Response from FW de Klerk to Nelson Mandela's memorandum of 26 June 1992
To: Mr Nelson Mandela
President of the African National Congress
Dear Mr Mandela
I acknowledge receipt of your memorandum dated 26 June 1992. However,
an exchange of memoranda is no substitute for face to face talks. I was
therefore disappointed that you did not accept my invitation to immediate
discussions. Every day that is lost will make the resumption of the process
more difficult and may lead to the loss of further lives.
Annexures A-F contain observations relevant to issues raised in your
memorandum and elaborations on issues dealt with in this letter. There
are however, a number of fundamental issues which need to be addressed
urgently at a meeting between us.
Contrary to the ANC’s accusations, the Government has not, and will
not plan, conduct, orchestrate or sponsor violence in any form whatsoever
against any political organisation or community. The lie that the Government
is sponsoring and promoting violence remains a lie no matter how often
it is repeated. Where elements in state structures err in this regard,
the Government will not hesitate to take appropriate measures. There are
prosecutions and convictions on record to prove this.
The second interim report of the Goldstone Commission showed that the
causes of violence are numerous and complicated. The fact remains that
most political violence occurs between supporters of the ANC and the IFP.
This question must therefore be urgently addressed by the leaders of the
ANC and the IFP, and by the Government, in view of its responsibility for
the maintenance of order. I therefore propose that you, Dr Buthelezi and
I meet as soon as possible for this purpose. The agenda for this meeting
could be to consider:
an active full-time monitoring mechanism on the adequacy, efficacy
and performance of all the instruments and processes already in place to
combat violence and intimidation; and
the advisability of a joint monitoring body through which the three
parties could act to defuse and solve problems that could give rise to
violence. The role of the international community in an observer capacity
could be considered, especially in relation to this item.
2. THE ANC’S PROGRAMME OF MASS MOBILISATION
The South African Government acknowledges the right of peaceful demonstration
and protest as important civil liberties. However, the ANC Alliance’s campaign
of mass mobilisation, owing to its nature and aims, poses serious threats
to the stability and safety of the whole of South African society, particularly
in the current volatile climate.
Furthermore, the use of this kind of mass mobilisation to make and impose
demands in the negotiation process is just as unacceptable as the use of
violence for this purpose. Our information indicates that the SACP and
COSATU have played a dominant role in redirecting the ANC from negotiations
to the politics of demands and confrontation which are inherent in mass
Insurrectionist thinking is currently flourishing within the ANC and
is being propagated by a cabal with close links to the SACP and COSATU.
These elements undermine the attempts of many ANC realists to negotiate
in good faith and also induce within the ANC the spirit of radicalism and
militancy of the insurrectionist school, which was evident at the SACP’s
8th congress in 1991.
The ANC/SACP have been trying to create the impression that they and
the South African Government are the only adversaries. This is patently
misleading and wrong since there are numerous players on the South African
political scene, each with an own identity but opposed to ANC/SACP policies
and methods. The ANC’s rhetoric has been radicalised and is now virtually
indistinguishable from that of the SACP, and so are the ultimatum and polarisation
politics now being conducted. In recent days this rhetoric has degenerated
into incitement to violence and hatred at grass-roots level.
The current mobilisation action can unleash forces which the instigators
will not be able to control. This will, in turn, make extended government
action unavoidable. The programme of mass mobilisation, in the prevailing
circumstances, will inevitably:
Iead to further violence;
delay the search for democratic solutions;
damage the economy, on which all South Africans depend; and
seriously disrupt social services to the detriment of those in need
of medical care, protection, support and education.
The Government does not seek confrontation and has repeatedly stated
its belief that negotiations present the only viable option for the solution
of our problems. However, it will not hesitate to take all steps necessary
to prevent the country from sliding into anarchy. Any change of government
must come about in a negotiated constitutional manner. The stated ultimate
goal of the ANC’s mass mobilisation campaign is the overthrow the Government
by coercion. This will not be countenanced.
3. THE ANC’S ABORTING OF THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS
You say that you have withdrawn from the negotiating process because
of the Government’s involvement in violence and its lack of commitment
to genuine democracy in the negotiating process.
Your allegations about Government involvement in violence have already
been dealt with.
With regard to your allegations concerning the Government’s commitment
to genuine democracy, I should like to refer you to the substantial agreements
already reached in the Working Groups of Codesa. The fundamental difference
between the approach of the ANC and that of the Government regarding the
purpose of negotiations lies, on the one hand, in our commitment to constitutionality
and a transitional government as soon as possible; and on the other hand,
in the ANC’s insistence on an unstructured and immediate transfer of power
before a proper Transitional Constitution is negotiated.
Even after Codesa 2, our approach to transitional arrangements was again
explained to ANC representatives. Our proposals are in line with universally
accepted democratic principles. A summary of our approach can be found
in Annexure “F”, and in Annexure “B” allegations that
the Government is clinging to power are conclusively refuted.
Once again, the remaining differences between the ANC, the Government
and the other political parties on key constitutional questions make multi-party
negotiations more – and not less – imperative.
In our view what you are presenting as demands are issues that are being
tailored by the ANC to support its programme of mass mobilisation and to
justify the abortion of the negotiation process. All these issues could
have been suitably discussed at the negotiation table and it is imperative
that such discussions do take place to remove any misconceptions and misunderstanding.
It should be recorded that some of these have already been dealt with by
way of agreements, or have been dealt with by governmental measures. Annexure
“E” contains observations in this respect.
However we would like to comment in particular on the hostels and dangerous
The problems relating to the hostels have been the focus of much concern
and attention, but, as you are aware, it is an extremely complex situation
and although extensive deliberations and consultations have already taken
place, much work remains to be done. This is therefore an issue that we
would like to be given particular attention at our proposed meeting.
As regards dangerous weapons, weaponry and explosives measures have
been taken and adopted regarding the carrying and possession thereof. These
measures will be strictly enforced. Further regulations about the possession
and carrying of dangerous weapons are currently under consideration.
The carrying and possession of dangerous weapons should receive attention
when we meet, but particular attention must be given to the implementation
of measures relating to the illegal possession of firearms and explosives,
and the introduction of such weapons into the country. The AK47 has become
the symbol of political and criminal violence and firearms are the weapons
mainly used to kill political opponents and to perpetrate criminal violence.
Ways and means must be found to ensure that this problem is resolved and
we must discuss this issue when the leaders of the Government, the ANC
and the IFP meet. Until integral part of the problem of violence that it
can no longer remain solely on a bilateral agenda.
I reiterate the Government’s commitment to peaceful negotiations as
the only way to bring us to a new democratic constitution as soon as possible.
I repeat my proposal that we should meet urgently for fundamental discussions,
especially on the abovementioned four issues.
F W DE KLERK
THE CURRENT INFLUENCE OF MARXISM-LENINISM WITHIN THE ANC
1. Despite initiatives to become more independent, the SACP still has
a close relationship with the ANC, which not only enables its members to
constantly influence ANC strategy, but creates a climate conducive to radical
and militant thinking during a phase in which negotiation and reconciliation
should be a priority. In fact, the SACP lends so much support to initiatives
to influenceand even transform the ANC, that it seems that its independent
profile serves only to draw attention away from its primary revolutionary
strategising role within the ANC.
2. It is clear that the SACP, COSATU and individuals within the ANC
still pursue outdated tactical communist doctrines and objectives. The
question arises whether the ANC is not becoming a captive of these forces.
The SACP furthermore still regards a socialist system as only a necessary
phase towards realising an eventual communist system. It should be obvious
that these objectives and the prominent position of their proponents within
the ANC cast doubt on the real character of the ANC.
3. There can be no doubt that both the SACP and COSATU were, in their
individual and collective capacity, instrumental in a number of recent
crucial ANC decisions regarding the negotiation process. These decisions
followed intense deliberations between SACP and COSATU members and were
clearly the result of specific guidelines drawn up by the SACP/COSATU.
The following examples are relevant in this regard:
The ANC’s decision to implement a programme of mass action in order
to force the Government to meet certain bottom lines and/or to transfer
power to the ANC.
The ANC’s attempts to deadlock Codesa.
The ANC’s decision to suspend negotiations notwithstanding opposition
within both the NEC and the so-called Codesa PF.
4. As South Africa moves towards a new democratic order, the strategy
and policy of various revolutionaries within the ANC Alliance are increasingly
in conflict with internationally accepted norms. For example, to regard
negotiation in principle as a “terrain of struggle” undermines
the essence of the concept itself. In the final instance it gives rise
to concern that the ANC allows these influences to flourish when these
forces are already committed to extra- parliamentary struggle against the
new dispensation that the ANC is propagating. This extraordinary approach
underlines the fact that revolutionary ethics generally overrule all other
principles, and are therefore incompatible with democracy.
PERCEPTIONS REGARDING THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS
1. When the process of negotiation was initiated by the Government,
it was clearly stated that its aim was to extend democracy to the whole
of the South African nation. It was also made clear that a fundamental
and sincere policy decision had been taken by the governing National Party,
fully endorsed by its supporters and many others, to remove racial discrimination,
to abolish apartheid and to be instrumental in the establishment of a constitutional
state in the new South Africa in which all citizens would be equal and
justice would reign supreme.
2. This approach will require a restructuring of government and society
on an immense scale. Hardly any sphere of life, any element of administration
or any aspect of politics has been or will be left untouched by the processes
of constitutional change. It would therefore be irresponsible to advocate
less than an orderly, albeit urgent, process of transition from present
structures, administrations politics and processes to those of a responsibly
negotiated new dispensation. That is why, as a first priority, the Codesa
negotiation process focused on transitional arrangements whereby those
not now represented in government could become involved.
3. The ANC, on the other hand, has been advocating a sudden plunge,
virtually without preparation, into simple majoritarianism. The Government
responsibly insists upon the replacement of the present dispensation with
a fully functional and comprehensive Transitional Constitution providing
for proper curbs on the misuse of power during the sensitive period of
transition to an eventual constitution. It appears that the ANC wants to
avoid proper checks and balances on a “Constituent Assembly”,
which, according to a fair construction of the ANC’s views, will function
in a constitutional void after the destruction of the present dispensation.
To accede to such a demand founded on revolutionary thinking would be irresponsible
on the part of the Government. The unreasonableness of the ANC in this
regard is the real obstacle to progress in constitutional negotiations.
Further negotiation on the details of a transitional dispensation with
the purpose of extending democracy to all South Africans and to bring social
and economic stability to the nation, must be the priority of negotiating
parties having the well-being of all South Africans at heart.
4. Given the initiatives that the Government has taken over the past
years and the structures created, financed and managed for the purposes
of sober negotiation and the restoration of social peace, it is invidious
and entirely unconvincing to accuse us of attempting to cling to power
in an undemocratic manner. After all, we express our proposals for a transitional
dispensation in terms of power sharing and fully accept that such political
parties as may be capable of demonstrating substantial support in a democratic
election, must not merely be present in the decision-making processes,
but must also have meaningful influence under a transitional constitution.
5. The progress that was made in the various working groups of Codesa
is indeed impressive even in summary. Key elements of agreements which
were endorsed by the ANC negotiators as well, include the following:
“A climate for free political participation is an essential element
of the transitional phase towards and in a democratic South Africa”.
(Working Group l Report, par 18.104.22.168)
Political intimidation must be terminated. This means “any action
or set of actions committed by any … organisation … that is designed
by the use or the threat of use of force or violence to disrupt or interfere
with the legal rights of an individual, inter alia … the right of freedom
of movement.” (Working Group 1 Report, par 7.2)
A reaffirmation of the National Peace Accord. (Working Group 1 Report,
“Political parties and organisations should have fair access to
public facilities and venues without discrimination”. (Working Group
1 Report, par 14)
¥Codesa should draw up a transitional constitution. (Working Group
2 Steering Committee Proposal of 13 May 1992)
The Transitional Constitution should provide for a bicameral Parliament
elected by universal adult suffrage, proportional representation being
the basis for the election of one Chamber; a multi-party executive; the
separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers; a justiciable
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the establishment of the boundaries,
powers, duties and functions of a regional government structure and its
entrenchment in the Transitional Constitution. (Working Group 2 Steering
Committee Proposal of 13 May 1992)
¥The establishment and detailed structuring of a Transitional Executive
Structure for the purposes of preparing the ground for the institution
of a transitional dispensation was fully agreed upon by Working Group 3.
The principle of and some details concerning the re-incorporation of
the TBVC states was agreed upon by Working Group 4.
6. The Government at all times made it clear that it was willing and
eager to support and promote progress in the negotiation process, whereas
the ANC has lately derailed Codesa 2, reintroduced “mass action”
to a tense and suffering society as a form of “struggle”, and
is now making demands in a threatening manner apparently in order to coerce
the Government into- irresponsible concessions that could not be negotiated
with the parties in Codesa.
7. An honest analysis of the events leading to the present impasse makes
it clear that the ANC is responsible for obstructing the negotiation process,
which was progressing extremely well until shortly before Codesa 2. It
would appear that the ANC found shortly before Codesa 2, that such progress
did not serve its political purposes, and therefore insisted upon driving
Working Group 2 to a point where agreement to its proposals or none at
all in the whole of Codesa was demanded. The ANC’s perception, it would
seem, was that its purpose of an unqualified take-over of power would not
be served by the reasonable agreements in Codesa that were ready to be
8. The Government firmly believes in democracy. We maintain that democracy
entails universal adult suffrage and majority decision-making procedures.
However, to suggest as the ANC does, that simple majority decision-making
is the sole essential feature of modern democracy, is over-extending the
notion. A far more fundamental feature of modern democratic states is the
extent to which all citizens enjoy meaningful participation and fair representation
in government institutions.
9. It is not democratic to attempt to deny meaningful political segments
of society access to assemblies tasked with the determination of their
future. Furthermore the Government does not accept the ANC’s reduction
of South African politics to a battle between Black and White. This reduction
ironically exposes the ANC’s approach to be founded upon outdated racial
10. The perception that the road to democracy is simple, is a dangerous
one. The approach that mere majoritarianism is sufficient will not bring
peace to our land. It is the Government’s opinion that participation and
representation, and not majority domination, however structured, are the
building blocks of a democratic future. In a country whose human wealth
lies precisely in the diversity of its population, the exclusion of significant
minority political parties from decision-making regarding a matter as fundamental
as the terms of a future constitution would be courting disaster.
11. Modern democracy goes beyond the mere identification of the majority:
it is equally concerned with the protection of minorities against possible
excesses of the majority. Universally acknowledged constitutional mechanisms
like bicameralism, regional autonomy (federalism), effective proportional
participation in government by all significant parties and enforceable
and justiciable fundamental rights entrenched in the constitution, serve
precisely the purpose of curbing majority domination. It is significant
that the Government has been advocating these and the other elements of
the constitutional state, while the ANC was prepared to derail Codesa 2
on the grounds of rejecting such mechanisms of modem democracy which had
virtually been agreed upon for the transitional dispensation.
12. A healthy and responsible administration constructed on the basis
of the effective representation of all meaningful political parties and
providing for their participation in the process of government is surely
in the national interest. On the other hand, a constitution in which politically
meaningful elements of society had no say, would in all probability lead
to political instability of no mean proportion. The ANC seems to be bent
on such a disastrous outcome.
THE ANC AS A NEGOTIATING PARTNER
1. The Government believes that a sound foundation for at least a mutually
acceptable process was laid at the Groote Schuur and subsequent bilateral
agreements which, besides reflecting a clearly identifiable spirit, also
contained the following:
“The Government and the ANC agree on a common commitment towards
the resolution of the existing climate of violence and intimidation from
whatever quarter as well as a commitment to stability and to a peaceful
process of negotiations” (Groote Schuur Minute).
“Both parties committed themselves to take steps and measures
to normalise and stabilise the situation, within the spirit of mutual confidence
that exist between the leaders ….” (Pretoria Minute).
“The right of the broad population to make their views known through
It was further agreed that violence and intimidation, from whatever
quarter, that form part of mass action, should be eliminated.
Further agreed that peaceful political activities and stability should
be promoted (DF Malan Accord).
Despite these agreements and the spirit in which they were concluded,
the ANC at regular intervals started using threats and ultimatums as part
of its political approach, which from the start had a detrimental and erosive
effect on the mutual trust that was beginning to develop. The ANC do have
a bad track record in maintaining agreements and can be considered an unreliable
2. Therefore the decision of the ANC NEC on 24 June 1992, in collaboration
with its Alliance partners, to suspend negotiations, is viewed as only
the most recent of a range of similar past decisions which further contributed
to the creation of negative perceptions regarding the ANC’s approach to
negotiations per se and as a process. The perception that has been
created includes indications that:
The ANC is committed to negotiations only to the extent that its own
objectives are served.
The ANC readily enters into agreements but is not committed to supporting
the practical implementation of such agreements.
The ANC is using extremely coercive negotiation tactics, including
ultimatums, deadlocks, threats, reneging on agreements, and projecting
unrealistic time-frames, etc, almost every time it becomes apparent that
genuine compromise on a give-and-take basis is in the offing.
3. The South African Government remains responsible for the maintenance
of law and order in South Africa. It is however a truism, conveniently
disregarded in the ANC’s statements, that to disrupt law and order is simple,
but to restore and maintain it with finite resources, is always problematic.
Therefore the Government is concerned about the high level of violence
in certain parts of our country. The Government regards existing bilateral
(Groote Schuur Minute, Pretoria Minute, D F Malan Accord) and multi-lateral
(National Peace Accord, Declaration of Intent) agreements as important
instruments in preventing and curbing the violence and finding permanent
solutions to the problems facing South Africa. The Government endorses
the contents of these agreements. Nothing will however be achieved without
mutual trust existing between the parties. The ANC and its allies have
violated these agreements, the following being examples:
Paragraph 2.4 of the National Peace Accord states as follows:
“All political parties and organisations shall respect and give
effect to the obligation to refrain from incitement to violence or hatred.
In pursuit hereof no language calculated or likely to incite violence or
hatred, including that directed against any political party or personality,
nor any wilfully false allegation, shall be used at any political meeting,
nor shall pamphlets, posters or other written material containing such
language be prepared or circulated, either in the name of any party, or
In contravention of this agreement numerous inflammatory statements
have been made by many ANC leaders, especially in the recent past. Language
likely to incite violence and hatred is constantly used. False allegations
are made and pamphlets and posters contravening these agreements abound.
For the period November 1991 to June 1992, the ANC was responsible for
186 recorded breaches of the National Peace Accord and the D F Malan Accord.
4. The ANC, by starting planning for mass action even before it became
clear that a deadlock might develop at Codesa, reneging on all Working
Group agreements on the basis that there was no agreement if all agreements
were not accepted, as well as suspending negotiations, cannot but further
compound the already negative perceptions surrounding the organisation’s
approach to negotiations.
5. From these and other decisions and actions by the ANC, in conjunction
with its Alliance partners, it can only be deduced that the ANC is indeed
negatively viewing negotiations as an “area of struggle”, and
even as a battle in the “struggle” that must be won at all costs.
If this is indeed the case, then it is clear that in the ANC’s current
view of negotiations there is no room for compromise, much less for mutually
VIEWS ON THE CURRENT VIOLENCE
1. The South African Government remains responsible for the maintenance
of law and order in South Africa. It does, and has been doing, everything
possible within its power and within the existing political climate to
address this scourge that has descended on our country.
2. The Government is however not the only role player in this regard.
It is the responsibility of every individual, organisation, party and leader
(whether political or otherwise) to strive for stability.
3.The appalling events at Boipatong on 17 June 1992 have once again
shown that the situation in South Africa is highly volatile and accompanied
by a vicious spiral of violence and counter-violence.
4. The Government wishes to state categorically that, contrary to ANC
claims, the Government does not plan, conduct, orchestrate or sponsor violence
in any form whatsoever, against any political organisation or community.
5. The time has come for the ANC in particular, but also for other political
groups, to recognise the fact that policies aimed at gaining a monopoly
on power in themselves promote violence.
6. The Second Interim Report of the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry
quite correctly stated that the causes of violence are numerous and complex.
However the ANC has to date not acknowledged its involvement in violence,
and as far as the Government is aware has consequently taken little constructive
action to curb violence. As a matter of fact, the ANC is guilty of selective
quoting from the above report. It never refers to criticism of the ANC
by the Commission but uses the Commission to put the blame for violence
on other parties. The Government takes a serious view of the criticism
in the Goldstone Commission report, but expects the ANC to do the same.
7 The question may also be asked: to what extent does the ANC’s non-
compliance with the various accords, in particular the National Peace Accord,
contribute to the web of violence in which South Africa is entangled ?
“On the other hand the Government regards the existing bilateral and
multi-lateral agreements, especially the National Peace Accord and the
Codesa Declaration of Intent, as important instruments for curbing violence
and finding permanent solutions to the problems facing South Africa and
8. The ANC’s direct and indirect involvement in the creation of a climate
conducive to violence gives rise to the question whether the ANC was ever
fully committed to the National Peace Accord, in particular to paragraph
2.4, which reads as follows:
“All political parties and organisations shall respect and give
effect to the obligation to refrain from incitement to violence or hatred.
In pursuit hereof no language calculated or likely to incite violence or
hatred, including that directed against any political party or personality,
nor any wilfully false allegation, shall be used at any political meeting,
nor shall pamphlets, posters or other written material containing such
language be prepared or circulated, either in the name of any party, or
In this regard the following statements by prominent ANC leaders are
Mr Harry Gwala admitted that the ANC is fighting a war and that the
ANC is killing IFP “warlords” and their associates (Natal
Witness, 29 April 1992).
On 26 April 1992 Mr George Mathusa (Chairman of the ANC in the Western
Transvaal) vowed that Bophuthatswana would be made ungovernable through
necklace killings and bombs. Addressing people at a funeral service Mr
Mathusa said: “In South Africa we did it through our necklaces and
bombs, we can easily repeat it here.” (Cape Times, 27 April
In The Citizen of 23 May 1992 it is reported that Mr Nelson
Mandela said in Helsinki that President De Klerk was involved in the violence
in which almost 1 000 people in South Africa have been killed this year.
Mr Mandela told a news conference that it was a serious responsibility
to accuse a Head of State of fuelling the violence and the killing of innocent
people, but that facts indicated that President De Klerk was involved in
In The Citizen of 25 May 1992, it was stated that Mr Mandela,
in Geneva, likened the violence in South Africa to the killing of Jews
in Nazi Germany.
On 16 June 1992 at the Dan Qeqe Stadium, Zwide, Port Elizabeth, Mr
Harry Gwala stated inter alia:
“If the only way to our freedom is through bloodletting, so let it
be and if we all perish let that happen.” He said those who believed
the time for armed struggle was over were seriously mistaken, ….(EP
Herald, 17 June 1992).
9. The Government recognises that the ANC’s suspension of armed action
on 6 August 1990 was taken in the interest of a peaceful transition in
South Africa. Unfortunately, this has had no marked effect on violence.
Since the suspension of armed action. numerous cases of MK involvement
in establishing self-defence units and renegade self-defence units, as
well as armed crimes by MK members, have occurred. Numerous ANC arms caches
– in violation of the provisions of the DF Malan Accord – still exist.
For example 13 MK arms caches have been uncovered since 2 February 1990.
Considering the well documented lack of discipline that MK members have
demonstrated, both locally and in foreign countries in the past, the Government
must inevitably ask whether the ANC still has any control over arms caches
and how many of the murder weapons presently being traded to the highest
bidder, originate from ANC caches.
10. The Government finds it contradictory that the ANC’s answer to violence
is the formation of so-called self-defence units, which eventually become
uncontrollable, as in the case of Phola Park. It is well known that these
self-defence units are themselves major contributors to violence.
11. Another urgent matter is the question of how many incidents of violence
can be ascribed to ANC members masquerading as members of the Security
Forces. Taking the two recent incidents in this regard into account, the
question also arises whether actions such as these are official ANC policy
or reflect a lack of control over ANC members.
12. The ANC owes the people of South Africa an explanation for the extreme
forms of violence perpetrated against its own dissenting members in detention
camps. Since South Africans were involved and since Codesa (Working Group
1) has interested itself in this issue, all investigations and findings,
notably the ANC’s own commission’s report, should be tabled – preferably
13. The ANC’s history of violence, and its murder of innocent civilian
men, women and children, its barbaric extrajudicial “necklace”
executions, the torture and murder in its detention camps and its total
disregard for the consequences of mass action, remove whatever moral base
it may have had to point fingers at others concerning the violence. Most
of the perpetrators of the atrocities mentioned are still at large and
the dossiers are still open.
14. It is clear, in order to escape their own involvement in violence,
that the ANC blames other political parties, the Government and the Security
Forces for the violence. What is particularly reprehensible is to blame
the State President – the very man who started the negotiation and National
Peace Accord processes.
15. There is a clear strategy of discrediting the Security Forces. This
statement is made due to the following supporting facts:
Complainants in criminal cases are often influenced by the ANC not
to co-operate with the SAP.
Unfounded allegations are presented as facts to create the perception
that the SAP, in particular, is biased and takes part in violent action.
16. In conclusion, the ANC has to account for its direct and indirect
involvement in the more than 30 000 incidents of violence since February
1990, and the murder of over 6 000 persons during the same period. Likewise
the ANC must also answer the question as to what extent its calls for attacks
on Security Force members in the 1980’s, and which have never been withdrawn,
contributed to the deaths of over 90 members of the SAP in acts of violence
since January 1992 alone.
17. When is the ANC going to transform itself from a liberation movement
to a conventional political party, and thereby shed its image as a violent
THE DEMANDS OF THE ANC
1. How the interruption of the negotiation process can be brought to
an end, how the demands of the ANC can be dealt with to achieve this end,
and how the negotiation process can be structured so as to ensure progress
and avoid similar interruptions in future, are matters that should be discussed
and deliberated upon at the proposed meeting between the ANC and the Government.
What follows are observations about certain aspects of the statement of
the ANC on 23 June 1992, and of the Memorandum of 26 June 1992 from Mr
Mandela to Mr F W de Klerk.
2. All the information at our disposal points inevitably to the conclusion
that factions within the SACP and the ANC were not happy with what was
being negotiated at Codesa and that they initiated, before Codesa 2, a
strategy to abort the negotiation process by deliberately creating a deadlock
and by reverting to the pursuance of their own goals by way of what is
euphemistically called mass action, but what is in reality physical confrontational
action. This is our perception of what has happened and this is the only
interpretation that can be placed on “demands” backed up by threats
to completely destabilise South Africa if these demands are not met. In
our view, mass mobilisation and activation with the war-talk presently
being built into these can only be described as reckless given the existing
climate of violence.
3. A second leg of this strategy is that at the same time the ANC has
also been using mass action and confrontational politics to mobilise support
when they registered that their support base was dwindling. This has been
happening in spite of the ANC’s undemocratic and violent isolation of areas
they have taken control of, against all other political parties or viewpoints.
They simply do not seem able to adjust to a democratic political process
where the people are allowed to listen to the points of view of all the
other parties and then to make up their own minds whom they would like
to support. We have experienced the violent excluding actions of the ANC
and have been informed that these were not isolated incidents but firm
policy. Many examples of such “no go” areas for other political
parties can be cited. 4. Observations on Aspects of the Memorandum:
4.1 Par 1.2 to 1.5 (The Government is blamed for the crisis
in the negotiation process and accused of minimising the crisis):
The Government is not trying to minimise the seriousness of the situation.
We are convinced that the ANC/SACP tried to engineer a crisis. What other
interpretation can be placed on the withdrawal of the ANC from Codesa and
from bilateral negotiations? That is how a crisis is created, not how it
4.2 Par 2 (The Government is accused of ignoring democratic
principles and of trying to build a white minority veto into the political
process and constitutional structures):
The constitutional negotiation process leading up to the ANC-created
deadlock is dealt with in another annexure. What follows are examples of
inconsistencies in the Memorandum:
2.5 According to figures of the Development Bank of Southern Africa
approximately 23 million people will be able to vote in 1993 in an election
for a constituent assembly/transitional government. Of those only 4 million
(17%) will be white voters who will probably be voting for different parties.
How can a 70 or 75% majority requirement possibly amount to a white veto?
2.6 Here the deadlock is attributed to the Government’s supposed insistence
on a minority veto (whatever that may mean); but the ANC itself is proposing
a sixty-six per cent majority. There is therefore agreement on the principle
that a constitution should not be created by a mere majority but should
rather have “overwhelming” support.
2.10 to 2.13 Here the ANC aligns itself behind the principle that constitution
making should be a unifying and legitimising process which should enjoy
overwhelming support. This is the guiding principle underlying the Government’s
approach to the process. This is why the Government wants as many parties
and interests as possible to be part of the constitution-making process.
The product of the process, the new constitution, must be accepted and
supported by all; it should not be a constitution enacted by a majority
in a constituent assembly elected on party political issues.
4.3 Par 3 (The Government is blamed for all violence and [read
with the NEC statement accused of pursuing a strategy embracing negotiations
together with systematic covert action, including murder, involving security
forces and surrogates):
Nothing in this whole paragraph even attempts to support the bizarre
and completely unfounded opening sentence of the ANC Statement. The whole
paragraph is blatant propaganda rhetoric containing factual inaccuracies
and distortions. Thus it is not true that the majority of deaths have been
caused by “cultural weapons”. There is also a distorted description
of police investigations, while the ANC itself has been intimidating Boipatong
residents from talking to the police. The ANC has also not once fulfilled
its obligation under the Peace Accord to assist the police in their investigations
when ANC members have been involved in atrocities. Compare this with the
numerous instances when the criminal acts by security force members were
investigated, prosecuted and punished. Apartheid is blamed for the current
violence, while the ANC’s history of political intolerance and violence
and atrocities against mainly black political opponents over more than
a decade is ignored. The difference is that the Government has rid itself
and the country of-apartheid but the ANC has not been able to adjust to
democratic political competition.
4.4 Par 3.3 (The Government is blamed for legalising the carrying
of dangerous weapons)
In terms of the National Peace Accord the parties agreed that no weapons
or firearms may be possessed, carried or displayed by members of the general
public attending any political gathering, procession or meeting. The Government
has subsequently honoured its obligation in terms of the National Peace
Accord by issuing the relevant proclamations after consultation with political
parties, ie the ANC and IFP. On 28 February 1992 a prohibition was issued
in term of Section 2(2) of the Dangerous Weapons Act, 1968, prohibiting
any person attending or participating in a political gathering at any public
place to be in possession of any dangerous weapon which clearly includes
Other steps taken by the Government are as follows:
On 19 March 1992 a further prohibition was issued in terms of the Dangerous
Weapons Act, 1968, prohibiting a person from being in possession of any
dangerous weapon at any property of the South African Rail Commuter Corporation
Limited. Objects, including so- called traditional weapons, which are to
be regarded as dangerous weapons, are explicitly listed.
Various prohibitions concerning dangerous weapons were issued under
the Unrest Regulations in terms of the Public Safety Act, 1953. Provision
was also made for an additional substantial prohibition with regard to
The Government is presently preparing draft regulations in terms of
which the possession and carrying of all dangerous weapons at any public
place may be absolutely banned. As the need may arise these regulations
will be implemented in areas declared to be unrest areas.
5. The Demands
In preparation for the discussion of the demands, the following observations
are made and need to be dealt with in such discussions:
The Government will do whatever it can, without departing from its
principles and ideals, to get negotiations, both bilateral and in Codesa,
on track again.
Fourteen issues have been identified:
Re the issues of a constituent assembly and an interim government
of national unity. In Codesa complete agreement was reached on the
broad structure of transitional arrangements, including a transitional
executive council, an independent electoral commission and a constitution-making
body within the framework of an elected transitional government. The Government
has therefore already agreed, in Codesa together with the other parties,
to that which is now demanded. What the Government was not prepared to
agree to was an appointed, as opposed to an elected, interim government.
If there are any misunderstandings on these issues, the Government would
like to discuss these when we meet.
Re the issues of covert operations, special forces, prosecution of
Security Force personnel and repression in Self-governing States. These
demands are introduced with a general demand that the “regime must
immediately end its campaign of terror against the people and the democratic
movement”. This is a demand that cannot be met simply because there
is no such campaign of terror; and the ANC knows this. The Government is
however agreeable to discussing once again the specific issues mentioned,
but will also want to discuss the ANC’s own contribution to political and
other violence and to explore ways and means of bringing that to an end.
Re the issues concerning hostels. The Government is concerned
about the hostel situation and has therefore approved a comprehensive hostel
strategy. The aim of this strategy is to create humane living conditions
for the hostel dwellers by means of upgrading the hostels or converting
them into family units. The upgrading/conversion will however be based
on consensus reached after negotiation between the hostel dwellers, surrounding
town residents, the owners and all other concerned parties such as political
groupings, civic organisations, trade unions, employers etc. A peaceful
resolution of the issue is therefore not possible without consensus amongst
the parties directly involved at local level. In its memorandum to the
Government, the ANC attached a document dealing with the problem of the
KwaMadala hostel an in which many allegations were made against a number
of individuals and organisations. It is clear that factual disputes will
arise. As the Goldstone Commission is currently investigating the Boipatong
incident, it is suggested that any findings concerning these allegations
be left to the Commission.
Re the issue of dangerous weapons. The carrying of dangerous
weapons has already been dealt with but can be further discussed. The Government
would also want to discuss the application of measure to counter the illegal
possession of all dangerous weapons, including fire-arms and explosives,
and ways and means of stopping the introduction of such weapons into South
Africa and of ensuring that such weapons are not used in the perpetration
of political and criminal violence. Contrary to the ANC’s allegations,
these are mainly the weapons used to kill political opponents and to perpetrate
Re the issues of international involvement, “political prisoners”
and “repressive” legislation. Although grouped together by
the ANC, these demands concern three separate issues. two of which namely
“political prisoners” and “repressive” legislation,
have already been the subject of extensive agreement. These two can nevertheless
be further discussed and so can the third issue, namely ways and means
of arriving at the truth about the Boipatong massacre and other acts of
violence; and ways and means of preventing such occurrences in future together
with the role the international community can play in this regard. With
regard to these issues the Government would like to elaborate as follows:
The Goldstone commission charged with investigating the Boipatong case
involved interactional assistance to assess and evaluate. The Government
wishes to reiterate its abhorrence of all the events surrounding the Boipatong
incident and trusts that justice will prevail in the shortest possible
time. At the same time the Government wishes to express its grave concern
over newspaper reports to the effect that witnesses were instructed not
to co-operate with the SAP in its investigation.
The Government has fulfilled its obligations under the various agreements
resulting in the release of a very large number of prisoners. What is now
disputed is the release of a number of prisoners who have committed common
law crimes such as murder and whom the Government maintains fall outside
the ambit of the agreed definition on guideline for identification of political
prisoners. Yet the Government (and the ANC) have agreed at Codesa working
Group 1 that a task group consider the identification of such prisoners,
and the definition of “political prisoners”.
Apart from the above, the Government and the ANC have been involved
over a long period in bilateral talks on a number of issues identified
as far back as the Pretoria Minute, which should and could be finalised
in one single agreement with a multilateral effect, including the disputed
prisoners; the lack of indemnity for MK and senior officials of the ANC;
the future of MK; and the arms caches. Ancillary issues such as the question
of treatment of former detainees in ANC camps abroad and whether such camps
still exist will possibly have to be addressed.
Working Group 1 has made extensive unanimous recommendations in regard
to security and emergency affairs at Codesa 2. The ANC’s inexplicable delaying
tactics are keeping these issues alive. The Government can not possibly
abrogate its duty to govern and to take steps to reduce the level of violence,
intimidation and crime. In this regard reference is made to legislation
passed recently in Parliament, pertaining inter alia to illicit trafficking
in arms and ammunition, usurping police and military powers, violence and
intimidation, drugs and drug related crimes.
6. In conclusion, withdrawing from negotiations, especially from
Codesa, cannot contribute to the resolution of any of these issues. The
Government is only one of nineteen parties in Codesa. How can the ANC justify
the deliberate wrecking of Codesa by putting demands to the Government?
What better forum is there for putting its demands, if this is what it
really wants to do, than Codesa itself.
GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS REGARDING A TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTION FOR SOUTH
PRINCIPLES GOVERNING A TRANSITIONAL DISPENSATION
The Transitional Constitution must be a complete constitution.
The Transitional Constitution must effect the fundamental replacement
of the principles of the current Westminster system with those of a Constitutional
The diversity of interests existing in the South African community
must be accommodated in the Transitional Constitution.
The further restructuring of the second and third tiers of government
must be facilitated by the Transitional Constitution.
The Transitional Constitution must satisfactorily underpin the maintenance
of order and stability.
MAIN FEATURES OF A TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTION
The following are the main elements of the Transitional Constitution
proposed by the Government:
A Parliament consisting of a National Assembly and a Senate
An Executive Council directly elected by all the voters
A Cabinet appointed by the Executive Council
An independent judiciary, with judges being appointed by a non-political
A justiciable Charter of Fundamental Rights
Autonomous regional government
Autonomous local government
Special provisions regarding the following functionaries and institutions
in order to safeguard them against political manipulation:
The South African Defence Force
The South African Police
An independent Auditor-General
An independent Ombudsman
An independent Commission for Administration
The entrenchment of constitution-related legislation (such as electoral
laws, laws concerning the courts and laws applicable to the Public Service)
and of other laws such as those relating to existing pension rights and
laws regulating standards for public offices and professions.
REPLACEMENT OF THE TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTION
For the amendment or substitution of the Transitional Constitution
a majority of 70% will be required and 75% for the Charter of Fundamental
If the Transitional Constitution has not been replaced within three
years, a general election will be held in terms of the Transitional Constitution.
The Transitional Constitution will be amended or replaced only within
the framework of general constitutional principles as agreed upon at CODESA,
and the Constitutional Chamber of the Appellate Division must certify this
to be the case.
The following must, inter alia, be enshrined as general constitutional
The autonomy of civil society, ie the exclusion of interference by
the state in the affairs of the civil society, such as sport, culture,
professional life, religion. trade unionism and traditions.
Democratic standards to which political parties must conform.
The Transitional Constitution must itself also be drafted within the
framework of the agreed general constitutional principles, including the
The National Assembly
The Transitional Constitution will provide for a National Assembly
vested, together with a Senate, with legislative powers as well as the
power to amend and replace the Transitional Constitution by special majorities.
The National Assembly shall be elected proportionally by universal
adult suffrage according to the party list system.
The Transitional Constitution will provide for a Senate. An equal number
of members will be elected from each of the electoral regions that will
be delimited for this purpose, using the development regions as the point
of departure. Seats are allocated to a region in proportion to the party
support in that region.
Legislation may be initiated in the Senate and all laws must be approved
by both Houses. The Transitional Constitution will provide for mechanisms
for the resolution of differences between the Houses as well as for exceptions
in regard to specific subjects in respect of which the powers of the Senate
may be upgraded or downgraded (eg financial laws, laws relating to education
or specific regional matters).
When the Transitional Constitution is amended or replaced, the boundaries
of each region and its functions, powers and form of government will also
have to be approved by a majority of the representatives from each electoral
region that will be affected in each case.
There will be regional governments in the transitional dispensation.
Agreement must be reached regarding the powers, functions and boundaries
of regions and regional governments prior to the coming into operation
of the Transitional Constitution. Should the process of the full establishment
of the regional dispensation delay the implementation of the Transitional
Constitution, the finalisation of the boundaries and the implementation
of aspects of the system of regional government may be left to the Transitional
If some of the present regional authorities still exist when the Transitional
Constitution comes into effect, they will continue to exist for the time
being; provided that a TBVC state may participate in the transitional dispensation
by undergoing a transformation of status beforehand from independent state
to self- governing territory.
The autonomy of regions will consist in their powers, functions and
boundaries being derived originally from the Transitional Constitution
and will not be subject to amendment without the concurrence of the authorities
of the regions concerned.