterised by limited engagement, despite repeated attempts to participate formally.

Challenges include:

- MKLWV not being regularly invited to ANC structures despite submission of names.
- No deployment of MK veterans into ANC structures at any level.
- Provincial leadership feeling marginalised and excluded.
- Lack of political oversight from ANC deployees

6. RELATIONSHIP WITH GOVERNMENT & THE DMV

The Department of Military Veterans remains the greatest obstacle to veteran welfare, unity and development.

6.1 DMV Dysfunction

This is characterized by, amongst other things Department's failure to deliver legislated benefits (healthcare, housing, pensions, education). Administrative inefficiency, lack of consultation and absence of accountability. Refusal to support MKLWV's programs.

6.2 Lack of Consultation

DMV repeatedly:

- Consulted disbanded structures (MKMVA), creating confusion and division.
- Excluded MKLWV from key programmes including verification, pensions and benefits processing.

DMV has failed to consult MKLWV on key policies that affect Military Veterans (e.g. unilateral decision to not fund new university entrants and/or those in private institutions. This has created immense problems for veterans structures.

Continued exclusion of MKLWV in the Presidential Task Team, despite several efforts by MKLWV to reach out and engage and even propose key programs for veterans support

6.3 Divisive Conduct

DMV's actions have directly contributed to disunity in the veteran community, including:

- Funding or engaging former MKMVA despite its disbandment.
- Interfering with provincial launch processes.
- Undermining SANMVA reform.

6.4 Need for ANC Intervention

The MKLWV has formally requested the ANC President and SGO to intervene to restore proper governance and accountability.

7. RELATIONS WITH SANMVA & THE EMERGING CHALLENGES

8.1 Engagements with SANMVA

MKLWV has made multiple attempts to engage SANMVA to formalise participation under the Military Veterans Act. These efforts have been unsuccessful largely due to internal instability in SANMVA.

8.2 SANMVA Hijacked and Politically Diverted

The SANMVA process has been infiltrated by individuals aligned with the MK Party (MKP), who are not committed to unity of former MK combatants. This has worsened factionalism and compromised SANMVA's role as the statutory umbrella body.

8.3 MKMVA and the Formation of a New Party

Correspondence to the President (21 September 2024) emphasised concern that:

- Disbanded MKMVA leaders are active in parallel structures.
 - Some have participated in the formation of the MK Party.
 - DMV continues to engage these illegitimate structures.
- This has created confusion and threatens the unity project endorsed by the ANC.

9. CHALLENGES

Lack of government support, especially from DMV.

Poor ANC integration—veterans excluded from ANC structures and decision-making.

Financial constraints affecting programmes, travel, and organisational functioning.

Division caused by former MK members who have defected to MKP.
Slow pace of provincial launches due to political and administrative obstacles.
Weak coordination by employees in government.
Unresolved verification and pensions issues, affecting thousands of veterans.

10. CLARION CALL TO THE NATION

The MKLWV calls upon the ANC, government and society to recognise the immense contribution of liberation war veterans—men and women who risked their lives for the freedom enjoyed today. Veterans continue to serve with dignity, patriotism and commitment to building a prosperous and united South Africa.

South Africa cannot abandon its living heroes.

We call on all sectors to support veterans through:

- meaningful economic opportunities,
- recognition and inclusion,
- access to land and resources,
- preservation of liberation heritage, and
- full implementation of legislated benefits.

11. THE DESIRE FOR SELF-RELIANCE

Veterans are not seeking perpetual dependency; they seek partnership and opportunity.

MKLWV has demonstrated:

- entrepreneurship,
- agricultural productivity,
- infrastructure protection capacity,
- private sector partnerships,
- and readiness to serve in nation-building.

With support from the ANC and government, self-reliance is achievable. Without that support, the burden of veteran poverty, exclusion and frustration will deepen.

12. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ANC NGC

1. Formalise full political integration of MKLWV into ANC structures at all levels.
2. Direct immediate reform of the DMV, including accountability measures.
3. Reconstitute SANMVA to exclude illegitimate and factional actors.
4. Protect the unity project and reaffirm the disbandment of MKMVA and MKNC.
5. Provide political oversight to complete provincial launches nationwide.
6. Support the establishment and capitalisation of the Veterans Empowerment Fund (VEF).
7. Accelerate land allocations for veteran agricultural cooperatives.
8. Include MKLWV in all Presidential Task Team (PTT) working groups.
9. Champion heritage work, including museums, documentaries and repatriation programmes.

13. CONCLUSION

MKLWV presents this report with humility and firmness of purpose. We remain disciplined cadres of the ANC, committed to unity, renewal and the socio-economic advancement of all liberation war veterans. The NGC must now give concrete expression to the ANC's long standing resolutions and moral obligations. With decisive leadership, political will and structured support, MKLWV can fulfil its mandate and help stabilise communities, grow the economy, strengthen the ANC and safeguard the legacy of the liberation struggle.

PROVINCES

Overview

The Provinces of the ANC play an important role in implementing the NDR and coordinating work of the ANC across the country, implementing a unitary vision adapted to provincial and regional specifics. The peculiarities, progress and challenges faced by the people, influenced by history, demographics, cultures and the political economy of each province, require a large degree of dexterity and focus, with the responsibilities resting with our Provincial Executive Committee to manage these complexities.

They play a major role in the key tasks of the moment, to build inclusive economies, truly developmental states that effectively serve the people, mobilization of the motive forces and the renewal of the ANC in their provinces, mindful that they are integral parts of a national movement and a unitary South Africa. The achievement of one province, must therefore help to lift others, mutually reinforcing the mission of a united, democratic, non-sexist, non-racial and prosperous South Africa. In similar vein, challenges faced by one province, whether crime and gangsterism, or child malnutrition or high levels of unemployment, or climate change, or external threats, have an impact on the nation as a whole.

The demographics of our country, as the 2024 Census showed have changed over the last three decades of freedom, with population growth, migration, life expectancy, access to basic services, smaller households, climate change, fast-changing technology all having an impact on peoples in every corner of our land. The changes in the political landscape, over the last ten years or so, but most dramatically in the 2024 National and Provincial elections, forces us to look at each province in its own right, but also as part of the sum-total of the whole, each component part invaluable to the functioning of our nation.

EASTERN CAPE

Overview of Balance of Forces

1. The province remains one of the strongholds of the ANC, although the national trends of declining political participation, demobilisation of the motive forces, economic pressures, governance weaknesses, declining basic services, and the rising cost of living have had a serious impact. The ANC continues to be the dominant political force and the strategic centre of progressive politics. However, this dominance is not immune to erosion. In the 2024 NPE, ANC support declined to 62%, with support in Nelson Mandela Bay Metro persistently around 40%, Buffalo City Metro declining by 8%, and Sarah Baartman increasingly becoming an entry point for the DA and PA as they slowly gain ground in that region.

2. The ANC maintains relatively strong hegemony in local government, with overwhelming support and control in 34 municipalities, while 5 municipalities are hung. These include Nelson Mandela Bay Metro, governed by an ANC-led coalition, and Kouga Local Municipality, which is fully under opposition control.
3. The decline in voter confidence has occurred alongside a decline in ANC membership—an unmistakable signal that decisive organisational renewal and the re-energisation of our cadreship are required. The enemy is no longer only external; it manifests internally through complacency, disunity, gatekeeping, and declining revolutionary discipline. A renewed ANC must re-emerge as a movement of the people, rooted in the daily struggles of the working class, youth, and rural poor.
4. Elections will be won or lost on the terrain of service delivery and credibility. Communities are demanding visible improvements in governance, infrastructure, jobs, and basic services. Our people must see and feel the difference where the ANC governs. The perception that the ANC has become inward-looking and self-serving must be decisively reversed. We must demonstrate, through word and deed, that ours remains a movement deeply committed to the needs and aspirations of the people.
5. The decline in membership, even if contested in scale, is a clear warning sign. The ANC must grow—not shrink. Recruitment must be linked to political education, activism, and service to the people. The strategic task is to transform every ANC member into an active organiser and community builder.
6. The Eastern Cape government continues to make important strides in education, health, roads, and social development. However, significant challenges persist, particularly in municipal governance, water provision, and inclusive economic activity. The ANC must ensure stronger political oversight over government performance, especially in municipalities under ANC control, while intensifying efforts where we are not in power, to reclaim lost ground.
7. Service delivery failures undermine the ANC's political standing. Therefore, integrated political and administrative monitoring through the Rapid Response Team and PMER subcommittees is essential. Accountability, consequence management, and ethical leadership must remain the cornerstone of our governance posture.

State of Organisation

8. The Provincial Executive Committee (PEC) of the Eastern Cape, elected at the 9th Provincial Conference in May 2022, has been executing its leadership responsibilities, implementing the organisational programme of action, and meeting regularly as both PEC and PWC to strategise and oversee the movement in the province. Active PEC subcommittees ensure that ANC programmes across thematic areas are advanced, and that engagements with diverse sectors of society are frequent. The Leagues and MKLWV, through their representatives, participate actively in the PEC and its structures and programmes.
9. ANC membership has been declining over the past decade, a trend compounded by persistent challenges in the national Membership Management System. Systemic problems—including fluctuating membership figures and members not appearing on the system—pose serious difficulties for the province despite ongoing attempts to resolve them in collaboration with national Organising and Membership structures. These challenges make it difficult for branches to focus on organisational rebuilding when they must constantly address system errors. Beyond inconvenience, these issues undermine the ANC's ability to manage its own internal processes, democratic systems, and members' constitutional rights. The NGC must address this matter decisively.
10. The Eastern Cape has commenced its Regional Conferences, with Alfred Nzo, Chris Hani, Joe Gqabi, Nelson Mandela, OR Tambo, and Dr WB Rubusana regions already concluded. Immediately following each conference, the PEC ensured the induction of new RECs, the development of programmes to implement conference resolutions, the

facilitation of BBGMs for remaining branches, and the management of outstanding reruns where disputes existed. Regional Conferences for Amathole and Sarah Baartman will be completed by March 2026.

Eastern Cape Provincial Membership Trend: 2022–2025

Region	55th National Conference Membership 2022	Provincial Conference Membership 2022	PGC Membership	2025 Regional Conference Membership	2025 NGC Membership	% Change
Alfred Nzo	17,011	17,821	14,993	14,220	11,536	-23.27%
Amathole	14,608	15,285	14,350	11,795	10,273	-14.82%
Chris Hani	18,428	20,072	16,347	18,569	12,685	-46.39%
Dr WB Rubusana	19,302	20,805	15,139	14,897	10,934	-36.24%
Joe Gqabi	5,334	6,107	4,868	5,271	3,813	-38.24%
Nelson Mandela	8,009	7,910	6,696	8,314	5,360	-55.11%
OR Tambo	30,114	36,879	26,555	22,401	14,082	-59.08%
Sarah Baartman	6,132	6,416	5,692	6,896	5,780	-19.31%
Total	118,938	131,295	104,640	102,363	74,463	-37.47%

11. The province has 710 ANC branches across all regions and municipalities. Of these, 483 branches are currently in good standing, while 227 are due (or will soon be due) to convene BBGMs to renew their mandates.

Region	Branches in Good Standing	Branches Due / To Be Due
Alfred Nzo	90	16
Amathole	55	66
Chris Hani	99	11
Dr WB Rubusana	32	18
Joe Gqabi	30	15
Nelson Mandela	26	34
OR Tambo	128	19
Sarah Baartman	23	48
Total	483	227

12. Since its election in 2022, the ANC PEC has enjoyed constructive and cooperative relations with all ANC Leagues in the province. These relations are rooted in consistent political engagement, the support provided to each League to ensure their functionality and visibility, and the mobilisation efforts contributing to ANC renewal. The Youth and Women's Leagues continue to run significant mass campaigns and organisational programmes, while the Veterans League remains a moral compass in guiding values, discipline, and organisational renewal.

13. Through its branches and PEC subcommittees, the ANC in the Eastern Cape continues to operate as a campaigning movement. Community campaigns have focused on confronting social ills such as extortion, high murder rates, and GBVF, while also advancing solidarity programmes with the peoples of Lebanon and Palestine. These campaigns enhance the ANC's visibility, but more importantly, they activate communities as agents in confronting injustice.
14. Mass work remains a central pillar of ANC renewal, and the province aims to deepen this through: Establishing ANC sub-branches to respond to community issues at micro level as they arise. Developing a **branch activism index**. Launching ANC campaigns on the high cost of living, including fuel prices, municipal rates and tariff hikes, and food inflation. Incorporating minority groups into ANC campaigns against social ills. Establishing ANC special branches in areas of concentrated populations such as workplaces and farms. Mobilising communities across race, gender, and class to foster progressive policy direction in the context of the GNU—anchored not only in ANC interests, but in broader popular demand.
15. These campaigns are driven by ANC subcommittees responsible for mobilisation, political education, and campaigns, and will be cascaded down to branches and sub-branches.

Political Education and Roll-out of the ANC Foundation Course

16. The Eastern Cape has 710 branches, of which 204 have already commenced the Foundation Course. A total of 14,596 members out of 95,965 have participated in the course. Regional breakdown is as follows: **Alfred Nzo**: 68 of 106 branches (54.7%); 1,288 participants trained out of 14,394 (13,106 outstanding). **Amathole**: 64 of 121 branches; 1,798 participants of 7,282 (5,484 outstanding). **Chris Hani**: 85 of 101 branches; 260 participants of 18,154 (17,894 outstanding). **Dr WB Rubusana**: 50 of 50 branches (100%); 2,665 participants of 14,403 (11,738 outstanding) **Joe Gqabi**: 45 of 45 branches; 217 participants of 4,449 (4,232 outstanding). **Nelson Mandela**: 47 of 60 branches (80.4%); 1,294 participants of 6,753 (5,459 outstanding). **OR Tambo**: 142 of 147 branches (96.6%); 441 participants of 22,478 (22,037 outstanding). **Sarah Baartman**: 32 of 69 branches; 2,088 participants of 5,637 (3,549 outstanding).
17. In the first phase, the province trained approximately 1,825 branch-based trainers, who will facilitate mass training in the second phase. Because the Foundation Course is a requirement for Regional Conferences, some attempts were made to treat it as a tick-box exercise, condensing the course into a single day. The province intervened decisively to stop this practice. The Veterans League played an invaluable role, particularly in Nelson Mandela Metro and Dr WB Rubusana regions. However, the politics surrounding regional conferences affected morale, leading to a drop in attendance at some Foundation Course sessions.

Unity and Cohesion of the ANC in the Eastern Cape

18. Overall, the organisation in the Eastern Cape is politically, organisationally, and ideologically coherent. Historically, the province has faced deep-rooted divisions, parallel structures, and high levels of defiance within its ranks—dynamics that extended into the Leagues as well. However, the organisation has made significant strides in overcoming these challenges.
19. Since the 9th Provincial Conference, the province has experienced a marked improvement in coherence and unity, due largely to the sustained political work of the current PEC. All ANC Leagues now have constitutionally elected structures, and they rallied their constituencies behind the ANC during the 2024 NPE. They continue to complement the work of the ANC in their respective sectors. Recognising the

importance of Alliance cohesion to the National Democratic Revolution, the ANC also prioritised uniting SANCO in the province—an effort that has yielded positive outcomes, with the province now having a single SANCO structure. A notable indicator of improved unity was the smooth and scandal-free list process during the 2024 NPE.

20. Although challenges remain, the PEC is convinced that the work of consolidating unity must continue in the daily operations of the organisation. This must be complemented by the broader renewal programme to isolate and neutralise any divisive tendencies, particularly during the sensitive period of Regional Conferences, which often attracts opportunistic factional elements.
21. The PEC remains fully committed to safeguarding the unity of the ANC and ensuring organisational stability, even during conferences that traditionally present fertile ground for division. Political work to reinforce unity is ongoing and guided by the renewal programme adopted by the organisation.
22. Political education and training remain essential tools for cadre development—instilling the ANC’s moral values and principles, transforming quantity into quality, and ensuring that ANC members are exemplary community leaders who can be trusted to champion the needs and struggles of the people.

Alliance Relations

23. The ANC maintains healthy relations with all its Alliance partners in the province. However, there is a long-standing acknowledgement that these relations must go beyond meetings and become programmatic, with partners offering visible and practical support to one another. All partners agree that Alliance stability is best built from below—at sub-provincial and branch levels—where many contradictions originate.
24. To strengthen collaboration, the Alliance Secretariat convened a meeting and agreed on a proposed framework for “Alliance Unity in Action”, including preparations for a broader Alliance Plenary involving all PECs before the end of 2025. The framework is organised around the following thematic areas: Unity and programme of the Alliance, including practical activities to strengthen cohesion. A shared analysis of the balance of forces locally, nationally, and globally, and its implications for the NDR. Reconfiguration of the Alliance—its meaning, mechanisms, and desired outcomes. Renewal of the ANC, the Alliance, and the broader Mass Democratic Movement, including practical programmes. Implications of the SACP’s decision to contest state power and its organisational and political modalities. Building a capable, ethical, developmental state, with priority areas for government and municipalities in 2025/26. Strengthening local government through interventions to improve municipal functionality, including water, roads, electricity and revenue generation. Crime-fighting strategies, especially GBVF, extortion, stock theft, and infrastructure vandalism. Preparations for the 2026 Local Government Elections, including building strong Alliance structures at branch and regional levels. Addressing the crisis of initiation deaths through coordinated action involving government, municipalities, traditional leaders, and communities, supported by dedicated budgets.
25. All Alliance partners regard this initiative as overdue and an important step toward practical, programmatic unity. The ANC places high value on maintaining the revolutionary Alliance, not only for organisational interests but for the working-class masses who are the motive forces of the struggle. A renewed ANC must also express itself through renewed and pragmatic Alliance relations, which this framework seeks to advance.

Ethics, Integrity and Discipline in the ANC

26. Promoting ethics, integrity, and discipline among members, leaders, and structures remains central to the ANC’s renewal and recovery. With public trust in the ANC

diminished, leaders must engage with humility and ensure that organisational perspectives are evidence-based. Since 2022—and during the campaign and elections period—there have been minimal instances of behaviour inconsistent with ANC expectations.

27. Matters of integrity and discipline fall under the Provincial Integrity Commission (PIC) and Provincial Disciplinary Committee (PDC) respectively. The PIC remains active and effective, guided by experienced and principled cadres with strong moral standing. Its values and internal discipline insulate the PIC from corrupt influences, enabling it to resolve matters referred by the PEC in a manner that preserves unity and organisational cohesion.
28. The Provincial Disciplinary Committee, as a PEC subcommittee, deals with disciplinary breaches among members and leaders. The low number of cases before the PDC indicates that serious ill-discipline has been limited during this period.
29. Like other provinces, the Eastern Cape has not been immune to allegations of vote-buying and the use of money to influence outcomes of conferences. While the province has remained largely stable during lobbying processes, early signs of factionalism exist. The PEC has responded firmly during Regional Conferences, ensuring that fierce contestation does not lead to division. Where comrades step out of line, the organisation must act decisively, without fear or favour.
30. The ANC must pay close attention to behaviours that undermine organisational integrity and discipline, including: Irresponsible conduct on social media, especially during conference periods. Public behaviour of members and leaders that contradicts ANC values. The conduct of comrades removed from deployment, especially acts of vengeance or hostility towards the organisation. A growing culture of entitlement among some individuals, which undermines the ANC's tradition of selfless service.

Preparations for the 2026 Local Government Elections

31. As the 2026 Local Government Elections approach, the ANC is called upon to reaffirm its commitment to democratic values, organisational discipline, and renewal. These elections provide an opportunity to deepen community connections, strengthen local governance, and renew the ANC's mandate as leader of society.
32. The ANC in the province recently convened its Provincial Elections Strategy Workshop, which developed a comprehensive Programme of Action for ANC structures leading to the 2026 Local Government Elections.
33. The province is currently re-establishing ANC election structures at all levels—from Voting Districts to the province. This includes establishing Provincial List Committees and Regional Interview and Vetting Panels responsible for coordinating candidate selection processes.

State of Eastern Cape Governance

34. The provincial economy expanded in the second quarter of 2025, with eight industries recording growth. The largest increases were in Mining (up 4.5%), Agriculture (up 2.7%), Manufacturing (up 1.9%) and Trade (up 1.9%). The Government Services sector also expanded by 0.6%. The only sectors that recorded declines were Transport (down 0.8%) and Construction (down 0.4%).
35. On the labour front, the Eastern Cape labour force increased by 6.9% to 2.4 million. The not economically active population declined by 6.2% to 2.2 million. Employment increased by 6.5%, reaching 1.5 million people, while unemployment rose by 7.6% to 956,089. The number of discouraged work-seekers decreased significantly by 12.7% to 256,169. Six out of ten sectors recorded job growth, with strong performance notably in Agriculture and Construction—sectors central to future growth pathways in the

province. The impact of U.S. tariffs on the auto and agricultural sectors in the province threatens thousands of jobs and the provincial revenue base. This is not abstract economics—it directly affects workers, ratepayers, and the financial viability of municipalities.

36. The Eastern Cape is increasingly vulnerable to disasters—including floods, storms and fires—while the current disaster management system is underfunded, slow, and overly reactive. A fit-for-purpose, properly funded disaster response model with faster turnaround times is urgently required.
37. Crime continues to tear communities apart. GBVF, stock theft, assassinations of businesspeople, and even killings of judicial officers are escalating. The ANC in the province calls on government to urgently increase SAPS capacity, intelligence operations, and investigative resources. Private security firepower must also be better regulated, and dangerous communities must be disarmed to prevent further loss of life.
38. Analysis shows that while conventional policy approaches remain important, they are insufficient on their own to address the province’s economic and labour market challenges. Success hinges on implementing catalytic interventions, including: Macroeconomic measures to stimulate aggregate demand and formal-sector growth. Transformation of labour market supply institutions (PSET, Career Services, Employment Placement) to improve responsiveness, innovation and productivity. Spatial development strategies that tackle geographic inequalities in opportunity. Youth-targeted interventions creating sustainable career pathways beyond declining traditional sectors.

Local Government, Infrastructure and Service Delivery

39. In 2021, the ANC called on South Africans to “Build Better Communities Together.” It is now clear that the Eastern Cape is in a better state than it was in 2021, and the contribution of ANC-led municipalities is visible and measurable. The ANC has since brought political stability to most of the councils it leads. Where instability existed, leadership intervened; where paralysis took hold, decisive action was taken. OR Tambo District is a leading example of a turnaround driven by political and administrative stability—reflected in financial recovery, reduced debt, and aligned planning under the DDM pilot.
40. Despite ongoing challenges, municipalities in the Eastern Cape have made tangible progress: Clean audits increased from 2 in 2019/20 to 6 in 2023/24—an achievement that should inspire and guide other municipalities. Funds returned to National Treasury were reduced by 53%, and municipal grant expenditure now stands at 95%—the direct result of ANC PEC Subcommittee guidance through Risk-Adjusted Strategy workshops. Nelson Mandela Bay Metro remains a critical battleground, with a history of instability, crime, and leadership tensions. The ANC-led Government of Local Unity has stabilised the metro, but significant work remains to consolidate these gains. Administrative weaknesses continue to constrain service delivery, undermining its strategic economic importance. Provincially, the low revenue base and municipal debt—now at R42 billion, with 83% owed by residents—pose a major risk to municipal sustainability.
41. Poor infrastructure and a weak revenue base expose municipalities to persistent service delivery challenges. Municipalities remain constrained by the legacies of apartheid geography—rural, underdeveloped, and fiscally fragile. The current funding model is failing rural municipalities. The province has consistently raised this, including in its submissions to the White Paper on Local Government review.
42. Nelson Mandela Bay Metro faces both service delivery backlogs and violent crime that erode public confidence. While stability has been restored, it must still be defended. Interventions by the province and COGTA—such as senior management secondments—are essential to strengthening governance and improving service delivery to rebuild voter trust. Makana Municipality has faced chronic failures, including lack of clean water, poor roads, and weak financial management. Ongoing COGTA interventions through Section 154 technical support packages offer hope that the municipality will be in a significantly better state ahead of the Local Government Elections. Buffalo City Metro, despite being ANC-led, faces serious governance issues—including weak revenue collection, poor contract management, and

internal political instability. The PEC is prioritising this matter, as an ANC-led metro must set a standard of excellence rather than become a liability. OR Tambo District and its local municipalities face widespread infrastructure challenges, including poor roads, inadequate water treatment, sanitation issues, unreliable electricity supply, and frequent disaster impacts. The region has also been hit by GBVF-related crimes, mass shootings, stock theft, and vandalism—further threatening service delivery. Port St Johns, King Sabata Dalindyebo (KSD), Mhlontlo and Nyandeni municipalities have experienced rising political tensions that have spilled from council into administration. Enoch Mgijima Municipality is among the ten priority municipalities required to develop a Municipal Performance Turnaround Strategy (MPTAS), monitored by the Inter-Ministerial Committee as part of efforts to restore institutional capacity.

43. The Eastern Cape is home to several traditional Kingdoms. It is crucial that government support for Great Places, Councils and Palaces be standardised and urgently improved, as many have historically been neglected despite recent efforts by the province.
44. The ANC in the Eastern Cape welcomes the Local Government Action Plan and its key pillars. The PEC, through the PMER and Legislature & Governance subcommittees, has developed contextual frameworks to monitor and evaluate its implementation. Key elements include (a) Directing all Troikas to conduct service delivery scorecards and account for 2021 manifesto commitments. (b) Expanding Risk-Adjusted Strategy workshops to improve grant spending, now at 95%. c) Reviving the Political Steering Committee to monitor Section 139 interventions and ensure FRPs yield results. (d) Establishing Rapid Response Committees across municipalities to address community grievances early. (e) Requiring ANC councillors to hold compulsory monthly community meetings to rebuild grassroots connection ahead of 2026. (f) Conducting PEC visits and interventions in all hotspot municipalities.
45. These interventions aim to reconnect the ANC with communities, restore public trust, institutionalise accountability, and accelerate service delivery—particularly in water, roads, and electricity—while building a capable and resilient local government system.

Conclusion

46. This report is an honest reflection on the state of the organisation in the Eastern Cape since the Provincial Conference in May 2022 and the 55th National Conference in 2022. It should be read together with successive annual reports submitted to the National Office.

FREE STATE

1. Overview

The PEC elected at the 9th Provincial Conference in January 2023 inherited a divided organisation, weak branch functionality, and distressed municipalities. Alliance partners remained engaged but frustrated, and community confidence had declined.

The PEC placed renewal at the centre of recovery, with a focus on forging unity, ethical leadership, rebuilding structures, and socio-economic transformation through land reform, improved services, and accountable governance.

Post-May 2024 shifts increased pressure on the movement but also created space for renewal. The ANC remains a majority in the Legislature, offering leverage for transformation only if branches stabilise and operate beyond conference cycles.

Since 2023, the PEC has prioritised functional BECs, political education for deployees, improved council participation, grassroots organising, and interim support where branches were dormant. Discipline, programme-driven activism, and Alliance coordination form the core of renewal work.

2. Shifts in the Balance of Forces post–55th National Conference

The Free State remains an ANC-majority province, retaining electoral dominance in the 2024 national and provincial elections. Support, however, has declined from 57% (2019) to 51% (2024), though this reflects recovery from the 46% local government outcome in 2021. The balance of forces therefore reflects majority control, but with reduced hegemony and a clear warning that renewal must translate into visible governance improvements.

The ANC's main opponents remain the DA, EFF, and FF+, with MKP and ACT present but marginal. DA growth is the most notable trend and requires a strategic response. The EFF and FF+ have stagnated, while MKP and ACT target disaffected ANC voters but remain structurally weak.

Internal organisational decline and service delivery failures have contributed to weakened public confidence, especially where local government collapses have widened the gap between communities and the movement. The loss of urban middle-class support, particularly in DA-held suburbs, signals the need for a renewed programme of engagement beyond traditional voting blocs.

Despite these weaknesses, the 2024 campaign re-energised volunteers, reactivated civil society in many wards, and restored some confidence among voters who still see the ANC as the principal vehicle for their aspirations.

3. State of Organisation, Programmes and Renewal Work

The PEC has remained active and cohesive, meeting regularly and executing a structured Programme of Action. Since 2023, renewal has been the core organising principle restoring functionality, discipline, and credibility. PEC members were redeployed into branches to guide political work, improve systems, and rebuild structures that had become election-only formations. The Secretariat Forum meets consistently, serving as a coordinating hub and ensuring decisions filter directly from the PEC to branches and caucuses.

The PEC has worked deliberately to re-establish collective leadership and organisational centrality. The integration of the Premier into Officials resolved long-standing tensions related to the “two centres of power” perception, improving communication between the organisation and government. Political induction for deployees has begun but needs deeper institutionalisation for sustainable behaviour change.

Subcommittee performance is uneven. High work demands and legislative deployments weakened some portfolios, prompting reconfiguration to sharpen execution capacity. Subcommittees now anchor three core functions: campaigns and programme work, policy support, and oversight/monitoring.

Political education is the strongest pillar of renewal. POLEDU has repositioned cadre development as compulsory for organisational leadership. Training has been rolled out to PEC, RECs, branches, youth, women, and veterans. The Foundation Course has trained 512 facilitators, and by September 2025, 9 168 members had completed all five modules—one of the highest political education outputs nationally. Sessions run weekly through hybrid platforms, expanding reach to remote branches and embedding organisational values, Freedom Charter interpretation, NGC base documents, and lessons from local government failure.

Organising and Campaigns has revived grassroots contact. Street committees, Letsema clean-ups, crime prevention drives, school governing body participation, and community forums have begun reconnecting the movement to daily struggles. Monthly branch roadshows assessed branch functionality, while recruitment and civil society integration have been prioritised to rebuild legitimacy.

The PSO conducted a province-wide branch functionality audit in early 2024 using the ANC Branch Manual, exposing widespread organisational weakness, lapsed mandates, and limited community activism. A recruitment drive improved membership numerically, but quality and ideological grounding remain low, highlighting the need for compulsory induction and the Foundation Course for all branches.

Membership growth is further constrained by the new MMS system, non-production of cards, bulk-buying abuse, gatekeeping, and factional infiltration. The PEC has deployed each member to branch structures to stabilise political work, though compliance has been weak. The majority of branches have expired mandates, and a roadmap for re-establishment is awaiting final PEC adoption. A planned membership system workshop with Luthuli House was postponed, contributing to uneven system access and verification challenges across ANCWL, ANCYL, and ANCVL. Verified membership stands at 34 200 across 319 branches, with only two branches still within mandate. Weak induction of new members undermines cadre development, while middle-class and allied sector participation remains low.

Legislature and Governance work has focused on stabilising municipalities, improving Troika performance, and tightening oversight. The municipal assessment tool standardised reporting across councils, identified weaknesses in grant expenditure, and guided political interventions. Officials conducted a province-wide caucus roadshow for mid-term performance reviews, deepening accountability and consequence management.

Monitoring & Evaluation now tracks manifesto implementation quarterly and works alongside Legislature & Governance and War Room structures to trigger intervention where services fail. The intention is a shift from post-crisis firefighting to early warning and response.

Social Transformation work has expanded outreach to vulnerable communities through GBVF campaigns, disability sector dialogues, ECD engagement, vendor forums, and dignity pack distribution in schools. These programmes have improved visibility where the organisation had receded.

Education, Health, Science, and Technology engage directly with provincial departments on readiness, infrastructure repairs, and teacher support. The subcommittee intervened in 2024 to avert delayed matric marking payments, illustrating growing responsiveness.

Discipline and integrity remain renewal pressure points. While the previous culture favoured reconciliation over consequence, the PEC has begun adopting firmer discipline. Cases have been escalated, and integrity expectations for leaders are increasingly enforced.

Electoral readiness remains the weakest link. Branches are still largely conference-orientated with limited activism between elections. BETs inherit organisational weaknesses, morale fluctuates, and

voter confidence remains fragile. The province acknowledges that renewal must translate into mobilisation capacity if 2026 outcomes are to be reversed.

Economic Transformation, International Relations, Finance, Deployment, Renewal, and Arts & Culture subcommittees reflect uneven functionality. Economic Transformation remains weak in execution, triggering PEC review and potential reassignment. International Relations has not implemented its programme but led notable Palestine solidarity actions. Finance is active under the Provincial Treasurer, securing resources for election work, though long-term sustainability and revenue streams remain fragile. Deployment operates with leagues and Alliance partners, applying merit-based criteria for strategic municipal and provincial appointments. The Renewal Commission is active, convening a province-wide chairpersons' forum and implementing a unity and renewal programme led by the Provincial Chairperson. Arts & Culture has revived after reconfiguration, prioritising activation of the Waaihoek Heritage Site through a technical team and intergovernmental engagement.

4. Local Government LGE2026 Readiness

The 2024 provincial result confirmed the ANC as the leading political force in the Free State, winning 51.87% of the vote and 16 seats, despite a difficult electoral climate and administrative challenges at voting stations. The organisation accepted the outcome as a fair reflection of public sentiment.

The vote trend shows a sharp decline in 2021, followed by partial recovery. The ANC gained back 107 000 votes between 2021 and 2024, translating to only a marginal percentage rise, but still below historic strength.

Election structures are in motion for 2026. The Demarcation Board has briefed the PEC on ward delimitation, regions are engaging the process, and branch election machinery is being rebuilt. Workshops aligned to the NET POA have started across all regions, and election readiness is accelerating, though uneven and still reliant on resolving branch mandates and turnout gaps before 2026.

5. State of the Alliance

The province has recognised the importance of weaving together the Revolutionary Alliance for a broad liberation front in pursuit of the strategic objectives of the NDR. It is common cause that weaknesses existed in the province in terms of a living Alliance informed by common programmes. At the centre of some unnecessary tension is the unresolved debate on the reconfiguration of the Alliance.

The province has also witnessed the fragmentation of progressive trade unions and the loss of membership in the province and therefore argues that the renewal of the ANC must be undertaken jointly with the renewal of the Alliance as a whole. The party has not been adequately playing its revolutionary strategic role in providing strategic analysis of the current epoch of our struggle.

Working relations among Alliance partners in the province fluctuate on an issue basis. Recently, during the COSATU Provincial Congress, the Provincial Chairperson of the ANC was denied a chance to address the Congress, and the leadership of the ANC was ridiculed. A strongly worded message was directed at the ANC, accusing it of having sold out as a result of its relationship with the DA through the formation of the Government of National Unity.

A week after that Congress, an Alliance Secretariat was convened to iron out issues of concern from other Alliance partners. Out of this meeting, an Alliance Programme of Action was adopted, which culminated in the Alliance Political Council meeting and later the Alliance Summits.

CONCLUSION

Renewal is ongoing. With NEC support, the province continues rebuilding capacity, credibility, and community trust.

GAUTENG

Balance of Forces and the Motive Forces in Gauteng

47. Gauteng's motive forces are characterised by high levels of urbanisation, diversity and economic integration. They are, in many ways, the most "modern" and demanding constituency in the country. Their status and relationship with the movement of liberation and transformation can be summarised as follows:
48. **Metropolitan Working Class and the "Precariat"** This is no longer the classic industrial working class of the 1980s, but a vast and fragmented group that includes: Formal sector workers in services, finance and logistics. A large "precariat" made up of informal traders, taxi operators, domestic workers and security guards living with profound insecurity. The unemployed, concentrated in sprawling townships such as Soweto, Tembisa and Alexandra—young, connected and directly experiencing failures in local government and service delivery. The ANC's core base has fractured. The shift of protest votes from the ANC first to the EFF and now to the MK Party in Gauteng shows that this discontent is becoming entrenched. Large sections of the working class and poor no longer believe ANC promises on jobs, housing and services. **Evidence:** Decline in support in traditional ANC strongholds in Gauteng's townships. The deterioration of basic services—for example, Merafong experiencing four days of water outages without communication—signals to communities that their daily lived reality contradicts ANC commitments. This is a clear indication that the ANC can no longer rely on the automatic allegiance of the black working class in the province.
49. **The Aspirant and Anxious Middle Strata:** Gauteng is the heartland of South Africa's black middle strata, including: Professionals in Johannesburg's corporate sector and Tshwane's public service. Small business owners and entrepreneurs. A "struggling middle class" whose post-1994 social mobility is sustained largely through credit, leaving them highly vulnerable to inflation, interest rate hikes and load-shedding. The ANC has largely lost this layer. This group prioritises competence, clean governance and economic opportunity and inclusion above liberation history. **Evidence:** The strong growth of the DA and the rise of parties such as ActionSA in middle-strata and suburban areas—including previously ANC-leaning black suburbs—demonstrate this shift. The middle strata largely blame the ANC for load-shedding, collapsing infrastructure, crime and corruption, which they perceive as threats to their hard-won gains.
50. **The Youth:** Gauteng has an exceptionally young population. Their defining objective condition is mass unemployment and a desperate search for opportunity. They are digital natives, politically aware, but deeply sceptical of traditional structures. The ANC's language, methods and organisational culture are increasingly irrelevant to the "born-free" generation. They are moved not by the history of struggle, but by the present reality of joblessness and exclusion. **Evidence:** Low youth voter turnout and the growing appeal of radical, youth-focused messaging from parties such as the EFF and MK Party. The ANCYL in Gauteng is a shadow of its former self and no longer shapes or anchors the province's dynamic youth culture.
51. **Women:** As nationally, women in Gauteng experience the triple burden of race, class and gender oppression, intensified by urban pressures of crime (especially GBVF), the rising cost of living and the reality of many being sole breadwinners. While women remain a significant part of the ANC's activist and volunteer base, the organisation's limited impact on GBVF and economic equality for women has produced a quiet crisis of confidence. **Evidence:** Although this is not easily disaggregated in voting patterns, the overall decline in ANC support, together with persistent levels of GBVF and economic insecurity, suggests that gender policies are not resonating

sufficiently to offset broader grievances such as cost of living and crime—burdens that fall disproportionately on women.

52. **Capital (Patriotic and Monopoly Capital)** Gauteng hosts the headquarters of both established (predominantly white-dominated) monopoly capital and emerging black capital. Their shared objective interest is a stable, functional and growing economy—an objective severely undermined in recent years. Both established and emerging capital in Gauteng have become deeply frustrated with the ANC's inability to guarantee stability, policy certainty and effective service platforms. Policy uncertainty, the collapse of logistics (Transnet) and energy crises have significantly hurt profitability and investment sentiment. **Evidence:** The broadly positive, if cautious, reception of the Government of National Unity (GNU) by sections of the business community—especially given the participation of a market-friendly DA—signals that capital increasingly views the ANC on its own as a risk to stability and is now hedging its bets.
53. **Conclusion: The ANC's New Reality in Gauteng** The 2024 election results are a clear report card on the relationship between the ANC and the motive forces in the province. The ANC's share in Gauteng dropped to 34.7%, indicating a severe erosion of support across all key motive forces. The 2024 outcome compels the ANC into a fundamentally new relationship with these forces. The ANC can no longer command support; it must now *compete* for it, and negotiate with other parties claiming to represent the same constituencies. The ANC is no longer the unchallenged hegemon in Gauteng—it is one actor among several in a competitive coalition environment, and its ability to unilaterally set the provincial agenda has been lost. The motive forces in Gauteng have asserted their political sovereignty. Voters have demonstrated that they are not captive to the ANC and will “shop around” for alternatives that better address their conditions: the DA for stability and middle-class interests; the EFF and MK Party for alienated and protesting poor communities.
54. **The challenge of coalition governance:** To govern, the ANC in Gauteng may need to cooperate with the DA, a party widely regarded as anathema to its alliance partners and many of its members. This will strain relations with COSATU and the SACP and may alienate sections of the working class who perceive the DA as a vehicle of “white monopoly capital.”
55. In essence, the ANC in Gauteng now relates to its motive forces from a position of weakness rather than revolutionary strength. Its future in the province depends on whether it can use coalition governance to demonstrate clean, effective administration and tangible improvements in people's lives. If it fails, the 2024 result will not be a temporary setback but a consolidated new reality.

Programmes since 55th National Conference

- a) The Gauteng 14th Provincial Conference elected a PEC, and a Provincial Lekgotla was convened in February 2023 with the participation of the PEC, NEC, Alliance partners, ANCYL, ANCWL, ANCVL, SASCO, COSAS, YCL, faith-based organisations, the business sector and civil society organisations. The Lekgotla charted a programme of renewal and mobilisation for the province and adopted four priorities:
- (i) End load-shedding.
 - (ii) Drive economic programmes that create jobs for our people.
 - (iii) Conclude the strategic posture towards coalitions.
 - (iv) Prepare for the 2024 Provincial and National Elections.
56. This was in addition to the day-to-day organisational tasks of defending and advancing the gains of freedom, deepening organisational renewal, reconnecting with the people, working with communities to resolve their problems, and finding lasting solutions to challenges such as crime, GBV and lawlessness.
57. Some of the organisational campaigns undertaken by the PEC include:
- Back to School and Right to Learn Campaigns.
 - Voter Registration Campaign.
 - Regional Volunteers' Assemblies in preparation for elections.
 - Transformer Rollout Campaign.
 - Siyanqoba Rally.
 - Save Water Campaign.
 - Membership Recruitment Drive.
 - Solidarity activities with the people of Palestine, including a candlelight vigil and

interfaith prayer.

- Launch of a cooperation agreement to combat crime in Gauteng metropolitan municipalities.
- ANC reflection on the first 100 days of the GNU.
- Cleaning campaigns.
- Mama Albertina Sisulu Commemoration.
- O.R. Tambo wreath-laying and memorial lecture.
- Mass Walk to Deliver the People's Mandate – Tshwane Region.
- Programme on the crisis in spaza shops and food poisoning.

58. In the lead-up to the 2024 elections, Gauteng became the central battleground for political contestation among parties, including new formations such as the MK Party, ActionSA, Patriotic Alliance, BOSA and others. While the ANC in Gauteng ran a comprehensive election campaign, the organisation suffered a strategic setback, losing its narrow majority of 50.2% and declining to 34.8%, with a loss of 9 seats in the Provincial Legislature. The PEC attributed this decline to a combination of political and organisational weaknesses, including disunity, destructive leadership contestation, weak organisational and election structures, slow economic growth and inadequate service delivery by ANC-led government structures.
59. The May 2024 results confirmed earlier research findings indicating increased voter apathy and declining interest in electoral participation, driven mainly by disillusionment with politics and distrust of the political system. An IPSOS survey (November 2022) found that 40% of residents were not interested in politics; 66% believed the country was heading in the wrong direction; 70% felt that the cost of living was rising faster than inflation; 68% believed Eskom's load-shedding would negatively affect ANC support in May 2024; and 61% felt that the ANC could not be trusted, saying leaders "just make promises but don't deliver." The 2023 Plus 94 Research survey found that residents wanted leaders who are honest, transparent and not self-serving. Many respondents believed the 2024 elections would be "just another election" and felt discouraged or sad when thinking about them. Over 80% of respondents who indicated they would not vote said they were not excited about the elections and did not believe they would bring change.
60. A post-election Plus 94 survey showed that voter turnout in Gauteng dropped from 72% in 2019 to 59% in 2024, with electoral abstention rising from 28% to 41%, indicating deepening disengagement. The same survey found that voter dissatisfaction was driven by unmet promises, poor service delivery and concerns about corruption. Yet, 87% of ANC voters expressed an intention to vote for the party again in 2026—indicating a resilient core base and a potential platform for recovery if the ANC responds credibly to voter concerns and improves governance and service delivery.
61. The PEC assessed the election results in order to develop appropriate responses. Immediately after the elections, the NWC visited all regions in Gauteng to evaluate outcomes with structures and review the state of the organisation. Based on a comprehensive report, the NEC resolved to reconfigure the PEC, and a Gauteng Provincial Task Team (PTT) was appointed in February 2025. The PTT identified its key tasks as: rebuilding the movement in the province; reconnecting with the people; intensifying political education through the ANC Foundation Course; strengthening local government; and driving the 13+1 governance programme announced by the Premier in the State of the Province Address.

STATE OF ORGANISATION IN GAUTENG

62. Provincial and Regional Executive Committees have been established and are largely functional, particularly organisational, political education and governance committees, as well as election structures. Provincial subcommittees play an important role in outreach to various sectors of the motive forces, with a particular focus on: women; domestic and farm workers; labour unions; LGBTQIA+ communities; national groups including the HIP Alliance community, Chinese, Indian and Coloured communities; the middle strata; hostel and informal-settlement residents; youth; the disability sector; and the sport and creative industries.

Key highlights of PTT sectoral work include:

- Joint campaigns with faith-based organisations and traditional leaders to highlight and

address social ills such as substance abuse, GBV and lawlessness.

- Community engagements to assess the impact of undocumented and illegal immigrants on social services, particularly healthcare and education.
- Branch-led community campaigns and Letsema programmes, working alongside communities to identify and resolve problems.
- Church visits across the province as part of build-up activities towards the 70th Anniversary of the Freedom Charter.
- Engagements with the legal fraternity to build a collaborative legal network to provide strategic guidance, legal representation and training support on governance, human rights, elections and gender justice.
- Active involvement in the reburial of comrades who passed away in exile; of 26 fallen heroes from Gauteng, 7 reburials are still outstanding.

63. By the end of 2024, the province could only account for 178 out of 529 branches with over 100 members in good standing. Across Gauteng—the most populous province in the country—only 46,042 members were in good standing. Johannesburg reported a high number of members on probation, which indicates that membership growth is occurring. Ekurhuleni reported that 1,009 members have departed to other political parties. All regions have active regional structures, campaigns and programmes that also oversee performance in municipalities and service delivery. The regional breakdown is as follows:

Table. Gauteng Membership and Branches by Region, 2025

REGION	MEMBERSHIP	POTENTIAL BRANCHES	BRANCHES IN GOOD STANDING	BRANCHES NOT IN GOOD STANDING
Ekurhuleni	18,114	112	88	24
Johannesburg	23,260	135	125	10
Sedibeng	—	102	34	68
Tshwane	21,700	107	84	23
West Rand	—	112	34	68

Political Education and ANC Foundation Course

64. The Provincial Foundation Course roll-out was officially launched in March 2025. All regions actively implemented the programme aimed at building political and organisational capacity across branches. Each region was allocated targets to complete Modules 1 and 2 by June 2025. The roll-out is progressing well, with most regions on track to meet their targets. At the time of submission of the NGC Midterm Report, the status was as follows:

Table. Gauteng Foundation Course Rollout per Region

Region	Total number of branches	Branches completed	Branches remaining	Members trained
Ekurhuleni	112	100	12	24,235
Johannesburg	135	122	23	6,988
Tshwane	107	78	29	5,443
West Rand	72	33	39	6,985
Sedibeng	72	68	4	3,168

Region	Total number of branches	Branches completed	Branches remaining	Members trained
PTT, RECs & Caucuses	—	—	—	227
Total	498	391	107	47,046

65. Regions have also conducted additional political education programmes. Twelve branches in Johannesburg completed the OR Tambo Introduction to Political Studies course, with 614 members receiving IPS certificates. Various memorial lectures, Freedom Charter 70th Anniversary activities, commemorations of ANC veterans and other political education events were also held.

Local Government, Service Delivery and Infrastructure

66. The 2016 local government elections were devastating for the ANC, with the loss of Johannesburg and Tshwane to opposition coalitions. Ekurhuleni remained under a stable ANC-led coalition until 2021, when a DA/EFF coalition took over. In 2024, an ANC/EFF coalition regained control of Ekurhuleni. By the 55th National Conference in 2022, the ANC governed only two municipalities in Gauteng. After the PEC consolidated its coalition approach, the ANC has since returned to leading coalitions in Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni, and participates in a governing coalition with ActionSA in Tshwane.

67. As reported at the ANC Councillor Rollcall in September 2025, several indicators show improvement in local government performance. Municipal financial health is strengthening:

- Municipalities closed the first quarter of the 2025/26 financial year with an aggregate surplus of R14 billion, up from R2.2 million in September 2024/25.
- Only two municipalities (Johannesburg and Merafong) reported operating deficits, down from three the previous year.
- Aggregate capital expenditure reached 9% in September 2025/26, up from 8% in 2024/25.
- Eskom and Rand Water debt remains a major concern.
- Three municipalities (Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni and Midvaal) have consistently passed funded budgets over the past three years.

68. On service delivery, major challenges remain regarding water losses and maintenance, road infrastructure, sanitation failures and illegal electricity connections, all of which impact communities. However, green shoots are visible, including:

- The Johannesburg “bomb squad” dealing with illegal connections,
- Stabilisation work in Tshwane, and
- Ongoing interventions in Emfuleni.

ANC Leagues and MKLWV

69. The ANCWL in Gauteng has experienced internal strife and declining membership, but is on a path to recovery. It has demonstrated capacity through: Leading campaigns against GBVF. Advocating for women’s representation in government, legislatures and strategic institutions, and Strengthening programmatic relations within the Mass Democratic Movement.

70. The ANCYL held its provincial congress in 2024 and has embarked on several campaigns and programmes to reconnect with young people.

71. The MKLWV remains active within the ANC structures in the province, championing the welfare of liberation veterans and playing a significant role in reburial processes and commemoration activities.

State of the Alliance in Gauteng

72. The Alliance in Gauteng remains stable, with good and cordial relations. The Alliance Secretariat convenes regular sessions to engage on political and governance matters. The Gauteng Alliance Political Council convened at a critical moment as the Alliance responds to the strategic setback suffered during the 2024 general elections.
73. The Alliance Political Council recognised Gauteng's pivotal role in the country's social, political and economic life, and emphasised the need for a united and focused Alliance leadership to fulfil its revolutionary responsibilities. The APC stressed the importance of ongoing communication and joint action to advance a common programme of radical socio-economic transformation to defeat poverty, unemployment and inequality.
74. The Alliance Political Council agreed on the following joint work areas: Implement a comprehensive memorialisation and commemoration programme for struggle heroes and heroines. Coordinate political education initiatives. Strengthen Alliance relations and organisational capacity at local, zonal/subregional, regional and provincial levels in line with conference resolutions. Strengthen monitoring and evaluation of the Gauteng Provincial Government's 13 plus two priorities, with a focus on progressive economic interventions. Mobilise for the 40th Anniversary commemoration of COSATU in December 2025 in Dobsonville, Soweto. Support the War Against Corruption: Welcome and endorse the SIU report on Tembisa Hospital and all remedial actions taken by the provincial government. Welcome lifestyle audits for MECs, senior GPG officials and all SCM staff. Urge intensified measures against mismanagement, maladministration, crime and corruption. Welcome the Public Protector's report on the Gauteng Crime Prevention Wardens and the Premier's commitment to implement all remedial actions and safeguard the jobs of over 9,000 wardens. Reaffirm full confidence in Premier Panyaza Lesufi and his Executive Council. Reject the DA's Motion of No Confidence as opportunistic and destabilising. Call on all political parties in the Legislature to unite in defending the Government of Provincial Unity, as issues raised in the motion are already being addressed by the Premier and GPG.

Discipline and Integrity

75. The PTT Provincial Disciplinary Committee (PDC) has been established and will begin adjudicating several disciplinary matters arising from BBGMs in Ekurhuleni, Greater Johannesburg, Greater Tshwane, and Sedibeng from January 2026. The PDC will also conduct workshops for RECs and BECs. The establishment of the Integrity Committee will be finalised in December 2025.

Governance and Transformation in the Gauteng Province

76. The ANC has fundamentally transformed the socio-economic conditions of millions through the provision of basic municipal services such as water, electricity, sanitation, housing, quality education and healthcare, and job creation. However, the progress achieved since 1994 represents only the beginning of a long and protracted process of societal change.
77. As part of this ongoing journey to build a better life for all, the ANC-led provincial government identified 13+2 challenges that continue to shape the daily lives and livelihoods of Gauteng residents. These are:
 - Water,
 - Cable theft and vandalism,
 - Non-functional traffic lights,
 - Potholes,
 - Crime and lawlessness,
 - Mushrooming of informal settlements,
 - Electricity (load shedding and load reduction),
 - Rising GBVF,
 - Drug abuse,
 - Service challenges in hospitals and clinics,
 - Lack of school capacity,

- Failing infrastructure in CBDs, and
- Unemployment.

78. The two additional challenges recently added are undocumented nationals and dolomitic areas, particularly in Merafong.
79. **G1. WATER:** According to the 2024 Quality-of-Life Survey, 92% of Gauteng households are connected to clean piped water. Despite this achievement, recent outages were caused by ageing infrastructure, water losses, illegal connections, and power failures at Eikenhof and Emfuleni pump stations. Work is underway to repair leaks, replace old pipes, and upgrade municipal infrastructure to accommodate additional water from the Lesotho Highlands Water Project.
80. **G2. CABLE THEFT AND VANDALISM:** Cable theft and vandalism pose a severe threat to economic growth and job creation by damaging transport and power infrastructure. Government's response has been swift and decisive: 1,079 scrap yards shut down for non-compliance, 593 illegal spare shops closed, 149 tyre shops closed, and 716 owners/operators arrested and prosecuted. Work is progressing on installing tech-logs to alert authorities of tampering, supported by a 24-hour response team. A multi-agency reaction unit, including private sector partners, has been deployed to protect cables and public infrastructure.
81. **G3. NON-FUNCTIONAL TRAFFIC LIGHTS:** Non-functioning traffic lights threaten public safety and disrupt economic activity. Significant progress has been made in repairing and safeguarding traffic lights across the province. A continuous monitoring and rapid-response system is now in place and functional.
82. **G4. POTHOLES:** Transport is the lifeblood of Gauteng's economy, essential for mobility and commerce. The provincial government, working with municipalities, CSIR and other stakeholders, is resurfacing roads and repairing potholes. Seven major provincial road upgrades are underway or completed, including: D1814 (Bronkhorstspuit) – completed. K101 Olifantsfontein Road (Midrand) – completed. P122 Solomon Mahlangu Drive (K69) – completed. K175 from P6-1 (K201) to Ekandustrial (K14) – completed. P73 Golden Highway. K31 Malibongwe Drive. K50 Garsfontein Road. Government has adopted a 72-hour pothole repair commitment supported by intelligent traffic systems to ensure timely repairs.
83. **G5. CRIME AND LAWLESSNESS:** Despite attempts to undermine the provincial government's efforts, progress is evident through a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach. This includes strengthened partnerships between SAPS, Provincial Traffic and Metro Police, private security, and business. Further momentum will come from repurposing traffic wardens into Gauteng Traffic Officers. The deployment of an airwing, additional fleet, digital technology, panic buttons, CCTV cameras, and an integrated command centre form a strong support system in the fight against crime.
84. **G6. MUSHROOMING OF INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS:** Gauteng has lost 8,000 hectares of state land to illegal invasions and informal settlement proliferation. This is despite ongoing housing interventions such as rapid land release, mega human settlements, hostel redevelopment, and title deed restoration. The provincial government is prepared to deploy all necessary state resources, including lawful evictions, to curb illegal occupation. This work requires coordinated action across all spheres of government and with key stakeholders.
85. **G7. ELECTRICITY:** The Gauteng Provincial Government is rolling out an ambitious programme to expand generation capacity, invest in renewable energy, electrify underserved communities, and protect critical infrastructure. Key interventions include: A R1.2 billion investment in energy infrastructure for 43,400 households, Expansion of Kelvin Power Station by an additional 600 MW, Revitalisation of the John Ware power station to produce 200 MW, Microgrid projects in Evaton and Alexandra, Waste-to-energy projects producing 212 MW across the province, Replacement of 643 transformers since the 6th administration, Agreement for 800 MW of solar power in Merafong, Installation of more than 3,000 smart meters, and 45 solar high-mast lights in crime-prone communities. Working with Eskom, the province is exploring the rollout of Small Modular Reactor (SMR) nuclear plants to provide clean, stable, decentralised power.
86. **G8. INCREASE IN GBVF:** Interventions include: Partnerships with faith-based organisations and civil society to raise awareness, Distribution of more than 100,000 physical e-panic buttons to enhance women's safety, Outreach by GBVF Brigades reaching over 500,000 households, Referral of more than 4,000 victims to social workers and SAPS for support and

case opening, Court support, including observing over 200 GBVF cases and providing watching briefs, and Deployment of 134 active green doors offering safety, counselling and guidance for victims.

87. **G9. DRUG ABUSE:** The province continues implementing the Substance Abuse, Demand, Supply and Harm Reduction Strategy. Interventions include: Increased uptake in rehabilitation and support programmes, The Masupatsela Programme, engaging over 30,000 young people in anti-drug and girl-child empowerment initiatives, Strengthening aftercare services through seven Centres of Excellence offering training in IT, photography, beauty, life skills, and hospitality. These centres provide crucial support for recovering substance users to rebuild their lives.
88. **G10. SERVICE AT HOSPITALS AND CLINICS:** The province has: Approved 11 new hospital applications and 29 expansion/reconfiguration projects. Digitised paper-based patient records to improve efficiency and reduce waiting times. Expanded the Central Chronic Medicine Dispensing and Distribution Programme to nearly 1.5 million registered patients. Converted 38 of the targeted 40 clinics to operate 24-hour services, many with full-time doctors as part of NHI pilot projects. Installed solar energy in all clinics to prevent service disruptions during loadshedding. Deployed 16 mobile clinics across health districts offering TB, STI, pregnancy testing and childhood vaccinations. According to District Health Information System data, HIV infections in Gauteng have significantly decreased between 2020 and 2024. Gauteng is completing the Digital Fingerprint System within Forensic Pathology Services for full implementation over the next two years. This system will assist in identifying unknown deceased persons and tracing their families, sparing residents the trauma of physically viewing bodies to identify their loved ones. The plan to reduce surgical backlogs is also yielding results, with over 40,000 patients operated on since its launch on Mandela Day in 2023.
89. **G11: LACK OF SCHOOLS:** Working together with National Treasury, the provincial government will build 18 new schools at an estimated cost of R2.5 billion. Investment in township schools continues to yield positive outcomes. The performance gap in National Senior Certificate (NSC) results between township schools and former Model C schools has narrowed significantly. Gauteng achieved an NSC pass rate of 88.41% in 2024—an improvement of 3.03% from 2023. All 15 districts achieved above 80% for the sixth consecutive year, with three districts surpassing 90%. Johannesburg West, the top-performing district in the country, achieved a 97.03% pass rate, with 147 schools achieving a 100% pass rate (up from 129 in 2023). The province achieved 67% bachelor passes in 2024. Learners with Special Education Needs (LSEN) schools continue to excel, achieving a 95.4% NSC pass rate. Schools of specialisation across the province continue equipping youth with skills in engineering, artificial intelligence, and other specialised fields, with matriculants gaining admission to prestigious institutions locally and internationally.
90. **Multi-Certification Programme:** This programme ensures that young people leave the basic education system with more than just a matric certificate by equipping them with additional technical and life skills. The programme is ongoing and will be expanded to include emerging skills such as Artificial Intelligence, as well as practical life skills such as swimming, driving, and first aid.
91. **G12: INFRASTRUCTURE AND CBDs UPGRADING:** The Gauteng Department of Infrastructure Development, GIFA, and COGTA have established a partnership with municipalities to address challenges affecting bulk infrastructure across the province. The Gauteng Infrastructure Financing Agency (GIFA) has been tasked with addressing bulk infrastructure delivery needs.
92. **Revitalisation of CBDs into Vibrant Economic Hubs:** Working with civil society and the private sector, stakeholders are committed to transforming CBDs into thriving economic nodes where people can live, work, and play. Key interventions underway in Johannesburg include: Reclaiming the CBD and enforcing by-laws to regulate informal trading; Reclaiming hijacked buildings that were under criminal control; Developing the Park Station Precinct Transit-Oriented Development (TOD), integrating four major taxi ranks to enhance mobility and stimulate economic activity; Construction of South Africa's largest mall in Langlaagte, comprising 2,400 square metres of retail space.

93. **G13: UNEMPLOYMENT:** High unemployment remains a significant concern in Gauteng, with 34% of the labour **force** unemployed—particularly youth and women. Provincial interventions include: The *Nasi'Ispane Reloaded* programme placing young people in internships, skills development programmes, and public works opportunities; Attracting investment into SEZs to create employment opportunities; A R3 billion expansion of Lanseria International Airport, creating 3,000 new jobs for Diepsloot and surrounding communities.
94. The Mekgereng Smart City Project has attracted R20 billion in investment, creating 20,000 new jobs for Brits and **neighbouring** areas. The expansion of the Gautrain is expected to create 125,000 jobs. The tourism and hospitality sector is also poised to support 60,000 jobs, offering opportunities particularly for youth and small businesses. Through a R1.3 billion investment from the Department of Higher Education and Training, the province will recruit 40,000 NEET youth. Additionally, through the labour activation programme in partnership with the Department of Labour, Gauteng has been allocated 20,000 stipend-based work opportunities, while the Presidential Youth Employment Stimulus will generate 32,000 Teacher Assistant posts.
95. **+1: SINKHOLES:** The sinkhole challenge in the province requires an integrated approach involving all spheres of government to ensure coordinated and effective solutions.
96. **Gauteng Provincial Legislature Oversight:** The Gauteng Provincial Legislature (GPL) plays a pivotal role in ensuring that the Gauteng Provincial Government meets its constitutional and strategic obligations. Through Committee hearings, site visits, motions, petitions, and Executive questions, the GPL holds departments accountable and drives corrective action. Its oversight has increasingly resulted in tangible improvements in service delivery.
97. The Legislature has made noteworthy strides in promoting public participation and strengthening PCO work. Platforms such as e-petitions, sectoral parliaments, and public hearings have expanded opportunities for citizen input. However, the integration of public submissions into committee deliberations and Executive decision-making remains uneven, reducing the overall impact of these mechanisms.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO NGC

- A. Build ANC organisational machinery capable of enabling the movement to act as the strategic centre of power, leveraging organisational and intellectual resources across society to achieve the vision of a national democratic society.
- B. Develop a framework for the capacity-building and orientation of deployees in governance structures, outlining the exercise of political leadership within the state and strengthening monitoring and evaluation of ANC deployees to enhance accountability.
- C. Review the ANC deployment policy in light of public critique, incorporating systems of meritocracy, political and ideological training, and preparedness for assigned responsibilities.
- D. Implement a structured performance management system for ANC public representatives.
- E. Institutionalise organisational monitoring and evaluation of governance performance, with clear political and accountability indicators.
- F. Establish a Party Corruption Hotline to enable members to report corrupt behaviour, including issues related to internal nomination processes, election conduct, and the behaviour of deployees in government.
- G. Strengthen public monitoring strategies to ensure accountability, drawing lessons from the Communist Party of China's approach to delegating evaluation and monitoring functions to society.
- H. Introduce mandatory financial disclosures by ANC leaders, both inside and outside government.

KWAZULU-NATAL

Overview

1. We enter this mid-term period under significantly altered political conditions in KwaZulu-Natal. The balance of forces shifted most sharply in KZN following the 2021 Local Government Elections and continued to move unfavourably thereafter, reflected in declining electoral support, a weakened organisational presence, and reduced control over strategic municipalities. Opposition parties expanded unevenly: the IFP regained ground in rural areas where our organisational footprint had eroded, while the MK Party drew substantial support from formerly ANC-aligned voters through emotional appeal, symbolism, and anti-establishment sentiment.
2. Rising abstentionism emerged as the most consequential shift. Many historic ANC supporters chose non-participation rather than outright defection. Urban centres became hubs of frustration driven by perceptions of corruption, instability, unemployment, infrastructure collapse, crime, and failures in local governance. Criminal syndicates, construction mafias and extortion networks exploited institutional weaknesses and, in some areas, displaced political authority.
3. Despite this hostile environment, the ANC still carries ideological and emotional legitimacy among large sections of the population—particularly older members of historically loyal communities—demonstrating that our decline is not irreversible. The balance of forces has shifted away from us, but remains recoverable through disciplined renewal, governance turnaround, and visible re-connection with communities.
4. This mid-term briefing presents an updated provincial review since the 55th National Conference in December 2022. It reflects honestly on the shifting balance of forces, the state of the motive forces, the condition of the organisation, programme delivery, governance performance, and the key steps we recommend the National General Council (NGC) endorse as we consolidate renewal and prepare for the 2026 Local Government Elections.

Balance of Forces

5. Since National Conference, the balance of forces in KwaZulu-Natal has continued to shift against the ANC—not primarily through mass defection to opposition parties, but through disaffection, demobilisation, and declining turnout among our traditional base. Our vote share has dropped, margins have narrowed, and we increasingly operate under conditions of contested power, coalition uncertainty, and reduced strategic room for manoeuvre in governance.
6. This erosion is driven by organisational weaknesses (weak branches, gatekeeping, factional deployments, poor political education, ill-discipline) and governance failures (service delivery breakdowns, instability in municipalities, corruption). These weaknesses created space for opposition parties, populist formations, and criminal networks—such as extortion rings, construction mafias, and political-violence actors—to insert themselves into the provincial power balance.
7. At the same time, no opposition party has replaced the ANC ideologically or organisationally. The MK Party's rise is largely emotional and reactionary; the IFP's resurgence remains geographically concentrated; and the DA and EFF remain marginal in African working-class communities. The balance of forces remains fluid and contestable. The core conclusion is that the ANC is weakened structurally, politically and morally, but not defeated. Restoring hegemony remains possible if renewal, governance reform, and mass work are pursued decisively.

State of the Motive Forces in KwaZulu-Natal and Attitude to the Movement and the NDR

8. The ANC in the Province continues to locate organisational renewal within the social forces that have historically carried the NDR:

- The working class and labour movement remain broadly aligned with our programme, but confidence has weakened due to persistent economic strain, de-industrialisation, and uneven service delivery.
 - The most pronounced shift is among young people, who face high unemployment, social exclusion and precarity, increasingly locating themselves outside formal politics or gravitating towards digital-driven, anti-establishment identities
 - Women—especially single-headed households—carry the heaviest burden of service-delivery failures, GBV vulnerability and daily insecurity. Their disillusionment has deepened, but not in a manner that rejects the NDR itself.
 - Rural communities remain emotionally aligned to the ANC but increasingly critical of councillor performance and municipal dysfunction.
 - Traditional leadership expresses concern over weak municipal coordination and expects structured involvement in rural development.
 - Professionals, SMMEs, and informal businesses remain ideologically sympathetic to transformation, but express frustration with red tape, instability, and crime.
9. The emotional connection that once defined ANC–community relations has weakened, but is not broken. Older rural voters, historically unionised segments of the working class, women in informal economies, and communities rooted in traditional authority remain sentimentally attached and can be re-mobilised. The motive forces are open to persuasion—but only through visible improvements in governance, renewed political education, ethical leadership, and consistent community presence, not rhetoric.

State of Organisation, Programmes and Campaigns Towards ANC Renewal

10. Organisationally, the province entered this period with substantial weaknesses: weakened branches, inconsistent leadership visibility, factional conflict, poor cadre discipline, collapse of political education, and erosion of revolutionary morality. These weaknesses undermined our ability to mobilise the motive forces and defend the NDR.
11. In February 2025 the NEC intervened, reconfiguring the provincial leadership and appointing the PTT on 25 February 2025 with a clear mandate: to rebuild unity and discipline, drive organisational renewal, prepare for the 2026 Local Government Elections, address factional divisions, and reconnect with grassroots constituencies. The PTT is a temporary structure established to stabilise and rebuild the organisation ahead of electing a new PEC.
12. Within this renewal programme, political education, cadre development and branch rebuilding have been placed at the centre. The POLED subcommittee has led the induction of REC, RTT and BTT structures; the training of Branch Membership Administrators; rollout of the Foundation Course; Thursday Forums; and memorial lectures. Implementation, however, has been constrained by financial and material resource shortages. POLED recommends that all leaders and members complete the Foundation Course and that dedicated resources be allocated for sustained political education.
13. The Renewal Charter, signed by the PTT leadership, serves as a binding framework to confront factionalism, corruption and careerism; rebuild branches and regional structures; recalibrate relations with alliance partners and social sectors; and re-establish the ANC’s mass character through campaigns and direct community activism. It aligns the provincial renewal programme with ANC constitutional values, the Pledge, the Code of Conduct and resolutions of the National Conference.
14. Membership trends reflect organisational fragility: Members in Good Standing decreased from 62,384 to 60,487, while grace numbers rose to 10,246. Branch qualification remains uneven due to administrative lapses and inconsistent BMA capability. Political education, however, has expanded across regions through the ANC Foundation Course, Cadre Development initiatives, BTT and RTT inductions, Thursday Forums and memorial lecture platforms. Resource constraints have limited our ability to deliver the full Political and Organisational Programme, yet we have nonetheless developed a structured approach to securing funding for the work of the organisation.
15. The ANC Renewal Programme in KZN follows a three-phased approach aimed at restoring organisational activism, strengthening discipline and rebuilding legitimacy from branches

upward: Diagnosing organisational challenges; Engaging members and social sectors; Implementing corrective solutions.

Major Activities of the ANC in the Province During 2025

16. We characterise 2025 as a decisive year of political renewal, mobilisation and consolidation under the direct guidance of the NEC and leadership of the newly appointed 66-member PTT, led by Cde Jeff Radebe as Convenor. Supported by a collective of experienced leaders, the PTT approached this period as a wake-up call to arrest organisational decline and rebuild the movement as a disciplined, community-rooted liberation organisation.
17. From February 2025 onwards, major activities unfolded in a clear sequence. The appointment and public unveiling of the PTT in Durban on 25 February 2025 set the tone, with a mandate to recover lost ground after the 2024 electoral setback. The PTT adopted a revised roadmap towards the 2026 regional and provincial conferences, centred on Operation Ziveze membership verification, induction of new BECs, training of portal users and structured assessments of branch readiness.
18. In April, we launched “ANC Friday with the Communities” in the Richmond Sub-Region, Moses Mabhida Region. This weekly programme of constituency-based outreach, community meetings and door-to-door engagement aims to reconnect with residents, address service delivery challenges and rebuild trust—particularly in areas where we have lost by-elections. Operation Ziveze was intensified in 2025 as a province-wide campaign to verify membership, enforce accountability and restore organisational integrity, with PTT deployees leading verification events across all regions.
19. In June 2025, coinciding with World Elder Abuse Awareness Day, we launched the Asiy’Ekhaya Campaign as the central political driver of reconnection with our historical base. Asiy’Ekhaya, framed around the message “The ANC is Our Only Home,” calls for unity, introspection and disciplined reconstruction. It directly responds to the 2024 electoral decline and weaknesses identified by the 55th National Conference through targeted visits, mass mobilisation and political messaging designed to reaffirm the ANC as the leading force in society.
20. These campaigns were complemented by *Ukhongolose Ubuyela Kubantu*, a programme of systematic community engagement after by-elections, regardless of whether the ANC wins or loses. This programme has been implemented in Richmond Ward 2 and Mandeni Ward 18 (where the ANC lost), and Uphongolo Ward 12 (where the ANC won), demonstrating our commitment to serve communities beyond electoral considerations.
21. In parallel, the ANC was centrally involved in the reopened inquest into the 1967 death of former ANC President-General, Chief Albert Luthuli. The inquest formally reopened on 14 April 2025 and culminated in a historic judgment on 30 October 2025 that overturned the apartheid-era finding of accidental death and confirmed that Chief Luthuli was murdered by apartheid security forces in collaboration with railway employees. Our involvement, alongside national leaders, reaffirmed our commitment to historical truth and justice.
22. Throughout 2025, we organised or co-organised major political commemorations, including the funerals of Cde Lungi Gcabashe (Deputy President of the ANCWL) and Cde Nathi Mthethwa. These events drew thousands of mourners and reinforced messages of unity, women’s empowerment, heritage, international solidarity and leadership continuity. By the end of the 2025 programme cycle, media analyses indicated that the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal was reconnecting with communities, returning to its organisational roots, and repositioning itself for a decisive turnaround ahead of 2026.

Implementation of the Local Government Action Plan and LGE2026 Preparations

23. The ANC in the Province recognises local government as a central pillar of the renewal project and a decisive battleground for the 2026 Local Government Elections. KwaZulu-Natal has 54 municipalities (1 metro, 10 districts, 43 locals). The ANC governs some outright, leads coalitions in others (including the only metro), and participates in coalitions led by other parties.

Overall, the state of local government is uneven: while some municipalities demonstrate stability and good governance, many face severe financial distress, political instability, infrastructure decay and persistent service delivery failures.

24. The Local Government Action Plan and provincial assessments highlight recurring risks: high levels of irregular expenditure, unfunded budgets, weak financial controls, political infighting, unstable coalitions and poor maintenance of critical infrastructure. Seven municipalities were under national or provincial intervention in the 2023/24 financial year. At the same time, municipalities such as Umshwathi, Richmond, Greater Kokstad, uMlalazi and the City of uMhlathuze demonstrate that stability, sound financial management and focused leadership can yield positive outcomes.
25. To prepare for LGE2026, we convened an Alliance Local Government and Service Delivery Summit from 21–22 June 2025, preceded by a comprehensive assessment of all municipalities in the province—not only those led by the ANC. The assessment produced a Local Government Assessment Report and a set of focal points guiding our turnaround strategy, including political and administrative stabilisation, improved financial management, basic services, local economic development and a three-step approach to mitigating the cost of living and unemployment. A provincial local government elections strategy has been developed, understanding the 2026 elections as a turning point that must demonstrate renewal in practice, present credible candidates and rebuild the ANC’s mass character at community level.

State of the Alliance and Work with Sectors

26. The Alliance in KwaZulu-Natal has been placed at the centre of the renewal programme, especially in relation to local government, service delivery and election preparation. The province convened an Alliance Local Government and Service Delivery Summit (21–22 June 2025) to collectively assess municipal performance and agree on joint focal areas for intervention. This has been followed by Alliance-led work on the provincial local government strategy and preparations for LGE2026.
27. Beyond the Summit, Alliance partners have participated in key political engagements, including strategy workshops and Alliance Political Councils, which directly inform our elections work and programme implementation. Our 2025 programmes—Asiy’Ekhaya, ANC Friday with the Communities and *Ukhongolose Ubuyela Kubantu*—have also drawn on sectoral and Alliance participation, reaching older persons, women, youth, informal economy workers and religious communities. These engagements show that, although alliance relations and sectoral links have been strained by governance failures and organisational decline, there remains meaningful space to rebuild joint work through concrete, community-centred campaigns.

Discipline and Integrity Issues

28. A decline in discipline and integrity has been a major contributor to the weakening of the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal. The review identifies factional conflict, poor cadre discipline, the collapse of political education and the erosion of revolutionary morality as core drivers of organisational instability. In local government, irregular expenditure, maladministration, weak controls and politicised deployments have undermined governance and damaged our credibility among communities.
29. Our response places discipline and integrity at the core of the renewal project. The PTT mandate emphasises unity, discipline and the rebuilding of branches. The Renewal Charter commits the leadership collective to confronting factionalism, corruption and careerism; enforcing constitutional discipline; and linking leadership eligibility to political education and ethical conduct. Operation Ziveze, as a membership verification and accountability campaign, is intended both to clean up organisational records and to send a clear signal that only bona fide, active members will participate in conferences and candidate selection processes.

State of Provincial Governance

30. Governance in the province reflects a dual reality. In parts of local government and certain provincial functions there are pockets of stability, improving service delivery and sound financial management. However, a significant number of municipalities remain in crisis, facing

interventions, unfunded budgets, deteriorating infrastructure, unreliable water and electricity supply, and rising community protests. This uneven performance undermines implementation of ANC Conference resolutions and the 2024 Manifesto commitments on basic services, local economic development, public employment and pro-poor budgeting.

31. The provincial turnaround agenda therefore prioritises governance discipline, professionalisation of local government, stronger financial oversight, repositioning the District Development Model, and targeted interventions to address the cost of living, unemployment and poverty. We have also prepared submissions to the national review of the White Paper on Local Government aimed at repositioning local government as a developmental engine, strengthening merit-based appointments, tightening fiscal rules, and aligning SCM, IDPs and budgeting with transformative outcomes. These interventions give practical effect to National Conference resolutions on building a capable, ethical state and advancing the core priorities of the 2024 Manifesto at provincial and local level.

Recommendations to NGC

32. Drawing from this mid-term review, our key inputs to the NGC are as follows:

- a) We propose that the NGC affirm the NEC's intervention in KwaZulu-Natal and endorse the Renewal Charter as a practical, binding framework for organisational renewal, to be replicated and adapted in other provinces where necessary. Renewal must be anchored in rebuilding branches, enforcing constitutional discipline, combating factionalism and corruption, and making political education mandatory for leadership.
- b) We recommend that the NGC prioritise sustained funding for political education, including the Foundation Course, induction of leadership structures, memorial lectures and Thursday Forums. Previous programmes collapsed primarily due to financial constraints; without dedicated, protected funding, renewal commitments will remain rhetorical.
- c) On local government, we call on the NGC to treat the 2026 Local Government Elections as a decisive moment for the NDR and adopt a national approach that integrates: (a) turnaround plans modelled on the provincial assessment work conducted in KZN; (b) a strong, proactive local government election strategy; and (c) bold proposals on professionalisation, fiscal reform and reorienting municipalities as developmental engines, as captured in our submission to the White Paper review.

Finally, we propose that the NGC explicitly ground the NGC Base Document's renewal and balance-of-forces analysis in concrete tasks: confronting criminal networks and political violence; reversing disaffection among the motive forces through campaigns such as *Asiy'Ekhaya*, *ANC Friday with the Communities* and *Ukhongolose Ubuyela Kubantu*; and strengthening alliance and sectoral work through visible, community-based programmes. If implemented with discipline, these measures will enable the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal—and nationally—to turn this period of crisis into a platform for renewal and strategic repositioning ahead of 2026.

LIMPOPO

Overview

1. The 10th PEC of the ANC in Limpopo was elected in June 2022 to lead and guide all ANC structures and members in the province. Limpopo comprises 568 municipal wards, with an ANC branch in every ward, forming the fundamental units of political representation and

service delivery. Importantly, the number of wards in Limpopo will remain unchanged in the 2026 Local Government Elections, ensuring continuity in electoral planning, community engagement and governance structures.

2. The Province is divided into five Regions: Peter Mokaba, Sekhukhune, Norman Mashabane, Vhembe and Waterberg. Each Region reflects distinct socio-economic characteristics: mining dominates in Waterberg and Sekhukhune; agriculture is strongest in Vhembe and Norman Mashabane; tourism and heritage activities are central to Norman Mashabane (including the Hoedspruit area); and urban development and services are concentrated in Peter Mokaba, centred in Polokwane. These economic sectors play a significant role in the province's contribution to national GDP and job creation.
3. Limpopo is home to many stalwarts and heroes of the liberation struggle whose legacies continue to inspire ANC work in the province. These include Frans Mohlala, Peter Mokaba, Elias Motsoaledi, Norman Mashabane, Collins Chabane, President Sefako Makgato, Peter Dambuzza and others. Their contributions are honoured through lectures, memorials, and provincial events. Their sacrifices and leadership remain foundational to the ANC's ideological and moral compass. The ANC in Limpopo continues to honour these legacies through active programmes such as Letsema campaigns, Freedom Charter celebrations, and engagements with Traditional Leaders, Youth and Business. These initiatives reinforce the ANC's commitment to grassroots mobilisation and advancing the National Democratic Revolution amidst shifting political dynamics and growing opposition forces.
4. This report highlights the state of the organisation, including an objective analysis of strengths, weaknesses and achievements since the 55th National Conference.

State of Organisation

5. The 10th ANC Limpopo Provincial Conference was held from 03–05 June 2022 in Polokwane under the theme *The Year of Unity and Renewal to Defend and Advance South Africa's Democratic Gains*. The most recent membership audit is reflected below:

REGION	MEMBERS	TOTAL BRANCHES	BRANCHES IN GOOD STANDING
Norman Mashabane	—	129	55
Peter Mokaba	—	113	49
Sekhukhune	—	117	98
Vhembe	—	127	76
Waterberg	—	—	—
TOTAL	126,265	568	520

6. All Regional Conferences were due in 2025, and the following were successfully held:
 - Sekhukhune: 24–25 April 2025
 - Vhembe: 04–05 May 2025
 - Norman Mashabane: 09–11 May 2025
 - Peter Mokaba: 22–23 May 2025
 - Waterberg: 01–03 September 2025
7. The ANC in the province implemented an extensive programme of activities, including commemorations of fallen heroes (Cdes Chris Hani, Jessie Duarte, Alfred Nzo), Freedom Day, Workers' Day, June 16 Youth Day, Africa Day, World AIDS Day, 16 Days of Activism, Mandela Day and various provincial memorial lectures, including one honouring former ANC Secretary General, Cde Duma Nokwe.

8. As part of the 70th Anniversary of the Freedom Charter, each Region was allocated two clauses of the Charter and tasked with spearheading activities and community engagements reflecting on their allocated clauses.
9. The Province issued a directive for all ANC Branches to relaunch and intensify Letsema campaigns, focusing on working directly with communities to help resolve local challenges. Activities included:
 - Clean-up Fridays
 - Saturdays: attending community funerals and *Kgoro*/Traditional sittings
 - Sectoral engagements by branch leadership
 - Sundays: attending church services (to worship, not address congregations), followed by community meetings where Ward Councillors brief and listen to residents
10. Additionally, Letsema campaigns included visits to Kings and Queens in Limpopo, church visits, interactions with the business community, continued engagements with traditional communities, engagements with PSL soccer teams, and Provincial Secretaries' engagements with PMTs and Councillors.

ANC Leagues in Limpopo

11. The ANC Youth League requested the PSO to assist in convening a provincial summit of the Progressive Youth Alliance (PYA) to address challenges facing young people and to strategise around the voter registration campaign, especially targeting first-time voters, including 17-year-olds who will turn 18 next year. The Summit also focused on organising and contesting SRC elections in universities and TVET colleges. Outcomes were mixed, with SASCO failing to secure majorities in all three universities and achieving varied results in TVET colleges. Contributing factors included limited PYA visibility outside the Right to Learn period and technical challenges with electronic voting systems used on campuses.

Elections and By-elections

12. Since July 2025, Limpopo has contested 15 by-elections. The Provincial Elections Team adopted a hands-on approach to mobilisation and election management, and the ANC retained all contested wards.
13. ANC Limpopo held its Provincial Elections Strategy Workshop for LGE2026 in June 2025 in Polokwane. NEC deployees, PEC members, Leagues, Alliance partners, MKLWV, the PYA and broader MDM structures attended. The workshop produced an Elections Strategy that now guides all election work in the province. Following this, all five Regions convened their Regional Elections Strategy Workshops.

State of the Alliance and Sectoral Work

14. Alliance relations have continued to experience strain. COSATU and SANCO expressed concerns about the ANC's internal instability and lack of consistent consultation. These matters have since been addressed, and relations have begun to stabilise. Throughout 2025, the ANC has engaged Alliance partners (SACP, COSATU and SANCO) through Alliance Secretariat meetings and joint programmes. Alliance partners have been invited to offer messages of support during meetings. However, following the SACP's decision to contest by-elections in Limpopo, they were excluded from election-related programmes and removed from the Elections WhatsApp communication groups.
15. In line with the resolution of the ANC/SAMWU report-back meeting with the Secretary General, the Limpopo PSO will meet with SAMWU Regional structures on 6 November 2025, after which a report will be submitted to the Secretary General's Office.

Discipline and Integrity Issues

16. The Provincial Disciplinary Committee (PDC) received five cases — four from Lephalale — all of which have been concluded and appealed to the National Disciplinary Committee. The PDC met on 30 September 2025 and formally closed the Boy Mamabolo matter on the basis that he resigned from the ANC, meaning the organisation no longer has jurisdiction over him as a non-member.
17. During the review period, the PEC ensured that Facebook groups using the name and branding of the ANC to promote insults or factional content were either shut down or had ANC branding removed.

PROVINCIAL GOVERNANCE AND MANIFESTO IMPLEMENTATION

18. Limpopo Province is located in the northern part of South Africa and shares borders with Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. The Province is known for its rich cultural heritage and is home to the Mapungubwe Cultural Landscape, a UNESCO World Heritage Site. According to Census 2022, Limpopo's population stands at approximately 6.6 million, of whom 96.5% are Black African and 2.5% are White. The most widely spoken languages are Sepedi (55.5%), Tshivenda (17.4%) and Xitsonga (17.3%). Economically, Limpopo was ranked the fifth-largest contributor to the national GDP in 2022 (Stats SA, 2023).
19. Limpopo recorded a GDP growth rate of 1.0% in 2022, below the national rate of 1.9%, ranking sixth among provinces. Key contributing industries included mining, personal services and finance. Mining remains the largest contributor at 25%, followed by personal services (24%), finance (14%) and transport (5%).
20. The Limpopo Central Academic Hospital (LCAH) — a 488-bed central hospital under construction in Polokwane — is funded by the National Department of Health. Construction began in May 2023, with progress currently at 19%. The project has benefited 54 SMMEs and created 659 employment opportunities. Completion is projected for May 2028. The hospital will strengthen specialist training platforms, serve as the primary teaching hospital for the University of Limpopo's Faculty of Health Sciences, and reduce reliance on Gauteng for advanced medical services. The main strategic risk is securing sustained funding for this R5 billion project during the current economic climate. Once completed, it will be among the leading medical facilities in the country, significantly reducing waiting times for specialised operations.
21. Agriculture remains a vital contributor to Limpopo's economy and job creation. The province accounts for 7.6% of national agricultural output, with agriculture contributing 2.3% to the provincial GDP.
22. The Province is constructing a R396 million Provincial State Theatre in Polokwane. The project includes a main theatre with 600 seats, a secondary 200-seat theatre, a restaurant, bar, coffee shop, bookshop and poetry spaces. This initiative aims to strengthen the arts sector, create 100 jobs and support nearly 20 SMMEs. Plans for hawker stalls around Bakone Malapa, supporting local traders, are also underway.
23. Access to water in Limpopo declined by 6.5% between 2011 and 2022 (from 86% to 79.5%). Limpopo now has the highest proportion of households without piped water at 20.5%, compared to the national average of 8.7%. This decline is largely due to ageing infrastructure. Conversely, access to electricity increased by 8.2% and refuse removal services improved by 10.2% over the same period. While water provision remains the province's greatest challenge, District Municipalities (as Water Services Authorities) and Local Municipalities have implemented interim measures through extensive borehole drilling.
24. **Borehole Interventions:** Sekhukhune drilled 65 boreholes across Traditional Authority areas. Vhembe drilled an additional 15 boreholes. Polokwane City drilled 46 boreholes across the City and Seshego clusters, including 5 in the Juju Valley area (Ward 13), and 4 more in surrounding wards. Capricorn District Municipality has 556 operational boreholes out of 722. Of the 166 non-operational boreholes, 45 dried up, 51 were vandalised or stripped, and 70 are being attended to. New boreholes were opened in Blouberg (Matsoana, Madona and Taaibosch), benefiting 3,001 households, and in Molemole (Ratsaka and Dikgoloaneng), benefiting 2,037 households. Mopani District Municipality drilled 19 new boreholes and reticulated 25 villages under the Greater Giyani Municipality as part of Giyani Phase 1. Budget

approval is awaited for Phase 2, including completion of the bulk pipeline by the Department of Water and Sanitation and Lepelle Northern Water. Waterberg Municipalities — as Water Services Authorities — implemented the following interventions: Mogalakwena (30 boreholes), Bela Bela (11), Thabazimbi (22 operational boreholes out of 47), and Lephalale (108 operational boreholes). A 140 km bulk water pipeline project in Lephalale, supplying the municipality, Exxaro and Eskom, is underway. In Sekhukhune, the Moutse Bulk Water Project is being implemented to supply Greater Elias Motsoaledi and Ephraim Mogale Local Municipalities.

Manifesto Priority 1. A Jobs Plan to Put South Africa to Work

24. The Limpopo Provincial Government continues to make steady progress in expanding job opportunities and promoting inclusive economic participation. Through the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) Phase 5, 49 581 work opportunities have been created since the start of the financial year, surpassing the provincial target. This has been supported by deliberate procurement measures prioritising township and rural enterprises (25.82%), women-owned businesses (37.48%) and youth-owned enterprises (33.67%).
25. Partnerships with the private sector have also contributed to employment growth, with overall provincial employment increasing from 1.488 million to 1.515 million. Key growth sectors include mining, agriculture, finance and trade. Youth empowerment remains central, demonstrated through the R100 million merSETA apprenticeship programme targeting 500 learners across various trades, and the ETDP SETA programme which recruited 300 young people for digital skills training. In line with transformation imperatives, 1 424 learners were placed across government departments, 74% of whom are women. Despite this progress, several departments remain below the 50% women and 3% disability equity targets.

Manifesto Priority 2. Industrialisation and Infrastructure for Inclusive Growth

26. Major industrial and infrastructure initiatives remain the cornerstone of Limpopo's development agenda. Significant progress was recorded at the Musina-Makhado Special Economic Zone (MMSEZ), where township establishment approvals for the North Site have been finalised, enabling the rollout of bulk infrastructure (water, sewer and security systems) from early 2026. The South Site process remains delayed but is expected to conclude by May 2026.
27. At the Fetakgomo-Tubatse Industrial Park (FTIP), fencing and enabling infrastructure are progressing toward full SEZ proclamation by December 2025. Parallel initiatives include hydrogen energy development and automotive manufacturing partnerships. Across the province, infrastructure investments include 129 km of gravel road regraveling, 17 km upgraded to tar, and pothole patching covering 126 668 m². Energy infrastructure development is advancing through Eskom's 400/132kV transmission line projects at Leseding and Nzhelele, scheduled for completion by 2029.
28. The Provincial Investment Conference scheduled for October 2025 targets R120 billion in investment pledges, reflecting the province's commitment to inclusive growth. Over 1 842 small enterprises benefited from LEDET empowerment programmes, while flagship infrastructure projects—including the Limpopo Provincial Theatre and the Limpopo Central Academic Hospital—demonstrate long-term investment in developmental transformation.

Manifesto Priority 3. Tackling the High Cost of Living & Supporting Incomes

29. The province continues to cushion households against rising living costs through subsidised basic services and targeted renewable energy investments. A total of 317 229 households benefit from free basic services across the five districts, although delays in updating indigent registers remain a challenge. To improve energy affordability and sustainability, R78 billion in renewable energy investments has been pledged, including major solar projects such as Lephalale Solar PV (90% complete) and Bolobedu Solar PV (under construction).

30. Additional measures to support household incomes include strengthening social grants and social relief programmes, while exploring pathways for a basic income support system. In partnership with energy and transport entities, initiatives such as the conversion of public transport fleets to electric vehicles and retrofitting public buildings with solar power are under way to reduce costs and promote environmental sustainability.

Manifesto Priority 4. Investing in People and Basic Services

31. Investing in human capability remains central to Limpopo's development trajectory. In education, 756 practitioners have been trained in the National Curriculum Framework, and 324 underperforming schools have received targeted support to improve learner performance. Health services have been strengthened through the procurement of a R42 million PET-CT scanner for Pietersburg Hospital, recruitment of additional nurses and medical officers, and upgrades to health infrastructure. Family preservation services reached over 11 000 beneficiaries, while 13 809 older persons received community-based care.
32. Water and sanitation remain key priorities. Major projects include Sinthumule-Kutama (completed), Mametja-Sekororo (99% complete), and Giyani Water Services (93% complete). A provincial water and sanitation strategy has been adopted to address systemic challenges such as funding gaps, ageing infrastructure and weak intergovernmental coordination.

Manifesto Priority 5. Defending and Advancing Freedom

32. The province continues to safeguard citizen rights and security through intensified law enforcement operations, anti-crime initiatives and social cohesion programmes. Conviction rates for sexual offences and aggravated robbery remain high at 70% and 74% respectively. More than 5 500 victims of violence received psychosocial and legal support, while 2 567 GBVF cases were reported—reflecting both increased reporting and persistent vulnerability.
33. Governance and accountability continue to improve, with six provincial departments achieving clean audits and six receiving unqualified audit outcomes. Most departments comply with the 10% vacancy rate, and invoice payment compliance stands at 99.9%. Local government support interventions have strengthened audit performance, with two municipalities achieving clean audits and fourteen receiving unqualified opinions. The creative sector continues to promote social cohesion through multilingual, cultural and artistic programmes benefiting over 400 practitioners and young creatives.

Manifesto Priority 6. Building a Better Africa and the World

34. Limpopo positions itself as a critical player in regional and continental cooperation. Premier Phophi Ramathuba led the provincial delegation to the Intra-Africa Trade Fair in Algeria, presenting Limpopo as a regional logistics hub under the AfCFTA framework. Fifteen provincial enterprises—particularly in creative industries and agro-processing—participated in the fair.
35. The Province has strengthened bilateral relations through engagements with China, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Algeria, focusing on infrastructure management, youth leadership development and trade cooperation. Environmental sustainability is a core pillar, with 5 000 trees planted under climate-resilience programmes and 37 environmental impact assessments finalised within statutory timeframes. Progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) remains uneven: electricity access stands at 96.6%, while poverty (55%) and unemployment (35%) continue to present major challenges.

Recommendations to the NGC

36. These recommendations are preliminary, with Limpopo having already consolidated and expanded its proposals in the report submitted following the Provincial General Council:
- Strengthen Political Education: Enforce completion of modules and integrate ideological training into candidate vetting.
 - Improve Governance Oversight: Monitor municipal performance monthly and enforce consequence management.
 - Enhance Alliance Coordination: Formalise and resource joint programmes with COSATU and SANCO.
 - Accelerate LGE 2026 Preparations: Initiate manifesto consultations, community-vetting processes and early campaign mobilisation.
 - Rebuild Public Trust: Prioritise rural service delivery, strengthen councillor accountability and enhance leadership visibility.
 - Review the role of motive forces within the current democratic dispensation in relation to their evolving interests.
 - Assess the challenges and progress of the Government of National Unity (GNU).
 - Review legislation governing the security cluster in light of the current political climate.
37. The report outlines several key achievements by the ANC Limpopo PEC since the 55th National Conference. These include the successful implementation of Letsema campaigns, strengthened community engagement, major infrastructure rollout (including the Central Academic Hospital and Provincial State Theatre), and youth empowerment through SETA programmes and PYA structures. Organisational discipline remains strong, with most branches in good standing and active participation in Regional Conferences.
38. However, the report also identifies critical challenges requiring urgent intervention. These include strained Alliance relations, municipal financial distress, and underperformance in SRC elections. Infrastructure backlogs—particularly in water provision and road maintenance—continue to frustrate communities. The rise of new political formations and the SACP’s decision to contest elections pose strategic risks to ANC unity and electoral strength. The PEC has responded with targeted interventions, including training workshops, caucus engagements and strengthened governance oversight.
39. The PEC calls for intensified political education, stronger Alliance coordination and accelerated preparations for the 2026 Local Government Elections. The report further recommends reassessing the role of motive forces, reviewing the effectiveness of the GNU and revisiting legislation governing the security cluster in the current political context.
40. These steps are essential to safeguarding the ANC’s leadership role and advancing the transformation agenda in Limpopo and beyond.

MPUMALANGA

1. Overview

The ANC in Mpumalanga continues to maintain political dominance across the Province, with an organisational presence in all municipalities. However, this strength is now accompanied by declining voter confidence, uneven service delivery performance, reduced electoral participation, and weakened organisational cohesion in certain areas. While our governance footprint remains intact, community trust increasingly depends on visible delivery, reliable infrastructure, strong leadership accountability, and the renewal of organisational discipline at all levels.

2. Shifts in the Balance of Forces Since the 55th National Conference

Since the 55th National Conference, the balance of forces has shifted under conditions of heightened political contestation, internal organisational weaknesses, inconsistent electoral performance, and changing community sentiment. Although the ANC remains the majority political force in the Province, our support is no longer uniform. Community confidence in ANC governance is increasingly conditional on visible improvements in service delivery, the credibility of leadership, and tangible socio-economic progress.

The movement retains a broad institutional footprint, yet the 2024 election outcomes confirm significant declines in several key municipalities:

- Chief Albert Luthuli: from historic levels of 92.99% to 57.29%
- Msukaligwa: 84.58% down to 38.86%
- Mkhondo: 85.56% down to 40.43%
- Lekwa and Govan Mbeki: both falling below 45%

Similar downward trends were recorded in Dipaleseng, Dr Pixley Ka Isaka Seme and Victor Khanye.

These figures reflect a decade-long erosion of ANC hegemony, with the steepest contraction occurring between 2019 and 2024. Crucially, this decline was not driven primarily by opposition growth. A large segment of traditional ANC voters withdrew from participation altogether: 43% of registered voters did not cast ballots in 2024, despite the voter roll exceeding two million. This abstention—rooted in frustration with slow service recovery, governance instability, and weakened branch mobilisation—is the most significant strategic risk. It signals not mass rejection of the ANC, but silent disengagement.

Despite this, the ANC remains the governing party in Mpumalanga, holding majority control at provincial level and maintaining representation in all municipalities, including through coalition or cooperative arrangements where required. The 2024 decline reflects performance-related disengagement rather than ideological displacement.

The balance of forces, therefore, remains **contested but recoverable**—dependent on organisational renewal, stricter accountability for councillors and deployees, accelerated service delivery turnaround, and sustained reconnection with communities, especially in municipalities where confidence declined most sharply.

3. State of the Motive Forces in Mpumalanga, and Their Attitude to the Movement and the NDR

The motive forces in Mpumalanga remain historically aligned to the ANC, but their confidence has become increasingly linked to the quality of governance experienced in their daily lives. Support persists, but it is more conditional than in previous periods. Where communities experience reliable water provision, electricity stability, responsive councils, social support programmes, and economic relief, political confidence remains strong. Where service failures and instability persist, participation retreats.

Unemployment—especially youth unemployment—remains the most potent driver of discontent. Economic exclusion restricts mobility and intensifies frustration among young Black men and women who increasingly feel alienated from formal political processes. This cohort is not ideologically opposed to the ANC; rather, it is disengaged, and thus sits at the centre of the organisation's renewal and mobilisation challenge.

Rural and township communities continue to demonstrate deep emotional loyalty to the ANC, particularly elders who hold long historical memory of the movement. However, this allegiance is now mediated by day-to-day service reliability: access to water, stable electricity, timely responses from municipalities, and visible, accountable councillors. The motive forces respond positively where

delivery improves, and withdraw participation when performance stagnates. This trend is evident in municipalities that experienced sharp support declines between 2019 and 2024 despite stable demographics.

In the workplace and labour environment across the Province, structural changes in the mining and energy sectors have weakened union presence, reducing one of our most reliable channels of politicisation and mass organisation. Informal traders, farm workers, domestic workers and small rural co-operatives represent an expanding constituency but require deeper integration into economic transformation programmes, co-operative development and agricultural support mechanisms. Workers and labour-union constituencies remain broadly loyal to the NDR, but their organising capacity and sustainability have been severely affected by retrenchments, mine closures, and the shutdown of power stations such as Komati, which has removed stable industrial employment and weakened labour's organising strength in Mpumalanga. Farm workers, domestic workers, informal traders and rural communities constitute a large proportion of the ANC's lived constituency, but they require stronger policy prioritisation, especially in areas where water security, electricity reliability, access to productive land and local economic support remain uneven.

We continue to observe pockets of renewed confidence in areas where delivery has improved and where job-creating programmes and provincial deployments are visible at community level. These responses confirm that trust has not collapsed; the people remain open to recovery when progress is felt directly through stable water supply, fewer electricity interruptions, functioning municipalities and leadership that is present, visible and rooted among communities. Youth unemployment continues to generate significant pressure, shaping political sentiment within households and neighbourhoods. However, this constituency remains reachable and can be drawn back into active participation if real economic pathways, training opportunities and sector-specific placements are created at scale.

The ANC in Mpumalanga therefore confronts motive forces that are not hostile, but sceptical—less responsive to rhetoric and more persuaded by tangible delivery and leadership proximity. Their loyalty is recoverable, but only through visible service turnaround, intensified ward-level mobilisation, expanded youth economic inclusion, revitalised political education and a disciplined organisational presence that engages communities continuously rather than only during elections.

4. State of Organisation, Programmes and Campaigns Towards ANC Renewal

The organisational machinery of the ANC in Mpumalanga remains intact and functional, with leadership structures that convene regularly and maintain political coherence. The Provincial Executive Committee, elected at the 13th Provincial Conference in April 2022, has met more than fifty (50) times, while Officials continue to meet weekly as part of organisational routine. PEC subcommittees mirror national structures and remain critical platforms for driving the renewal agenda. The Elections, Economic Transformation, Gender, Youth and Political Education subcommittees have been the most active and consistent in implementing their Programmes of Action, while other subcommittees require stronger reporting and programme discipline.

The PEC and PWC have executed their mandate with clarity: supporting regional conferences, resolving political conflicts in Nkomazi, Mkhondo, Msukaligwa, Govan Mbeki, Lekwa and Steve Tshwete, and leading the Province into the 55th National Conference. Vacancies were filled timeously through a Special PGC; co-options strengthened capacity; and leadership continuity was secured through acting arrangements in the Treasurer's Office.

PEC subcommittees have led central renewal and governance programmes:

- The **Legislature and Governance Subcommittee** bridged relations between the PEC and the 6th Administration, managed the mid-term lekgotla process, led the Provincial 30-Year Review Rally, facilitated 100-Day Report-Back engagements across districts, convened the water intervention task team, and supported the 2024 leadership transition in Lekwa.

- The **Economic Transformation Subcommittee** convened the Provincial Economic Summit, strengthened debates on mining and the Just Energy Transition, enhanced SMME support, advanced agricultural training, launched the Carbon Capture Utilisation project in Govan Mbeki, and drove the Mining and Investment Conference which secured R242 billion in commitments.
- The **Culture and Religious Affairs Subcommittee** strengthened mass contact through Easter programmes, coordinated provincial end-year events, revitalised Chaplaincy structures and engaged Traditional Leadership.
- The **Education, Health, Science and Technology Subcommittee** consolidated back-to-school programmes, exam monitoring, BELA Bill mobilisation, clinic-based Cheka Impilo work and NHI communication, and engaged higher-education institutions and TVET colleges.

The mobilisation and social-programme structures of the ANC have also remained active:

- The **Gender and Equity Subcommittee** led high-visibility GBVF campaigns, Disability Month activities, International Day for the Girl Child, Rural Women's Day, Older Persons Wellness programmes and the Elukwatini March, where a provincial GBVF pledge was signed.
- **Peace and Stability** ensured successful January 8 events over the past three years, supported election deployment in Gauteng, monitored by-elections and provided security guidance.
- **Social Transformation** revived branch committees, supported food, sanitary and school uniform interventions, and initiated oversight work for shelters and NGOs.
- **International Relations** strengthened BRICS participation, Palestine solidarity, Africa-Cuba cooperation and engagements with FRELIMO and PUDEMO, and hosted the Africa-Cuba Solidarity Conference in early 2024.
- **Political Education**—the engine of cadre renewal—rolled out the Foundational Course at provincial, regional and branch levels, inducted PEC and RECs, trained twenty-two (22) trainers, and positioned Mpumalanga as the leading province in national implementation.
- The **Elections Machinery** contested all seventeen (17) by-elections since the PEC was established, implemented the 2024 campaign, launched voter-registration drives, activated war-room tracking, delivered community report-backs, and initiated LGE2026 preparations.
- **Deployment, Constitutional and Legal Affairs, Communications, Organising, PMER, Finance, Disciplinary and Dispute Resolution** collectively stabilised candidate processing, resolved disputes, strengthened branding, funded major events and managed PDC/NDCA cases with discipline.

On membership: the Province currently has 53 091 members on the digital system. Growth trends vary across regions:

- Ehlanzeni declined to 20 095
- Nkangala peaked and stabilised at 16 580
- Gert Sibande recorded steady growth to 16 416

A total of 302 branches are in good standing, while others are affected by renewal lapses, meeting irregularities or insufficient membership thresholds. Branches remain active in campaigns—GBVF, Letsema, back-to-school, NHI, food gardens, funeral and community support—although irregular BGMs/BBGMs and weak reporting remain organisational vulnerabilities.

5. Local Government, Implementation of the Local Government Action Plan and LGE 2026 Preparations

Local government remains the most contested and fragile layer of governance in Mpumalanga. The Province acknowledges that service delivery failures, instability in councils, weak administrative capacity and prolonged infrastructure backlogs have been central drivers of declining public confidence. Water insecurity, electricity interruptions, waste management failures and deteriorating road networks were repeatedly identified as triggers of community frustration, protest action and

withdrawal from electoral participation. Where governance has been consistent, communities respond positively; where provision breaks down, trust fragments quickly.

The ANC in the Province has directed its deployees to prioritise water stabilisation, sanitation recovery, electricity reliability and road maintenance as the core pillars of the Local Government Action Plan. Municipalities have been instructed to strengthen revenue collection, reduce non-technical electricity losses, improve staffing levels and ensure that executive leadership provides visible, day-to-day oversight of service delivery. The Province has supported turnaround interventions in dysfunctional municipalities, facilitated leadership changes where required, and pushed for improved intergovernmental coordination to accelerate delivery. The Executive and Legislature have worked jointly to monitor the performance of municipal managers, assess project implementation, and ensure that councillors become more accountable and present in communities—not only during parliamentary cycles.

As we move toward the LGE 2026 cycle, the Province has entered a preparation phase focused not on campaigning, but on governance recovery. The experience of 2024 demonstrated that electoral support is no longer automatic; it must be earned through visible improvement in the lived conditions of communities. The LGE 2026 planning framework is therefore tied to delivery: councillors must lead clean governance, respond rapidly to water disruptions, oversee infrastructure maintenance, and act as first responders to community grievances. The Province has further emphasised the need for councillors to submit regular activity reports, increase casework visibility, expand ward-based volunteer structures and strengthen oversight in service delivery units. These are not election activities—they are renewal activities that create the credibility required to contest elections from a position of organisational strength.

The ANC in Mpumalanga enters this phase fully aware that the outcome of LGE 2026 will be shaped not by manifesto language alone, but by whether municipalities demonstrate progress between now and the ballot. The recovery of trust depends on delivery. Councillors must work. Governance must respond. Infrastructure must improve. The Province recognises that this is the decisive terrain of renewal.

6. State of the Alliance and Work with Sectors

The Alliance in Mpumalanga remains functional, cooperative and politically aligned around the strategic objective of defending and advancing the National Democratic Revolution. Engagement with COSATU, the SACP and SANCO has remained structured, with joint activities undertaken throughout the term, including the 30-Year Democracy Commemorations, bilateral engagements, provincial rallies, mass mobilisation initiatives and collaborative policy discussions. The Alliance continues to serve as a reservoir of political support, ideological grounding and mobilisation capacity, even where programme execution varies across partners.

Relations with the SACP remain constructive, though the Province acknowledges increasing internal debates within the Party on electoral posture and the possibility of independent contestation. This emerging dynamic requires sustained engagement, programmatic clarity and reaffirmation of the shared strategic horizon of the NDR, ensuring that tactical differences do not drift into organisational fragmentation. COSATU continues to engage the ANC on labour matters, wages, energy policy, mine closures and industrial restructuring, especially in relation to job security. SANCO remains a key community interface structure, although its organisational strength varies across municipalities.

Beyond the Alliance, the Province maintains regular interaction with traditional leaders, faith-based structures, labour formations, youth organisations, student movements and civil society groups. The ANC continues to enjoy support and participation from these sectors—particularly through churches, traditional councils and organised workers—though the rise of splinter formations and community-based independents has created a more competitive organising environment. Youth and student formations remain politically aligned but require renewed programme focus, economic inclusion pathways and stronger organisational consolidation to translate affiliation into sustained activism.

7. Discipline and Integrity Issues

The ANC in Mpumalanga recognises that discipline, organisational culture and ethical conduct remain central to renewal and credibility. The Province continues to manage disciplinary cases, resolve disputes and monitor conduct at leadership and branch levels through established organisational processes. Structures responsible for Discipline, Constitutional and Legal Affairs, and Dispute Resolution remain operational—processing complaints, guiding constitutional compliance, and intervening where internal conflict or instability threatens cohesion. In most regions, disciplinary matters are being addressed within formal organisational channels rather than spilling into the public arena, indicating that the organisation retains internal capacity for self-correction.

The Province acknowledges, however, that discipline is uneven. In some areas, factional competition, leadership disputes and proximity to state or municipal resources continue to influence behaviour, manifesting in branch instability, conference tensions and lapses in organisational coherence. These instances—while not dominant—continue to weaken unity and delay programme execution. Where internal contestation is not resolved institutionally, it undermines political authority and erodes public trust.

The leadership remains firm that renewal cannot advance without consequence management, consistent application of organisational rules and the cultivation of a culture in which wrongdoing is confronted, not tolerated. The credibility of the ANC depends on ethical leadership, discipline, and the restoration of revolutionary morality at all levels of the movement.

8. State of Provincial Governance and Implementation of Conference Resolutions & 2024 Manifesto

The ANC in Mpumalanga recognises that governance performance has become the decisive measure through which communities evaluate the movement. The Province reports continued progress in expanding access to services since the advent of democracy—improved water connections, electrification, educational infrastructure, road networks, free primary healthcare, an expanded social wage and growing Black economic participation. These gains remain foundational to the ANC's credibility, and they continue to anchor loyalty where delivery is visible and consistent.

However, governance performance remains uneven, and the Province acknowledges persistent weaknesses now shaping public sentiment. Communities continue to experience unreliable water supply in several municipalities, sanitation backlogs, deteriorating internal roads and intermittent electricity. Budget pressures, municipal instability, weak technical capacity and poor project execution slow implementation and, in some cases, undermine the movement's authority among the motive forces. The rise in poverty, unemployment and the high cost of living—sharply reflected in the report—has intensified frustration, particularly among youth and working-class households who are not experiencing meaningful improvement in their daily material conditions.

The implementation of Conference resolutions and the 2024 Manifesto therefore requires accelerated delivery. The Province affirms the strategic direction of building an ethical, capable and developmental state, and recognises that the success of the NDR now depends on visible improvements in service outcomes. Deployment of ANC cadres into government structures must reflect competence, accountability and community-centred work, with no tolerance for administrative collapse or political detachment. Councillors and MPLs must lead oversight efforts, monitor service points, respond promptly to community concerns and provide regular feedback, so that governance is felt—not only promised or articulated.

9. Key Recommendations to the NGC

To consolidate renewal ahead of LGE 2026, the Province submits the following strategic directives for NGC consideration:

- a) **Deepen organisational renewal with urgency**, prioritising disciplined branches, active subcommittees, strengthened political education, improved membership management and consequence management for conduct that weakens the organisation. Renewal must not be declared—it must be implemented through structured work, accountability and strengthened cadre capacity at every layer. Branch life must be restored to an activist posture, characterised by regular meetings, campaigns and sustained community presence.
- b) **Accelerate governance delivery** through a focused programme centred on water reliability, electricity stability, road infrastructure, sanitation, waste management and improved revenue collection. Councillors and deployees must be held to measurable performance standards and report work consistently. Communities must experience governance, not merely hear commitments to it. Material improvements must be visible between now and 2026 in order to rebuild confidence.
- c) **Ground LGE 2026 preparations in delivery, mobilisation and reconnection.** The Province recommends strengthening ward-based organising, volunteer structures, voter re-engagement, youth economic pathways and targeted mobilisation in areas where support has declined. Recovery requires presence—street by street, household by household—with governance delivery as the central pillar of persuasion.

NORTHERN CAPE

Overview

1. The ANC in the Northern Cape remains in a healthy political and organisational state. The unity of its structures enables coherent action and collective responsibility on political developments within the province. The 10th Provincial Conference—preceded by all Regional Conferences—demonstrated a strong unity of purpose, avoiding the divisive and destructive tendencies experienced elsewhere. While differences of opinion emerged during robust discussions, the overriding consensus was that ANC renewal requires the subordination of personal ambition to organisational unity and stability.
2. The 10th Provincial Conference affirmed that *“the time has come to rebuild the movement, to reconnect with the people, and to recommit ourselves to the revolutionary ideals that have guided us for over a century. The ANC belongs to the people, and it is only through the people that the vision of a better life for all shall be realized.”*
3. Over the past three years, the PEC has focused on implementing the resolutions of the 55th National Conference, anchored in the ANC’s strategic objective of transforming South Africa into a united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous society. Pursuing this objective requires a strong, resilient organisation capable of responding to the needs of the people. Despite challenges within the membership system, provincial membership has increased significantly, and the PEC has ensured that most structures are now in good standing.
4. In line with policy directives, the newly elected PEC established PEC Policy Subcommittees to drive the implementation of the 55th National Conference and 10th Provincial Conference resolutions. Over the past three years, the PEC has consistently convened Provincial and Mid-Year Lekgotla meetings to guide the work of provincial and local government. Both Provincial and Regional Conferences held extensive policy discussions based on submissions from ANC branches.
5. In line with NEC directives, the Political Education Programme has included Foundation Course Training Workshops across the province, policy training for conferences, and elections-related training. The PEC has also established Political Education Cells made up of PEC members, each assigned specific topics to present during PEC meetings.

6. The work of the Department of Communication, Information and Publicity (DCIP) has been anchored in the movement's ideological foundations. The battle of ideas has been actively pursued across modern communication platforms, including social media and broadcasting.
7. All five regional structures are in good standing and functioning optimally. All Regional Conferences were convened earlier in the year, prior to the Provincial Conference in May.
8. The ANC Veterans League, ANC Women's League and ANC Youth League all have functional structures in good standing and continue to run relevant programmes within their respective constituencies.
9. The ANC is beginning to experience a resurgence in electoral support. Of the 10 by-elections held since the 2024 National and Provincial Elections, the ANC won 8. Although the ANC experienced a decline of around 6% in the 2024 elections—reducing representation in the Provincial Legislature from 19 to 15 seats—the province has now shifted into full preparation mode for the 2026 Local Government Elections. An Elections Strategy Workshop was convened in August 2025, the Provincial Elections Team (PET) was appointed in October 2025, and in November provincial training of trainers commenced for LETs and BETs. This training also incorporates preparation for the 5th NGC, the NGC Base Document discussions, and the 2026 LGE.

State of Organisation

10. Of the 232 ANC branches in the province, 218 are in good standing, having successfully convened BBGMs. The remaining 14 branches are not in good standing due to expired terms of office. These branches have been given a grace period to reconvene BBGMs by 15 November 2025. Levels of branch activism vary across and within regions. Active branches are running Letsema campaigns, undertaking elections work, conducting community outreach, and implementing political education programmes.

Table: Status of ANC Northern Cape Branches, November 2025

Region	Potential Branches	Branches in Good Standing	% in Good Standing	Branches Not in Good Standing
Frances Baard	57	54	95%	03
Pixley Ka Seme	51	49	96%	02
Z.F. Mgcawu	46	42	91%	04
Namakwa	40	36	90%	04
John Taolo Gaetsewe	38	37	97%	01
Grand Total	232	218	94%	14

11. ANC membership in the Northern Cape increased during September and October 2025, driven by the 30 September cut-off date for NGC participation and increased membership uploads by National Membership Officers.

\

ANC Northern Cape Membership, November 2025

Region	Members in Good Standing	Grace Period	Expired	Probation	Total Registered Members
Frances Baard	8 130	947	4 648	150	13 725
Z.F. Mgcawu	5 755	632	5 003	0	11 390
Pixley ka Seme	6 931	249	4 701	83	11 964
Namakwa	4 470	201	2 145	0	6 816
John Taolo Gaetsewe	5 190	497	4 924	261	10 872
Grand Total	30 476	2 526	21 421	494	54 767

12. The membership statistics—especially the 21 421 expired members—show substantial room for improvement in membership renewal. There are already members who have paid and are awaiting upload onto the ANCMMS. The PSO and RSOs will prioritise renewal of existing membership, and National Membership Officers will return to the province to upload and update all paid-up members.
13. The ANC Leagues remain active and continue to enjoy a constructive and supportive relationship with the ANC in the province.

Political Education and ANC Foundation Course

14. The province successfully rolled out the mandatory Foundation Course Trainings across all five regions. While the number of members reached remains relatively low, the target is to ensure that every ANC member completes at least the introductory five-module course, which provides a uniform understanding of the ANC's mission, history and origins.

Foundation Course Training Progress

Region	# of Branches	Branches Trained	Branches Outstanding	No. of Participants
Frances Baard	57	54	3	1 748
JT Gaetsewe	38	28	10	1 138
ZF Mgcawu	46	27	19	1 231
Namakwa	39	13	26	200
Pixley Ka Seme	50	44	6	916
3-per-branch Training of Trainers	—	—	—	891
PEC and REC Members Trained	—	—	—	153
Provincial Totals	232	166	66	6 565

15. The Provincial Executive Committee (PEC), at its first sitting, resolved to establish ten political education cells, each assigned to specific PEC members. The thematic areas covered include:
- (i) historical tenets and the formation of the ANC;
 - (ii) the 1969 Hani Memorandum;
 - (iii) the Morogoro Conference and its significance;
 - (iv) international relations and the emergence of a multipolar world;
 - (v) ANC renewal;
 - (vi) state interventions in the minerals sector;

- (vii) the history of cadreship originating from the Northern Cape;
- (viii) social media, information warfare and artificial intelligence, including disinformation ahead of the LGE;
- (ix) local government elections; and
- (x) women in politics and the barriers they face.

Work by Regions

16. The Northern Cape provincial report provided a detailed account of REC operations since 2022, following their Regional Conferences and subsequent induction processes. This included an in-depth analysis of the 2024 National and Provincial Elections (NPE), detailing performance by sub-region, as well as a comprehensive assessment of the state of branches, the work of the Leagues, and REC oversight over municipalities in implementing the Local Government Action Plan.
17. A consolidated submission of recommendations from Regional General Councils (RGCs), Provincial General Councils (PGCs), and—where applicable—branches and Leagues, was prepared and submitted for consideration as part of the NGC process.

Conclusion

18. Despite the setback of the 2024 Elections in the province, the ANC remains determined to ensure that the NDR remains on track, by strengthening and renewing ANC structures, ensuring that the political economy of the N Cape serve its citizens and contribute to national economic development. The province shows great potential and opportunities, and can become a beacon of hope and inspiration for the rest of the country.

North West

1. OVERVIEW

The ANC in the North West enters this mid-term period under conditions of organisational strain, declining support, municipal instability, rising unemployment and growing public impatience with the pace of socio-economic change. Despite these challenges, the organisation remains the primary political force in the province, anchored by deep historic roots, broad mass presence and the continued recognition of the ANC as the leader of the National Democratic Revolution.

2. BALANCE OF FORCES

The balance of forces in the North West cannot be characterised only by decline. While the movement experienced pressure arising from organisational instability, community frustration and internal weaknesses, the 2024 electoral outcome demonstrated recovery, resilience and the continued ability of the ANC to command majority confidence when organisational work is coherent and visible.

However, this strength coexists with vulnerability. Support is no longer automatic; it is conditional on delivery, ethical leadership and stability in local government. The Province recognises that the motive forces remain largely aligned with the NDR, but they now demand progress they can feel—

water, electricity, functioning municipalities, visible leadership, youth opportunity and disciplined activism. The provincial political terrain reflects increased competition, fragmented voting patterns and coalition-dependent governance outcomes in several municipalities.

Internally, branch capacity and ideological discipline have weakened due to factional contestation, careerism and uneven activism. Externally, the authority of the movement is now determined less by liberation history and more by immediate lived experience and performance in governance.

3. STATE OF ORGANISATION, PROGRAMMES & RENEWAL WORK

The ANC in the North West retains functioning structures across PEC, REC and branch levels. Four regions constitute the provincial organisational base—three with elected RECs and one under a Regional Task Team (RTT). PEC Officials meet weekly, while the Provincial Working Committee executes PEC decisions, Lekgotla outcomes and directives flowing from strategic workshops.

Bojanala remains the strongest and most activated region. With 14 741 members and 4 322 cadres processed through the Foundation Course, it reflects a culture of mobilisation, political training and high organisational responsiveness. Branches convene regularly, programmes are implemented, and cadre development is visible in practice—not merely on paper.

Ngaka Modiri Molema carries a large membership base of 12 831, but the organisational engine remains weak. Less than half of qualifying branches have convened BBGM/BGM processes, and the region reflects structural underperformance in branch life, discipline and programme execution.

Dr Kenneth Kaunda reflects a more stable and administratively disciplined picture, with 86% of branches qualified and 89% having convened BGMs. Dr Ruth Segomotsi Mompati, with 7 384 members, demonstrates strong branch qualification and BGM readiness and is currently preparing for its Regional Conference.

Branch activity remains uneven—strong in some areas and dormant in others. Where branches exist only on paper, without programmes, campaigning, recruitment or sustained community presence, the movement loses authority. Political education has emerged as the strongest pillar of renewal, with the large-scale rollout of the OR Tambo School Foundation Course stabilising cadre consciousness and helping to re-establish discipline, activism and values-based leadership.

Subcommittee functionality also remains uneven. Elections, Political Education, Communications, Social Transformation and the Provincial Disciplinary Committee perform consistently. Legislature, Organising, Planning, Research, International Relations, Gender and PMER require stronger reporting discipline and improved programme execution.

The ANC in the North West has designated 2025 as a year of consolidation, renewal and organisational stabilisation. Renewal and service delivery are treated as core tasks, not peripheral work. Central to this approach is **Thuntsa Lerole**, retained as the primary mass-based activation programme driving direct community contact, rapid intervention on service delivery breakdowns and visible leadership presence on the ground. Complementing this, the **Provincial War Room** remains the enforcement mechanism for monitoring service failures, coordinating responses, compelling accountability and tracking progress across municipalities.

4. STATE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SERVICE DELIVERY & LGE PREPARATION

Local government remains the frontline expression of ANC governance in the North West. It is at this level where communities measure the organisation through water in the taps, refuse removal, electricity stability and the visible conduct of councillors. In the province, this sphere reflects strain, uneven functionality and unstable coalitions, yet also pockets of recovery and intervention-driven improvement.

A full provincial assessment of all 22 municipalities confirms a divided picture: ten municipalities are broadly stable in council functioning, while twelve present varying levels of distress, risk or dysfunction. Ditsobotla remains the most severe case, marked by the breakdown of council processes, non-payment of salaries, service delivery collapse and the exit of Clover as a major employer.

Coalitions define much of local governance, particularly in Rustenburg, JB Marks, Ditsobotla, Lekwa-Teemane and Maquassi Hills, where the ANC governs through negotiated partnerships. While these arrangements have retained ANC-led administrations, they have also introduced instability where partners resist programme implementation or undermine caucus discipline. Coalition politics in the province therefore requires clarity, firmness and strong political management.

Service delivery remains inconsistent. Many communities continue to experience water supply disruptions, electricity failures, refuse backlogs and deteriorating road networks. Under-expenditure of the MIG, poor Bid Committees operation and project stoppages linked to business forums further weaken delivery. Audit outcomes show gradual movement in a positive direction in some areas, with Bojanala District improving to an unqualified opinion, but irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure remains widespread. In several municipalities, these losses have grown by more than 300% over five years.

Intervention work by the PEC has intensified. The **Thuntsa Lerole** programme has been institutionalised as the primary mass and service-delivery mechanism, while the **Provincial War Room** continues to enforce accountability and unblock delays. Caucuses in Moretele, Moses Kotane and Kgetlengrivier have been stabilised politically, and work is ongoing in Rustenburg, Madibeng, Kagisano-Molopo, Greater Taung, Mamusa and Lekwa-Teemane. The PEC has initiated disciplinary measures where councillors collapsed sittings or defied organisational instruction, including cases in Madibeng, Ramotshere-Moiloa and Mamusa.

Forward work includes strengthening district municipalities to better support struggling local municipalities, improving irregular, fruitless and wasteful (IF&W) expenditure controls and audit compliance, and tightening grant expenditure monitoring. The Province is also considering the future viability of small municipalities such as Kgetlengrivier, with possible re-demarcation flagged for the next review cycle. Coalition governance must be regularised through a structured Provincial Framework that protects the ANC mandate and ensures accountability within shared councils.

5. STATE OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT & MANIFESTO IMPLEMENTATION

The ANC in the North West enters 2025 with measurable implementation gains flowing from the 2024 ANC Manifesto. The work of government continues to reflect the resolutions of the Provincial Makgotla (February 2024) and the Provincial Local Government Summit (February 2025), with departments translating manifesto commitments into delivery programmes, youth employment pathways, small business support, infrastructure rollout and procurement reform.

Priority 1: Putting South Africa to Work

- Public employment has been the most visible area of delivery. The Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP Phase V) has already exceeded the 2024/25 target, generating **36 916 work opportunities** across departments.
- Public Works and Roads, DEDECT, ACSR, Health, Education, COSATMA, Social Development and Provincial Treasury remain the primary drivers.
- Noteworthy is the absorption of over **13 000 young people** through the Basic Education Employment Initiative, complemented by DEDECT's **587** youth placements and **369** Treasury-led internships and learnerships.
- Small enterprise development continues through DEDECT's Empowerment Funds, turnaround interventions and Enterprise Information Centres, while Public Works' Contractor Development Programme successfully progressed **52 learner-contractors** to improved CIDB levels, with women and youth strongly represented.
- Performance in procurement equity continues to improve. Education alone spent **44%** of its Q2 procurement value on women-owned businesses, while several departments report increased participation of youth-owned suppliers.
- Engagement with the private sector is becoming more structured. PWR projects generated **1 759 secondary jobs** through capital works; DEDECT partnered with ABSA, Bank-SETA and Dunlop to support more than **300** SMMEs; and COSATMA secured aviation and security-industry training for **500 youth**.
- Health leveraged private clinic upgrades to stimulate local employment. Employment equity forums continue to institutionalise transformation: ACSR reports **57%** women representation, Treasury **40%** women at management level, and disability inclusion indicators are improving, though still uneven.

Priority 2: Building Our Industries for an Inclusive Economy

- Industrial development remains anchored in localisation. DEDECT has initiated an industrial Special-Purpose Vehicle partnership with Gauteng, with provincial industrial parks now being upgraded to accommodate Black Industrialist Programme beneficiaries.
- The Province is adopting a "10-aside" inclusive production model to stimulate circular economies, supply diversity and community-linked manufacturing. The outlook is positive, although full results will depend on capital mobilisation and reliable infrastructure.

Priority 3: Investing in Infrastructure

- Roads and infrastructure continue to serve as economic catalysts. Public Works and Roads has completed **17 major road projects**, injecting more than **R1 billion** into local economies and creating **567 direct jobs**.
- A second stream, currently underway across Bojanala, Dr Kenneth Kaunda and Dr RS Mompoti, is projected to create **836 additional jobs** with capital expenditure expected to exceed **R2 billion**.
- All projects adhere to the **30% local labour sourcing threshold** and contribute to spatial connectivity, economic mobility and the rural development mandate.

Priority 4 & 5: Democracy, Governance and International Work

- Employment Equity has been institutionalised in recruitment frameworks.
- International linkages through finance partnerships, training support and industrial cooperation (including Bank-SETA and ABSA) show growing orientation toward regional investment.
- The Province affirms that economic diplomacy must increasingly complement trade, industrialisation and skills-development objectives.

Constraints remain in the form of budget pressure, silo implementation, procurement compliance weaknesses and slow infrastructure execution. Remedial actions include ring-fencing designated procurement, reviewing policies and strengthening interdepartmental integration.

The economy remains mining-dependent and vulnerable to commodity fluctuations, automation and energy transition pressures. Youth unemployment in mining-belt communities is acute. Agriculture, tourism and beneficiation offer diversification potential but remain under-capitalised. Coal-area risk is high, and the transition must protect workers, towns and value chains while building renewable, industrial and agro-processing capacity. The Province asserts the need to shift from extraction to empowerment and beneficiation, strengthen SEZ development, support township and rural economies, deepen beneficiation and position Stilfontein as a just-transition hub.

6. STATE OF THE ALLIANCE & SECTORS

Alliance relations reflect both strength and volatility. The relationship with **COSATU** remains strong, following engagements after its Provincial Congress, with cooperation continuing at both workplace and municipal levels. Engagement with **SANCO** has been unstable; however, the Province has initiated stabilisation efforts, including leadership engagements in August 2025, and SANCO continues to participate in key ANC activities. The relationship with the **SACP** has weakened following its decision to contest the 2026 Local Government Elections, a shift that has altered participation patterns and introduced uncertainty into what had previously been a stable relationship of cooperation.

7. DISCIPLINE & ORGANISATIONAL INTEGRITY

Discipline and integrity remain central to renewing the organisation in the North West, with the PEC prioritising the restoration of ethical leadership rather than a purely punitive approach. The July 2025 PEC session reaffirmed discipline as fundamental to renewal, attributing many municipal governance failures to defiance of ANC mandates, factionalism and ethical lapses.

The Provincial Disciplinary Committee has processed numerous cases, applying appropriate sanctions and addressing major incidents, including the dissolution and re-election of councillors in Ditsobotla and judgments against individuals who undermined council processes. The PEC has further established a central disciplinary register to track cases and accelerate resolutions. Ongoing disciplinary processes in Ramotshere-Moiloa and Madibeng reflect a broader effort to restore ethical leadership and reinforce the principle that deployment is a responsibility. Discipline and integrity are therefore affirmed as the foundation of organisational renewal.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NGC

The Province submits the following resolutions for recommendation to the NGC:

1. Reclassify mineral policy to prioritise local beneficiation.
2. Review DORA to better address rural underdevelopment.
3. Finalise national coalition governance guidelines.
4. Review the candidate selection approach and PR list handling.
5. Provide guidance on the SACP's electoral posture.
6. Enforce stronger investment accountability from the DTIC and Invest SA.
7. Provide national support for municipal audits and turnaround strategies.
8. Strengthen the role of PECs and RECs in governance monitoring.
9. Adopt **Thuntsa Lerole** as a national service delivery and mobilisation model.
10. Expand municipal revenue tools, including smart metering.

11. Intensify anti-corruption measures and enforce ethical deployments.
12. Prioritise public employment programmes, Basic Income Support and youth economic pathways.

Western Cape

1. Shifts in the Balance of Forces since the 55th National Conference

The ANC in the Western Cape confronts a uniquely challenging political terrain, unlike other provinces where it remains dominant. The Democratic Alliance has governed the province since 2009, while ANC electoral support has steadily declined. This has been compounded by the growing influence of the Patriotic Alliance in coloured working-class communities and the emergence of the MK Party in former ANC strongholds.

In response, the Provincial Task Team (PTT) was appointed in October 2025 to stabilise the organisation, rebuild branches, confront factionalism and reverse electoral decline. The 9th Provincial Conference identified key threats, including persistent factionalism, inactive branches and declining electoral support. These challenges form the core focus of the PTT as it seeks to restore the ANC's credibility and organisational effectiveness in the province.

2. State of the Motive Forces and Attitude towards the ANC & the NDR

The motive forces in the Western Cape display a mixed posture towards the ANC and the National Democratic Revolution. Working-class communities, particularly in metropolitan townships and rural towns, remain broadly aligned with the objectives of transformation; however, trust in the ANC has weakened due to inconsistent service delivery and a thin organisational presence at branch level. The rapid rise of the Patriotic Alliance reflects this frustration, as it has absorbed significant sections of the coloured working class that historically viewed the ANC as their primary vehicle for social change. The penetration of the MK Party into former ANC base areas further illustrates political drift where branches are weak and community organising has collapsed.

The PTT has therefore positioned its core mandate around restoring community confidence through renewed grassroots organising, rebuilding BECs and BTTs, and reaffirming the working class as the central motive force of the NDR.

3. State of Organisation, Programmes & ANC Renewal Work

The ANC in the Western Cape is currently in an intensive rebuilding phase under the leadership of the Provincial Task Team established in October 2025. Officials meet every Monday to process organisational matters, direct implementation and intervene urgently where instability and structural weaknesses arise. Where rapid decisions are required, the full PTT is convened to enforce resolutions and stabilise structures.

Subcommittees within the PTT have been established and are operational with defined programmes that directly address ground-level challenges. Their work is under continuous review to strengthen execution capacity. Guided by the NWC assessment, the province has confirmed the weakened state of the organisation and has taken a strategic decision to reconfigure three regions whose terms have lapsed. Regional Task Teams (RTTs) will rebuild cohesion, restore political presence and re-establish functional BTTs in all non-operational branches. All PTT members have been deployed to regions to drive renewal work, coach structures, implement resolutions and provide sustained guidance on organisational recovery.

A Secretariat Forum has been activated as the operational nerve centre of the organisation. It meets regularly to synchronise programme implementation and serves as the relay point between NEC/PTT decisions and regional and branch structures. The Forum will continue meeting weekly to monitor performance, guide newly established BTTs and ensure uniform programme rollout across the province.

Membership, Branch Life & System Readiness

The membership system is operational and accessible through the digital portal. However, branch access delays persist due to unestablished BTTs and limited user capacity, particularly in regions with zero operational status. Branch Coordinator training has commenced to address these shortcomings.

Current branch standing:

- Dullah Omar: 37 branches in good standing
- Southern Cape: 14 branches in good standing
- West Coast: 6 branches in good standing
- Central Karoo: 6 branches in good standing
- Boland & Overberg: No branches in good standing

Regional term status reflects further organisational vulnerability. Central Karoo, West Coast, Boland and Overberg last convened conferences between August and December 2022. Dullah Omar (August 2023) and Southern Cape (July 2023) remain within term. The decision to reconfigure and deploy RTTs is therefore corrective, urgent and necessary for rebuilding regional authority and restoring branch-level political work.

Organising, Campaigns & 2025 Programme Execution

Programme delivery demonstrates active mobilisation capacity where organisation remains alive. Key activities include:

- **BAGM rollout:** 62 branches qualify across the province; progress uneven, with Dullah Omar leading.
- **Branch Electoral Officers:** Secretariat convened; processes underway for candidate selection readiness.
- **Commemorative work:** Solomon Mahlangu Lecture hosted on 06 April 2025 in Khayelitsha, addressed by the Deputy President.
- **NGC Preparatory Councils:** Circular issued; councils integrated with ongoing BGM work.
- **Councillor Roll Call:** Province convened 183 councillors, including chief whips, on 02 September 2025; regional roll-calls finalised on 20–21 September 2025.
- **OR Tambo Month:** Four-phase programme implemented at branch, sub-regional, regional and provincial levels.

- **Volunteer deployment:** Strongest in Dullah Omar with 123 volunteers deployed and retained for ongoing work; West Coast confirmed two organisers; Boland deployment in progress.
- **Mass campaigns:** Palestine Solidarity March (27 September), COSATU anniversary, International Decent Work Day, SACP deployments and the Dullah Omar Decent Living March.

These activities confirm that the movement retains mobilisation strength where structures function, although organisational unevenness persists across the province.

Political Education & Cadre Development

POLEDU continues to serve as the central instrument of organisational renewal. The Foundation Course rollout has reached most sub-regions in Dullah Omar, Southern Cape and Central Karoo, with partial implementation in West Coast, Overberg and Boland. Completion rates vary, with some areas finalising all five modules while others remain midway through implementation.

To date, the province has trained **439 cadres**, who constitute the core renewal engine tasked with rebuilding political consciousness, unity and activism. The immediate task is to ensure that political education translates into revived BTTs, functional branches and sustained community-based organisation.

4. State of Provincial Government

The Western Cape Legislature operates in a highly constrained political environment, with the ANC largely functioning as the opposition and possessing limited institutional power. The party's leverage is further weakened by the loss of municipal control and unstable coalition arrangements that lack clearly defined governance frameworks, resulting in blurred accountability. A coherent provincial political strategy, led by NEC deployees, is required to guide coalition participation and align it with collective organisational objectives.

Provincial Legislature

The reduction of MPLs from 12 to 8 resulted in operational delays and weakened oversight capacity, although recent stabilisation measures have improved functionality. New systems are being implemented to strengthen accountability and reporting. The central challenge remains the improvement of caucus effectiveness through enhanced research capacity, improved speech preparation, strengthened constituency work and tighter programme coordination.

5. State of Local Government

The province comprises one metropolitan municipality, five districts and 25 local municipalities. The ANC governs primarily through coalitions and remains institutionally marginal across most councils.

City of Cape Town

The City remains under opposition control, with an active ANC caucus utilising protests, oversight interventions and public engagements to expose DA failures. Leadership has stabilised following recent transitions.

Cape Winelands, West Coast & Overberg

These districts remain predominantly DA-controlled, with unstable hung councils.

- **West Coast:** The ANC lost Matzikama and Cederberg but later regained Cederberg amid continuing instability. Support in Saldanha Bay is declining due to internal conflict, while Swartland and Bergvliet remain solid DA strongholds.
- **Overberg:** Persistent coalition collapses and council volatility continue. Despite temporary gains, the ANC struggles to consolidate stable governance. Overstrand remains firmly under DA control with a relatively stable financial position.

Central Karoo

This is a hung district characterised by unstable coalitions, leadership disputes and adverse audit outcomes. Several areas require urgent intervention. Beaufort West remains DA-led under provincial oversight.

Garden Route

The region remains largely DA-controlled. Coalition arrangements remain unstable, with frequent national government interventions due to administrative crises. Oudtshoorn's coalition has achieved relative stability, while Knysna remains volatile despite ANC mayoralty leadership.

Key Governance Problems Identified

- Lack of discipline and accountability within caucuses
- Coalition members frequently defy organisational mandates for personal gain
- Widespread service delivery failures
- Capacity and commitment challenges among councillors
- Financial inducements driving ANC defections
- Coalitions often serve personal ambition over collective governance goals
- Administrators exploit instability for personal benefit

6. State of the Alliance and Sectors

The province continues to strengthen the revolutionary Alliance and to manage tensions, particularly relating to Alliance reconfiguration. Despite recent disputes, joint campaigns continue, with reciprocal participation between the ANC, SACP, COSATU and SANCO. Notable joint activities include Workers' Day commemorations, solidarity campaigns and sectoral engagement programmes. The 113th ANC January 8th celebration in Khayelitsha was a major success, drawing participation from across provinces.

Sectoral work remains a strategic priority for rebuilding community connections and responding to economic and social challenges through structured stakeholder engagement. Key recommendations include prioritising sectoral programmes, deploying dedicated organisers, allocating adequate resources, partnering with relevant subcommittees and strengthening follow-through on commitments. Current reporting reflects a 65% quantitative success rate and 85% regional participation. As the 2026 Local Government Elections approach, strengthening sectoral engagement and institutionalising this work remain critical for effective mobilisation and service-delivery advocacy.

7. Elections

The ANC's declining electoral performance has been driven largely by persistent internal organisational weaknesses, including the lack of sustained renewal since 2014 and the deterioration of grassroots structures. Surveys indicate growing impatience even among core supporters, as many branches have become inward-looking and disconnected from community struggles. Programmes such as Letsema failed to achieve their intended impact due to these pre-existing weaknesses. Consequently, many ANC branches have become prone to internal conflict rather than community engagement, damaging the organisation's public image and accelerating voter apathy, particularly in traditional support areas. To reverse this trend, the ANC must undertake a rigorous assessment of its performance, develop credible corrective strategies and reinforce election structures with experienced cadres and consistent national support.

8. Recommendations to NGC

- a) The Governance and Legislature Sub-committee must respond decisively to the programmatic challenges confronting ANC caucuses.
- b) Strengthen collaboration with the Legislature through improved research support and direct assistance to councillors to fulfil their mandates.
- c) Enforce the Code of Conduct for councillors consistently and without exception.
- d) Align the Provincial Sub-committee with its National counterpart for coordinated support and strategic exchange.
- e) Streamline the Sub-committee's work and refocus it as a tool for rapid intervention rather than routine council administration.
- f) Lobby National Government for increased infrastructure budgets and employment-creation opportunities, particularly in ANC-led coalition municipalities.
- g) Reorient the work of the Sub-committee towards 2026 Local Government Election priorities and ensure close coordination with election structures.
- h) Develop a binding Service Delivery Charter for all municipalities.

THE REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE

1. The revolutionary alliance between the national liberation movement (ANC), a vanguard party of the working class (SACP), a progressive trade union movement (COSATU) and a progressive civic movement (SANCO) is unique in the history of anti-colonial struggles. This strategic alliance is an organic expression of the shared vision and minimum programme of the democratic forces in South Africa – the Freedom Charter and the National Democratic Revolution. This alliance is characterised as both revolutionary and strategic because while we remain independent organisations with our own internal processes, we share a common vision and strategy for fundamental change. We also have a shared history and membership.

2. The Alliance started in the early 1920s, weakening in the 1930s, but grew much stronger in the 1940s and the 1950s when the struggle against apartheid reached new heights. While the specific components of the alliance changed with time, the actual non-racial and multi-class character of the Alliance as an expression of the motive forces of the NDR did not change. The ANC, Communist Party (from CP SA to SACP) and progressive trade unions (from ICU, SACTU and COSATU) have been the backbone of the Alliance throughout the century of its existence, the Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC), Natal Indian Congress (NIC), the Coloured People's Congress (CPC) and the Congress of Democrats (CoD) became part of the Congress alliance at some point later and this changed as the movement adapted to new conditions after the banning of the people's organisations and turn to armed struggle in the 1960s onwards. adopted the Freedom Charter as a shared vision and common minimum programme of the Alliance. When the civic movement developed stronger in the 1980s and 1990s, it became a critical component of the Alliance.
3. Ours is not a tactical and issue-based alliance or cooperation of convenience but a strategic alliance based on a deeper political and strategic vision of the National Democratic Revolution – a national democratic society that is united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous. The ANC assumed the leadership of the Alliance based on the nature, content and character of the NDR national liberation is the principal and dominant content of the struggle up to this point.
4. Since 1994, the Alliance has been contesting the elections together under the banner of the ANC based on the understanding that the ANC remains the leader of the NDR and the Alliance. We have developed the RDP together and subsequent election manifestos and ensured that the ANC lists of public representatives and deployment to various responsibilities in government reflect broadly the Alliance.
5. We have achieved a great deal of progress in moving South Africa from apartheid colonialism to a more democratic society with significant improvement in the quality of life of the motive forces – a new constitution protecting workers and the poor; transformative laws empowering those previously disadvantaged and excluded from the state and the economy; basic infrastructure, services and the social wage expanded to areas and communities that were previously excluded. These are our common achievements.
6. The Alliance has also faced a common set of challenges and setbacks with regard to the political management of state power and incumbency - corruptive and corrosive nature of power has eroded the progressive values and revolutionary principles on which our organisations operate. Corruption and resource-inspired factionalism undermine the discipline and cohesion of our revolutionary movement and strategic alliance. While the ANC has been hardest hit by the "vices" or "sins" of incumbency, no formation of our democratic movement has been spared.
7. The weaknesses of the Alliance and what needs to be done is a matter that has been debated since the advent of democracy. Several summits were held to discuss the challenges of coordination, policy formulation and implementation as well as the political management of deployment and accountability of cadres. There is broad strategic agreement that new mechanisms and organisational forms need to be found to ensure that the Alliance indeed adapts to new conditions. The idea of a "reconfigured alliance" has been proposed firmly as the way forward. In principle,

the ANC has no objection to the reconfiguration of the alliance as long as this doesn't change the character and content of the NDR. In fact, we need a strong and dynamic alliance today as we have done in the past due to the threats facing the NDR, both domestically and globally. We need a much stronger revolutionary Alliance now!

8. The resolution of the SACP to contest elections independently poses a serious challenge to the cohesion and unity of the Alliance. Following the strategic electoral setback suffered by the ANC-led democratic movement in the 2024 elections and the electoral decline that has been steadily underway since 2009, the SACP decision will result in a further fragmentation of the motive forces and strategic weakening of the alliance. This resolution has far-reaching implications not only for the ANC and SACP, but for the strategy and tactics of the National Democratic Revolution and the entire Alliance.
9. The NEC has developed a paper in response to the SACP resolution and has engaged with the SACP, COSATU and SANCO on how we should collectively strengthen the Alliance and avoid taking decisions that have adverse consequences for the Alliance, the motive forces and the future of the NDR.
10. There is a mutual concern and agreement that everything should be done to avoid further dividing the Alliance and fragmenting the motive forces. There is also broad agreement a reconfiguration and renewal is necessary to ensure that the Alliance can function with strategic and tactical coherence and programmatic unity of purpose.
11. However, it is clear that the SACP is determined to go ahead with the decision to contest local government elections and it has started with contesting the by-elections. There is serious concern that the SACP resolution will not only divide the Alliance but it will also cause divisions and strife inside the individual organisations of the Alliance affected by historical phenomenon of shared or dual membership.
12. In the light of this emerging situation, the ANC will take steps to ensure that it safeguards its internal unity and organisational discipline among its members. Secondly, the ANC has a responsibility to safeguard the unity and cohesion of the Alliance and the core social forces of the NDR. Any adventurism and recklessness must be avoided at all cost.

Reconfiguration of the Alliance

13. The Reconfiguration of the Alliance was and is being championed through the Alliance structures since then, with each partner producing a position paper on the subject and this being consolidated into an Joint Alliance paper in 2019.
14. Because the approach to Reconfiguration is a departure from the perspectives on the NDR, its organisational expression and leadership as set out in ANC Strategy and Tactics, the Joint Alliance paper was referred to lower structures ahead of the postponed National General Council of 2020, and was part of the discussion papers towards the 55th National Conference in 2022.

15. The specific issues of the form and content of a Reconfigured Alliance, we must admit, did not find much prominence in the discussions towards and at Conference, including in the paper on the Balance of Forces. The **55th National Conference resolution therefore instructed the NEC to ensure that “the discussion on the reconfiguration of the Alliance is concluded, paying adequate attention to the theoretical underpinnings and organisational form that the Alliance may require as the new conditions of democracy take root.”**
16. Acting on the 22nd National Conference mandate, the NEC had a discussion on the Reconfiguration of the Alliance at one of its first meetings in March 2023, engaging with the Alliance Joint document. From the onset, a matter of contention was whether the previous NEC had agreed to the Reconfiguration approach set out in the Joint document: whilst the Alliance partners insisted the then SG reported to the Alliance Secretariat that the ANC had agreed. The ANC contended that the NEC referred the matter, first to the NGC and then to the National Conference for resolution.
17. Alliance meetings over the period have been irregular, although the partners cooperated on joint programmes, international solidarity and the 2024 elections campaign. The ANC held a series of bilaterals once the SACP confirmed its decision to contest elections on its own.

ENGAGEMENT WITH SANCO

18. The ANC had a bilateral engagement with SANCO on the 09 June 2025. The ANC President and the SANCO President led their respective delegations. Amongst issues discussed were those pertaining to the following:
- Recognition that our stance on Gaza was correct and that many European countries were beginning to share our stance. SANCO expressed full support on SA’s stance on GAZA.
 - Recognition that the ANC has distinguished itself in fostering relations with a number of progressive parties, including liberation parties as well as beyond our region.
 - The meaning of GNU and how we move forward are some of the issues as the ANC must grapple with.
 - Recognition that 2025 marked the 70th Anniversary of the Freedom Charter, with focus into the achievements attained, and outstanding development challenges. Recognition for the fact that the Freedom Charter has inspired people in our country, workers, women, youth etc, as our theory of social change.
 - The economy as a causal factor impacting on the strategic setback we suffered.
 - The relevance of the Alliance in uplifting the working class from poverty. This include the specific role of each of the Alliance partners. Focus in this regard included the weakening of Alliance structures.
 - That SANCO remains an important part of the Alliance as a barometer on the interests of Abahlali or residents.
 - The implications of the SACP decision to directly contest elections and what this means.

- We should also focus on state of local government, which is our Achilles heel. The role of SANCO in this regard has to be discussed openly and honestly. We must discuss this very important matter of what are we going to do with local government, given challenges on financial management and poor state of service delivery.
- Recognition that poverty, inequality and unemployment was worsening the state of the working class in South Africa and that required urgent intervention.
- The affirmation by SANCO that the ANC was on right direction, with regards to the NHI, BELA bill, Expropriation Act. And that these were issues that have drawn the attention of countries such as the US.
- SANCO still believes on the correctness of the national conference resolution to support the ANC elections campaign.
- The ANC SG Fikile Mbalula was not partisan in helping resolve the impasse of the two SANCO NECs before the last national conference.
- Convey gratitude to the ANC for helping convene the last SANCO Conference.
- Thankful for appointing SANCO leaders as Deputy Ministers.
- Reconfiguration of the Alliance must be part of the APC.

BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT WITH COSATU

19. The President led an ANC delegation on an ANC bilateral meeting with COSATU which was held on the 20th October 2025 at COSATU House. The ANC delegation included the Secretary General, the 1st Deputy Secretary General, the Treasurer General as well as NEC members.
20. The ANC SG Cde Fikile Mbalula presented the NEC perspective on the SACP resolution to contest the election and on the state of the NDR, Congress Alliance, and analysis on the labour movement. The COSATU GS Cde Solly Phetoe presented the 8th CC resolutions on the NDR, the reconfiguration of the alliance, including the challenges thereto, 8th CC mandate to the November CEC to develop a program towards a deeper consultative process to discuss the 5th SACP Special Congress.
21. Matters from previous bilaterals: COSATU General Secretary took the meeting through issues tabled in the last bilateral meeting in 2023. These issues included: Reconfiguration of the Alliance, the Alliance economic summit, SOEs, Non-trading Holidays, Implementation of the NHI Two-pot system taxation and the SA Post Office

Way forward

22. In bilateral meeting elaborately and cordially deliberated on a number of issues affecting the alliance, the stance by the SACP to contest elections, the state of the economy and the international balance of forces, amongst others. There was consensus with regards the following:
 - To appreciate and respect the autonomy of alliance components.
 - ANC and COSATU agreed on the Reconfiguration of the Alliance.
 - Current challenges of the Alliance are structural, not ideological.
 - To urgently convene the Alliance Economic Summit.
 - To establish the Alliance working groups on specific common issues, which will then be able to make recommendations and report to the Alliance Secretariat.
 - Convene the Alliance Political Council before COSATU's November CEC to discuss shared views on the NDR and the Alliance, the left popular front, the ANC NGC, COSATU's 40th anniversary, and other matters that the SACP and SANCO may like to include.

- To collectively identify policy reforms to influence trade and industry, both locally and internationally.
 - To consolidate the Alliance international programs, including multilateral platforms that we all participate in, to formulate a joint policy position and Alliance solidarity.
 - To strengthen the work of the Alliance political education subcommittee and appreciate the Seminars of the OR Tambo school that are ongoing
23. It was agreed that the Alliance Summit must be held as soon as possible and if possible, ahead of the ANC NGC as well as the 40th COSATU Anniversary celebrations so that the challenges facing the Alliance in this regard are not deferred to those platforms by default. The ANC indicated that it has an outstanding bilateral engagement with the SACP on their decision to contest the elections.
24. COSATU indicated that they have deferred their decisions on the SACP decision to contest the elections to their National Congress next year.

ENGAGEMENTS WITH SACP ON DECISION TO CONTEST ELECTIONS

25. The ANC convened a meeting with the SACP on the 24th November 2024. This was after the 2024 National and Provincial Elections, to which the ANC attained electorate support below 50% for the first time since the dawn of the democratic breakthrough in 1994. The ANC characterized this as a strategic setback in its broad perspective captured in the document: “The Moment”.
26. High on the agenda was an “Analysis of current moment in SA, the state of the NDR and global developments” and “Analysis of the Elections Outcomes for the NDR”. The discussions were led by the ANC President and the Secretary General for the ANC, and the General Secretary and Deputy General Secretary for the SACP.
27. The ANC presentation dealt with the decline of electoral support nationally, but which was more pronounced in the provinces of KwaZuluNatal and Gauteng, further noting the continued loss of support in the Western Cape. It was against this backdrop that the ANC had robustly and elaborately engaged through the NEC Lekgotla, on these developments, broadly characterised through the presentation: “The Moment”. This made consideration of domestic and international balance of forces vis-à-vis the pursuit of the National Democratic Revolution.
28. The SACP decried that they were not consulted towards the formation of the Government of National Unity, further suggesting that the ANC left behind what they characterised as progressive formations such as the EFF and the MKP. However, the ANC reminded the SACP that it was the SACP itself through the General Secretary that had enjoined the ANC to secure power at all costs. And that in doing so, the ANC had invited all political parties, including the EFF and the MKP, who for their own reasons declined to be part of the GNU. And that in doing so, the ANC went against the DA’s objection to the participation of the EFF and the MKP in the GNU, whilst affirming the SACP’s directive that the ANC must secure power at all costs.
29. A further meeting was held on the 23 June 2025. Having further deliberated on matters of mutual concern mainly evolving around the implementation of the NDR, the SACP decision to contest the elections independent of the ANC as well as the reconfiguration of the Alliance, the bilateral meeting resolved on constituting a technical team that would refine an approach on the SACP decision to contest the elections.
30. The ANC NEC subsequently met and gave the National Officials a mandate to further engage the SACP on its own decision to contest elections independent of the ANC. The ANC NEC was of the firm view that such a decision would neither help the pursuit of the NDR nor the individual nor collective interests of the both the ANC and the

SACP, as well as the Alliance as a whole. The ANC NEC further resolved that the matter of the reconfiguration of the Alliance must not be limited to the ANC and the SACP but must involve the Alliance as a whole.

31. Subsequently, a meeting was held on the 24th November 2025 which deliberated extensively on the SACP decision to contest elections independent of the ANC. The engagement could not broker any solution other than the previous stances taken by the SACP to contest the elections, insisting that was their Special National Congress resolution, on the one hand, and the stance the ANC took that such a scenario would undermine the electoral support of both the ANC and the SACP. Throughout these bilateral deliberations, the ANC highlighted the historic, current and future importance of the Alliance.
32. Both the Alliance Political Council and the Alliance Summit could not be held due to clashes on diary engagement by alliance partners. However, there was commitment by both the ANC and the SACP towards convening both the Alliance Political Council and the Alliance Summit wherein both the issues of the SACP decision to contest the elections as well as the broader reconfiguration of the Alliance would be discussed. But what was clear was that the SACP would in the meanwhile go ahead and contest the elections whilst the ANC would be bound to reconsider the inclusion of SACP members in its electoral machinery. This invoked the issue of dual membership to which the ANC Special NEC meeting sitting on the 1st December 2025 resolved that it could no longer be allowed, lest the ANC harbour within its ranks sleepers who could work against the ANC from within. However, the ANC further sought to refine what this would entail in its NEC Lekgotla in January 2026.

CONCLUSION

33. Whatever setbacks and weaknesses we face at this moment (there are many), the ANC remains convinced that the NDR is neither derailed nor totally defeated but has elements of advances and reversals. The Alliance and formations of the mass democratic movement have a collective duty to defend and advance the policies of the NDR even under conditions of electoral setbacks where there are coalitions or unity governments.
34. Post-NGC, the NEC will ensure that the Alliance is convened to address the challenges that we all face as the progressive forces at this hour of destiny. We have to do everything to avoid internal divisions and ultimately defeat of the National Democratic Revolution.
35. This NGC will have to shape the ANC's strategic approach to the 2026 local government elections. All ANC members will be expected to march in unison once the NGC has given strategic direction on the matter.

ANC Caucus Report

OVERVIEW

1. The ANC Parliamentary Caucus' report entails the work of the Caucus from the 2022 National Conference, which is the period of the sixth and seventh Parliaments. Both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces constitute a critical national platform through which the people of South Africa design legislation and enforce accountability of their elected public representatives. Both of them the mandate to ensure oversight and public participation consistent with the injunction of the Freedom Charter that the people shall govern.
2. The last National and Provincial Elections coincided with national celebrations to mark 30 years since the 1994 democratic breakthrough which ushered in a democratic system of governance in South Africa. This was a culmination of more than 80 years of struggle for liberation led by the National Liberation Movement at the head of which was the African National Congress.
3. The primary focus and mandate of the ANC Caucus is to ensure that ANC conference resolutions and the elections manifesto is converted into a practical program of action. At the heart of this work is transformation of our country to eradicate the legacy of colonialism and apartheid. Emerging from the 55th National Conference, the ANC Parliamentary Caucus focused on developing a systemic oversight approach to improve the living conditions of all South Africans. The Caucus prioritized critical, transformative, and developmental legislation, such as the NHI Bill, BELA Bill, Expropriation Bill, Public Procurement Bill, Climate Change Bill, Pension Fund Bill (two-pot system), amongst others. The pieces of legislation served as a contentious matter, shaping election campaign narratives.
4. This approach sought to enhance the implementation and oversight of ANC Policy toward the 2024 elections. Whilst the ANC enjoyed a majority in Parliament, the Caucus has had to contend with a shifting balance of power signified by an emboldened opposition party that formed the moonshot pact seeking to weaken the ANC in the remainder of the sixth administration. The electoral setback and the formation of the Government of National Unity have elevated various contradictions which pose a threat to the strategic objectives of the National Democratic Revolution. The formation of the government and establishment of structures of Parliament was a process the ANC steered, establishing various structures in Parliament to representative of the parties constituting the National Executive and Parliamentary leadership of decision-making structures.
5. The Government of National Unity is composed of parties with different ideological perspectives representing different interest groups with differing class interests. This has elevated the policy contradictions, impacting the processing of various pieces of legislation, as epitomized in the tabling of the 2025 budget, which only succeeded in the third tabling. The changed environment has required the Caucus to enhance its tactical approach and political management processes, as parliamentary decisions require a simple majority, and in the instance of a lack of support from parties in the GNU, the Caucus has had to lobby opposition parties. This circumstance has required the Whippers to increase its political management approaches to ensure the Parliament executes its constitutional role as a tribune of the people. Opposition parties have also voted against the ANC position in various matters, resulting in the ANC position not always prevailing.
6. The new conditions occasioned by the 2024 electoral setback are also exacerbated by the fact that only 33% of former MPs were returned, and only 20% of former Whips were returned. This has resulted in a significantly less experience within the Whippers, which is charged with the day-to-day political management of Caucus and proceedings both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. Members have thus had challenges in competing in the battle of ideas with more established parties and political adversaries in a compelling and meaningful way, as well as with the management of the narratives arising out of the GNU arrangements in Committees which are chaired by other parties.
7. Executive and Parliamentary members from opposition parties have, in many regards, taken positions which are opposed to the ANC position and, in some circumstances, attempted to change existing government policy without adequate cabinet consideration (SABC Bill is an example). In the National Council of Provinces, the ANC enjoys a Majority (7 out of 9 provinces), creating possibilities for the ANC to assert its policy priorities through leading the NCOP and resolving matters within the powers of the National Council of Provinces, as signified by the failed attempts by the DA to dissolve the Knysna Municipality.

8. The ability of the ANC to mobilise and engage other political parties behind various parliamentary decisions has enabled the Caucus to play a leadership role while opposition parties outside the GNU are fragmented. However, the Caucus is cognizant of the fact that the transformation agenda is complex undertaking and a contested terrain. It is incumbent upon the ANC Parliamentary caucus to consistently work to enhance its capacity to play a strategic and leading role in legislative development and accountability to retain the loss support amongst the people.

Challenges

9. For the first time since 1994 the ANC Caucus has lost the privilege of having a majority in Portfolio Committees which constituted a total of 11 members in the National Assembly. This new reality forces the ANC with only 4 members in each of the committee to master the imperative to advance not only cogent and convincing arguments during debates, but also the ability to lobby other parties within and outside the National Government of National Unity. The correctness and sustenance of policy position to accelerate the transformation agenda require, more than any other time, well red and dynamic study groups. This is certainly a daunting challenge for the ANC Parliamentary Caucus.
10. The challenges impacting the Caucus are the gradual adaptation of new Members of Parliament, due to a low level of retention as per the ANC guidelines relative to opposition parties that retain the majority of their members. An increase in the committee membership of MPs relative to the previous term due to the electoral setback, resulting in weaknesses in the effective ANC presence in structures. GNU ruptures risk key policy decision-making processes, at times opportunistically triggered by GNU opposition parties to advance their constituency and class interests.
11. The ANC National Executive Committee must continue to strengthen the ANC Caucus to content with new challenges and in many instances ideological contradictions even with the Government of National Unity. This particularly important because parties in the GUN do not necessarily share a common view and policy orientation about the transformation of society. In this context the contestation of ideas will remain a permanent feature of that parliament and the ANC has to assert its ideas of transformation.
12. There is generally a poor culture of learning and reading, and little skill in basic research and writing one's own material and/or lack of initiative, though skilled, which has impacted both members' performance as well as the role assigned to the Research and Development Unit. It is important ANC members of strengthen their capacity to serve the people of South Africa. This includes cultivating knowledge of various sectors, particularly in sectors where Portfolio Committees have numerous entities, or are highly technically specialized.
13. Given the reduced of membership numbers in the National Assembly and absence of an outright majority, there are competing interests for the time available to Members:
 - a) Parliamentary work, i.e. committees and sittings,
 - b) Oversight work
 - c) Constituency work,
 - d) Organisational work, particularly in the periods ahead of by-elections, Local Government Elections and National General Elections.

Opportunities

14. However, every dark cloud has a silver lining and the ANC Caucus should and must effectively exploit the current reality to advance the transformation agenda, despite constraint. In the current administration the ANC works within the Government of National Unity majority in the NA and a simple majority in the National Council of Provinces. This was a tactical position imposed on us by the 2024 electoral outcomes. We are determined to strengthen GNU political management structures and enhance the dynamism of the Whippery whilst simultaneously coordinate opposition to support our policy positions.
15. The advantage of having been the governing party for the past 30 years gave the movement the possibility to design policies and progressive legislation to implement the programme for transformation of society in accordance with the objectives of the National Democratic

Revolution. It is important to take full advantage of that history and focus more on implementation rather seeking to introduce new legislation.

16. We have to ensure that our Parliamentary Constituency Offices as community nodes for resolving challenges and advancing popular campaigns against various social ills and for the empowerment of the community. The ANC continues to command significant state power, and this should be used to accelerate the creation of a better life for all. The ANC can mobilize progressive civil society and think tanks to increase their parliamentary participation to win the battle of ideas and ideological hegemony.
17. Development of sector specialization capacity development for each member of the Caucus to deepen knowledge to enhance the ability to participate in the battle of ideas. The provision of study assistance to Members during their tenure, which would assist in this area, has only had an uptake of 13 ANC members since the beginning of the 7th term of Parliament. Furthermore, the Caucus is working to strengthen relationships with various sectoral organizations and think tanks on various policy matters.

REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF CAUCUS

Transition and Caucus Annual and Five-Year Plan

The Parliamentary Caucus began the seventh administration managing the transition from the sixth to the seventh Caucus, through the establishment of substructures and further held an induction coordinated by the OR Tambo School of Leadership. The Caucus participated in the OR Tambo modules.

In January 2025, the Caucus held its lekgotla, which developed a 5-year and annual plan for all substructures of the Caucus in line with the ANC Manifesto Priorities and the NEC Lekgotla that set a 5-year plan to implement the Manifesto. This priority-determining process enables a systematic programming – this also entails a systematic oversight approach- of matters in Parliament, ensuring an alignment of the Caucus priorities to advance conference resolutions and manifesto commitments.

Oversight and Accountability

The Caucus plan has guided the focus of the oversight work of both houses to ensure the policy implementation of Manifesto commitments. The Caucus Strategy Committee, Clusters and Study Groups have focused on various policy priorities, ensuring decision-making processes lead to decisions that serve the people and the ANC's commitments to the people.

The Caucus continues to uphold constructive criticism and self-criticism in executing its oversight role of the National Executive, at the level of the Study Group and Committee. A mutual reinforcing approach characterises the approach of the Caucus to ensure accountability of policy implementation.

Caucus sub-structures participate in various NEC subcommittees and process various policy matters, ensuring a cogent approach to policy matters. Monitoring and evaluation are thus embedded in the functioning of Caucus as its oversight mandate is data-driven.

The Caucus will be undertaking its MP Assessment process as part of the Accountability Framework, which will seek to enhance the performance of members and the Caucus collective. Caucus is further planning a sector specialisation of each member of the Caucus to deepen strategic focus and a systematic approach.

There are currently 346 written questions for which answers are outstanding, and for which a summary as at 10 October 2025 reflecting some of the challenges on the responsiveness of the National Executive impacting accountability.

Battle of Ideas

The Caucus has increased its efforts in communications and participating in the battle of ideas on various topical matters of national importance. This is despite a relatively unsupportive fourth estate, but the Caucus has increased its frequency and involvement in various policy discourses. Key matters are highlighted in the balance of forces section. The ANC has won the battle of ideas on various subject matters, but the consistency of public engagement on key policy matters and campaigns is critical for broad mobilisation, and that approach is underpinning the efforts of the Caucus.

Legislative Programme

The Parliamentary legislative programme is largely constituted by revived legislation from the previous term. Opposition parties have also tabled private member bills from the previous term, and a few have been tabled this term. Some of the bills particularly the DA bills, seek to duplicate anticipated legislation from the National Executive. The changes in the balance of forces in parliament also lead to a slowing of the processing of various legislation due to a lack of consensus at the level of parliamentary structures. Since the seventh Parliament, 52 bills have been tabled in different phases, 7 bills have been passed, and 5 have been assented to by the President. (see Annexure A and Additional Attachment).

Constituency Work

The Caucus has elevated a focus on constituency work as the key priority through safeguarding the National Parliamentary Constituency Office's presence in the country despite a significant resource constraint. For every constituency period, the Caucus develops guidelines for various campaigns to resolve challenges impacting communities. Constituency work has varied in different poles, but an improvement is evident in various PCOs.

All provinces have a full complement of fieldworkers. However, the Western Cape, Mpumalanga, and KwaZulu-Natal still have vacant support staff positions, with a total of eight vacancies nationally.

The majority of PCOs have established their Constituency Management Committees (CMCs). However, six CMCs remain outstanding in the Free State, KwaZulu-Natal, and Western Cape. CMCs play a crucial role in the planning and coordination of PCO programmes. There is, however, growing concern regarding the limited availability of CMC members during the planning stages, which negatively affects programme implementation and prevents PCOs from achieving their intended objectives. It is therefore essential that CMCs are convened regularly to ensure the efficient functioning of the PCO. In October, as an example, PCOs were allocated outreach funds to implement programmes focusing on voter registration, ID campaigns, and Heritage Day community-building initiatives.

About 139 out of 179 PCOs successfully implemented their outreach activities. The main contributing factor for the lack of implementation by some PCOs is the unavailability of MPs to authorise PCO programmes and the late submission of outreach requests. Additionally, poor planning among some PCOs remains a concern.

As part of constituency work, PCOs consistently follow up on service delivery issues affecting their respective areas, working in collaboration with various government departments and stakeholders to resolve such challenges. Service Delivery War Rooms play a critical role in monitoring progress, providing advice, and escalating unresolved matters to the relevant departments. However, certain persistent service delivery bottlenecks continue to require the direct intervention of the executive. Escalated matters should therefore be treated with the utmost urgency, as they indicate that both local and district municipalities were unable to address the issues at their level.

Recommendations on Constituency Work

- The limited availability of Members of Parliament (MPs) remains a key challenge and should be addressed as a matter of priority. Ministers, Deputy Ministers, MECs, and other deployables should also inform the respective PCOs when conducting programmes within the constituency to ensure coordination and visibility.
- Continuous engagement with government departments is recommended to clarify the role of PCOs and to strengthen collaboration in addressing constituency-based service delivery challenges.
- Escalated service delivery challenges must be treated with urgency and referred to the relevant executive authorities for immediate intervention and resolution.

RESOLUTIONS AND THE MANIFESTO

The update on the progress of implementation of ANC resolutions and the Manifesto will focus on the assessment of the Caucus on various policies.

Social Transformation Cluster

Fiscal consolidation has negatively affected the cluster by reducing public-sector spending on social services, including health, education, and housing. The underfunding of social services has limited people's potential for upward mobility and has plunged many deeper into poverty. Therefore, in regaining its lost ground, the ANC must evaluate the impact of fiscal consolidation on social transformation and commit itself to advancing more pro-poor and gender responsive budgeting to fund and realise the implementation of the ANC Manifesto commitments.

Despite many achievements over the past 30 years of the democratic dispensation, the country faces multiple challenges that threaten the nation's hard-fought democratic gains, including poverty, the high cost of living, unemployment, the crisis of social reproduction, and weak state institutions, among others. These challenges undermine development efforts and the empowerment of people to be self-reliant and fully contribute to society. These factors also culminate in social ills that reproduce themselves in various forms that burden the cluster, such as substance abuse, gender-based violence, femicide, and people falling out of the system by not being in employment or education, which further widens the inequality gap and undermines the ANC's effort for social transformation.

The signing of the NHI on 15 May 2025 marked a turning point in ending South Africa's two-tier system towards the realisation of universal health coverage. Notable progress has been observed towards the phased implementation of the NHI, including the release of regulations from March to June 2025, advancing the digital health system and strengthening infrastructure and primary health care. Nevertheless, systemic and governance weaknesses continue to undermine the quality and phased implementation of the NHI, including underspending in the NHI program as observed in the 2024/25 financial year, of about R186.8 million. Limited capacity and resources across health entities, which are intended to lay the building blocks in the implementation of the NHI and fragmentation in overall performance in provinces weaken the sector and threaten the implementation of the NHI.

Despite the SRD grant's central role in stimulating economic growth and poverty alleviation, the policy proposal for the Basic Income grant has not been finalised. The SRD grant currently reaches about 9 million unemployed people each month, amid high unemployment rates, underscoring the urgency for the government to expedite the realisation of a permanent grant for this vulnerable cohort. Concerns have been raised that the grant has been budgeted until March 2026, causing confusion and anxiety among beneficiaries. The value of the grants has also been contentious, despite the increase to R370, which is below the current food poverty line of R796 as of 2024.

Despite the urgency of providing uninterrupted social grants to beneficiaries, disbursements have faced notable challenges, including delayed payments due to system failures and poor governance. This is not a unique challenge to SASSA but reflects more profound structural and institutional weaknesses in the state's capacity to deliver much-needed essential services to people. Notable interventions, such as biometric systems, have been implemented to combat fraud and corruption. Given the vulnerability of most SASSA beneficiaries, changes to the system must not disadvantage or alienate those intended to benefit from it.

The Department of Social Development contributes to all six pillars of the National Strategic Plan on GBVF, particularly pillar four on response, care, support, and healing. Notable improvement has been observed in the Gender Based Violence Command Centre and its functioning after extended periods of dysfunction, which disadvantaged victims. Other psychosocial support interventions are implemented through campaigns targeting GBVF hotspots. Though there are 66 Thuthuzela Centres nationally, these must be established in every district to provide adequate support to victims and survivors. Existing centres also need more funding and capacity to address operational challenges, resulting in inadequate support.

The PSET sector has played an instrumental role in critical areas of social development, such as human development, skills training, research, and innovation. Through critical reforms such as NSFAS, millions of historically disadvantaged groups have entered and exited the system towards thriving careers that contribute to the growth and development of not only our country but also the global community. Nevertheless, student protests from RhodesMustFall and FeesMustFall to the recent unrest on campuses reveal the slow pace of decolonising the sector, as well as systemic and governance challenges. These also include financial exclusion, NSFAS payment delays, and inadequate accommodation, all of which impede access and throughput rates. These challenges are linked to corruption, unskilled personnel in critical government positions, poor intergovernmental coordination, and budget constraints.

Failure to urgently and productively engage young people poses significant economic and social ramifications that deepen poverty and inequality, and increase social unrest and instability. Both the government and the private sector must harness the potential of youth.

The BELA Bill was signed into law by President Cyril Ramaphosa in December 2024, positioning the sector to address historical gaps in admissions, language policy, SGB accountability, and compulsory schooling. Since then, there has been pushback on the Act from neoliberal forces seeking to derail and stall transformation. Additionally, the timeframe for the release of regulations has been unsatisfactory. Similar to the NHI Act, this calls on the ANC to continue mobilising and empowering our constituencies to understand and defend progressive legislation.

Access to ECD plays an integral role not only in the development of children in their formative years but also in addressing literacy and numeracy rates, supporting children's ability to read with meaning and take up complex subjects such as STEM, which are required for the skills needed by the labour market. Access to ECD subsidies has more than doubled between 2019 and 2023. Work is ongoing regarding streamlining support to ensure all centres are registered, practitioners are adequately trained, etc. Nevertheless, funding remains inadequate, necessitating the sustainable financing of ECD.

Sports, arts and culture have consistently featured in ANC Conference resolutions as vital instruments for social transformation, nation-building and economic development. Yet, despite these clear policy intentions, the sector continues to face structural challenges which undermine its potential to contribute to the broader developmental agenda. For instance, many historically significant sites remain neglected, while the memory of the liberation struggle is at risk of being lost.

Equally important is the development of a sustainable creative and cultural economy, which has demonstrated its enormous potential for job creation, but remains underfunded and poorly coordinated. Concerted efforts should be made to increase support for film, music, crafts, theatre, fashion, and digital content. These must be coupled with stronger intellectual property protections and fair compensation for the work of artists.

As declared by President Cyril Ramaphosa, water is an apex priority for the ANC government. Critical reform has been advanced in Parliament through the introduction of the South African National Water Resources Infrastructure Agency SOC Limited Amendment Bill and the Water Services Amendment Bill. These are meant to professionalise the sector, improve service quality, strengthen regulation, and accelerate investment in infrastructure so the country can address the water crisis and ensure more reliable provision of water for all.

Governance and Monitoring

The G&M Cluster is championing the reform of the public through legislative intervention and other policy reforms. taken through from the previous administration. The public service professionalisation framework is being implemented, including the digitisation of the public service, meant to improve front-line services. COGTA SG is working to see through the review of the Local Government White Paper. The department is working on the Coalitions Bill, which has passed the public participation stage.

The SG on WYPD is taking steps to coordinate plans to regulate the strategies to deal with statutory rape in South Africa. The SG has also overseen the passing of the National Council on Gender Based Violence, which is about to start the process of appointing board members in line with the Act of 2024.

Department of Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation is championing the State Enterprises Bill. However, the balance of forces in the Portfolio Committee must be strictly monitored to see policy decisions of the ANC through.

The G&M Cluster has worked to see through the implementation of the following resolutions;

- Ethical, capable development state- Professionalisation framework is being rolled out in local government in the current financial year.
- Review of the Local Government White Paper is underway.
- The National Strategy on Gender-Based Violence and Femicide is underway through the interim secretariat while awaiting the appointment of the board, which is imminent.
- State Enterprises Bill to create a state holding company for all state-owned companies
- Monitoring of the implementation of the Medium Term Development Plan
- Public accountability through robust contributions to Public Accounts Committees and Provincial visits strategies to hold municipalities accountable
- Restoration of Parliament is on Track

Peace and Stability

See in Caucus report

Economic Transformation Cluster

*Key policy updates are entailed in the NGC submission

Policy Priority	Progress	Challenges
Industrial policy coordination	The dtic is currently consolidating industry-specific Master Plans into a comprehensive industrial policy to drive localisation and economic transformation, focusing on enhancing competitiveness and expanding exports IRP revised emphasizing Gas and other renewables	Some parties in the Government of National Unity (GNU), especially the DA, opposes the consolidation of industry-specific Master Plans into a single industrial policy to transform the economy and create jobs
Macroeconomic Policy	Fiscal strategy has been contractionary and credit premiums escalated the increase of debt servicing costs constituting close to 21%	
Transformation policy	A draft concept document of the Transformation Fund – a partnership between the private sector to establish a R100bn aggregated fund, capitalised at R20bn per annum over a 5-year period, to support the ever-growing funding requirements for businesses owned and managed by black entrepreneurs to propel inclusive economic growth across various sectors	banking sector is not under the control of the state/government, thus making it difficult for the state/government to influence the investment portfolios of commercial and equity banks
Trade & Exports	South Africa's G20 Presidency prioritised four key issues under the Trade and Investment Working Group: (a) trade and inclusive growth; (b) responsive trade and investment agenda to address the challenge of global commons; (c) green industrialisation and investments; and (d) WTO reform	The global slowdown in trade growth, intensified by protectionist policies and geopolitical tensions, has significantly impacted emerging markets, including South Africa.
Infrastructure Development for processing minerals (e.g. refineries, smelters)	An operational and legally compliant SANPC that contributes to national energy security and refinery output	
SABC Bill	<i>The outcome of the finalized version is still on hold</i>	<i>The primary and common constraint is that the Minister of CDT belongs to the DA</i>
Post Bank	Post Bank will function as a fully-fledged bank and create diversity within the banking sector.	
EPWP- addressing structural unemployment	The focus was to clearly define the mandate of EPWP, discuss appropriate legislative mandate, implementation of funding model	
Wellisizwe Bridge Building Programme	Mneno Bridge has been indicated as 100% completed – The bridge has since washed away during a flood in January 2025 Plant allocations for completion of the 19 bridges been approved;	
Commercialisation of Black farmers	Industrial Development Corporation and the Land Bank has been implementing the Blended Finance Scheme (BFS) to support black farmers. As of September 2024, 225 black producers were supported, resulting in 3,936 jobs. The IDC approved R21.45 billion to assist emerging and small-scale black farmers.	Barriers to access affordable finance, land ownership issues, and market integration challenges
Rapid release of land – Restitution and	In progress	Funding constraints slow down pace of land

Policy Priority	Progress	Challenges
Redistribution		restoration and redistribution
Strengthening Capacity of the Land Bank to deliver on its mandate	The institution remains plagued with challenges of incapacity to support and upscale emerging farmers etc	Contingent on cooperation of other departments including Treasury.
Township and Rural Enterprise Programme	The Township and Rural Enterprise Programme has been allocated a budget of R597 million for the 2024/25 financial year. It is implemented through Sefa's direct lending, microfinance, and wholesale lending mechanisms, specifically targeting rural and township-based enterprises. We are actively monitoring the programme's performance.	
National Labour Migration Policy together Employment Services Amendment Bill.	National Labour Migration Policy together Employment services Amendment Bill (To be tabled in the National Assembly).	

RECOMMENDATIONS TO NGC

The ANC Parliamentary Caucus conducted an engaging process of discussions and received inputs on matters raised in the ANC base document. The discussions were based on an analysis and critique of the base document to problematise matters further and propose various **recommendations** to enhance the analysis on the balance of forces and policy positions. The position papers produced by the Caucus focus on various elements of the base document, namely:

1. A conjunctural rethink of the NDR?
2. Nation-building, social cohesion and empowerment of the motive forces
3. Navigating a complex global situation
4. Toward an egalitarian society: a redistributive developmental path for growth and equity
5. The ANC as the leader of society: ANC renewal as agent of change

**The Position Papers are attached in the NGC Digital File*

Annexure A: Legislation passed since 2022 in the sixth Parliament period

1. Divorce Amendment Bill
2. Copyright Amendment Bill
3. Proposed Act No 3 of 2024
4. Performers' Protection Amendment Bill
5. Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Amendment Bill
6. Eskom Debt Relief Amendment Bill
7. Economic Regulation of Transport Bill
8. Cannabis for Private Purposes Bill
9. National Road Traffic Amendment Bill
10. National Council on Gender-Based Violence and Femicide Amendment Bill
11. Proposed Act No 10 of 2024
12. National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Bill
13. National Youth Development Agency Amendment Bill
14. Revenue Laws Amendment Bill
15. Expropriation Bill
16. Electoral Matters Amendment Bill
17. Independent Police Investigative Directorate Amendment Bill
18. Proposed Act No 16 of 2024
19. Companies Amendment Bill
20. Companies Second Amendment Bill
21. Second Adjustments Appropriation Bill
22. National Health Insurance Bill
23. Division of Revenue Bill B4 – 2024
24. Gold and Foreign Exchange Contingency Reserve Account Defrayed Amendment Bill B7 – 2024
25. South African Post Office Soc Ltd Amendment Bill B11 – 2-2023
26. National Small Enterprises Amendment Bill – B16 – 2023
27. Electricity Regulation Amendment Bill – B23 – 2023
28. National Nuclear Regulator Amendment Bill – B 25 – 2023
29. South African Institute for Drug Free Sport Amendment Bill – B 41- 2023
30. Climate Change Bill B9 - 2022
31. Basic Education Laws Amendment Bill B2 – 2022
32. Upstream Petroleum Resources Development Bill B13 – 2021
33. Housing Consumer Protection Bill B10 – 2021
34. Deeds Registries Amendment Bill B28 – 2022
35. Pension Funds Amendment Bill B3 – 2024
36. Public Procurement Bill B18 – 2023
37. Statistics Amendment Bill B31 – 2023
38. Preservation of Agricultural Land Bill B8 – 2021
39. National Water Resources Infrastructure Bill B-24 2023
40. Railways Safety Bill B7 – 2021
41. Transport Appeal Tribunal Amendment Bill – B8 – 2020
42. General Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill – B40 – 2023
43. Marine Pollution (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Amendment Bill – B5 – 2022

ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION COMMITTEE

1. Overview

The African National Congress enters this National General Council (NGC) with a sober appreciation of the terrain on which we are advancing the programme of economic transformation. The 55th National Conference set out an unambiguous mandate: *to rebuild the economy on a people-centred footing, restore industrial capability, democratise ownership and control, and reassert the leadership of a capable, ethical developmental state*. In the period under review, the Economic Transformation Committee (ETC) has worked to carry this mandate in conditions not of our choosing characterized by a Government of National Unity (GNU) that often blunts coherence; a global order shifting from rules-based multilateralism to unprecedented tariff wars; domestic constraints in energy, logistics and finance that continually test the resilience of our productive sectors; and slow economic growth, while the cost of living for our people continues to rise. This midterm report therefore assesses where the balance of forces has moved, and what that means for the motive forces on whose shoulders the National Democratic Revolution rests. The report further provides an overview of the implementation of conference resolutions and manifesto commitments, highlighting the areas of progress and challenges. We also provide a report on the work of the ETC during the period under review and key recommendations for the NGC to consider.

Shifts in the Balance of Forces

Internationally, the strategic environment has hardened. The promise of “hyper-globalisation” has given way to a politics of strategic protection and club-based trade. The United States, the chief architect of the post-war trading order, has returned to tariff instruments under Section 232, extending them across vehicles and parts and signalling a wider re-armouring of its market. In October 2025, the White House formalised recommendations for 25% ad valorem duties on defined medium- and heavy-duty vehicles and parts, explicitly linking these moves to the pre-existing Section 232 automobile tariff programme, with further universal tariff measures debated in U.S. courts and policy circles. The effect for South Africa is direct: the rules of access are being rewritten in ways that compress our policy space and unsettle firm-level investment plans in autos, components and metals.

Compounding this, AGOA reached its end date on 30 September 2025 without a Congressional extension in force. While elements within the U.S. administration have canvassed a temporary reprieve, exporters on the ground face a materially altered environment, preferences have lapsed, and new U.S. tariff layers are in place. This has immediate implications for autos and agribusiness and accelerates our required shift toward AfCFTA corridors and BRICS+ markets.

These external pressures have landed on an economy still operating below potential. Business sentiment remains subdued, the RMB/BER index printed 39 in Q3 2025, a level consistent with an economy “muddling through,” while monetary conditions have eased at the margin, the SARB held the repo rate at 7.0% in September with CPI around the lower half of the target band, but not yet enough to unlock the scale of private fixed investment a jobs surge requires. In the absence of rapid gains in rail, ports and

electricity, risk premia remain high for producers, especially black industrialists and SMMEs.

The structural picture of industrial competitiveness mirrors this pressure. UNIDO's most recent Competitive Industrial Performance snapshot places South Africa in the 50s globally, a reminder that the long slippage in manufacturing value-added, diversification and technology intensity has not yet been reversed. It is precisely for this reason that Conference tasked the movement to re-centre industrialisation, transform concentrated markets, and align the state-finance architecture behind productive investment.

In this environment, the ETC has treated defensive trade instruments, export diversification, and corridor recovery as political tasks, not technocratic housekeeping. The tariff shock to autos has intersected with the technology transition, threatening model allocations unless we deepen local content, firm up continental rules-of-origin under the AfCFTA, and stabilise logistics. In agriculture, the additional 30% U.S. tariff on citrus, on top of baseline duties, has been flagged by the Citrus Growers' Association as adding about \$4.25 per carton and potentially jeopardising around 35,000 jobs in linked rural economies if not mitigated through diplomacy and market re-weighting. These are not abstractions; they are shifts in economic power with immediate social consequences.

The clearest lesson of the midterm is that there can be no national sovereignty without industrial sovereignty. In a world of tariffs, weaponised standards and contested supply chains, our side advances when the movement leads the state to deploy fiscal, monetary, trade, competition and DFI instruments as one arsenal; when we treat AfCFTA implementation not as a slogan but as an export-platform strategy; and when we align institutional savings and public procurement to rebuild domestic capability in steel, autos, agro-processing and green value chains. That is the line of march set by Conference and operationalised through ANC's action plan.

The period since the 2024 General Elections has presented the ANC with a fundamentally altered balance of forces. With the movement securing 40% of the national vote, the ANC continues to lead society and the state, but now does so within the context of a Government of National Unity that brings into one government with political actors with divergent ideological perspectives. This is not the first GNU in our democratic history, but it is the first to emerge under conditions where the ANC does not command a parliamentary majority. This shift in the political landscape has reshaped the terrain on which the National Democratic Revolution must unfold. The democratic state remains led by the ANC, but its ability to drive transformation now requires sustained negotiation, political discipline, and heightened ideological clarity.

In this context, the 2025/26 Budget and appropriations cycle became the sharpest expression of the new conjuncture. The Budget is not a neutral document; it is an instrument through which the strategic priorities of the democratic state are advanced. Under current conditions, however, the appropriations framework became an arena in which anti-transformation forces attempted to reconfigure the policy horizon of the state and roll back gains made over the past three decades.

The most acute manifestation of this contest emerged through the posture adopted by the Democratic Alliance. Rather than approaching the Budget as a question of expenditure discipline, macroeconomic balance, and developmental priorities, the DA sought to insert into the appropriations negotiations demands that were unrelated to

the fiscal framework. These included calls for the reversal or suspension of the Expropriation Act, attempts to halt or dilute National Health Insurance (NHI), and proposals to reverse the BELA act amongst others. These positions reflected not fiscal concerns, but a long-standing ideological opposition to transformation. In attempting to link support for the Budget to such demands, the DA effectively sought to use the appropriations process as leverage to constrain the democratic state's transformative mandate.

This dynamic must be understood within the broader political economy of South Africa. The ANC's Strategy and Tactics teaches that the state is a terrain of contestation and that the balance of forces is always shifting. The movement's task is to ensure that the state remains an instrument of social transformation rather than an arena captured by narrow class interests. The ANC's task in the appropriations cycle was to defend the transformative content of the Budget while maintaining stability within the GNU and ensuring fiscal credibility in a climate of heightened economic pressure.

The fiscal environment itself remains constrained. Years of slow growth, high unemployment, weak revenue performance, and increasing debt-service costs have tightened fiscal space. Through the process of negotiations within and outside the GNU, the ANC sought always to put the interest of the people of South Africa first. For this reason, the ANC defended the social wage, prioritised frontline services, and protected investment in infrastructure, energy, logistics recovery, and industrial policy, even under difficult fiscal conditions.

Coalition governance has introduced new complexities to fiscal coordination. Under these coalition conditions it has highlighted the need for deeper political alignment on the overall fiscal stance well before the finalisation of tax instruments. The ANC recognises the need to strengthen internal mechanisms that ensure political guidance on the big questions of fiscal policy, growth strategy, expenditure direction, debt path, and redistribution, while upholding the confidentiality necessary for credible macroeconomic management.

The appropriations cycle therefore revealed essential truths about the current phase of the NDR. Transformation no longer advances on the basis of an uncontested parliamentary majority; it advances through political struggle across multiple fronts, inside the state, within Parliament, in public discourse, and in society at large. The ANC remains the strategic centre of political power, but the means through which it exercises leadership require heightened strategic discipline. Without ideological clarity, organisational coherence, and effective mobilisation of the motive forces of change, the transformation project risks dilution under the pressures of coalition bargaining.

Despite these challenges, the Budget that emerged from the appropriations cycle retained its developmental and redistributive character. The social wage was defended. Frontline services were protected. Public investment in energy, logistics, industrialisation, and infrastructure remained prioritised. These outcomes were not accidental, they were the result of political discipline and firm defence of the democratic state's transformative mandate.

The release of the ANC's 10-Point Economic Action Plan contributed to a further shift in the national discourse. The plan has been broadly supported by society with independent analysts and business commentators broadly welcoming it as a more coherent and coordinated articulation of the government's economic priorities, particularly its emphasis on execution, industrial recovery, logistics and energy reform.

The Plan has served to re-centre the importance of targeted planning and execution.

Taken together, these developments confirm that the NDR continues to progress under highly contested conditions. The appropriations struggle demonstrated the fluidity of the balance of forces, the risks posed by anti-transformation pressures, and the resilience of the movement's leadership capacity. The Budget must remain an instrument of liberation and transformation, not a bargaining chip for diluting the democratic state's mandate. The ANC enters the next period with clarity: the path to social justice and national development requires defending the transformative core of the state, strengthening state capacity, deepening governance reform, and sustaining a political economy framework that links growth, equity, industrialisation, and redistribution.

State of the Motive Forces

The state of the motive forces remains the ultimate measure of progress in the National Democratic Revolution. The working class and the poor continue to face a labour market defined by exclusion and insecurity. Stats SA reports an official unemployment rate of 33.2% in Q2 2025, with the expanded rate at 42.9%. This structural crisis manifests as energy poverty, precarious incomes and weakened social cohesion in townships and rural towns. Youth bear the sharpest edge of this crisis; unless the economy generates labour-absorbing industrial jobs at scale, and unless public employment and skills programmes become a genuine bridge into production, the social distance between the movement and its base will widen.

Rising Cost of Living and the Erosion of Real Incomes

The Competition Commission's 2025 Cost-of-Living Report confirms that the poorest households face inflation far above the headline rate. For the lowest-income decile, food and non-alcoholic beverages consume 40.7% of total expenditure, followed by housing and utilities at 26.1%, leaving little room for transport, education or healthcare. Over the past five years, electricity prices have increased by 68% and water tariffs by 50%, well above general inflation. These administered-price increases have forced millions of working-class households to choose between *food and power*, a crisis now openly acknowledged by government leaders.

The cost-of-living squeeze is compounded by rising transport costs and high interest rates. Minibus-taxi fares, the main mode of transport for more than ten million commuters, have surged since 2022, driven by escalating fuel and vehicle-finance costs. At the same time, aggressive interest-rate hikes have raised monthly bond and credit repayments by nearly 30%, pushing indebted households deeper into distress. Wage growth has lagged far behind these pressures, with average salaries stagnating in real terms for over two years.

The cumulative effect is a shrinking real wage, a collapse in household savings, and growing debt exposure. The ETC's policy assessment confirms that these pressures are not episodic they are structural outcomes of an economy where market concentration, administered-price escalation and weak state coordination reinforce one another.

Industrial Pressures and Job Losses

Within the productive core, the stresses of this period are visible in strategic value chains. ArcelorMittal South Africa's long-steel operations, particularly in Newcastle and Vereeniging, face the combined effects of high electricity costs, rail and port inefficiencies, weak domestic demand and import surges. The company's curtailment of production has placed over 3 500 direct jobs at risk, with broader downstream effects in fabrication, construction steel and mining supply.

In the automotive sector, the imposition of U.S. Section 232 tariffs on vehicles and parts, together with uncertainty around AGOA preferences, threatens tens of thousands of jobs. The Reserve Bank and industry sources warn that the tariff shock could affect both the auto and agricultural export sectors. Unless South Africa accelerates its model transitions toward new-energy and hybrid vehicles, local content cumulation and reliable logistics corridors, the sector's employment and export base will weaken further.

Agriculture illustrates how tariff shocks intersect with rural livelihoods. The 30% U.S. tariff on citrus exports coinciding with the harvest season threatens employment multipliers in towns such as Citrusdal and the Olifants River Valley. Without exemptions, new markets and efficient ports, these tariffs will destroy one of the few value chains that have expanded black producer participation and exports.

Black Industrialists, SMMEs, and Township Economies

For black industrialists, SMMEs and township or rural enterprises, the barriers remain primarily financial and logistical. Business confidence remains below 40 points; risk-adjusted financing costs are high; and market access is constrained by buyer power concentrated in logistics, retail and procurement chains. The Conference instruction to align DFIs, expand state-banking capability, and leverage procurement for local producers remains the correct strategic line. The mid-term experience confirms that where such alignment exists, firms survive and learn; where it is absent, promising enterprises collapse back into informality.

Women and the economy

The condition of women in the economy remains one of the most decisive indicators of the health of the democratic breakthrough. Since 1994, South Africa has made constitutional commitments to non-sexism, equality, and the dismantling of patriarchal social relations. Yet, three decades into democracy, the lived reality of millions of women still reflects structural barriers that continue to blunt the transformative capacity of the economy and narrow the horizons of the National Democratic Revolution.

The labour market remains deeply gendered. Although women constitute just over half of the working-age population, their labour force participation lags substantially behind that of men. The latest labour market data shows female unemployment consistently above that of males, with the unemployment rate for women sitting well above 34 per cent. When expanded unemployment is considered, including discouraged work-seekers, the picture deepens: women disproportionately populate the ranks of those who have given up looking for work, often due to the burdens of unpaid care work and the lack of accessible economic entry points.

The occupational structure of the economy continues to reflect centuries-old patterns of exclusion. Women remain concentrated in the lowest-paid occupations domestic work, community and social services, elementary labour and underrepresented in higher-skilled, higher-paid segments such as management, technical professions, and industrial sciences. Despite improvements in educational attainment, women's progression into STEM fields, skilled trades, and industrial occupations remains limited, which has entrenched wage disparities that remain stubbornly persistent. Women consistently earn far less than men for work of equal value, with gender pay gaps still estimated to range between a quarter and a third of comparable earnings.

These inequalities are deeply rooted in the structure of the household economy. Women shoulder the overwhelming majority of unpaid care work: childcare, eldercare, household management, and community-level social reproduction.

This labour is essential for functioning of society and the economy remains invisible, unremunerated, and overwhelmingly borne by women. The result is a "double burden": a full unpaid workday superimposed on attempts to secure income in a contracting labour market. The erosion of early childhood development systems, the high cost of childcare, the spatial distance between townships and centres of work, and persistent gender norms conspire to force many women out of the labour market or into precarious forms of work.

Women's exclusion is also materialised in patterns of ownership. Women remain significantly underrepresented in land ownership, asset holdings, enterprise ownership, and access to credit. Financial exclusion persists despite the expansion of banking services and government interventions in SMME and enterprise finance. Women SMMEs face higher barriers to start-up capital, collateral requirements, and market access. Enterprise development programmes, procurement systems, and DFI pipelines have historically failed to adequately prioritise women industrialists and entrepreneurs at scale.

The rural and township economies illustrate this most sharply. Women in these communities face the triple burdens of poverty, distance from opportunities, and historical marginalisation from productive land. Poverty rates among women remain significantly higher than among men, with female-headed households consistently exhibiting the highest incidence of poverty nationally. In rural areas, where farming, agro-processing, and environmental management could be engines for inclusive growth, women's access to land, extension services, inputs, and markets remains constrained.

The social crises of our time fall hardest on women. Rising food prices, energy insecurity, transport costs, and limited support systems extract a disproportionate toll. The social wage, child support grants, the SRD grant, public health services, education, and transport subsidies, remains a crucial buffer, cushioning millions of women at the coalface of poverty. Yet, these instruments also highlight the structural position of women as primary caregivers and shock absorbers of economic distress.

These patterns reveal that women, despite carrying the weight of social reproduction, sustaining households, and buffering communities during crisis, remain structurally marginalised within the mainstream economy. This contradiction strikes at the core of the NDR: a society cannot claim to be advancing towards non-sexism while half of its population bears the heaviest burdens with the fewest economic rewards.

However, women also represent one of the most dynamic and decisive motive forces

with the potential to shift the trajectory of the economy. Women constitute the majority of graduates in higher education. They are the backbone of the community economy, ECD practitioners, community health workers, social workers, educators, and informal traders. They dominate the caring economy, a sector with immense potential for job creation if properly industrialised, formalised, and supported. Women entrepreneurs form a significant portion of township informal enterprise, yet remain disconnected from formal value chains.

The task before the movement is therefore twofold. First, to confront directly the structural barriers that confine women to the periphery of economic power: wage inequality, limited access to productive assets, inadequate childcare and transport infrastructure, exclusion from industrial value chains, and persistent gender discrimination. Second, to build an economic programme that recognises and elevates women's roles as economic agents—not merely as beneficiaries of welfare interventions but as central actors in productive sectors, innovation, enterprise development, and industrial expansion.

The success of the ANC's economic transformation agenda, including the 10 Priority Interventions, the reindustrialisation programme, the reform of DFIs, and the restructuring of energy, logistics, and the skills system, depends fundamentally on the integration of women not at the margins but at the centre. The transformation of the economy cannot be achieved without transforming gendered power relations in production, ownership, and decision-making.

The emancipation of women is not a secondary or "social" question; it is an economic and strategic imperative. It is a pillar of the National Democratic Revolution and a determinant of whether our society can attain the inclusive, just, and a capable ethical developmental state envisioned in the Freedom Charter and reaffirmed by successive ANC Conferences.

● Youth and the economy

Youth remain one of the most decisive motive forces in the National Democratic Revolution. They embody the energy, creativity and restlessness that have historically propelled periods of national renewal. Yet, in the present period, their lived realities reflect the deepest structural weaknesses of the South African economy, resulting in a contradiction that sits at the centre of the balance of forces confronting the movement.

South Africa's youth population, now over 20 million people aged 15–34, represents a demographic opportunity that has not yet been translated into productive participation. The labour-market data confirms that young people remain the most marginalised segment of society. Over the last decade, youth unemployment (15–34) has risen from 36.8% to 46.1%, and the proportion of youth not in employment, education or training has increased to 43.2%. The unemployment rate of youth between the ages of 15 and 24 is at an alarming 62.4%. These figures reflect a generation structurally disconnected from work, skills, and pathways to mobility.

This exclusion is not confined to the unskilled. Even as more young people complete matric or attain higher education, many still struggle to find work. Graduate unemployment, despite being lower than the general youth rate, has continued to rise, a clear sign that the economy is not generating enough opportunities for young entrants or absorbing the skills being produced. For millions of young people, education

has ceased to function as a reliable ladder into stable employment, weakening their confidence in the promise of upward mobility.

The youth share of total employment has steadily declined, while their share among the unemployed has increased. This reflects a labour market that is closing existing pathways into work rather than expanding new ones. With manufacturing, mining, construction, logistics and other labour-intensive sectors either stagnant or shedding jobs, traditional entry points into the productive economy have contracted. Young people attempting to enter the labour market for the first time face a system that absorbs too few and excludes far too many.

The economic pressures facing youth extend into the social sphere. Many young people live in households without any employed adults, and increasing numbers experience hunger or rely on social grants as a primary income source. The Social Relief of Distress grant has become a crucial survival mechanism for millions, yet it cannot substitute for stable employment or provide a durable foundation for economic empowerment. Rising exposure to crime, unsafe environments, substance abuse, and mental-health stress is directly linked to prolonged unemployment and the absence of meaningful opportunities to participate in society.

This situation has direct implications for the balance of forces. When youth face persistent exclusion from economic activity and declining confidence in public institutions, their energy can turn inward or become channelled into frustration, cynicism and disengagement. High NEET rates weaken the fabric of social cohesion and open space for populist or anti-democratic narratives that exploit economic despair. A generation that does not feel included in the nation's development path is a generation vulnerable to demobilisation or exploitation by forces hostile to transformation.

Yet, even in this context of profound exclusion, young people remain a powerful reservoir of potential. There is visible innovation and resilience emerging in township economies, digital work, creative industries, gig-based sectors, and local micro-enterprises. Many young people express a desire to start businesses, participate in green and digital value chains, or pursue artisanal and technical work, but are constrained by limited access to finance, markets, infrastructure and networks. Their aspirations far exceed the opportunities available to them.

For the movement, addressing the youth question is not optional; it is a strategic necessity. The economy cannot grow without integrating its largest demographic cohort into productive activity. Industrial policy cannot succeed without aligning skills pipelines, apprenticeships, and training pathways to absorb young workers into masterplans and expanding sectors. The developmental state cannot be renewed without drawing younger professionals, artisans, engineers and entrepreneurs into its institutions, its enterprises, and its national programmes.

The ANC's economic agenda must therefore centre youth across all its pillars: reindustrialisation, infrastructure rollout, localisation, township and rural economy revitalisation, the green transition, and state capability. Youth employment cannot be treated as a peripheral social concern, it must be embedded into the core design of industrial zones, construction programmes, public procurement, renewable-energy investments, digital infrastructure, transport reform, and DFI financing strategies. Every major catalytic project must have a defined youth participation pathway.

The movement's strategic task is to convert the present moment of youth frustration

into a programme of youth empowerment. This means expanding labour-absorbing sectors, scaling public employment, deepening apprenticeships, linking the social protection to opportunities, strengthening technical and vocational education, supporting youth-owned enterprises, and creating an enabling environment for township and rural innovation.

Youth remain the most dynamic element of society, but they cannot become the motive force of transformation while standing outside productive activity. The future of the NDR depends on whether we can bring this generation into the centre of economic reconstruction. A society that fails its youth cannot secure stability; but a society that harnesses their energy can unlock a new wave of development, social cohesion and political renewal.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

Background and Balance of Forces

1. Following the 55th National Conference, the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the African National Congress resolved to establish the Local Government Interventions Task Team (LGITT) and later the Local Government Intervention Sub-Committee to address critical challenges facing municipalities, including governance, financial sustainability, institutional capacity, and service delivery.
2. Being a new committee, the LGITT developed a set of Terms of Reference (ToR) set to frame its work and enable it to develop a Programme of Action (PoA), in line with the directives of the Secretary-General Office, which laid the basis of its activities.
3. In 2023, LGITT adopted Terms of Reference supported by a Programme of Action (PoA) and a monitoring dashboard, reviewed annually and updated monthly. These interventions align with ANC Resolutions, Lekgotla directives and strategic priorities of the National Executive Committee.
4. One of the immediate issues that were evident, related to the overlap of responsibilities with the Legislature and Governance (L&G) Sub-committee, and thus the two committees identified areas of distinctive and overlapping responsibilities and respective PoAs.
5. The 55th Conference occurred immediately after local government elections that produced over 70 hung municipalities a first in democratic South Africa. This reality necessitates a review of the Municipal Systems Act to stabilize coalition governance and create predictability within the System, and this process is currently underway.
6. In 2022 the Sub-Committee convened a Local Government Summit to reflect on the resolution of the 55th National Conference and develop a programme of action to monitor the implementation of resolutions and coordinate interventions in the implementation of resolutions.
7. At a strategic level interventions in Local Government are in various forms as enabled through the South African Constitution which outlines constitutional obligations of National and Provincial Government. Beyond that, the Presidency is also implementing phase two of Operation Vulindlela which facilitates interventions in local government. The Local Government Intervention Sub-Committee is overseeing and monitoring impact of these various interventions.
8. The implementation of Section 139 of the Constitution which empowers provincial executives to intervene in a municipality when it fails to fulfil its executive obligations. This intervention can take several forms, including issuing directives, assuming responsibility for certain functions, or, in extreme cases, dissolving the municipal council and appointing an administrator until new elections are held.
9. The purpose of these measures is to maintain essential national standards,

prevent actions that harm other municipalities or the province, and ensure economic unity. Section 139 interventions are often triggered by persistent governance failures, financial mismanagement, political instability, or service delivery breakdowns.

10. While these interventions aim to restore functionality, studies and experience is showing that they are frequently reactive and have limited long-term success due to resistance from municipalities and procedural shortcomings. In some instance municipalities have regressed under section 139 interventions.
11. The second interventions at in terms of Section 154 of the Constitution, which focuses on proactive support rather than direct intervention. This section obliges national and provincial governments to support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities to manage their own affairs, exercise their powers, and perform their functions effectively.
12. This includes providing technical assistance, training, and resources to improve governance and service delivery. Section 154 also requires that any legislation affecting local government be published for public comment to allow municipalities and stakeholders to make representations.
13. Unlike Section 139, which is invoked when a municipality is in crisis, Section 154 promotes cooperative governance and capacity-building to prevent such crises. However, research indicates that this supportive approach is often underutilized, with governments relying more on Section 139 interventions instead of sustained capacity-building efforts.
14. Operation Vulindlela Phase 2 marks a shift towards strengthening local government as a critical enabler of economic growth and service delivery. Building on the successes of Phase 1, which focused on energy, logistics, telecommunications, and water reforms, the second phase introduces reforms aimed at improving municipal performance and reliability in delivering basic services such as water and electricity.
15. This includes restructuring local utilities, ring-fencing water and electricity services, and introducing performance-based incentives from National Treasury to encourage investment in infrastructure. The overarching goal is to stabilize municipalities, reduce inefficiencies, and create an environment where businesses and communities can thrive without disruptions caused by failing local systems.
16. In addition to service delivery, Phase 2 addresses deeper structural issues by tackling spatial inequality and enhancing governance capacity. The programme seeks to reshape urban development through housing and transport reforms, enabling citizens to live closer to economic opportunities and reducing the high cost of commuting, which currently consumes up to 40% of household income for the poorest South Africans.
17. Furthermore, the initiative emphasizes professionalizing municipal administrations by tightening rules for senior appointments and insulating them from political interference, thereby improving accountability and efficiency. These reforms, combined with digital transformation strategies, aim to create

financially stable, well-governed municipalities that can support inclusive growth and job creation across South Africa.

18. Since the 55th National Conference, the state of local government has shown only marginal improvement between 2021/22 and 2023/24, according to Auditor-General MFMA reports and Department of Cooperative Governance assessments. In 2021/22, only 15% of municipalities achieved clean audits, mostly in the Western Cape, while the majority received qualified, adverse, or disclaimed opinions.
19. Financial health remained precarious, with widespread unfunded budgets, material losses exceeding R5 billion, and fruitless expenditure of R4.7 billion. Governance failures, inadequate skills, and poor consequence management persisted, undermining service delivery and infrastructure maintenance.
20. The midterm review 2023/24 reflects slight progress: clean audits increased to 16%, still dominated by the Western Cape. However, 90 municipalities received qualified opinions and 11 were disclaimed.
21. Financial sustainability remains a critical risk, with unresolved material irregularities and inability to cover operational costs. Governance and accountability weaknesses endure, while service delivery risks have worsened particularly in metros and secondary cities due to declining infrastructure management.

Adoption of the Local Government Action Plan (LGAP)

22. In September 2025 the ANC NEC convened a Special National Executive Committee focusing on Local Government, this Special NEC reviewed the implementation of the 55th ANC Resolutions and assessed the state of Local Government and produced the now Local Government Action Plan for Accelerated Service Delivery Community Engagement and Infrastructure Development.
23. The Action Plan has six pillars driving roll-out in municipalities across the country
 - a) Act on core Service Delivery Commitments to citizens (water, sanitation, refuse removal, potholes, water leaks etc)
 - b) Driving effective and sustainable infrastructure which is fit for purpose, through effective planning maintenance and prevention of acts of vandalism
 - c) Building Capable Local Government and Institutional Capacity through improving revenue collection, adoption of funded budgets, improving billing systems, enforcing by-laws and filling critical vacancies.
 - d) Connecting with the people, Ward Councillors and Branch community, and public meetings, door-to-door responses to service delivery.
 - e) Building inclusive Local Economic Development, job creation and industrialization, supporting MSMEs in townships and villages, informal traders, women and youth, and activating public employment initiatives.
 - f) Communication and development of battle of ideas, regular media briefings on service delivery, policy discussions, on action taken against corruption, reflecting on performing municipalities.

24. The Sub-Committee continues to monitor and assess implementation of the Local Government Action Plan across municipalities in the country.
25. The outcome of the recent NEC is in the context of the reflections and resolutions of the 55th National Conferences which reaffirmed the need to strengthen governance stability, address factionalism and dysfunctional Troikas, and professionalize the political-administrative interface.
26. Implement Capacity-building measures through coordination among NSG, DCoG, NT, SALGA, and SETAs and introduce phased skills audits towards enforcement of professionalization of Local Government.
27. Financial reforms involve revising the equitable share formula, finalizing municipal debt relief, and ensuring funded budgets for infrastructure maintenance. Service delivery interventions, and quarterly monitoring to ensure that their appointment of qualified professionals to technical and financial leadership roles.
28. Structural reforms include stabilizing ward boundaries, aligning service delivery structures, and implementing single-tier government with expanded Category A municipalities by 2026. To address coalition instability, amendments to Section 12 notices and Electoral Act reforms will introduce Executive Committee systems and set representation thresholds.

Implementation of 55th ANC National Conference Resolutions

29. Immediately after its establishment, the Local Government Intervention Sub-Committee convened a Local Government Summit to crystallise resolutions of the 22nd National Conference. The main objective of the Summit was to align all municipalities towards advancing people's interests by ensuring better service delivery and prioritizing developmental local government.
30. To achieve these stated goals, the Summit had to collectively agree on implementation strategies to attain the 55th National Conference resolutions and identify intervention mechanisms to address challenges affecting local government, especially in the 66 dysfunctional municipalities. The outcomes of the Summit prioritised the following:
 - Municipalities must prioritise repairs and maintenance focusing on Sewer spillages, potholes, and streetlights.
 - Fastrack projects on mainstreaming of groundwater through MIG and other grants.
 - Engage DFIs on possible front-loading of the grants to FastTrack priority projects as well as project management support.
 - Deploy MISA, and DBSA to DDM hubs for accelerated and Centralized Service Delivery in key municipalities through Results Management Office (RMO) to support Local and District Municipalities.
 - Reorganise National to support Provinces and Municipalities.
 - Mobilisation of mining houses in areas they operate to make commitments

through the Social Labour Plans with a special focus on infrastructure projects and deployment of technical capacity.

- CWP army to implement the co-production service delivery model.
- Start the review of the White Paper on LG and the fiscal framework.
- Engage with civil society leadership and organizations, particularly traditional councils.

31. The 55th Resolutions were crystalized and a programme of action was developed – the Sub-Committee continue to monitor and refine timeframes for implementation of it's POA. Below is the POA with the ANC Conference Resolutions and update:

Task		Timeframe
POLITICAL MANAGEMENT		
1	Whips to be standing invitees to the REC meetings.	1 Sept 2023
2	Intervention is brought in as a last resort and the Regional leadership should be brought on board.	1 Sept 2023
3	ANC should enforce discipline throughout the Organisation.	Ongoing
4	The Whip's office should be a point of entry for government deployees, as they write to the Secretaries. Communication lines to be to the RSO and also to the Chief Whip.	1 Sept 2023
5	Develop a plan for the weekly meetings of the TROIKA + 1	1 Sept 2023
6	Strengthen DDM engagements with various spheres	Ongoing
7	Appoint competent senior officials	Ongoing
8	Workshop those deployed on their roles and responsibilities so they can play oversight properly.	Dec 2023
9	Meet the consequence management as per the performance agreement entered into.	Quarterly
10	MISA to assist the Municipality and capacity be assessed.	1 Sept 2023
11	Identify the source of dysfunctionality, whether it is because of budget constraints and/or capacity, resources need to be sourced to capacitate the Municipality.	Done
12	The RS and PS sign performance contracts with those deployed, and the Mayor signs with the administration.	1 Sept 2023
13	ANC to capacitate RSO to play an oversight over Municipalities.	1 Sept 2023
14	Where the deployed fail to build a good working relationship and their act disturbs the provision of services, RS summons them to spell out the expectations of the ANC.	1 Sept 2023
15	Conduct a SWOT analysis of dysfunctional municipalities to get into the depth of the source of the collapse of the Municipality. Develop a plan of action to assist the institution	Done
16	ANC to investigate the issue of mentors and coaches for TROIKA. They must be capacitated to execute their responsibilities with confidence.	Dec 2023
17	Skilling deployed cadres to recognise signs leading to dysfunctionality (NSG courses)	Ongoing
18	Capacitating cadres to understand the separation of responsibilities and powers	Ongoing
19	RSO to properly manage relations between the organisation and those deployed	Ongoing
20	On coalitions, the ANC applies its mind thoroughly as to how the agreements will change the principles members of the ANC are supposed to abide by. e.g., voting with the opposition. Resolutions register to be introduced and a resolution tracking system to be used.	1 Sept 2023
21	Capable researchers are to be appointed to assist the councillors with analysing documents. Put an end to the changing of prioritised needs on the IDP without following procedure.	Dec 2023
22	Create operational centres in the office of the Chief Whips and add Pop-up	1 Sept

Task		Timeframe
	call centres	
23	Daily verification and registration of voters to the issues on the ground	Ongoing
GOVERNANCE AND ADMINISTRATION		
24	Legislative review to manage coalitions	Mar 2024
25	Training in governance and municipal administration must be compulsory	Ongoing
26	Relook at processes that hinder the attraction of professionals and review of funding model	Mar 2024
27	Use former successful mayors to mentor.	Ongoing
28	Section 71 reports must list the councillors and officials who do not pay their municipal bills.	Mar 2024
29	Councillors should be getting paid from the national fiscus. Cut red-tape to make appointments easier (smart-tape).	Mar 2024
30	In coalitions, we must “gun” for the position of Speaker to enable the calling of meetings and having the advantage of casting ballot	Ongoing
31	All provinces must have summits to discuss coalitions.	Dec 2023
32	We need to work on the question of separation of powers	1 Sept 2023
33	Monitoring and accountability must be taken seriously and strengthened. The Transformation & Turnaround College (TTC) concept is supported.	Ongoing
34	Deploy spare capacity of national and provinces to municipalities	Ongoing
35	All councillors must have formal education and must better their education and training during their deployment of 5 years. All MPs and MPLs must have a minimum of matric. MMCs, MECs, and Ministers must have a diploma or better.	Ongoing
FISCAL FRAMEWORK AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT		
36	Section 71 reports written in non-technical language for mayors.	Ongoing
37	National and Provincial COGTA and Treasury to analyse section 71 reports and resolve problems in time.	Ongoing
38	Resolve issue of unpaid pension funds at financially distressed municipalities.	Mar 2024
39	Once off grant to make up for the losses of Covid-19 pandemic	Mar 2024
40	The equitable share should not be stopped when there is no spending on conditional grants.	1 Sep 2023
41	Outstanding third-party payments to be resolved.	Ongoing
42	Unspent grants are to be made available as part of intervention through sector departments and district municipalities.	Ongoing
43	Procurement is to be done immediately so that money is spent within the financial year.	Ongoing
44	Attachment of municipal account by creditors to be resolved by the Task Team headed by the Deputy President within two weeks.	1 Sept 2023
45	We must protect government infrastructure from vandalism and construction mafia.	Ongoing
46	Ring-fencing for women by National Treasury.	Ongoing
SERVICE DELIVERY		
47	Address the legacy of uneven development.	Ongoing
48	IDPs and budgets adopted must be fast-tracked.	Ongoing
49	EPWP is a low-hanging fruit to implement ANC mandate/resolutions.	Ongoing
50	Use an indigent register to empower rural communities.	Ongoing
51	Coordinating team is critical to deal with dysfunctional/ distressed municipalities.	Done
52	Fast-track dedicated units/people (RMO) to monitor the quality of services.	Ongoing
53	DDM is the best instrument to deal with service delivery challenges e.g., yellow fleets to re-gravel roads.	Ongoing
54	SCM processes to be fast-tracked.	Ongoing
55	Encourage sharing of resources (IGR) to realise cooperative/participatory government.	Ongoing
56	Good plans/programmes to communicate claim victories (big and small).	Ongoing
57	Local economic development to prioritise young people using available	Ongoing

Task		Timeframe
	budgets.	
58	Keeping the lights on (Loadshedding Mitigation and Electrification).	Ongoing
59	Water is life (Blue Drop), and Wastewater Treatment (Green Drop).	Ongoing
60	Road resurfacing and pothole repairs.	Ongoing
61	Cleanup Programs (Cities and Towns, Public Spaces).	Ongoing

LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY WORK OF LGI

32. The period under review reflects a significant intensification of legislative and policy work led by the LGI Sub-Committee, consistent with the ANC's mandate to renew and stabilise local government. According to documents from 2025, the Sub-Committee drove and oversaw several major reforms, ranging from the review of foundational policy instruments to the processing of critical Bills aimed at stabilising governance in the local sphere.

Review of the White Paper on Local Government (1998)

33. The Sub-Committee received detailed updates on the multi-year review of the 1998 White Paper on Local Government. This review is a central pillar of transforming the local government system, addressing structural weaknesses that have become entrenched over two decades.
34. **Key Elements of the Review:** Phase 1 involved national consultations, diagnostic assessments, and collection of submissions from government departments, SALGA, Chapter 9 institutions, civil society and political parties, resulting in over 260 submissions. Phase 2, underway during the reporting period, focuses on producing a revised draft White Paper.
35. **Thematic Areas of Reform** The proposals were consolidated around five themes: Governance and Political Leadership – stabilising councils, reforming coalition arrangements, strengthening council functionality. Institutional Capacity and Professionalisation – stricter recruitment standards, a professional cadre, improved performance management. Community Accountability – exploring municipal ombudsman mechanisms and potential recall provisions for ward councillors. Intergovernmental Relations and Structural Reform – adjusting municipal structures and improving coordination across spheres. Financial Sustainability – tackling debt, unfunded budgets, pension liabilities and improving revenue collection.
36. **Strategic Considerations:** The review includes proposals for disruptive reforms such as: Early-warning systems for failing municipalities. Legislative amendments to stabilise coalitions. Stronger consequence management for recurring audit failures. Greater attention to traditional leadership as part of local governance reforms.
37. **Timelines:** Draft White Paper for public comment by December 2025. Consolidation of comments in January 2026. Submission to Cabinet by March 2026.
38. The Sub-Committee reiterated the need for alignment between this review and the Local Government Action Plan.

Municipal Structures Amendment Bill (Coalitions Bill)

39. In line with the ANC's commitment to stabilise governance in hung and coalition-led

councils, the Sub-Committee dedicated considerable energy to shaping the Municipal Structures Amendment Bill, widely known as the Coalitions Bill.

40. **Purpose of the Bill:** To regulate coalition arrangements. To reduce instability in hung councils. To strengthen mechanisms for electing and removing office bearers. To improve the predictability and durability of governance arrangements.
41. **Key Provisions:** Legal recognition and regulation of binding coalition agreements. Powers for MECs to review Section 12 notices affecting municipal governance structures. Introduction of a representation threshold (initially proposed at 1 percent) to reduce fragmentation. A two-year cooling-off period for motions of no confidence. Options for open or secret voting in electing office bearers. Shift from mayoral executive systems to collective executive systems in certain contexts. Regulation of coalition negotiation periods, with proposals to limit them to 30 days.
42. **Concerns and Internal Debates:** Constitutionality and fairness of thresholds. Impact on smaller parties. Risk of litigation if thresholds are poorly justified. Need to differentiate between metropolitan and rural municipalities.
43. **Decisions and Recommendations** Obtain a senior counsel legal opinion on the constitutionality of thresholds and related provisions. Intensify political mobilisation across provinces, parliamentary committees and caucuses to prioritise the Bill. Finalise the Bill for submission to Cabinet by February 2026, with promulgation targeted before the 2026 Local Government Elections. Prepare for NEC, NGC and GNU briefings to build consensus. Strengthen advocacy and public communication to explain the Bill's benefits.

Local Government: General Laws Amendment Bill

44. The LGI Sub-Committee also oversaw the development of the Local Government: General Laws Amendment Bill, which will consolidate and implement key policy proposals emerging from the White Paper review.
45. **Purpose of the Bill:** To update multiple local government statutes in a single legislative instrument. To introduce reforms on governance stability, professionalisation, financial management and community accountability. To give effect to structural reform options being developed through the White Paper review. The Bill is structured as a vehicle to ensure that renewed policy direction is translated into enforceable law.

Intergovernmental Monitoring, Support and Interventions (IMSI) Bill

46. A major legislative priority under the Sub-Committee's watch is the IMSI Bill, intended to overhaul the national approach to interventions in failing municipalities.
47. **Purpose of the IMSI Bill**
 - To provide a clearer and more enforceable framework for monitoring, support and intervention across the three spheres.
 - To remedy systemic weaknesses exposed by the inconsistent use of section 154 and section 139 interventions.
 - To improve the design of early-warning systems and coordinated support.
48. **Status** The Bill was targeted for introduction to Parliament before the end of the financial year, aligning it with the broader legislative reform agenda.

Other Legislative and Regulatory Processes Supporting Local Government Reform

Additional policy and regulatory work supported or overseen by the Sub-Committee includes:

49. **Review of the IGR Framework Act:** The Act was tabled before Cabinet in October 2024 and is undergoing public consultation. The review aims to strengthen cooperative

governance and enforce compliance with the District Development Model (DDM).

50. **Implementation of the IGR Regulations:** Regulations promulgated in May 2024 to enforce DDM functionality and improve intergovernmental alignment.
51. **Reform of the Municipal Funding Model:** Proposals include revising the local government share of nationally raised revenue to 17.8%, addressing unfunded mandates and re-allocating a portion of the fuel levy to non-metros.
52. **Professionalisation Framework for Local Government:** Competency frameworks, skills audits and centralised misconduct databases are being implemented to strengthen municipal administration.
53. **Sectoral Reform Proposals (Operation Vulindlela):** Shifts toward utility models for water, sanitation and electricity. Consolidation of duplicated structures between local and district municipalities. Strengthened revenue collection and administrative capacity.

Policy–legislative Alignment with the 2021 and 2024 Manifestos

54. The legislative work of the Sub-Committee supports the following key commitments of the ANC's 2021 and 2024 Manifestos: Stabilising local government. Expanding national powers to support failing municipalities. Professionalising municipal administration. Ensuring greater accountability and improved basic services. Reforming the intervention model to protect communities from collapsing councils. This alignment ensures that legislative reforms do not stand alone but directly reinforce the strategic political commitments of the ANC.

The Implementation of the ANC manifesto 2021 and 2024

2021 LOCAL GOVERNMENT MANIFESTO

1. Manifesto priorities with partial implementation
 - Priority 1: Water, Sanitation, Sewerage and Roads
 - Priority 2: Electricity
 - Priority 6: Integrated government closer to the people through DDM
 - Priority 7: Food Security
 - Priority 12: Intensify the Fight against Gender-Based Violence
2. Manifesto priorities with weak implementation
 - Priority 3: Land and Housing
 - Priority 4: Choose the Best People to Lead Transformation
 - Priority 5: Create Jobs and Drive Economic Development
 - Priority 8: Fight Corruption, End Wastage, Ensure Public Money Is Spent on Needed Services
 - Priority 9: Make Municipalities Financially Viable
 - Priority 10: Build Safer Communities; Fight Crime, Drugs, Alcohol Abuse
 - Priority 11: Jobs, Education, Training and Opportunities for Young People

2024 ELECTIONS MANIFESTO

1. Manifesto priorities achieved:

- Priority 1: Identify municipalities with dysfunctionalities in provision of basic services and intervene

- Priority 2: Increase national and provincial capacity to intervene to support basic services
- Priority 3: Identify and intervene in municipalities with clean water provision challenges

2. Manifesto priorities under progress:

Priority 4: Ensure municipalities develop adequate maintenance capacity

- Partial progress through MIG repair allocation (10%)
- National and provincial technical capacity being built
- Artisanal programmes rolled out

Priority 6: Implement the Professionalisation Framework across all three spheres of government

- Monitoring of senior manager appointments
- Competency batteries
- Public sector misconduct database
- DDM Champions appointed

Priority 7: Strengthen planning, project implementation and M&E; attract and retain skilled personnel

- Legislative reforms underway (White Paper Review, IGR Regulations, IMSI Bill, General Laws Amendment Bill)
- Screening delays remain a bottleneck

Priority 4 (continued – universal basic services): Progressive realisation of universal basic services

- Free Basic Services provided
- Severe mismatch between indigent households funded (10.36m) and households served (1.8m–2.9m)

Priority 3 (January 8 Statement): Public employment programmes, artisanal and enterprise development

- Smart partnerships and youth-skilling programmes underway

Manifesto priorities with weak implementation:

- Priority 4: Ensure municipalities develop adequate maintenance capacity (weak progress overall)
- Priority 5: Ensure all water infrastructure projects are completed within planned timelines
- Priority 7: Strengthen planning, M&E and project implementation capabilities
- Priority 8: Advance e-government and digital services
- Priority 9: Increase disaster response capacity and funding

OVERVIEW OF MANIFESTO PERFORMANCE (JULY–DECEMBER 2024)

Total commitments assessed: 21

2. 3 achieved, 6 partially achieved, 12 not achieved

3. Structural challenges:

- Widespread service delivery failures
- Infrastructure decay
- Political and administrative instability
- Poor financial management and unmanageable municipal debt
- Growing criminality targeting municipal infrastructure
- Declining community trust in local government

MEETINGS, ACTIVITIES AND ISSUES DEALT WITH BY LGI

55. In 2025, the LGI Sub-Committee adopted a strengthened intervention approach in response to persistent governance failures, declining audit outcomes, and political instability across municipalities. This approach emphasised physical engagements with municipalities, prioritising those flagged by the Auditor-General, and direct interactions with TROIKAs, ANC Caucuses and administrative leadership. The purpose was to diagnose the underlying drivers of instability, reinforce political accountability, and accelerate corrective action in support of the ANC's Programme of Action.
56. During the reporting period, the Sub-Committee conducted visits to municipalities in the Eastern Cape, Free State and Gauteng, focusing on governance performance, caucus functionality, financial health, service delivery readiness and the coherence of political leadership. The engagements revealed recurring patterns of institutional weakness, but also identified pockets of stability where ANC structures function coherently. The summaries below reflect the key issues emerging from these provincial engagements.

EASTERN CAPE

Buffalo City Metro, OR Tambo District, Kumkani Mhlontlo, and Nelson Mandela Bay Metro

57. **Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality:** Buffalo City remains under significant governance pressure. The municipality is dealing with unresolved financial leadership matters, particularly the CFO impasse, which continues to undermine financial stability and consequence management. High levels of unauthorised, irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure and persistent weaknesses in water, sanitation, electricity, solid waste, and stormwater systems place the metro at risk of slipping into dysfunction.
58. The ANC Caucus is active, but the breakdown in the TROIKA relationship has compromised collective leadership and cohesive governance. Without urgent political stabilisation, the municipality faces escalating operational and reputational risks.
59. **OR Tambo District Municipality:** OR Tambo District demonstrates relative political and administrative stability, with improved audit outcomes and functional governance structures. The caucus is cohesive, and the TROIKA works in alignment with the executive. However, significant project delays persist, most notably the Mqanduli Bulk Water Project, and unresolved concerns regarding irregularities in the Ntsonyeni Dam expenditure. Technical capacity constraints continue to slow service delivery and require targeted support from COGTA and sector departments.
60. **Kumkani Mhlontlo Local Municipality:** Kumkani Mhlontlo is in acute crisis, marked by severe political divisions, administrative paralysis, and collapsing service delivery. The burning of municipal offices on 2 June 2025 has further destabilised operations. The suspension of the CFO, allegations of irregular contracts, and disputes involving senior officials have deepened distrust. The ANC Caucus is fractured, and TROIKA relations have collapsed entirely, obstructing any meaningful governance. Immediate political intervention and administrative support are required to stabilise leadership structures and restore basic services.

Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality

61. **Governance instability:** Urgent filling of senior positions, particularly in critical revenue-generating functions such as Electricity. Administrative instability tied to unresolved disputes concerning the Municipal Manager. **Financial and administrative collapse:** Extremely low grant expenditure rate (21% after 5 months), exposing the metro to serious service-delivery risks. Need for a stabilised risk-management strategy supported by Provincial COGTA.
62. **Service-delivery deterioration:** Backlogs in water and electricity infrastructure. Community dissatisfaction rising due to unreliable services.
63. **Coalition fragility:** Persistent tension with coalition partners, especially the Patriotic Alliance. Province instructed to intensify political management with partners.
64. **Resolutions of the Sub-Committee:**
- Province must formulate an actionable short-term improvement plan (3–6 months), focusing on water and electricity provision.
 - National departments (Electricity, Water and Sanitation, Human Settlements) to be immediately integrated into a coordinated support package.
 - Municipality and Province to return with a concrete, costed intervention plan addressing the governance, administrative and service-delivery failures.
 - Strengthen political management to stabilise the coalition environment.

FREE STATE

65. **Ngwathe Local Municipality:** Ngwathe has become the centre of a high-risk governance and political crisis following a court ruling recommending its dissolution for chronic service delivery failures. Although some improvements have been noted, the ruling created uncertainty and exposed divisions within the provincial leadership regarding whether the appeal should be supported. The ANC Caucus is only semi-stable, meeting irregularly and lacking a structured oversight rhythm. This weakens political leadership at a time when unified decision-making is essential.

Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality

66. **Water and sanitation crisis:** Reservoir levels remain below 60%, with recurring pipe bursts and leaks. Absence of effective monitoring systems for chronic hotspots.
67. **Weak governance and planning:** Engagements with the Department of Human Settlements not adequately reflected in municipal reporting. No clear environmental compliance plan or resource mobilisation strategy.
68. **Progress Observed:** Department of Human Settlements and Department of Water and Sanitation have begun intervention processes, but progress remains inconsistent.
69. **Resolutions of the Sub-Committee:**
- Sustain daily monitoring of reservoir levels and rapid-response mechanisms for outages.
 - Activate a coordinated capacity-building programme with COGTA and Water & Sanitation.
 - Advance political engagements to resolve systemic failures obstructing service-delivery recovery.
 - Maintain continuous progress-tracking and enforce accountability throughout political leadership.

70. **Broader Free State Findings**

The Sub-Committee engaged 21 municipalities, revealing sharp contrasts in governance and political cohesion. Municipalities fell into four categories:

71. **Stable Municipalities** Matjhabeng, Setsoto, Mantsopa, Mangaung, Thabo Mafutsanyana, Metsimaholo, Mafube, Phumelela, Tswelopele, Kopanong, Letsema, Tokologo, Xhariep. These municipalities exhibit functional caucuses, regular meetings, stable TROIKAs, and relatively improved governance and financial performance.
72. **Semi-Stable Municipalities** (Lejweleputswa, Ngwathe). Caucuses meet inconsistently and early divisions are emerging, risking deterioration if unaddressed.
73. **Dysfunctional Municipalities** (Mohokare, Fezile Dabi, Nala). These municipalities present severe governance collapse, deep caucus mistrust, irregular or collapsed council sittings, and service delivery paralysis. In Mohokare, municipal offices were burned down; in Fezile Dabi, councillors leak caucus proceedings to opposition parties; in Nala, TROIKA structures are not convening.
74. **Politically Volatile Municipalities** A number of municipalities reflect entrenched factionalism and financial distress, with caucus instability identified as a core driver of service delivery failures.

GAUTENG

Ekurhuleni Metro, West Rand and Emfuleni Local Municipality

75. **City of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality:** Ekurhuleni faces substantial governance, infrastructure and political challenges exacerbated by coalition dynamics. Major service delivery concerns include a housing backlog of 283 235 units, wastewater treatment plants operating above capacity, 113 000 unmetered stands, aging electricity infrastructure, widespread vandalism and underfunded upgrades. ANC Caucus performance is uneven, with poor attendance in key meetings, weak study group functionality, and strained relations with coalition partners. Council sittings are confrontational, and key issues raised in ward structures are not receiving adequate executive follow-up.
76. **City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality:** Coalition government has improved stability, but requires strengthened internal coherence. Critical focus on the financial recovery plan and stabilising the billing system. Municipality provided a comprehensive service-delivery report with clear backlogs and risks.
77. **Resolutions:**
 - Region must intensify engagement with branches to reinforce the coalition mandate.
 - Municipality to submit a detailed action plan to the LGI addressing issues raised during the engagement.
 - A strategic communication masterplan is required to ensure ANC visibility and strengthen public confidence.
78. **West Rand District Municipality:** Severe underfunding, with the municipality requesting approx. R20 billion. Serious health and water treatment failures requiring

urgent intervention. Need for detailed reporting on water-treatment works and infrastructure gaps.

Resolutions:

- Sub-Committee will conduct an oversight visit.
- Department of Water and Sanitation to continue direct support.
- Department of Electricity to help restructure electricity operations, reduce Eskom-dependence, and clear backlogs.
- Next regional report must include stakeholder mapping, administrative escalation to province/national, and full project implementation tracking.

Emfuleni Local Municipality

79. Emfuleni continues to struggle with long-standing failures in water and sanitation, financial mismanagement and collapsing infrastructure. Although turnaround plans exist, implementation remains slow, and public confidence continues to decline.

NORTH WEST

80. The LGI Sub-Committee prioritised the North West Province due to widespread political instability, collapsing governance systems, and acute service delivery failures. The province comprises 22 municipalities, the majority of which are in deep administrative and fiscal distress. Following repeated red flags from the Auditor-General, the South African Human Rights Commission, and ANC provincial structures, the Sub-Committee convened an in-person sitting in Potchefstroom on 8 August 2025, where Chief Whips and deployees presented on the state of municipalities and detailed the depth of dysfunction.

81. **State of Governance:** The assessment confirmed a structural governance crisis across the province:

82. **Fiscal and audit failures:** 16 municipalities adopted unfunded budgets in 2023/24, totalling R26.72 billion unfunded, with R3.56 billion unauthorised and R0.48 billion fruitless and wasteful expenditure. Multiple municipalities exhibit going-concern risks, with liquidity crises and rising creditor arrears.

83. **Breakdown of political and administrative relations:** In most municipalities, relations between the Mayor, Municipal Manager and CFO have collapsed, paralysing decision-making. Councils frequently fail to sit regularly, and oversight structures are degraded.

84. **Human rights violations:** The Human Rights Commission found Ngaka Modiri Molema District and Tswaing Local Municipality in breach of water and sanitation obligations, issuing formal directives for compliance and remedial action.

85. Municipalities in deep distress

- Ditsobotla: Salary non-payment, halted services, slow progress under mandatory intervention.
- Rustenburg: Severe service-delivery backlogs and political-management failures requiring reprimands of the Mayor and Chief Whip.
- City of Matlosana: Under mandatory intervention; deteriorating audit outcome; owes Eskom ~R2.6bn and Midvaal ~R2.1bn.
- Madibeng: Section 139(5)(a) intervention; conditional grants diverted to operations; collapsed council sittings.
- Lekwa-Teemane: Successive disclaimer audits; severe Eskom debt; unfunded budget.

- Bojanala DM: Corrupt exploitation of a mistaken R134m deposit; CFO dismissed and arrested.

86. **State of the Caucuses:** Political cohesion is the decisive fault line in the provincial crisis. Most ANC caucuses are unstable, factional and defiant of organisational authority:

- Ditsobotla: Parallel claims to leadership roles; nine councillors referred to the PDC (judgment delivered 16 July 2025).
- Matlosana: Persistent leaks, factional blocs and poor discipline.
- Madibeng: Factional caucus regularly collapsing sittings; disciplinary steps implemented.
- Ramotshere Moiloa: Councillors convening parallel meetings; repeated defiance of directives.
- Maquassi Hills: Entrenched G4/G7 groupings paralysing governance; by-elections lost due to internal conflict.
- JB Marks: Coalition instability; repeated withdrawal of coalition partners.
- Naledi: Tensions triggered by municipal manager appointment.
- Moretele: One of the more stable councils; caucus disciplined.
- Tswaing & Ratlou: Reporting stability and functional caucuses.
- Dr Kenneth Kaunda DM: Cohesive caucus with regular decision-making.

87. **State of Service Delivery**

- Service delivery conditions across the province are dire, with multiple municipalities facing system-wide collapse:
- Human Rights Commission findings include raw sewage in streets and homes (Agisanang, Delareyville, Letsopa) and prolonged potable-water outages.
- Ditsobotla: Collapse of water, sanitation and operational systems; district had to intervene directly.
- Rustenburg: Frequent protests due to unreliable electricity and infrastructure failures.
- Matlosana: Chronic spillages, failing roads, high electricity/water losses; requires urgent reservoir, sewer network and substation upgrades.
- Madibeng: Persistent bulk-water failures, irregular electricity supply, potholes, stalled projects.
- Ramotshere Moiloa: Recurrent protests due to unreliable bulk-water and electricity supply.
- Tswaing: Although MIG projects progressed, severe water shortages remain.
- Lekwa-Teemane: Strong MIG and disaster-grant performance but undermined by unfunded budget and disclaimer audit.

Municipal-Level Findings

88. **Madibeng Local Municipality** Deep caucus divisions; councillors collapse sittings. Allegations against Mayor: nepotism, corruption, administrative interference, vehicle misuse. Repeated interventions since 2023 with no improvement. PEC resolved to place Mayor on special leave; defiant councillors issued with letters.

89. **Rustenburg Local Municipality** Four consecutive qualified audits; **unresolved** material irregularities. Severe water, electricity and infrastructure failures; loss of MIG funds. Breakdown between Mayor and MM; fragile Troika.

90. **Greater Taung Local Municipality** Qualified audits; rising UIF/Wasteful Expenditure.

Mayor's conduct (three crashed municipal vehicles) undermines organisational standing. Caucus stabilised compared to prior years.

91. **Kagisano-Molopo Local Municipality** No substantive Mayor for over one year; critical vacancies; audit regression to adverse. MIG under-utilisation; high service backlogs.
92. **Lekwa-Teemane Local Municipality** Disclaimer audits; unfunded budget; weak oversight; unstable coalition. Serious allegations of corruption involving Mayor; Hawks seizure of luxury vehicle.
93. **Maquassi Hills Local Municipality** Political infighting; revenue collection around 16 percent; 60 percent senior management vacancies. Adverse audit opinion; persistent material irregularities.
94. **PEC Observations and Recommendations** The PEC emphasised the following:
 - Leadership instability and factional caucuses are the root cause of most governance failures.
 - Six municipalities i.e. Madibeng, Rustenburg, Greater Taung, Kagisano-Molopo, Lekwa-Teemane and Maquassi Hills require urgent provincial and national intervention.
 - Strengthen governance oversight through MPACs and Section 79 Committees.
 - Align organisational interventions with DCOG support programmes.
 - Enforce consequence management, finalise investigations, recover losses and refer cases to law enforcement where required.
 - Stabilise finances: mandatory financial recovery plans, improved billing, ring-fenced revenue, Eskom/water-board repayment plans.
 - Establish a Provincial War Room for rapid response on water, sanitation, electricity and waste.
95. **Provincial Conclusion** Municipalities in the provinces are facing serious challenges that **require** continuous monitoring and intervention by the LGI.

MPUMALANGA

96. The LGI held structured engagements with the PEC and municipal **leadership** of Emalahleni, Steve Tshwete, Mbombela and Lekwa, focusing on governance stability, service-delivery capacity, infrastructure readiness and financial sustainability.
97. **Emalahleni Local Municipality**
 - Rapid population growth overwhelming water, electricity and road infrastructure.
 - Severe financial strain, including R11 billion Eskom debt, and revenue collection below 50 percent.
 - Water deficit of 28 ML/day; non-revenue water above 60 percent; ageing infrastructure.
 - Electricity instability driven by vandalism, theft and outdated networks.
 - ANC caucus functional but discipline concerns noted.
 - Subcommittee resolved that Emalahleni requires intensive technical and political intervention.
98. **Steve Tshwete Local Municipality**
 - Declining liquidity, high liabilities and growing reliance on grants.
 - Audit regression from unqualified to qualified (all findings addressed).

- Water losses at 24–25 percent; electricity losses at 14 percent.
- Ageing asbestos network and inadequate bulk water capacity.
- Overall governance stable with functional committees.

99. **Mbombela Local Municipality**

- Four consecutive unqualified audits reflect good governance.
- Material financial constraints, electricity losses of 26.24 percent, and large debt impairments.
- Rural billing challenges: 70 percent of rural households outside the billing system.
- Water-security crisis due to absence of own dam and a 55 000 household backlog for piped water.
- Major asbestos-pipe replacement programme (estimated R2.5 billion).
- Functional council and oversight structures.

100. **Lekwa Local Municipality**

Submitted insufficient information; instructed to return with a complete, compliant report.

Provincial Observation

101. Mpumalanga exhibits pockets of good governance (Mbombela, Steve Tshwete) contrasted with severe infrastructure and financial crises in Emalahleni and systemic weaknesses in Lekwa. The province requires integrated technical support and strengthened political cohesion.

LIMPOPO

102. The LGI has met some municipalities and is still busy meeting various municipalities in the province. However the issues noted thus far are as follows:

103. **Provincial-wide Issues Identified**

- Water security and quality challenges across multiple municipalities.
- Deteriorating electricity infrastructure and rising outages.
- Escalating water-board and Eskom debt constraining operations.
- Roads and stormwater systems ageing and poorly maintained, worsening flood risks.
- Housing pressures, especially in fast-growing nodes, continue to outpace municipal capacity.
- The Subcommittee noted that Limpopo municipalities require stronger financial discipline, improved technical capacity and enhanced political oversight, aligned with the Local Government Action Plan.

CONSOLIDATED NATIONAL OBSERVATIONS ACROSS EASTERN CAPE, FREE STATE, GAUTENG, NORTH WEST, MPUMALANGA AND LIMPOPO

104. Across these six provinces, several cross-cutting themes emerged with consistency:

105. **Governance and leadership failures**

- Weak consequence management, non-functional committees, persistent material irregularities and chronic audit failures.
- TROIKA instability and role confusion frequently paralyse decision-making.

106. **Caucus dysfunction and political instability**

- Factionalism, absenteeism, leaks and parallel caucus structures undermine governance authority.

- Coalition-related instability (particularly in Gauteng) disrupts service-delivery momentum.
107. **Infrastructure collapse**
 - Water losses, sanitation failures, collapsing wastewater systems, ageing electricity networks, deteriorating roads and inadequate stormwater systems.
 - Infrastructure decay is most severe in Emalahleni, Madibeng, Nala, Mogale City and several North West municipalities.
 108. **Financial distress**
 - Unfunded budgets, escalating arrears to Eskom and water boards, declining revenue collection and liquidity crises.
 - High UIFW expenditure and poor contract management remain widespread.
 109. **Administrative weakness**
 - Vacancies in senior management, over-reliance on acting officials, and weak technical expertise.
 - Inability to spend conditional grants effectively, particularly on MIG-funded projects.
 110. **Community dissatisfaction**
 - Rising protests, infrastructure vandalism and deepening mistrust of local government.
 - Service-delivery backlogs are driving political volatility.
 111. **Need for Integrated, Cross-Sphere Intervention**
 - Provinces require aligned political, financial and administrative support.
 - The Subcommittee emphasises the need for dedicated War Room capacity, strengthened ANC caucus management, and improved coordination with national sector departments.

RECOMMENDATION ON NATIONAL WAR ROOM

112. The work of the Local Government Interventions Sub-Committee during this period demonstrates a sustained and structured effort to strengthen oversight, improve coordination across provinces, and support municipalities in addressing governance, service delivery and financial challenges. Through its engagements with provinces, the Sub-Committee has ensured that factual assessments guide political decisions, and that interventions are grounded in verified evidence rather than perception.
113. The Sub-Committee proposes the institutionalisation of the National War Room as a strategic instrument of the ANC, designed to centralise authority, integrate political and technical interventions, and drive the Programme of Action with urgency and discipline. Its intention is to bring together ANC deployables in government, state entities, and social partners under one command centre to stabilise municipalities, restore community trust, and demonstrate in practice the ANC's commitment to a capable developmental state.
114. The Local Government Sub-Committee developed a concept for the War Room which should be adopted in government for the wider roll out, with an implementation plan for the War Room. The committee also met with the Policy Monitoring and Evaluation Sub-Committee to align the work of monitoring implementation.
115. The War Room concept is presented as a strategic mechanism to coordinate and accelerate interventions in municipalities facing severe governance and service delivery challenges. Its primary purpose is to create a centralized platform for monitoring, decision-making, and rapid response, ensuring alignment between political oversight and government-led technical interventions.
116. The concept note emphasizes integration of ANC structures and government

mechanisms to ensure coherence. At the national level, the War Room will be led by the ANC's Local Government Intervention (LGI) team in coordination with the Resourcing and Monitoring Office (RMO) from government. Provincial and district-level war rooms will include ANC deployees, rapid response teams, and technical experts to track progress and escalate issues.

Key operational features include:

- Alignment with Government War Rooms: While government war rooms focus on administrative and technical interventions, the ANC war room will provide political oversight and accountability. Members stressed the need for clear boundaries to avoid compromising public servants in a multi-party Government of National Unity (GNU) context.
- Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs): These will define reporting lines, escalation protocols, and coordination mechanisms between ANC and government structures.
- Performance Monitoring and Evaluation: Weekly and bi-weekly progress reports will be required, with evaluation frameworks to measure impact against service delivery targets and audit outcomes.
- Deployment of Sub-Committee Members: Each pillar will have designated leads from the LGI sub-committee to ensure accountability and drive implementation.
- Risk Management: Members raised concerns about potential leaks and political exploitation, recommending careful drafting of documents to protect both the organization and public servants.
- Coalition Context: Guidance will be provided for municipalities where the ANC governs in coalition, outlining roles and responsibilities when the war room is led by another party.
- The War Room will also serve as a data-driven oversight tool, capturing real-time information on service delivery, financial performance, and governance indicators. This will enable proactive interventions rather than reactive measures, reducing delays that often undermine credibility.
- The Sub-Committee members agreed that the concept note should be adopted as a working document, with refinements to include SOPs, coalition guidelines, and clarity on resource allocation.

Arts, Culture and Sports

Overview

1. The creative sector continues to experience a complex and evolving balance of forces. Engagements throughout the period have demonstrated growing alignment among artists, unions, rights organisations, and industry bodies regarding the need for strengthened legislative protection, especially around creator rights, royalties, and the rising threat of digital piracy and artificial intelligence (AI).
2. While some stakeholders support broader access provisions such as fair use - especially for education, accessibility, and developmental reasons - others remain concerned about the potential negative impact on creators' livelihoods. The Subcommittee has served as a stabilising and mediating force, working to navigate these tensions while ensuring that policy direction is rooted in constitutional principles, economic justice, and sustainability of the creative and cultural sectors.
3. **Creative Industry and Legislative Advocacy:** The Subcommittee has focused its energy primarily on the legislative implications of the Copyright Amendment Bill and the Performers' Protection Amendment Bill, which have generated concern within the creative industry. Concerns were raised that some clauses in the Bills are an issue, particularly in relation to fair use and fair dealing.
4. **South African Cultural Observatory (SACO) Report:** The cultural, creative industries and sports industries (CCI&S) are vibrant and dynamic phenomena in South Africa's economy. They include an extensive array of goods and activities in traditions, literature, music, visual arts, knowledge-based activities, film, and sports. The activities are a product of human intellect and artistic capabilities.
5. These industries, driven by human intellect and artistic prowess, thrive on experimentation and problem-solving, often leading to innovative approaches. They significantly shape the country's economic landscape by contributing to its identity, providing entertainment, and fostering leisure.
6. Their importance extends beyond South Africa, championing innovation, employment, and economic development throughout the continent. For example, Africa has a share of 1.5% in the global share of the creative economy and is responsible for about 5% of the global creative employment (UNCTAD (2022)).
7. The CCI&S are well-known for generating multiplier effects on other related industries, hence governments around the world have identified the industries as one of the new drivers of local and economic growth. Over time, periodic assessment of the industries has become necessary for responsive interventions that unlock the ever-expanding trade and employment potential of the industries.
8. The South African Cultural Observatory (SACO) on the macroeconomic impact of the CCI&S report delves into quantifying the macroeconomic impact of the

CCI&S industries on the South African economy using the latest available dataset from 2021. The calculation of economic impact employs a Macro-Economic Impact contributed 21% and 20.6% respectively. (see committee report for details)

9. **Copyright Coalition of South Africa (CCSA) Report:** The Copyright Coalition of South Africa (CCSA) concerns were raised to the ANC NEC Arts Culture and Sports Committee in June 2025. The Copyright Coalition of South Africa is a broadly representative group mainly comprised of local trade and industry associations representing hundreds of local companies that drive investment into SA's creative and education sectors, creating jobs and opportunities for tens of thousands of SA's creatives in the publishing, music, film, animation, and other industries.
10. **Digital Content Piracy** is on the rise, with recent data from The Media Online revealing that visits to piracy platforms hit an astounding 215 billion—an 18% increase from the previous year. Illegal streaming accounts for over 80% of these visits, making it the primary means of consuming pirated content.
11. Creative sectors like Nollywood and Afrobeats are being affected. In Nigeria, for instance, it's reported that 50% to 70% of film revenue is lost to piracy. A study highlighted by The Media Online indicates that 21% of cinema operators across West Africa lose three-quarters or more of their earnings due to pirated content. This discourages investment in original productions and stifles job creation. Irdeto, a leading digital security firm, has found that the top 10 piracy websites in five African nations garnered 17.4 million visits within three months.

2. State of the Motive Forces in the Arts, Culture and Sports sectors

12. Many creatives feel sidelined due to inadequate protection, limited state support, and slow policy implementation. However, ongoing engagements with artists, unions, industry bodies, and civil society have revived a sense of trust and unity. Stakeholders increasingly recognise the ANC's role in shaping a fair creative economy, especially through legislative intervention and efforts to protect intellectual property.
13. The Subcommittee's outreach has strengthened relationships with: SACO, CCSA, CCIFSA, RISA, CAPASSO, SAMIC, SADTU, COSATU, SAGA, BlindSA, LIASA, SANCB, IDAA, as well as communication with MECs, partaking in National dialogues, and with partner departments.

IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS

14. The ANC NEC Arts, Culture and Sports Subcommittee is tasked with providing strategic political leadership and oversight over the development, transformation, and preservation of South Africa's arts, culture, heritage, and sports sectors. Its purpose includes:
15. **Arts, culture and sport as tools of mobilisation and nation building**, in line with the 55th National Conference resolutions, which emphasise strengthening social cohesion, nation-building, non-racialism, non-sexism, and unity in diversity.
16. **Protecting and promoting the rights and dignity of artists, athletes and cultural workers**, consistent with the Conference's call to address the

exploitation of artists by private companies and to ensure fair compensation, improved working conditions, ownership of intellectual property, and equitable representation in the sector.

17. **Championing the preservation and decolonisation of South African heritage**, in accordance with resolutions on the repatriation of human remains and artefacts, the restoration and protection of historical and liberation heritage sites, and the integration of indigenous knowledge systems into cultural, educational, and economic activities.
18. **Promoting inclusive cultural expression and access to sport and the arts**, aligned with Conference priorities for youth development, gender equality, disability inclusion, and the empowerment of historically disadvantaged communities.

Status of Implementation of ANC Manifesto 2021 and 2024

19. For South African artists, dying in poverty despite producing impactful work that transcends generations and is consumed widely has been a heart-breaking reality since the industry's inception. One of the core goals of South Africa's Copyright Amendment Bill is to provide a right to fair remuneration for all authors and performers while aligning copyrights with the digital era and developments at a multilateral level.
20. In doing so, the Bill would propel South Africa into the 4IR and enable all South Africans access to their fundamental rights to education, cultural participation, freedom of expression and access to knowledge.
21. Amongst other issues that need urgent attention are the following:
 - a) Amend Labour Relations Act to include workers status for creatives and cultural workers, so that these may have the same Social Security benefits as other Workers, including an employment environment which provides for Workers' Rights such as Basic Conditions of Employment-, Rights to Collective Bargaining, Unemployment Insurance Cover, CCMA arbitration, Pension, Disability Cover and Workmen's Compensation, etc.
 - b) Regulate the Entertainment Sector to provide more protection for Workers with regards to recognised qualification Grading, matched with equivalent Employment level Certification sanctioned by CATHSETA. This should not only take into consideration Academic Qualifications but also years' Industry Experience and demonstrable skills presented to a recognized Grading Authority.
 - c) Transformation and recognition of the Economic contribution and Viability of the SA Collective Cultural & Creative Brand, to include collaborations between State Departments – Basic Education / Trade, Industry and Competition / International Relations/ Finance (and others as appropriate) to embark on the large scale development of this Sector's potential as Economic Contributor to GDP, by way of:
 - State investment in the establishment of Provincial Cultural, Creative and Entertainment Academies where entrance is NOT based on Family affluence, but purely on the early-age assessment of natural aptitudes and born talent for Arts, Culture and Creativity
 - State investment in International Cultural & Creative Entertainment
 - Missions on every available shore, where SA Cultural & Creative Sector could earn foreign revenue by satisfying the already

existing wave of “appetite” for Afrocentrism in Modern Entertainment- Media-Music, Crafts, Fashion, Theatre, Dance and all other Creative expression

- Regulate Broadcasting and Advertising to allow for a 5-years conversion Plan toward an 85% Local Content quota on Public-Private- and Commercial Licensed Broadcasts.

- d) Formalise Legislation that Regulates enforceable Protection and collection of Royalties for Composition, Authorship and Performance of Copyrighted Works in Public Spaces, Venues and Media, to enable sanctioned Collection Societies to be more effective in looking after the Composers, Authors, Actors and Dancers, so that these will no longer die paupers!

RECOMMENDATIONS TO NGC

22. The ANC’s vision for the South African arts and culture is guided by the Freedom Charter that the *“Doors of Learning and Culture Shall Be Opened where the government shall discover, develop and encourage national talent for the enhancement of our cultural life”*. Within the broader liberation movement context, the ANC viewed arts and culture as a tool for the mobilization of society.
23. President Oliver Reginald Tambo succinctly stated this understanding when he proclaimed that *“let the arts be one of the many means by which...we inspire the millions of our people to fight for the South Africa we envisage”*.
24. In the **Ready to Govern** on the Arts and Culture, the ANC envisioned *“a flourishing cultural life that is vital to the well-being of South Africa. On the eve of the democratic breakthrough the ANC envisioned a government that will strive to facilitate and celebrate cultural production that captures the diversity, complexity and vibrancy of all South Africans in which the ANC recognizes that through arts and culture a sense of national identity and pride can be cultivated.*

Conclusion

25. Let the NGC consider the example of Zandi, a young woman creative born 30 years ago in post-apartheid South Africa. Zandi grew up in a township where access to quality education and artistic opportunities were limited. Despite her talent and passion for the arts, she faced numerous obstacles along her journey. Zandi struggled to access resources such as art supplies, studio space, and training programs due to financial constraints and lack of support. Without adequate funding, she found it challenging to pursue her creative aspirations and showcase her work to a wider audience.
26. Zandi also had to confront social and cultural stereotypes that undermined her creative ambitions and devalued her contributions to the arts. She faced pressure to conform to traditional gender roles and expectations, which hindered her ability to express herself authentically through her art.
27. Throughout her journey, Zandi lacked access to mentorship and support networks that could provide guidance, encouragement, and professional development opportunities. Without mentors or role models to inspire and guide her, she often felt isolated and unsure of her path forward in the cultural sector.

28. Despite these challenges, organisations like SACO play a crucial role in empowering young creative's like Zandi by:
- Conducting research to inform evidence-based policies and interventions by government
 - Providing training, mentorship, and networking opportunities
 - Advocating for greater investment in the cultural sector and addressing systemic inequalities
29. Despite the progress made since democracy, young creatives in South Africa like Zandi still face numerous challenges. We recommend that to support creative youth going forward into the next 30 years, it's essential for governments to implement policy interventions that address the unique challenges faced by young creatives and create an enabling environment for their growth and success.

EDUCATION, HEALTH, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Introduction:

1. The ANC Subcommittee on Education, Health, Science and Technology comprises of three (3) sectors, namely education, health, and science, technology and innovation. The education sector comprises of two sub-sectors, namely basic education and higher education and training, the latter also referred to as the post-school education and training sector.
2. Whereas the STI sector is cross cutting throughout society, industries and government, education and health are integral to the social sector. The latter two were up to 2007 components of the ANC Social transformation committee: hence, the need for regular meetings between the two NEC Subcommittees.

Shifts in the balance of forces since 55th ANC National Conference

3. The assessment of possible changes in the balance of forces since 55th ANC National Conference in the areas of work of the NEC Committee is that there has been no change. This assessment of “*No change*” is based on conclusions made from the continued popular support given to government policies, country laws and programmes based on ANC resolutions and directives, for example core policies on education and health and the BELA Act and the NHI Act; and also on continued voter support as demonstrated by ANC victories in local government by-elections that have taken place from May 2004 to date.
4. To understand the balance of forces in these sectors of the ANC NEC Subcommittee on EHST, one must understand the sectors’ critical stakeholders. In the public sectors, these include the following:
 - a) *The Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) sector* in South Africa is the organised set of public and private institutions, policies, resources and interactions that produce, translate and apply knowledge, research and technological capability to advance economic development, social inclusion and environmental sustainability. The sector operates as a National System of Innovation (NSI) that brings together government departments and agencies, higher education and research institutions, business and industry, civil society and intermediaries to generate research and development (R&D), build human capital, protect and commercialise new knowledge, and support diffusion and uptake of technologies for public and private value.
 - b) *The public science and technology sector* core components include national government departments and policy bodies, science councils and public research institutes, universities, public funding and grant agencies, regulatory and standards bodies, provincial and municipal research or innovation units, and public–private partnership platforms and intermediaries such as technology transfer offices, incubators in public institutions, and mission-driven PPPs that bridge researchers and firms
 - c) *The private science and technology sector* core components include stakeholders in business and industry, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and startups, private research organisations, contract research and development (R&D) organisations, venture capital, angel investors and finance intermediaries,

industry associations and standards consortia, non-governmental organisations and foundations, university-linked incubators, private accelerators and innovation hubs technology transfer, incubators and accelerators (third-sector), and patent agents and commercialisation advisors in the intellectual property field and related legal services.

- d) *The public education sector* core components include public community providers of Early Childhood Development (ECD), primary and secondary schools, special schools and learner support services for learners with special educational needs, government departments, providers of Adult Basic Education and Training (ABET) and community learning programmes, Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs), public colleges including Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) colleges, public universities including universities of technology, national and provincial regulatory and funding agencies including sector quality councils and inspectorates.
- e) *The private education sector* core components include independent providers amongst which are non-governmental organisations, community organisations and faith-based organisations. These also include private schools of various types, colleges, universities; vocational and skills training providers, including workplace training agencies and sectoral training providers; and private providers of education support services and suppliers of learner-teacher support material (LTSM) including assessment and educational technology companies, school management and teacher-training consultancies.
- f) *The health sector* in South Africa encompasses all institutions, actors, policies, and services involved in the promotion, protection, and restoration of health. It includes both publicly funded services aimed at universal access and privately funded services catering to those who can afford out-of-pocket payments or medical insurance. Its key characteristics include a highly inequitable dual system shaped by historical inequities, a constitutional mandate based on Section 27 of the Constitution of the Republic, and ongoing transformation efforts that aims to redress historical inequities to achieve universal health coverage.
- g) *The public health sector* in South Africa comprises of core components, which include stakeholders who are in the national and provincial sphere of government, municipal health services, public sector medical schemes and administrators, and those who are in public health programmes and agencies which include the National Health Laboratory Service (NHLS), the South African Health Products Regulatory Authority (SAHPRA), the Medical Research Council (SAMRC), and professional bodies such as the South African Nursing Council (SANC), the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) and the South African Pharmacy Council (SAPC).
- h) *The private health sector* core components include stakeholders in private hospitals and clinics, private practitioners, private medical schemes and administrators, private pharmacies and laboratories, and health technology companies, pharmaceutical companies and a large variety of private service providers such as medical waste and engineering and construction companies. Note must be taken of health stakeholders who are active in the sector, such as

the South African Chapter of the American Chamber of Commerce whose core interest is around influencing policies and benefiting from the health industry..

- i) In summary, although all these stakeholders in education, health, science and technology hold different political and ideological positions, and although these stakeholders have various social, political and economic interests, the balance of forces remain in the ANC's favour. It has not changed to favour opposition parties despite the realities of the 2024 South African Coalition Government-cum-Government of National Unity (GNU).

State of the motive forces in the area of work of the Sub-Committee:

5. Motive forces in the area of work of the Sub-Committee are classes, including social groups, which are the engine of social and economic progress that drive historical change. Without their active involvement in the sector, programmes in education, health, science, and technology would lack legitimacy, sustainability, and transformative power. They are not passive beneficiaries, but individuals and groups of active agents whose struggles, demands, and participation propel transformation in society. They are both beneficiaries of programmes of education, health, science, technology, and drivers of transformation.
6. These groups become motive forces of the revolution only when they consciously align their interests with progressive change. It is therefore important that they be empowered to contribute to progressive transformation, and not reforms or quantitative change, as their positive contributions add great impetus to the ANC's effort of achieving qualitative change, equality and development.
7. These motive forces comprise of the rural masses including traditional leaders, and remnants of rural peasants and smallholders; women, women, youth, people living with disabilities; and the working class, which includes urban industrial workers, rural semi-proletarians, peri-urban squatters and informal workers. These motive forces are critical beneficiaries and supporters of the ANC's and government programmes in education, health, science, and technology.
8. However, the participation of these motive forces is uneven, despite the existence of highly progressive resolutions of the ANC that have been translated into enabling government and country policy frameworks such as the plethora of approved White Papers aimed at transforming education, health, science and technology; the laws or legal frameworks that only need enforcement, such as the Education Act, the National Health Act, the BELA Act and the NHI Act; and solid plans such as the National Development Plan (NDP) Vision 2030, and the Science Technology and Innovation (STI) Decadal Plan that only need effective implementation. These resolutions, country policies, laws and plans all emphasise inclusion, elimination of structural inequalities, unemployment, and resource constraints which, as many are left unresolved, continue to limit the full empowerment and participation of these motive forces in discharging their responsibilities to own, defend and strengthen their hard-earned freedom and democracy. ANC activism and Active Citizenry are at their lowest ebb because of little or no contribution to programmes and implementation, monitoring and evaluation.
9. The ANC remains the leader and most preferred servant of the people in most provinces, for example 73% voter support in Limpopo and majority support in another four (4) provinces; and opposition parties (with the Zuma vote excluded)

have, individually and collectively performed dismally. The largest opposition party only gained 1% increase in voter support, and the second largest opposition party (not the newest large party in its formative state) lost a lot of support to the point where its greatest risk is possible extinction. It is critically important that this truth about voter support in most provinces and at the national level be understood in context, for the ANC to appreciate the correct diagnosis of its continued support in many provinces and the existential problem caused by its loss of the mandate to serve at national level.

10. Having the correct diagnosis is essential for the ANC to emerge with correct solutions for these priority sectors to enlist these motive forces to improve the quality of lives of our people.

IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS AND MANIFESTOS

11. This is the summary of the report. The detailed report is attached below as annexures.

Status of implementation of conference resolutions that falls under purview of the Committee: progress, challenges and opportunities:

12. The ANC and the ANC NEC Subcommittees:

Out of two hundred and sixty-seven (267) resolutions that are specific for the Subcommittee and its sectors, few of the resolution have been fully implemented, a substantial number has been partially implemented and are in progress, and most have not been implemented. The exact numbers of each category will be provided when all the sectors have submitted updates and relevant reports.

13. Government:

Science and Technology:

Education:

Basic Education:

Higher Education and Training¹:

Health:

Other stakeholders

Status of implementation of ANC Manifesto 2016, 2021 and 2024.

14. *The ANC and the ANC NEC Subcommittees:* The Subcommittee will submit a report on the status of implementation of the 2021 and 2024 ANC election manifestos as soon as it gets updated reports from various sectors.

Meetings, activities and issues being dealt with by the Subcommittee.

NHI Act

¹ Please note that no country has a ministry officially named "The Ministry of Post-school Education and Training." The phrase Post-school Education and Training (PSET) is a South African policy construct, used extensively in government planning documents, but the official department is the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET).

15. One of the key goals of the NHI is to transform the National Health System, not to reform it. The ANC had to continue dealing with obstructionist actions of those who are opposed to the NHI. Delegates to the NGC must be reminded that these actions by the detractors of the NHI has resulted in a twelve (12) year delay in the full implementation of the NHI, as the NHI was initially planned and schedule for full implementation by 2012.
16. Industry players, specifically medical aid administrators, are the greatest opponents of the NHI. The National Treasury is another consistent opponent of the NHI, despite the support of this programme by the majority in communities, in the National Cabinet and in Parliament.
17. The most important step that is facing the country is the enforcement of the law, namely the NHI Act.

Tobacco Products and Electronic Delivery System Bills:

18. The Bill was tabled to Parliament without first being processed through relevant constitutional structures of the ANC. The Subcommittee considered and advised the department on critical points that must be considered for inclusion or exclusion from the Bill. It also noted that the conditions of the GNU had to be studied and understood well, and compromises must be considered in the interest of the masses that the ANC serves.

Parliament and provincial legislatures:

19. The Subcommittee collaborated with ANC Study Groups of Parliamentary Portfolio Committees and the National Council of Provinces, especially on their lawmaking processes.
20. The Subcommittee noted that the ANC faces a problem of loss of cohesion in cases where Parliamentary Bills are submitted to Parliamentary Portfolio Committees without first being through the Subcommittee and the ANCNEC. This must be corrected for the ANC to continue earning its status of thought leader and the leader of the revolution in South Africa.
21. Other stakeholders: The ANC's Alliance partners participate fully in the work of the Subcommittee.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE 2025 NATIONAL GENERAL COUNCIL

22. That Mid-Term reports be structured to first assess the performance of the ANC as a liberation movement and political party, and thereafter on the performance of the ANC in government
23. That the Offices of ANC Ministers, ANC Deputy Ministers, ANC MECs, and ANC Mayors must have, as the job description of Heads of Office and Parliamentary, Legislature or Council Liaison Officers or equivalents, monthly audit reports on the implementation of ANC National Conference resolutions and progress reports on the

implementation of commitments of election manifestos; and that Subcommittees submit consolidated quarterly reports on the same to the ANC NEC.

24. That deployees in government, especially ANC members of the Cabinet and various Ministries, be reminded of and be directed by the NGC to always remain faithful to the practice of ensuring that policy making processes by the Executive and lawmaking processes by various legislature or Parliament starts in and are processed through ANC constitutional structures and their support structures, namely ANC NEC or PEC Subcommittees, the ANC NWC and the ANC NEC or PECs.
25. That all sectors of the ANC support and participate in the enforcement of the BELA Act and the NHI Act.:
26. *On the ANC Policy cycle:* The ANC NGC is hereby reminded that conference has resolved to increasing the ANC policy review cycle to ten (10) years, thereby strengthening and increasing its policy, monitoring and evaluation capacity, thereby transforming the policy system to work continuously and sustainably and not just before policy conferences. This must be followed up and implemented systematically by relevant departments or Subcommittees.
 - Education: That all sectors of the ANC support and participate in the implementation and enforcement of the BELA Act.
 - Health: That all sectors of the ANC support and participate in the implementation and enforcement of the NHI Act.
 - Science and Technology:

PEACE AND STABILITY REPORT

Introduction

1. The aim of this report is to give a midterm account on work done the by the African National Congress (ANC) National Executive Committee (NEC) subcommittee of Peace and Stability for the National General Council (NGC) taking place from 8 to 12 December 2025.
2. South Africa is experiencing a decisive shift in the political landscape, one that has direct implications for the balance of forces confronting the ANC. The movement's dip below the 50% electoral threshold has compelled the formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU) across all spheres of the state — a development that both constrains the ANC's transformative agenda and opens space for counter-revolutionary tendencies to reassert themselves.
3. Simultaneously, internal tensions within the ANC, combined with the rise of populist forces, right-wing mobilisations, and pseudo-left formations, including resurgent Afrikaner nationalist groupings, constitute a deliberate attempt to weaken the liberation movement and fragment the national democratic project.
4. Corruption continues to erode state capacity and weaken public confidence, especially where procurement manipulation and local-government capture undermine service delivery. Security institutions have intensified efforts to identify illicit financial flows and disrupt political profiteering, promoting ethical leadership and transparency.
5. More concerning is the emerging coalition between opportunistic political actors, elements of the private security complex, rogue taxi formations, and organised criminal networks. This convergence represents not merely a law-enforcement problem, but a strategic threat aimed at undermining state authority, destabilising communities, and eroding the ANC's historic role as the guarantor of peace, stability, and democratic order.
6. Major structural challenges persist. South Africa's porous borders enable illegal migration, smuggling networks, and informal economies that undermine state authority. The reversal of the decision to withdraw from the 1951 UN Refugee Convention has further complicated policy coherence.
7. SADC instability—terrorism in Mozambique, migration from Zimbabwe, and unrest in Eswatini and Lesotho—compounds domestic fragility
8. On the continental level, South Africa's ICJ case elevated its global standing as a defender of human rights and African dignity. However, this stance has also exposed the country to accusations of destabilising long-standing diplomatic alignments.
9. Globally, South Africa operates within an environment characterised by systemic contestation. Its non-aligned stance on the Russia–Ukraine conflict has strained relations with Western powers, triggering tariff threats and diplomatic pressure.
10. Collectively, these regional, continental, and global shifts represent a profound change in the balance of forces confronting the ANC. The environment is defined by

volatility, competing centres of power, heightened ideological contestation, and increasing pressure on state institutions. For the ANC to remain the principal driver of transformation, it must reinforce the capacity of the democratic state, rebuild public trust, strengthen regional integration under its leadership, and assert a coherent, disciplined foreign policy. South Africa must leverage its mineral wealth, technological sovereignty, and diplomatic standing to shape a progressive multipolar order — ensuring that it remains not a pawn, but a pivotal actor in the future of the global South.

Status of Implementation of Conference resolutions

Police Services

11. In addressing resolutions relating police matters the following progress has been reported. The South African Police Service (SAPS) is implementing the Integrated Crime and Violence Prevention Strategy (ICVPS) which was approved by Cabinet in 2022. It focuses on the prevention of crime and violence in communities, and advocates for a 'whole of government' and 'whole of society' approach by acknowledging that safety is the responsibility of all, and not only that of the police. The Civilian Secretariat for Police Service (CSPS) leads coordination across all spheres of government, providing technical guidance and support. The District Development Model (DDM) is a key mechanism for the effective implementation and coordination of the ICVPS across three spheres of government.
12. Progress Highlights on CVPS: Provincial Secretariats are implementing safety interventions with support from CSPS. A National Working Committee, led by CSPS, oversees implementation and quarterly reporting. Cooperation Agreements have been signed with six metropolitan municipalities (Cape Town, Nelson Mandela Bay, eThekweni, Johannesburg, Tshwane, and Ekurhuleni).
13. Progress in empowering CPFs and Strengthening Police–Community Relations. A Community Policing Policy has been adopted to build trust, partnerships, and local problem-solving between communities and police. Training and capacity-building initiatives for Community Policing Forums (CPFes) are ongoing. The CSPS is facilitating the establishment and functionality assessment of Community Safety Forums (CSFs) across provinces. The SAPS budget now includes dedicated funding for CPFes, with guidelines for proper utilisation and monitoring. These collaborations have enhanced trust and accountability, fostering a sense of shared responsibility for safety. The SAPS Amendment Bill further enables provinces to define mechanisms for CPF resourcing.
14. Progress towards a Single, Integrated Police Service: The CSPS has developed a Policy Framework on an Integrated Model of Policing to advance the goal of a single police service, integrating SAPS, municipal police, and traffic policing. The framework promotes uniformity, efficiency, and collaboration across law enforcement agencies. An action plan is being implemented through joint operations involving multiple departments and metro police structures.

Home affairs

15. Progress on review South Africa's accession to the 1951 UN Convention and 1967 Protocol on Refugees. The Minister of Home Affairs received legal advice concluding that withdrawing from the Convention and Protocol with the intention to re-enter with reservations would be futile. Constitutional guarantees—especially access to healthcare and education—apply to all persons, including foreign nationals, limiting potential benefits of withdrawal. The Department will not pursue the process.
16. Progress in Overhaul Citizenship, Refugees, and Immigration Acts. These matters are addressed in the White Paper on Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection. Public consultations have concluded, and stakeholder engagement continues. Updates are expected by the end of the financial year. Immigration Courts remain under the mandate of the Department of Justice.
17. An Immigration Advisory Board (IAB) was established on 1 April 2025 under Section 4 of the Immigration Act. It includes government entities, organised labour, business, and independent experts.
18. Progress in the establishment of the Border Management Authority (BMA): The BMA was launched on October 2023 in Musina , Limpopo province .It aims to improve efficiency , enhance national security and combat organised crime and illegal immigration.
19. To date the BMA has advanced its operational capabilities through the deployment of high-tech drones with long-range zoom, AI-driven tracking, and heat detection functions. Piloted during the 2024/25 festive season, the drones significantly improved prevention of illegal border crossings. A broader rollout began in April 2025, with further expansion planned. Additionally, the Border Management and Immigration Anti-Corruption Forum was launched in March 2025, comprising the SIU, BMA, NPA, DPCI, and Home Affairs to strengthen anti-corruption efforts.

Correctional Services

20. Progress on Addressing Overcrowding: DCS implements the Overcrowding Reduction Strategy with JCPS Cluster partners; however rising inmate numbers demonstrate the need for a stronger Interdepartmental Strategy. In 2024, an Overcrowding Task Team was established by JCPS DGs. Key Drivers of Overcrowding: High Remand Detainee (RD) population. Inability to redistribute RDs until sentencing. Declining approved bedspace (118 572 in 2019/20 to 107 067 in 2024/25) Mental health system shortages resulting in 382 state patients housed in correctional centres. Large population of foreign nationals.

21. As at 30 September 2025 the break down in our correctional centres was as follows
- Sentenced offenders: 107 310
 - Remand detainees: 60 381
 - Approved bedspace: 107 067
 - Overcrowding level: 57%
 - Sentenced foreign nationals: 14 609 (costing R6.7 million/day)
22. South Africa lacks domestic legislation to enable transfer of sentenced foreign offenders or SA citizens imprisoned abroad. A Draft Policy Position was prepared but requires further input from the South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC). International treaties permit bilateral transfer agreements, but implementation remains stalled.
23. Progress in Capacitating the Department: Budget allocations increased by R1.806 billion (2024) and R745.645 million (2025), but deep cuts across multiple MTEFs continue to undermine the Department's mandate. Overspending in 2023/24 was R614.257 million, with payables of R820.165 million by March 2024, highlighting financial strain.
24. Progress in Self-Sufficiency: Since 2021, the Strategic Framework on Self-Sufficiency and Sustainability (SFSSS) has strengthened internal production: • 27 822 uniforms produced (highest output to date). • 11 fully functional bakeries; 95.52% bakery self-sufficiency (saving R27.19 million). Furniture sales: R486 280.95 Arts and crafts revenue: R58 650; new KZN gallery opened.
25. Key Challenges in DCS: Persistent overcrowding driven by remand detainees. Absence of legislative framework for transfer of foreign offenders. Rising operational pressures amid shrinking budgets. Health system gaps requiring DCS to house psychiatric patients • Increased number of undocumented foreign nationals. Weak cluster-level coordination.
26. Proposed solutions: Strengthen the JCPS Interdepartmental Strategy to address overcrowding through improved cooperation among SAPS, NPA, Judiciary, DOH, DHA, and DCS. • Fast-track legislation enabling interstate prisoner transfers. • Expand alternative sentencing mechanisms. • Strengthen remand and bail management legislation. • Build new correctional facilities and refurbish ageing centres. • Expand mental health facilities to reduce DCS pressure. • Improve SAPS–NPA–Judiciary coordination to reduce case backlogs. • Promote non-custodial sentences and supervised bail. Enhance DCS–DHA cooperation to expedite verification and deportation processes. Ensure stable operational funding for humane detention, rehabilitation, and security. Expansion of Self-Sufficiency Projects Scale up agricultural, bakery, uniform, and craft production to reduce procurement costs and generate internal revenue.

Justice and constitutional development

27. Progress fighting corruption across the country: The IDAC (investigating Directorate Against Corruption) was established as a permanent entity within the NPA with investigative and prosecutorial powers.
28. The establishment of the National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council (NACAC) was appointed by the President to advise on strengthening the anti-corruption architecture of SA, among others. The NACAC has submitted its final report to the President, and the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development will advise the Executive.
29. The NPA enjoys independence in prosecutorial decision making and prosecutors must make decisions without fear, favour or prejudice. This is a critical safeguard in our constitutional democracy.
30. Progress in the state's efforts to enhance mutual and legal assistance capacity to pursue those who have fled and recover the money stolen including addressing illicit financial flows.
31. The Assets Forfeiture Unit and SIU has made significant recoveries and cancelled several unlawful contracts, with recoveries and recoveries amounting to billions of rands. The Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU) of the NPA successfully recovered over R3.9 billion in ill-gotten gains through the implementation of the Corporate Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanism, thus ensuring that persons and entities do not benefit from unlawful activities and corruption.
32. Since 2020, the special Investigation Unit (SIU) has successfully recovered more than R10.6 billion, significantly aided by its efforts in handling COVID-19-related corruption cases. SA is also a member of the STAR (Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative) of the World Bank which focuses on the recovery of money earned through corruption.
33. Progress in the finalisation of the relevant regulations to expedite the implementation of the Cyber Crimes Act. All regulations are in place except for the finalisation of regulations relating to search warrants, which require specific expertise in drafting and consultation with SAPS. The draft regulations have been finalised and will be promoted and finalised by early 2026.
34. Progress in modernising the Criminal Justice System: The work of IJS has been ongoing. 11 Departments are now connected to the IJS Hub. A centralised IJS Transversal Hub for data integration and interoperability has been established. The IJS has supported the development and implementation of electronic case management and workflow systems tailored to departmental business processes.
35. Progress in ensuring speedy prosecution of the GBV+F cases. Thuthuzela Care Centre (TCC) model has been introduced to, among others, reduce secondary trauma and prepare victims for court by providing the most comprehensive triad of services for

victims of gender-based violence, namely, psychosocial, medical, and prosecutorial legal services under one roof. These multi-disciplinary one stop care centres streamline the process of reporting, caregiving, investigation and prosecution of cases.

36. Over the 2024-25 period NPA recorded 3697 convictions in relation to sexual offence with over 79% convicted with direct imprisonment, while 44 147 victims were supported at the 66 Thuthuzela Care Centre's (TCCs) across the country. There are ongoing efforts to strengthen TCC centres which are one stop centres for sexual offences.
37. The national footprint of sexual offences courts has increased, particularly in rural communities with additional 16 sexual offences courts to be in this financial year. The Sexual Offences Courts shall assist to deal with the alarming figures of sexual violence in the country and offer support services that are tailor-made for the survivors of sex crime.
38. The courts have been capacitated to manage applications for interdicts, particularly through the implementation of the Domestic Violence Amendment Act, 2021

Defence

39. Progress at increasing the budget of the South African National Defence Force: Government has made significant progress in strengthening the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). High-level engagements between the Minister of Defence, National Treasury, Parliament, and the National Security Council have resulted in a commitment to increase defence spending to 1.5% of GDP, as announced by the President.
40. The Department of Defence has completed the review of the 2015 Defence Review, submitting updated policy documents to the Presidency. This work positions the SANDF for long-term restructuring through the Fiscal Framework Strategy, which outlines immediate funding needs while driving the broader Defence of the Future – Journey to Greatness blueprint. This reflects government's renewed emphasis on sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the modernization of national security capabilities, aligning with ANC resolutions on a capable developmental state.
41. Progress in the deployment of the SANDF members to peace missions and protect South Africa's interests: The SANDF continues to operate in line with South Africa's national interests—both in peacekeeping and domestic support functions. This includes border security, protecting Eskom infrastructure, anti-crime operations with SAPS, and combating illegal mining through Operation Val'umgodi. Regionally, Operation Vikela in Mozambique demonstrates SA's commitment to preventing terrorism and insurgency from destabilizing SADC. These deployments reinforce South Africa's leadership role in regional peace and security and align with ANC foreign policy values of African solidarity.

42. Progress in expediting efforts to resuscitate the defence industry to bolster the country's defence and security manufacturing capabilities. The transfer of Denel to the Defence portfolio in 2025/26 has improved governance and increased international orders. The state has provided guarantees to support Denel's turnaround.
43. Collaboration with Armscor and the defence industry under the AMD is strengthening national defence manufacturing. South Africa will showcase its capabilities at the 2026 African Aerospace and Defence Exhibition.
44. Reviving Denel and the industry protects sovereign manufacturing capacity, supports skilled jobs, and strengthens industrialisation.

Military Veterans

45. Progress in Amendments to the Military Veterans Act: The Presidential Task Team (PTT), led by the Deputy President, has been addressing DMV challenges. Eight workstreams were created, including a legislative review of the Military Veterans Act of 2011. The DMV has also issued new regulations to streamline benefits such as pensions and education support. This reaffirms government's commitment to restoring dignity to military veterans.
46. Progress in Unifying Ex-Combatants of MK: The DMV has recognised the MK Liberation War Veterans (MKLWV) and facilitated a unification conference in East London officiated by the former Deputy President and the President. A faction from MKMVA has resisted the unity process and is blocking progress through SANMVA. The efforts still signify a strong push from government and the ANC toward unity, renewal, and proper inclusion of all ex-combatants.

Meetings, activities and issues being dealt with by Subcommittee

47. The sub committee has been meeting in a satisfactory manner since its inception after the 55th conference . The subcommittee has been chaired by two comrades since t 2022 . Namely comrades Polly Boshielo (2022- 2025) , Thabang Makwetla (2025 - present). Currently comrade Dakota Legoete who is the deputy chair of the sub committee is holding the reigns as the current chair comrade Makwetla is on step aside and dealing with personal matters.
48. The Peace and Stability Committee has commenced a holistic discussion of the country's current security and stability challenges. The committee has revised and refined its work processes to make it less unwieldy, more responsive, and effective in dealing with fresh challenges while comprehensively tracking the implementation of conference resolutions.
49. The committee has started discussions around the rapidly changing geopolitical environment and its implications for our national transformation agenda, in conjunction with the International Relations Subcommittee. However, recent

developments within the police have triggered an environment fraught with seeds of instability, which require the urgent attention of the NEC. These allegations are wide-ranging and have the potential for dire consequences for the ANC and the country's Criminal Justice System.

50. A report has been generated with the support of the Secretary General's office, assisted by comrades who are deployed in the security sector, for presentation to the Officials. It will then be shared with the NWC for presentation at the next NEC.
51. The processing of the recent developments within SAPS is extremely difficult and calls for utmost discipline and circumspection on the part of the ANC leadership, and yet it is a task the ANC must face squarely without equivocation.

Archives and Heritage

1. The work of the ANC Archives and Heritage Subcommittee is rooted in the vision and values of the ANC Constitution and the 55th National Conference resolutions, particularly the commitment to memorialisation, nation-building, and the preservation of liberation history.
2. Key issues over the period include:
 - **Strengthened expectations from society** regarding the memorialisation of liberation struggle heroes, repatriation of remains, and protection of historical memory.
 - **Growing concerns about digital archives**, particularly regarding ANC Archives and Heritage Department's archival control due to disputes with private service providers (e.g., Africa Media Online).
 - **Institutional reliance** on provincial and league structures remains inconsistent, affecting implementation capacity.
3. **Stakeholders here include:** Families of fallen Comrades: many still seek closure through exhumations, repatriations, and dignified reburials. Government departments (DSAC, Department of Justice & Constitutional Development, NPA MPTT), whose cooperation is essential for exhumations and heritage work.
4. Heritage institutions (Nelson Mandela Foundation, UFH, NaLHISA) collaborating on archival preservation. International partners, including Angola, Russia, and other countries implicated in exile and liberation history.

Status of implementation of Conference resolutions

5. 55th Conference called for us to communicate the policy of government on the repatriation of remains of those fallen outside the country. This has been a major project during this period under review, and the Committee report provides much details. This included travelling to where comrades remains are buried, arrangements for repatriation and burial and honoring their memories through memorial lectures.
6. Strengthen institutions responsible for heritage and archives.
7. Development and maintenance of heritage infrastructure.
8. Digitalisation of archives.
9. International and cultural diplomacy.

Legislature and Governance Report

INTRODUCTION

1. The ANC is committed to decisive action on three urgent and interrelated fronts in order to regain the confidence of the majority of the people in our ability to represent their hopes and aspirations for a better life: Firstly, to improve the ability of our economy to create wealth and employment for all. Secondly, to improve the quality of services and the integrity, responsiveness and accountability of government in all spheres. Thirdly, to renew and rebuild the ANC so that it can provide decisive and ethical leadership in the resolution of our country's problems and the realization of the vision of the Freedom Charter.
2. In adopting the Programme of Action (POA) the NEC remained mindful of the global and local endogenous and exogenous complexities which are responsible for rising inequality and poverty, the rising cost of living, economic instability and trade wars. The NEC also noted the *"devastating effects of climate change and the risks posed by technology developments such as Artificial intelligence"*². Thus, the NEC committed to utilise 2024 to focus on *"working together with the Alliance and all sectors of society, to accelerate the reconstruction of our economy, deliver quality basic services and infrastructure, renew the ANC and society, fight crime and corruption, rejuvenate our nation and contribute towards a better Africa and world"*.
3. In contributing to this goal and elaborating on its own POA, the *Legislature* and Governance Subcommittee enumerated the legislative and governance areas of the NEC's POA. Which subcommittee's POA took into account the strides and challenges recorded in relevant National and Provincial programmes and structures as well as the objectives to **uplift the quality-of-life South Africans, especially the poor and the marginalised**.
4. 2024 was the year in which there were National and Provincial elections. Consequently, the Sub-Committee members actively participated in election campaign activations and deployments. The dipping of ANC support at the polls also resulted in the loss of an absolute national majority, resulting in different forms of governance models which saw a Government of National Unity and Governments of Provincial Unity in the provinces of Gauteng and Kwa Zulu Natal, which model had been borrowed from the 1994 transition government model as well as the practice in some local governments where 'hung municipalities' had prevailed.

HIGHLIGHTS AND CHALLENGES, BALANCE OF FORCES

² Ibid

5. The 55th National Conference of the ANC has emphatically and firmly resolved that urgent and decisive action must be taken to place our country back on a positive development path that puts the interests of the people first. The Conference further acknowledged that in order to respond adequately and boldly to these objective difficulties facing the people, the ANC must deal decisively and fearlessly with our own subjective weaknesses.
6. As the movement moves into the second century of its existence, we should ensure that all South Africans, including new generations, have a deep appreciation of the role of our movement in bringing about the democratic dispensation and its ongoing role in the construction of a national democratic society. The current generations should do their best to position the ANC as a progressive force of the future, with a proud history of loyal service to the people and sufficient foresight to anticipate and the agility to adapt to new challenges in a world characterised by many changes.
7. Certainly, many challenges and contradictions will arise in the process of building a new society. Some of these challenges and contradictions will be of an objective nature, while others will be subjective. At all times, the test of the movement's strength is its capacity and capability to provide leadership to the people, serve them loyally and to be the custodian of their interests and aspirations.
8. *Decisive Action to Advancing Peoples Interest* is principally about enhancing its transformative capacity and adaptive capability so that it can continue to serve the people and continue to lead them under changing conditions. Thus, **Decisive Action to Advancing Peoples Interest** ought to be real to be a force for good, not part of the problem in our people's quest for freedom from want and inequality, improved quality of life and freed potential of every person and community in a democracy. To this end,
9. The ANC is product of a particular historical moment in the evolution of modern-day South Africa. The ANC history is intertwined with the evolution of South Africa in the twentieth century. Consequently, the history of our movement and South Africa as well aspirations are objectively inseparable.
10. The *Decisive Action to Advancing Peoples* is a way to reaffirm our commitment to serve the masses of our people loyally. The work of the Sub Committee was to embark on a campaign to renew our movement's relationship with the communities through the public representatives and engagements as a leader in government whose interest is to bring quality life to the majority of people.
11. In this regard, the principal task of ANC is to mobilise all sections and classes of society. This includes the new social forces born out of our democracy, who were to be mobilised around the national programme of transformation to build a national democratic society. To achieve this objective, the ANC must have jacked-up its capacity as a transformative movement and the strategic centre of power that is capable of giving moral, intellectual and political leadership to society in all pillars of the NDR in the current phase, these include mass mobilisation, state, economy, battle of ideas, civil society, and the international arena.

JANUARY 08, 2025, STATEMENT AND CALL FOR ACTION

12. The President Cde Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa stated that *“The ANC is committed to decisive action on three urgent and interrelated fronts in order to regain the confidence of the majority of the people in our ability to represent their hopes and aspirations for a better life: Firstly, to improve the ability of our economy to create wealth and employment for all. Secondly, to improve the quality of services and the integrity, responsiveness and accountability of government in all spheres. Thirdly, to renew and rebuild the ANC so that it can provide decisive and ethical leadership in the resolution of our country’s problems and the realization of the vision of the Freedom Chart.”*

13. The National Executive Committee resolved that the priorities announced in January 8th Statement should remain the focus of our movement in the year 2025, with an added focus on elections. This decision was motivated in lieu of the fact that 2024 was the year in which the seventh National and Provincial Elections would be held. Thus, the over-arching priority was to work for a decisive ANC election victory to obtain a clear mandate to continue the transformation of our country developmental agenda.

14. In this regard, the NEC decided, in accordance with the directives of the 55th National Conference, on the following immediate priority actions, referred as **“TASKS FOR 2024/2025”**.

PRIORITY	ACTION PROCESS PLAN
1. Winning a decisive victory in Elections	1.1. The implementation of the POA as adopted at the January Lekgotla 2024, to build a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous South Africa. 1.2. Input to the Election Manifesto 1.3. Strengthening Local Government capacity. 1.4. Fixing of the dysfunctional municipalities. 1.5. Amendment Local Government: Municipal structures Amendment Act 2024 1.6. Review of the White Paper on Local Government. 1.7. Submission to the Technical and Political Electoral Reform joint Sub Committees. Chaired by the 1 st DSG. The report on this priority was presented to the NWC, NEC and Submission to the department of Home Affairs in October 2024.
2. Intensifying the renewal of ANC	2.1. Bringing Public representative closer to the people. 2.2. To reduce the role of the communities to spectators to wait for government to ‘deliver’. 2.3. To build the organization capacity to connect with the people and bring them as agents for change. 2.4. Implementation of the Conference Resolutions on the quality of the leaders and public representatives.
3. Reconstructing our economy to create more jobs and growth	3.1. Participate in the process of policy discussion and position government capacity to lead the charge to reduce energy crisis at Local Government level. 3.2. Provided technical inputs to the Ma-Kgotlas on the process of economic stimulations.
4. Improving Basic Services Infrastructure	Technical inputs at the implementation of infrastructure projects is stimulating economic activity and providing the infrastructure necessary for the growth of the economy.
5. Combating gender-based violence and building the family.	Technical support provided to the ANC Women’s League to strengthen their L&G Committee.

PRIORITY	ACTION PROCESS PLAN
6. Resolving the energy crisis ending loadshedding.	Joint Technical meeting with LG Interventions with SALGA on the Eskom debt owed by Municipalities.
7. Strengthen the fight against corruption.	7.1. Work by government to build functional, efficient leadership. 7.2. Technical work towards an accountable, and ethical public servants. 7.3. National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council (NACAC) was established by the President. 7.4. National Anti-Corruption Strategy has been developed in the Presidency.

PROFESSIONALISATION OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR

The ANC approach to governance and transformation is based on the following:

The ANC's approach to state power is informed by the Freedom Charter and the principle that "The People Shall Govern". The Main goal of state transformation is "building a developmental state that provides effective basic services and with capabilities to take forward a far-reaching agenda of national economic development, whilst at the same time placing people and their involvement at the centre of this process". The building of a capable and developmental state at all three spheres of government must be achieved through the following measures:

- Strengthening political institutions to deliver on their mandate.
- Ensuring that the state plays an important role in driving the economy and society, particularly through directing the effective deployment of state capital.
- Building effective integrated planning and service delivery systems.
- Ensuring ANC works with communities and civil society in achieving these goals.
- Strengthening and professionalizing the Public Administration, particularly top management and the delivery sectors.
- Building the educational and skills feeder system to produce developmental skills, technical and professional personnel.

Amendments of Bills and Regulations

- The Public Service Amendment Bill and the Public Administration Management Amendment Bill were submitted to Parliament on 31 March 2023, and it is envisaged to be processed through Parliament and finalised during the by 2025.

The Public Service Amendment Bill, 2023

The Public Service Amendment Bill provides for-

- Certain administrative powers to be vested with heads of department while strategic powers must reside with executive authorities.
- The Director-General in the Presidency will be the Head of the Public Administration to provide co-ordination between the spheres of government and support the President.
- The prohibition for a head of department and employees directly reporting to the head of department from holding an office of authority in a political party.

Public Administration Management Amendment Bill

The Public Administration Management Amendment Bill provides for-

- The transfer of employees between the public service and municipalities and between municipalities with consent to ensure the mobility of employees across the spheres of government where human resource deficiencies exist or where operational requirements necessitate.
- Clarification on the prohibition of doing business with the State.
- Clarification and augmenting the powers of the NSG to be a training facility that caters for the education and training of employees which is tailored to creating a cadre of professional public servants thereby ensuring a capable public administration.
- The imposition of a 12 month 'cooling off' period for employees involved in the procurement of services of service providers.

Review of Regulations, Determinations and Directives Issued In terms of the Public Service Act.

The review will include the following-

- Review of the minimum entry requirements for the SMS;
- The Competency Assessment Tools for Managers;
- The Training and Development Determinations and Directives dealing with Graduate/ Internship programmes, orientation and induction programmes and the Revolving Door Policy;
- The Special Adviser Dispensation; Discipline Management processes; PMDS processes;
- Ensuring merit-based recruitment practices that are inclusive and transparent

Public Service Commission Amendments Bill

PSC Bill published for comment. Closing date is 16 February 2024

- Objectives of the Public Service Amendment Bill:
- Strengthening the Public Service Commission to enable it to operate as an independent and impartial constitutional body with its own secretariat. This is in line with Chapter 13 of the National Development Plan.
- Implementation of the application of the PSC mandate to Municipalities and Public Entities. This is in line with Resolution of Parliament of 15 November 2011 that, the PSC must report on the Implementation of section 195(1) of the Constitution by the administration of government, organs of state and the public enterprises in South Africa.
- The Bill does not "extend" the scope of authority of the PSC – it merely confirms its existing Constitutional authority since sections 195 and 196 confer authority on the PSC to deal with public administration matters. PSC Act of 1997 adopted a narrow approach when developed. Bill now adopts a purposive approach.
- Public administration is broad and consists of the public service and the basic values and principles, policies in each sphere of government, organ of state and public entities.

Progress made in the professionalisation of the Public Service

- The 6th Administration Cabinet approved the Framework for the professionalisation of the public sector on 19 October 2022. Following that, the Minister of Public Service and Administration gazetted the Framework in August 2023 instructing departments to ensure that they prepare implementation plans from 1 April 2024.
- Key departments, including the Department of Public Service and Administration, Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, Department of Public Enterprises and Shareholder Ministers, Public Service Commission, and National School of Government, lead the implementation of the Framework. SALGA supports its adoption in local government.
- The Framework identifies key departments that must lead its implementation: the Department of Public Service and Administration (public service), i.e., national and provincial departments; the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (local government); the Department of Public Enterprises and Shareholder Ministers (state-owned entities); the Public Service Commission (monitoring the implementation); and the National School of Government (capacity building and advocacy and support). SALGA supported the adoption of the framework for local government implementation.

The progress is being evaluated based on the Framework's Five Pillars. The lead government departments are implementing the National Framework for professionalisation of the Public Sector and have recorded and presented the following progress:

Pillar 1 Pre-entry, Recruitment, and Selection:

The Minister for the Public Service and Administration establishes norms and standards under the Public Service Act and Regulations, outlined in the Directive on Human Resources Management and Development for Public Service. The DPSA released the Directive for Professionalisation, Volume 1, approved on February 14, 2024, for implementation effective from April 1, 2024. This Directive aims to create skilled, committed, and ethical employees in the public service. The Directive, Volume 1, enhances the professionalisation of the public service by implementing meritocratic selection processes and statutory requirements for integrity and ethical standards. It sets minimum entry requirements for senior management positions, including recognized educational qualifications and relevant managerial experience. The Directive also supports the recruitment of graduates, waiving experience requirements for entry-level posts, integrating "new generation talent" into the public service, fostering commitment, and building a pipeline of skilled individuals for growth within the sector.

The NSG has reviewed the Nyukela pre-entry examination for senior managers on levels 13-14 and is introducing Nyukela for middle management, which will be implemented across all spheres of government in accordance with the implementation plans. The Nyukela Programme for Executive Management (levels 15-16) is currently under critical review. The exam aims to equip public servants with knowledge of public service values, government structures, and legislative frameworks. It emphasizes the importance of ethical leadership in service delivery and contributes to a fair society.

The Framework proposed that the Public Service Commission should develop a database of technical experts to support Executive Authorities in the selection and recruitment process. Two technical experts will participate in the recruitment and selection process of Heads of Department (HODs), Chief Financial Officers (CEOs) and Municipal Managers (MMs) as members of the panels, not observers. This process aims to enhance the rigour of the recruitment and selection process to ensure that qualified specialists and executives are appointed. Over 700 experts are currently registered, with finalisation awaiting key policy and regulatory approvals. Finalisation and use of the database is dependent on the finalisation of key policy and regulatory measures by the DPSA for the Public Service (and DCOG for municipalities).

Pillar 2 Induction and Onboarding:

The Framework proposed that the NSG is also implementing induction programmes for public servants who are entering the system, and these must be extended to the entire public administration and reorientation programmes for all serving public servants. To date, 106 Boards of State-Owned Entities have undergone the NSG induction programme. The aim of the induction programme is to capacitate and expand the competence of aspiring and serving Board members of Public Entities. The IPB offers a learning opportunity for Board members to Strengthen the ethical culture within Public Entities, Understand the South African legislative and regulatory environment for Public Entities, Champion good governance and operational standards towards a more inclusive economy, and advance principled leadership for sustainable Public Entities.

Pillar 3 Planning and Performance Management:

The Directive links performance management with strategic planning, ensuring that employee performance aligns with departmental and public service goals for a skilled, ethical, and committed workforce.

Pillar 4 Continuing Learning and Professional Development:

The MPSA has issued a directive for implementation of compulsory training programmes, including amongst others, ethics, supply chain management, financial management, and project management, etc. The compulsory induction programmes, aimed at promoting competent, ethical, and professional public service. In 2023/24 financial year, 14 024 learners enrolled in the Ethics Course, with 8 283 learners completing the course.

There is a strong emphasis on continuous learning and professional development, including mandatory pre-entry courses, to ensure that all public service employees are equipped to perform their roles effectively. These training interventions are aligned with the public services strategic goals and are part of a broader effort to cultivate a culture of lifelong learning among public servants. The NSG has signed twelve (12) Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with various professional bodies and 10 universities to collaborate on delivering capacity-building interventions to enhance skills, competencies, and ethical values in the public sector.

Pillar 5 Career Progression, Succession Planning & Management of Career Incidence of Heads of Department:

- The Minister of Higher Education and Training has established the Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL) Steering Committee to review the National Coordination Policy for RPL and accommodate the use of RPL for recruitment and selection in the public service.
- Additional support will be provided to assist in the development of implementation plans. The retreat organised by PSC as part of its oversight role-inclusive governance structure- is established and consists of representatives from the public sector.
- The Public Service Commission is facilitating the coordination of the development of an implementation plan and drafting a process map in accordance with a directive from the former MPSA. Central to the Process Map is establishing a Governance Structure through which an implementation plan that is integrated into a 5-year government programme of action is developed. It is anticipated that endorsement engagements on the Process Map will occur with the Deputy President, MPSA, COGTA, SALGA, and DPME. Terms of reference for establishing a Governance Structure have been drafted for approval by stakeholders.
- The 6th Administration prioritised the building of a capable, ethical, and developmental state, which has been strengthened to Priority Three by the 7th Administration. A capable state has both direct and indirect duties in the economy, such as regulation, control of network industries, and maintaining an enabling climate in which law and order prevail. Furthermore, this framework is consistent with the Medium-Term Development Plan (MTDP) for 2024–2029. The MTDP's strategic initiatives aimed at professionalising the public sector were developed from the National Framework:
- Local Government: Amendments to local government legislative frameworks: Introduce amendments to key legislation, including the Local Government: General Laws Amendment Bill and the Municipal Structures Act; Professionalisation programmes for local government; Implement a Coordination Model for Municipal Capacity Building along with comprehensive plans and support models Promulgate policies to improve appointments in key positions in municipalities Enforce compliance with regulatory frameworks in place.
- Public service: Develop professional standards and partner with relevant Regulatory bodies to ensure technically capable officials are appointed in specialist roles and senior management level; Review the Public Finance Management (PFM) Competency Framework to ensure adherence to appointment standards; Monitor through adherence to standards and the reduction in the skill gaps.

7.3 Impact of Public Service Legislation

- Establishment of the Single Public Administration: Develop and implement Roadmap Toward the Single Public Administration; Conclude and implement PAMA and PSA Amendment Bills;

- Indicators: PAMA regulations developed and issued for implementation; Public Service Regulations reviewed and new ones implemented; Monitor changes in the % of key appointees meeting legislated qualifications, experience, and integrity standards to assess the effectiveness of amendments.
- Professionalization of the public service: Review the HOD PMDS (Performance Management and Development System) policy and implement the Professionalisation Framework plan with a focus on, amongst other leadership philosophy and Human Capital Management, towards professionalisation.
- Strengthening the role of the PSC (Public Service Commission): Enhance the PSC's capacity and processes to ensure compliance in key appointments.
- Repositioning of the NSG: Ensure 100% of SMS and MMS recruits complete the Executive Development Programme and Nyukela Programme, enhancing their understanding of public sector governance; and Institutional reviews and skills audits.

The following are key Dependencies identified:

- Amendment Bills and new legislation already in the Parliamentary system will be completed in the first year of MTDP implementation.
- The turnaround time of legislation must improve. Strengthening of Intergovernmental Relations mechanisms; and consequence management to address failures in the implementation of the plan.

LEGISLATIONS AND BILLS

During the reporting year, there were numerous pieces of legislation that were tabled and necessitated the Subcommittee to engage and facilitate their introduction and finalisation by the legislature and executive. Appended hereunder are the legislations considered during the year in question; namely:

- In May 2024 the process was initiated for comments in the **Local Government: General Laws Amendment Bill** aimed at enhancing the functionality and efficiency of local government. The Bill will reflect ongoing commitment to ensuring good governance and improving service delivery within municipalities. The Bill is to review the various pieces of legislation that impact local government to entrench good practices and address the challenges experienced in the Local Government Sector.
- The subcommittee led consultations and engagements on **the Local Government Municipal Systems Amendment Act 3 of 2022** to ensure that there are collective comments and inputs from National, Provincial and Regions to amend the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 2000.
- The joint Sub Committees on Legislature & Governance, Elections & Campaigns and Legal & Constitutional Affairs collectively led in organising of the Technical and Political meetings for contribution of the ANC on the **Electoral System for the National Assembly and Provincial Legislatures**, which process led by the Electoral Reform Consultation Panel (ERCP). The contribution was presented to the NWC and NEC.

THE WHITE PAPER REVIEW

The "White Paper on Local Government Review" is a process initiated to update the original 1998 white paper to address failures in local governance and make municipalities "fit for purpose". Launched in May 2025 with a revised paper planned for March 2026, it aims to reform institutional, legislative, and financial frameworks to improve service delivery, address corruption, professionalize administration, and restore public trust.

The Rationale for Revisiting the White Paper

The Subcommittee initiated and led processes for the National, Provincial and Regional engagements on the process for the review of the inputs and submission to Parliament the organization proposal as part of the review.

The original White Paper was crafted in an era marked by optimism and a collective drive to rectify the injustices of apartheid. It envisioned municipalities as proactive agents of change, working collaboratively with communities to meet their needs and improve quality of life. Yet, the intervening years have revealed gaps between this vision and the on-the-ground realities. Many municipalities have struggled with financial constraints, capacity issues, and service delivery challenges, underscoring the need for a policy refresh that aligns with current conditions.

Anticipated Benefits of the Review

- **Enhanced Service Delivery:** A contemporary review offers the opportunity to address systemic issues hindering effective service delivery. By identifying and rectifying these challenges, municipalities can become more responsive to the needs of their communities, ensuring timely and efficient provision of essential services.
- **Strengthened Financial Management:** Financial viability remains a critical concern for many local governments. Revisiting the White Paper allows for the development of strategies that promote fiscal responsibility, transparency, and sustainability, thereby enhancing the financial health of municipalities.
- **Capacity Building:** The review process can highlight areas where municipalities require additional support, training, or resources. By focusing on capacity building, local governments can be better equipped to fulfill their mandates and adapt to emerging challenges.
- **Community Engagement:** A renewed emphasis on participatory governance can foster stronger relationships between municipalities and their constituents. Encouraging active citizen involvement ensures that local governments remain attuned to the evolving needs and aspirations of the communities they serve.

Implications for South Africans

For the average South African, a revised White Paper holds the promise of more accountable, efficient, and responsive local governments. Improved service delivery translates to better access to water, sanitation, electricity, and other essential services. Enhanced financial management ensures that public funds are utilized effectively, leading to tangible improvements in infrastructure and community projects. Moreover, increased opportunities for community engagement empower citizens to have a say in the decisions that affect their daily lives, fostering a sense of ownership and trust in local institutions.

Essential Policy Refresh

The decision to review the 1998 White Paper on Local Government is both timely and necessary. It reflects a commitment to continuous improvement and adaptation in the face of changing circumstances. By addressing past shortcomings and building on successes, this review has the potential to rejuvenate local governance in South Africa, ensuring that it remains a cornerstone of our democracy and a catalyst for sustainable development.

This policy framework aimed to anchor local governments as development engines, ensuring that they provided essential services and actively promoted social and economic growth. However, over the past quarter-century, the landscape of local governance has evolved, presenting new challenges and opportunities that necessitate a thorough review of this foundational document.

The sum total of the legislation and other seemingly unrelated measures in the water, electricity and social sectors have pointed for the need of a consolidated view on local government reforms, which remains the most important sphere of governance.

COMPREHENSIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM PROGRAMME, INCLUDING THE REVIEW OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT WHITE PAPER

CONTEXT

- 6.1. The 1998 Local government White Paper (WPLG) ushered in a Democratic and Developmental Local Government System, which was responding to addressing the political, social and economic realities and pressures at the time. The democratic miracle emerged out of racially divided society with a segregated local government system and where majority did not have access to basic services, such as water, electricity, sanitation, and transport.
- 6.2. Consequently, the WPLG articulated a comprehensive, well thought through idea and futuristic vision of a Developmental Local Government, meant to be a game changer in municipalities working together with local communities to find sustainable ways to meet their needs and improve quality of their lives.
- 6.3. Unfortunately, despite significant progress made in the last 24 years of Local Government and 30 years of a Democratic State in South Africa, and through various policy, legislative and programme interventions. We have witnessed terminal decline of performance of Local Government, in critical areas of governance, administration, service delivery and financial management and viability. Some of the root causes of this regression is due to number of factors such as:
 - 6.3.1. incorrect assumptions made in 1998.
 - 6.3.2. Poor execution of the policy directives in legislation.
 - 6.3.3. Poor design of the structural and systems policy imperatives.
 - 6.3.4. Assumption that principles will translate into operational systems (in practice not possible).
 - 6.3.5. Manipulative conduct, culture and behaviour (corrupt and unethical tendencies).
 - 6.3.6. Systematic hollowing out of capacity and capability at local government level.
 - 6.3.7. Global pressures, urbanization, economic decline, climate change, technological advancement.
 - 6.3.8. Poor regulatory and oversight capability at National and Provincial level over Local Government.

- 6.3.9. Over-politicisation of the systems and instruments of governance and delivery.
- 6.4. Unfortunately, there were also certain assumptions and unintended outcomes such as:
 - 6.4.1. Wall to Wall municipalities would be financial viability thus placing undue pressure for municipalities to raise up to 90% of their own revenue,
 - 6.4.2. One size fit all and that all municipalities were the same and/or similar, this will require the principle of differentiation going forward,
 - 6.4.3. IGR and cooperative governance principle will translate into a coherent, integrated, seamless and cohesive state action in municipal spaces. (LG at forefront of community distrust and anger)
 - 6.4.4. Capacitated District with capability to coordinate regionally and support local municipalities; (powers and function problem and duplication)
 - 6.4.5. LG role in driving economic development (but instruments, incentives for creating an enabling environment are with National Government)

A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REVIEW OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT WHITE PAPER

- 6.5. Despite the growing trust deficit and chronic underperformance of local government in critical areas of governance, administration, service delivery and infrastructure development, financial management and others in the past three decades. Any review of the Local Sphere of Government is essentially a review of the Constitutional architecture of our Cooperative Governance arrangements, as it relates Constitutional responsibilities and duties of National and Provincial Spheres of Government over or towards Local Government.
- 6.6. It becomes imperative that the Review of the 1998 LG White Paper should comprehensively address all the structural and systemic issues that have hindered the full realisation of the 1998 LG white paper vision.(no holy cows) The 1998 Developmental Local Government vision is still valid and sound, however, evidence based interrogation of the root causes of failures of LG must be determined to enable a process of reimagining and co-designing a renewed vision that is sustainable and delivers a better life for our people.
- 6.7. Poor performance of LG has been identified as one of the key constraints to inclusive economic growth. In response the priorities and action plan arising from the January 8 Statement and the priorities of the GNU identified critical legislative amendments and Sector policy reforms to fix dysfunctionality and address poor delivery of services, such as water and electricity and professionalization of LG and others. The Review of the LG White Paper means that the ANC must lead a societal and government process that is focused, integrated, coherent and inclusive to address the chronic areas of structural and systemic failure by the three spheres of government.

B. IMPLICATIONS AND MANAGEMENT OF MAJOR RISKS

- 6.8. In recognition of the strategic importance of the Local Government Reform programme (LG White Paper). All the reforms (policy, legislation and programmes) that are targeting the spheres of Local Government must be

coordinated and aligned to ensure coherency of the reforms to drive a Constitutionally sound, effective and sustainable system of Local Government. The outcome of the Reviewed LG Paper must therefore inform any required and necessary Policy and Legislative amendments.

- 6.9. The 1998 LG White Paper is reviewed on the eve of Local Government elections. The integrity of the Review process and the content addressed might be marred by political contestations, posturing and campaigning to the detriment of the reform agenda. The communication and manipulation of the message around the review must be politically managed in this regard.
- 6.10. The ANC led the formulation of a vision of a Developmental Local Government that is still valid and sound. The assumptions that were made in 1998 and the developments that have happened since 1998 requires that ANC review its own policy positions and guide the future vision for LG.

C. KEY AND CURRENT REFORM PROCESSES AND LEGISLATIVE REVIEWS THAT REQUIRE ATTENTION AND FOCUS

- 6.11. Most of the following sector reforms are concerned with resolving immediate challenges that could produce unintended outcomes that may impact the future of local government:
 - 6.11.1. The review of the Authority (Municipality) and Service provider Authority debate relating to distribution of powers and functions of trading and key social services including Water, Electricity, Roads and Transportation, Housing and Human Settlements, and Health.
 - 6.11.2. Responses to Climate Change and Disaster Management including to Just Energy Transition Challenges and Disaster Management Planning.
 - 6.11.3. Spatial development planning, Reconsideration of Demarcations. This requires a careful view of the NSDF, SPLUMA, the IUDF and the Independent Municipal Authority Bill.
 - 6.11.4. The “Coalitions Bill”

7. SUMMARY OF BILLS BEFORE PORTFOLIO COMMITTEES

7.1. 34 Bills before NA Committees, as follows:

- **Section 74: 4**
- **Section 75: 17**
- **Section 76: 10**
- **Section 77: 3**

7.2. EXEC. BILLS: 20 PMB: 14

Statutory appointments:

- **Eight (08)**

Other Matters – Ad Hoc Committee

- **One (1)**

8. OVERVIEW OF MEETING(S) AND WORKSHOP(S)

The Sub Committee organised and convened Political and Technical meetings as well as providing support to the Leagues and Provinces.

8.1. *Improving ANC Processes to Deal with the Challenges in Local Government*

8.1.1. At its recent National Executive Committee meeting, the ANC reflected on a number of challenging areas and the manner in which it has managed them and including how its members participate in local government sphere.

8.1.2. The ANC further resolved that its deployees in the Executive and Administration should reflect in addressing challenges prevailing in the local governance system.

8.2. *Performance of January Tasks and Programme of Action Improving ANC Processes to Deal with the Challenges in Local Government*

8.2.1. The Sub-Committee continue to work collectively and collaboratively with the Local Government Intervention Sub-Committee as well participating in building Provincial Capacity Legislature of Governance Committees.

- a. The joint L&G PoA focussing on intervention at municipal level was developed and approved by the NEC. The PoA focuses on 30 priority municipalities.
- b. Once adopted by the NEC, the PoA was followed by provincial workshops.
- c. The provinces have since submitted priority service delivery matters for urgent redress.

9. OVERVIEW OF MEETING(S) AND WORKSHOP(S)

The work of the Sub-Committee was has enhanced through Political and Technical meetings and Workshops.

9.1. *Alliance and Sectoral Work*

The Sub Committee continues to work with the Alliance to ensure consultation and participation in activation and PoA. The presentations to Alliance Meetings and Workshop as well as overall strategic support were provided.

9.2. *Traditional Leadership Institutions*

9.2.1. The institution of traditional leadership is very critical in the realisation of the full emancipation of the South African people, especially the previously disadvantaged people residing in the rural and traditional communities. The importance of this institution finds expression in chapter 12 of the Constitution which gives recognition of the role played by the traditional leaders and communities in the growth and development in the country.

9.2.2. To give effect to the constitutional provision, the ANC-led government has enacted various pieces of legislation with a specific focus on the recognition of the institution of traditional leadership, role of traditional leaders in development of their communities, dispute resolution of disputes within the institution, amongst others.

9.2.3. The coexistence of traditional and contemporary governance in South Africa will only be achieved once the role of the institution of traditional leadership is clearly defined and finds expression in the daily livelihood of the South African people.

- 9.2.4. The ANC subcommittee has resolved to develop a clear process to support the institution. For instance, the prioritisation of the 10- Aside Meeting between the ANC and CONTRALESA would be strengthened with specific action process plan for engagement in advancing the development of the institution.
- 9.2.5. The Traditional Leaders have lost trust in the processes of the organization and there is a need to enhance the engagement and ensure that the resolutions of joint Task team are implemented.

9.3. THE TRADITIONAL AND KHOI-SAN LEADERSHIP ACT

The [Traditional and Khoi-San Leadership Act](#) of 2019 was declared unconstitutional by the [Constitutional Court](#) in May 2023 because Parliament adequate public participation. However, the court suspended the invalidity order for 24 months, which was later extended to May 2027, to give Parliament time to correct the bill and pass a new one. The new draft [Traditional and Khoi-San Leadership Bill](#) (2024) is currently undergoing a public comment process.

9.3.1. CURRENT STATUS:

A new draft bill, the Traditional and Khoi-San Leadership Bill 2024, was published in November 2024 for public comment. It is nearly identical to the unconstitutional 2019 act.

9.3.2. NEXT STEPS

Parliament must now pass a new version of the bill that meets the court's requirement for public participation before the May 2027 deadline.

10. PROVINCIAL AND LEAGUES SUPPORT

- 10.1. The ANC has achieved substantial improvement in state transformation since 1994, whilst being aware that there are policy proposals that have not been implemented to ensure that the life of the people are significantly improved.
- 10.2. A fundamental area of the argument of this support system is critical review of the local government, planning and legislative process that should be closer to the people to accelerate service delivery.
- 10.3. The Sub Committee working together with LGI, OR Tambo School of Leadership resolved to fast track the objectives set in the POA to support and provide capacity to the Provinces and the Leagues.
- 10.4. The Sub Committee further provided capacity at the Leagues Conferences to directly set up capacity on the Leagues L&G Committees.

11. RECOMMENDATIONS

- 11.1. The court's striking down the Systems Amendment Bill on ANC members of all municipal officials is an important lesson that Parliament must be subjected to NEC subcommittees as we did not agree to that amendment extending to all municipal workers that they can't be leaders in political parties.
- 11.2. The Bill which stated that all municipal employees should not be office-bearers of political parties went directly against decisions made in the alliance meetings on this Bill and which was communicated to the National Assembly should be amended.
- 11.3. Instead of limiting this amendment to senior management, it appears some in the NA allowed a change to make the restriction applicable to all municipal

- employees. SAMWU took the matter to court and won the case.
- 11.4. This does indicate the challenges of working process of the Department concerned, Sub Committee, Study Group, Caucus to ensure alignment of ANC decision for effective legislations.
 - 11.5. The NEC Subcommittee role is to advise on legislation, including the way in which important Bills like the Demarcation Bill are not even referred to the organization Committees.
 - 11.6. It is also a challenge that Parliament passed a tricky Demarcation Bill without us participating and consulting the Sub Committee as well as reporting to the NEC.
 - 11.7. There is an opportunity to intervene when the Demarcation Bill when it gets to the NCOP, the process plan for intervention and correcting the situation.
 - 11.8. In spite of the joint workshop there is very little direct leadership to stop the bleeding of all three spheres, a concern that the Sub Committee will develop a separate report.
 - 11.9. There is an opportunity to fast track the status of the IMSI Bill.
 - 11.10. A special meeting of the Sub Committee to address the Deputy Speakers and continual requests for legislative change.
 - 11.11. That the L&G Subcommittee meet to process the Local Government Reform Programme before the NEC Lekgotla in January.
 - 11.12. That Local Government Reform Programme find expression in the SONA, that a broader ANC consultation process be processed before the draft submission for opening up the white paper review process for public comment before March 2025, on the Local Government Reform Programme (Review Of 1998 LG White Paper).

12. CONCLUSION

- 12.1. An internal institutional machinery must be established to ensure that the ANC guides, monitors, and ensures the implementation of conference resolutions and decisions are implemented through the NEC structures.
- 12.2. To continue work collaboratively with the Sub Committee on Local Government Intervention is not about Local Government but rather the functioning of the government and state system in entirety.
- 12.3. The Sub Committee has been faced with a number of Local Government issues and during this period more time was focused on the overall building of Provincial capacity, joint provincial visit with LGI.
- 12.4. The year 2025, marks 5 year to the realisation of the aspirations of the NDP 2030 thus the Sub Committee focus will double down to ensure segmentation and the building provincial and local capabilities and capacities.
- 12.5. The creating of stability in Councils is key in addressing weak administration and building technical capacity through policy processes and legislative provisions.
- 12.6. The implementation of the remaining programme aligned to the POA through a committed schedule of meetings, workshops, and engagements.
- 12.7. The adoption of conference resolutions to guide government programme is fundamental to align ANC policy decisions to service delivery plans.
- 12.8. Expansion of basic services and infrastructure to millions of people who now have access to housing, roads, education, health, water, energy and income support

through a social security net.

- 12.9. Launching the first phase of economic transformation by introducing laws and policies on worker rights, employment equity and broad-based black empowerment, investment in infrastructure, public employment programmes and achieving higher levels of economic growth.
- 12.10. The establishment of democratic state institutions in accordance with the Constitution, such as the Auditor-General, the Commission for Gender Equality, the Pan South African Languages Board, the Independent Electoral Commission, the Public Protector and others to protect our democracy and freedoms.
- 12.11. Taking our place amongst the community of nations, advancing the African agenda, multilateralism, solidarity and a peaceful and just world order.
- 12.12. The democratic South Africa of today is very different from the lived experiences of apartheid South Africa 30 years ago, great strides have been made and more could be achieved to improve the lives of the majority of South Africans.

Social Transformation Committee

Overview

The STC is a critical committee of the NEC, given the broad policy areas it oversees and guides, as well as the overarching issues of the War on Poverty, our Social Policy and the needs and issues of various vulnerable groups. During the period under review, the STC guided ANC formulation on these cross-cutting issues and sectors, as well as on Human Settlements, Social Development as well as basic service departments such as Water and Sanitation, Electricity and Women, Youth, and People with Disabilities.

All these issues that the STC deals with are critical for the motive forces, their standard of living, and whether we are making progress on poverty eradication and creating a better life for all.

Engagement with Sectors and Motive Forces

People and Community Organisations

Civil society organisations engaged directly with the STC (December 2023 meeting), raising grassroots concerns. Participation by provinces and Leagues remains weak, with only three provinces attending meetings. COSATU has been a consistent ally; SACP participation has been poor. Civil society voices (e.g. Tintswalo Makhubele) have provided continuity in STC deliberations.

Allied Organisations

Inclusive Society Institute and Social Policy Initiative contributed inputs on the Basic Income Grant (2024). Tripartite Alliance participation uneven: COSATU strong, SACP weak, Leagues absent.

Private Sector Developments

Partnerships in water and sanitation: Water Partnerships Office, DBSA, SALGA, and private sector collaborations to support municipalities. FINMARK Trust partnered with DSD to link BIS beneficiaries to livelihoods. Private sector involvement in sanitation innovation (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, WRC, DST, DTIC) supporting decentralized sanitation systems.

KEY POLICY AND MANIFESTO ISSUES

- 1. Implementation of the Basic Income Support (BIS) Grant for 18–59 year olds:** Draft BIS policy tabled but stalled due to lack of consensus between DSD and National Treasury. Pilot projects linked 53% of profiled beneficiaries to livelihoods.

2. **Procurement opportunities for women-owned businesses:** Procurement for women-owned businesses reached 29.25% (short of 40% target).
3. **Strengthening food security and poverty reduction initiatives:** Over 770,000 households reached through food security programmes; 554,000 beneficiaries supported through feeding schemes.
4. **Automation of SASSA grant payment systems:** R266 billion disbursed in social grants, including SRD R370. Automation policy remains pending due to Cabinet delays.
5. **Bucket system eradication in informal settlements:** Nearly 40,000 buckets eradicated; however, new informal settlements continue to introduce bucket systems.
6. **Implementation of National Water and Sanitation Masterplan (NW&SMP):** Major water infrastructure projects (Lesotho Highlands Phase 2, uMzimvubu, uMkhomazi) unblocked; R100 billion pipeline of projects underway.
7. **Equitable water rights and licensing for Historically Disadvantaged Individuals (HDIs):** 85% of water licence applications finalised within 90 days; compulsory licensing in Kaap Catchment to allocate 30% of water to HDIs by 2028.
8. **Climate change adaptation and disaster management:** Disaster response structures (Flood & Drought Task Teams) established; improved coordination during floods in Eastern Cape.
9. **White Paper on Human Settlements:** White Paper presented to STC in January 2024; integration into broader Programme of Action
10. **Alignment of housing policy with ANC election manifesto priorities:** Ongoing coordination with Parliamentary Social Cluster to align housing delivery with ANC priorities.
11. **Gender-Based Violence and Femicide (GBVF) strategy implementation:** Over 114,000 GBVF victims reached with psychosocial support; 13,675 sheltered
12. **Teenage pregnancy and youth substance abuse.** Awareness campaigns in higher education institutions reached 10,000 student
13. **Rights of women, children, and people with disabilities:** DWYPD presented strategies on GBVF and teenage pregnancies in 2025, signalling stronger institutional focus.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO NGC

Basic Income Support Grant

Resolve deadlock between DSD and National Treasury.

Establish clear pathways for linking grant beneficiaries to sustainable livelihoods.

Women's Economic Empowerment

Strengthen enforcement of 40% procurement target for women-owned businesses.

Expand monitoring mechanisms to ensure compliance across provinces.

Water and Sanitation Transformation

Accelerate compulsory licensing to address inequitable water allocation.

Expand scope of bucket eradication to include informal settlements post-2012.

Address vandalism, theft, and "water tanker mafias" undermining service delivery.

Gender-Based Violence and Youth Development

Institutionalise GBVF strategies across all provinces.

Scale up campaigns on teenage pregnancy and substance abuse.

Human Settlements

Ensure implementation of the White Paper aligns with ANC's social transformation vision.

Prioritise integration of housing policy with water and sanitation infrastructure.

Strengthening Motive Forces

- Improve participation of provinces, leagues, and SACP in STC processes.
- Build stronger partnerships with civil society and private sector to enhance delivery capacity.

CONCLUSION

14. Since the ANC 2022 National Conference, the NEC Social Transformation Committee has made progress in social development, water and sanitation, human settlements, and women, youth and disability matters, but challenges remain in policy consensus, implementation capacity, and participation of motive forces. The National General Council must address these gaps decisively to restore confidence in the ANC's ability to deliver radical social transformation.

30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE CONSTITUTION

INTRODUCTION

The year 2026 marks the 30th anniversary of the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa in 1996. This follows immediately on the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1955. The two events are inextricably linked. This milestone coincides with an important conjuncture in the National Democratic Revolution (NDR), characterised in the NGC Base Document's as an "eye of a storm" moment faced by the country and the Movement.

The anniversary provides an opportunity for reflection, mobilisation and renewal.

It takes place in a conjuncture characterised on both increasingly strident assaults on the principles of constitutional democracy, the rule of law, human rights and dignity in several countries and as well as the undermining of a rules-based international order and multilateralism and multi-lateral institutions such as the United Nations, the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice.

These trends are underscored by the hostile and belligerent reaction to the theme of South Africa's Presidency of the 2025 G20 Summit: "*Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability*" by certain powerful countries and their acolytes. They play themselves out at the very time when global challenges such as climate change, risks related to artificial intelligence, and financial instability require more structured international cooperation and enhanced regulation.

Unfortunately, the world is characterised by rising polarization, geopolitical tensions, and social fragmentation, which are both cause and effect of increasing threats and the inability of societies and public institutions to effectively manage and resolve these crises.

The evidence being led before the Madlanga Commission and the Parliamentary Ad-hoc Committee have the potential further to undermine trust in the judiciary and institutions of our criminal justice system and, by extension, of our constitutional democracy. However, if properly handled, these processes also have the potential to emphasise the strength and resilience of our constitutional democracy and its ability to expose wrong-doing and to self-correct.

This document seeks to guide NGC deliberations on:

- (1) Assessing how the Constitution has advanced the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) and the realisation of the vision of the Freedom Charter.
- (2) Identifying constitutional provisions that may require amendment to strengthen developmental, ethical, and integrated and effective governance in order to advance the NDR.
- (3) Outlining the elements of a year-long 2026 national programme to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the adoption of the Constitution and to defend, and popularise the Constitution and constitutional democracy.

The 30th anniversary of the adoption of the Constitution will also coincide with the National Dialogue and the run-up to the 2026 local government elections. Accordingly, our discussions

must pay special attention to inter-governmental relations and the allocation of powers and functions in a democratic developmental state.

2. THE NDR, THE FREEDOM CHARTER, AND THE CONSTITUTION

Both the Strategy and Tactics and the NGC Base Document emphasise that the Constitution is fundamentally aligned to the long-term objectives of the NDR. President Nelson Mandela described the Constitution as *“our national soul, our compact with one another as citizens, underpinned by our highest aspirations and our deepest apprehensions.”*

Despite being forged in the furnace of negotiations between those forces representing a dying and decaying apartheid past and those representing a democratic and progressive future, the Constitution emerged true to its ancestry.

The Bill of Rights adopted by the ANC in 1923, the Africans’ Claims adopted by the ANC in 1943, and the Freedom Charter adopted in 1955 are the tributaries that fed deep reservoir of the Constitution.

The Constitution’s founding values: human dignity, equality, the rule of law, and a multi-party democracy, are principles that advance the Freedom Charter’s vision that:

- “The People Shall Govern”
- “All Shall Be Equal Before the Law”
- “There Shall Be Work and Security”
- “There Shall Be Houses, Security and Comfort.”

The Constitution is a revolutionary and transformative document. It is the supreme law of the land, the basis for the transformation of our society into a united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic state founded on the values of human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.

This vision can only be truly realised through the fundamental transformation of our society, a monumental historic project requiring a democratic developmental state acting in concert with all sectors of society.

Transformation is mandated, driven and guided by the Constitution. The Constitution is not designed to obstruct transformation but to facilitate it.

We are all duty bound continuously and critically to assess the progress we are making in discharging this mandate.

3. ACHIEVEMENTS SINCE 1996

The NGC Base Document highlights several transformative gains since 1994, many of which were mandated and enabled by the Constitution:

3.1 Democratic Governance and Rights

- Seven national and provincial, and six local elections, held peacefully and credibly since 1994, reflecting constitutional guarantees of political rights (Section 19) and universal suffrage (Section 1).
- Establishment of strong, independent institutions such as the Constitutional Court and Chapter 9 institutions supporting constitutional democracy such as the Public Protector, South African Human Rights Commission, Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities, Commission on Gender Equality, Auditor General, and the Electoral Commission.

- Transformation of the judiciary and legal profession, and expansion of access to justice under Section 34 (right to courts) and Section 33 (just administrative action).

3.2 Social Transformation

The Base Document notes tectonic advances in the “social wage” such as social grants, education, housing, water, electricity and health services, made possible by socio-economic rights in Sections 26–29 of the Constitution (housing, health, food, water, social security, education).

3.3 Building a Non-Racial, Non-Sexist Society

Equality provisions (Section 9) enabled affirmative action and progressive legislation (Employment Equity Act, B-BBEE, etc.), Labour Relations and Basic Conditions of Employment Acts (Section 23), consistent with the Strategy and Tactics’ emphasis on dismantling the triple contradictions of national and gender oppression and class super-exploitation characteristic of Colonialism of a Special Type.

4. CHALLENGES AND OBSTACLES

Despite constitutional progress, the Base Document warns that the country faces a crisis of declining trust, deepening inequality, and persistent unemployment which constitute threats to the very motive forces of the NDR.

Constitutional commitments have not fully translated into material improvements for millions. Several factors, both objective and subjective, have impeded progress in realising the transformative project mandated by the Constitution.

Whilst it is not the Constitution that has blocked transformation, the NGC must consider whether certain constitutional design features, in particular the allocation of powers and functions across the three spheres of government, and the management of inter-government relations, constrain the building and functioning of a capable, ethical, democratic developmental state.

5. DISCUSSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

5.1 Basic Principles

Any proposed amendments must:

- Deepen, not weaken, constitutional democracy.
- Strengthen the democratic, developmental state.
- Promote coherent, integrated governance.
- Enhance accountability and eliminate opportunities for corruption.

5.2 Areas for Discussion

This section identifies issues for discussion, not final recommendations.

5.2.1 Strengthening Cooperative Governance (Chapter 3)

The Constitution establishes three distinctive, interdependent and interrelated spheres of government. However, the Base Document observes governance incoherence, fragmentation, and uneven capacity, especially at local level.

Possible issues for discussion:

- Clarifying national powers to intervene where municipalities collapse.
- Strengthening minimum capacity requirements for councillors and administrators.
- Revisiting functional competencies in Schedules 4 (Functional Areas of Concurrent National and Provincial Legislative Competence) and 5 (Functional Areas of Exclusive)
- Provincial Legislative Competence to support integrated planning.
- Creating a more enabling constitutional framework for the District Development Model.

5.2.2 Enhancing the Developmental State

Debates may consider:

- Amending Chapter 10 (Public Administration) to provide for more explicit recognition of developmental state principles.
- Strengthening security of tenure for heads of key state institutions to protect them from factional interference.

5.2.3 Land Reform and Expropriation

Previous ANC National Conferences have resolved on amendments to Section 25 (property clause). The ANC introduced these amendments in Parliament, but was unable to secure the required two-thirds majority for them to be passed. Subsequently, Parliament passed an amended Expropriation Act which is being opposed by opposition parties. The NGC needs to reflect on the way forward.

5.2.4 Electoral System Reform

Following the judgment of the Constitutional Court in the *New Nation Movement*-case, which provided for independent candidates to stand in national and provincial elections, the Minister of Home Affairs appointed an independent panel to make recommendations regarding our electoral system.

The panel considered a number of options based on the following principles: Inclusivity, Fairness, Accountability, Simplicity, Election Manageability, Transparency, Stable and Efficient Government, and the Interaction Between Principles.

The options proposed by the panel range from retaining the present proportional list-based system to introducing mixed member or single member constituencies.

The details of these proposals fall outside the scope of this document and will be dealt with in other commissions. However, a number of these options will have constitutional implications that must be considered.

5.2.5 Strengthening State Integrity Systems

The recommendations of the National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council (NACAC) regarding the constitutional entrenchment of anti-corruption bodies with the necessary powers and independence must be considered.

5.2.6 Immigration and Citizenship

The NGC will need to consider whether there is a need for further clarity regarding which provisions of the Constitution apply to all who live in South Africa and which apply specifically to citizens and whether this can be achieved through policy and legislation.

6. THE 30th ANNIVERSARY OF THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION

6.1 Introduction

The 30th anniversary of the adoption of the Constitution represents a water-shed moment in our democracy, following immediately after the 70th anniversary of the adoption of the Freedom Charter.

It takes place in the very difficult international, regional and national conjuncture outlined above. It also coincides with two key processes in our national political life: The National Dialogue and the run-up to the 2026 local government elections.

It must serve as:

- A celebration of the Constitution, the process that led to its adoption, and the struggle and sacrifices that made its adoption possible.
- A mobilising platform to renew patriotism, active citizenship, and civic responsibility,
- A defence of constitutional democracy against internal threats (corruption, disinformation, extremism) and external threats (foreign interference).

The Base Document warns of growing democratic disengagement, with millions of young people not voting and declining trust in institutions. These are issues that a constitutional celebration campaign must address.

6.2 Key Objectives

The 30th Anniversary Celebrations must:

- Educate South Africans on constitutional rights, duties, and institutions.
- Rebuild public trust in democratic governance.
- Mobilise youth as constitutional defenders.
- Affirm unity in diversity, interpreting the Constitution as a collective national covenant.
- Promote dialogue on deepening transformation within the constitutional framework.

6.3 Programme Pillars

6.3.1 National Constitutional Education Campaign

- Community dialogues led by ANC branches, alliance partners, universities, civil society.
- Public education on the Bill of Rights, especially socio-economic rights, equality, and participatory democracy.
- Introduce the reciting of the pre-amble to the Constitution in all schools, government institutions, Parliament and provincial legislature, and at national events as well as on the national broadcaster and other media.

6.3.2 “The People Shall Govern” Civic Participation Drive

- Renewing ward committee effectiveness.
- Promoting community-based monitoring of service delivery.
- Enhancing participation in Integrated Development Plans (IDPs).

6.3.3 Popularising Constitutional Institutions

- Public dialogues with constitutional institutions on their roles and achievements.
- Youth internships and civic education programmes in partnership with these bodies.

9.4 Cultural and Creative Sector Programme

- Storytelling, theatre, exhibitions, music and film projects reflecting constitutional values.
- A mobile museum on the making of the 1996 Constitution.

9.5 National Constitutional Democracy Conferences

- A Constitutional Democracy Summit, possibly linked to the National Dialogue.
- Sectoral summits: labour, business, youth, traditional leaders, religious communities.

9.6 Mobilising Against Threats to Democracy

- Nationwide public education on combating disinformation and extremism.
- Community-based vigilance structures aligned with the Constitution and human rights.

7. CONCLUSION

The NGC Base Document warns, the country is at a crossroads where renewal, integrity, unity and state capability will decide the future of the NDR.

The 30th Anniversary of the Constitution must therefore re-affirm the foundational pact of our democratic breakthrough. It must remind our people that the Constitution is not the enemy of transformation. It is its most powerful enabling instrument.

The ANC must lead society with confidence, humility, and integrity, ensuring that constitutional democracy continues to serve the people, especially the poor and historically oppressed.