South African’s National Liberation Movement

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Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)

Questions from the TRC to the ANC in response to the ANC first submission to the TRC

15 November 1996


In its submission the ANC uses a definition of gross human rights violations different from that in the legislation governing the TRC: “Actions carried out in the course of the just war of national liberation do not constitute gross violations of human rights” (page 18). This interpretation could restrict the cooperation of the ANC with the TRC to such acts which it perceives as being outside of the boundaries of the just war. It could also influence the “victim status” and the right to TRC reparations of victims.

  • Would the ANC be prepared to accept the broad definition of gross violations of human rights as stipulated for the TRC, not withstanding the fact that it does not take into account the morality of the struggle as perceived by the ANC (page 18)?

  • On page 18 of the submission it is requested that acts carried out by cadres or supporters of our movement falling within the ambit of the TRC, ie acts perceived as gross human rights violations, “must, nevertheless, be treated within the context [of the just war of national liberation].” What does the ANC mean by this, especially with regard to amnesty application.

  • It needs to be clarified whether the ANC`s call on its members to apply for amnesty is valid only to those who did not adhere to ANC policy vis-a-vis just war theory. Alternatively, does the ANC encourage all those who committed gross human rights violations as defined by the TRC to apply for amnesty?

  • How does the ANC communicate to its members, supporters or other freedom fighter the need to apply for amnesty, even if the individual acted in good faith.
  • A further clarification of the definition of a justified target is needed. The ANC quotes a pamphlet identifying justified targets (page 52) as “the racist army, police, death squads, agents and stooges in our midst”. Can this definition possibly be used to legitimise the killing of policemen, alleged informers, community councillors, and co-opted parliamentarians? Is there any other documentation or recorded instructions to further specify legitimate targets? Can the ANC elaborate what is meant by “stooges in our midst”?

    The ANC submission does not give detail about MK missions within the framework of the just war. For our research purposes we request information on scope and scale of legitimate MK operations. The information should contain type of action, time, damage caused, death or injuries to civilians and/or state agents, and chain of command. The victims classified as legitimate targets need to be specified (e.g. SAP, kitskonstables, SADF, community councillors). This information would include:

  • attacks on security force infrastructure, e.g. police stations, SADF bases etc
  • attacks on government administrative offices and institutions
  • attacks on individuals
  • landmine attacks
  • combat with SADF, SAP or other enemy units

    It is suggested that the ANC fought a relatively “clean war”. According to the ANC submission, attacks not in accordance with ANC policy became a trend in the late 80s (page 53). Some examples of such acts were illustrated in the submission.

  • Can the ANC give a full indication of the scope of such attacks, with particular attention to time and place, intended target, loss of live and injuries, type of victims and chain of command?

  • Can the ANC elaborate and substantiate efforts made to avoid such attacks on civilian targets? What steps were taken, after the incidents, to investigate them? Were ANC cadres disciplined for their involvement in such activities?

  • According to the submission (page 53) MK commanders were instructed to visit the forward areas to communicate ANC policy. Which commanders visited which forward areas and units inside SA, and with what results?

  • To what extent did militant rhetoric and ambiguous statements possibly lead to misinterpretations of ANC policy on soft targets?

    The submission gives a basic outline of the command structures of the ANC in exile (page 57). More elaborate information is needed with particular focus on

  • MK structures
  • Security department
  • Revolutionary Councils
  • Politico-Military Councils
  • Training camps
  • Somafco
  • Detention and rehabilitation centers, eg Quatro

    How did these sectors interact? What were informal and formal channels of communication? How did the ANC in exile communicate with structures on the ground inside SA? Who received reports on incidents of torture and execution?


  • The TRC request an indication of the sources used for the compilation of Appendix 2 of the ANC submission (List of ANC members who died in exile). What other material collected by the Bereaved Parents Committee would be valuable? Is the Committee still in existence? Who is (was) the chairperson? Could contacts of people who were involved in compiling information be provided?

  • Would the ANC be able to supply the TRC with the details of circumstances surrounding “mysterious deaths” of cadres in exile, e.g. the death of Nomava Ntshangase referred to on page 70?

  • Can the ANC supply any evidence substantiating the involvement of South African security forces in the death or disappearance of MK cadres and ANC members?

  • Can the ANC give more details on the failed attempt to negotiate an exchange of captured operatives with the South African government (page 73)? Who refused the exchange of captives?

  • Who were the alleged government agents? What happened to them until their release in 1990?

  • Can the ANC make available the videotape containing the confession of Patrick Dlongwana referred to on page 74? Is there any other similar material that could be useful to the TRC?

  • Can the ANC supply the TRC with the names of people who were wrongfully arrested referred to on page 69? Can the ANC document the nature of the apology, ie a letter or note etc.?

    In the executive summary (page 7), the ANC refers to the “counter-mobilisation” strategy. Chapter 4.9 (pages 42 – 45) elaborates on covert actions and state sanctioned activities.

  • Can the ANC provide documentation and evidence illustrating the restructuring of the NSMS and its subsequent activities (page 43 – 45).

  • Can further information on government front companies, such as Adult Education Consultants (page 45) be provided. Information indicating involvement in gross human rights violations is of particular information.

  • Does the ANC have records, documents or written evidence of the Xhosa-Resistance Movement (page 7)?

  • Does the ANC have evidence and documentation assisting an investigation on the assassination of Chris Hani (page 43)?

  • Can the ANC provide detailed information about the attempted food poisoning of 500 MK cadres in the Catengue camp in 1977 (page 8)? Who were the victims? What did they suffer as a result of the poisoning? What were the means of introducing the poison? What is the evidence leading to the perpetrators?

  • Can the ANC provide material about subsequent attempts to poison water and food in ANC camps?

  • Can the ANC throw new light on the death of Steve Biko by supplying information on the link between the ANC and Steve Biko (page 49)? What exact information did Carl Edwards and Craig Williamson have? How did the ANC obtain this knowledge?
  • Is it possible to provide more examples and evidence on “mistaken attacks” and more information on “false flag” necklaces and other attacks as outlined in pages 62-63?
  • Amongst the questions brought to attention of the TRC, agents network and infiltration of ANC, MK, SDUs and other community based organisations (page 82) are mentioned. Can the ANC supply material, evidence, contacts, and concrete examples to assist the TRC to address this matter?

  • Does the ANC have evidence of the infiltration of SDUs by “De Klerk regime” referred to on page 65?

    The TRC research and investigation departments follow up particular individual cases presented to the TRC. Individuals approaching the TRC have usually contacted the ANC already – usually Lusaka HQ or Shell House – but have not received adequate information. Whom can the TRC approach to get a detailed and speedy response on the fate of these people?


    There are allegations of human rights abuses before 1984. For example, the amnesty international report “South Africa; Torture, ill-treatment and executions in African National Congress camps” claims, “the security department of the ANC … throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s conducted crackdowns against alleged indiscipline, particularly the use of dagga (marihuana) by MK members and the expression of dissenting views”. In 1981 Oupa Moloi died as a result of ill-treatment at Camalundi camp. Amnesty International also refers to Morogoro camp, where people were detained and on occasions tortured during the 70s.

  • The ANC`s views on these allegations would be helpful.

  • Can documentation with regard to disciplinary problems and punishment be provided? Who executed such disciplinary sanction – MK structures or the security department?

  • Can incidents of alleged infiltrators and cadres defying authority be specified?

  • Was there an inquiry into the death of Oupa Moloi? If yes, can the documentation be made available?

    HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE 90`S Except for the section on SDUs, there is very little in the ANC`s submission that deals with the period 1990 – 1993.

  • Can the ANC elaborate, especially with regard to dealing with the IFP and the conflict in KwaZulu/Natal?

    It needs to be acknowledged that in making available the reports of the various commissions of inquiry, the ANC has released highly sensitive information to the public. This indicates a commitment to deal with wrongs of the past. Would the ANC be able to make available the full evidence put to these commissions? Question will certainly emerge from this evidence.

    In this context the TRC requests affidavits, memoranda, minutes, data files, information concerning identity of individuals, original edition of reports and recommendations, video material and transcripts associated with the following commissions of inquiry:

  • The Stuart Commission

  • The Skweyiya Commission (The confidential list of members of the ANC security department alleged to be responsible for the ill-treatment of detainees submitted to the President is of particular importance)

  • Inquiry into the Death of Thami Zulu

  • Motsuenyane Commission

  • Any other Commission of inquiry set up by the ANC

    Can the ANC supply the TRC with the following documents:

  • Planning for People`s War, produced in mid-1983 by Military Head Quarters

  • For the Sake of Our Lives which outlines the ANC`s approach on SDUs

  • The 1978 Politico-Military Strategy Commission report, also known as the Green Book/Thesis on our Strategic Line

    The TRC request personal detail – such as name, age, rank, training received – of the following ANC officials:

    before 1985

  • Composition of the Revolutionary Council from 1969 onwards
  • Heads of regional structures
  • Heads of military, security and political departments under the RC
  • Commanders of MK training camps, Samafco, and detention/rehabilitation centers, eg Quadro

    from 1985 – 90s

  • Representatives from the MHQ, PHQ and NAT on the Politco-Military Council
  • Representatives of the MHQ, PHQ and NAT on the all regional PMCs (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tansania, UK, Zambia and Zimbabwe
  • Representatives of the NAT Regional Directorate of the Internal Units or Operatives
  • Commanders of MK training camps, Samafco, and detention/rehabilitation centers (Quadro)

    The TRC request the following information

  • A list detailing the date of establishment and closure of all camps in exile

  • An indication of the number of cadres living at the camps at various times
    3. Questions raised by the IFP submission

    Except for the section on SDUs, there is very little in the ANC`s submission that deals with the period 1990 – 1993. There is very little information on the attitude of the ANC to the IFP – for example, was the IFP considered to be “the enemy” for military purposes, and if so, who within the IFP? Leadership? Armed members? Members of the KZP etc?

    More specifically:

  • What was the ANC`s strategy vis-a-vis the IFP, especially from 1979 onwards? Are there any documents emanating from military or intelligence structures about stategy towards the IFP, or any policy decisions taken by political structures which were not made public at the time?

  • How does the ANC respond to claims that MK – especially operating from the Transkei (presumably after Holomisa`s coming to power there) – was responsible for the killing or assassination of IFP office-bearers? (Especially in early 1990s)

  • How does the ANC respond to claims by the IFP about its involvement in gun-running?

  • How does the ANC respond to claims by the IFP that its Intelligence and Security Departments were involved in a campaign to “smear” the IFP?

  • The IFP refers to “internal violence” by activists in various ANC “front organisations”. What does the ANC think the IFP is referring to in this instance, and how does it respond?
    Questions on motives, context and perspective

    The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34, 1995 requires that we give expression in our Final Report to “the motives and perspectives” of persons involved. Our request is that you kindly make available to us a two to three-page statement on your views, motivations and perspectives on the nature of the South African conflict. We would like you to give expression again to the underlying ideology of your party. What were the values that inspired the leaders of your organisation over the years? What motivated the involvement of your followers? What inspired the sacrifices which many of your followers made? What drove those who (in the words of the Act) were “responsible for the commission of violations”? It is important for these views to be boldly, and yet sensitively, articulated in order to facilitate the reconciliation process.

    Questions concerning alleged infiltrators, dissidents and disciplinary offenders
    ANC Structures and Personnel
  • 1. What were the structures and reporting mechanism within the Security Department? According to the ANC, what were the shortcomings of this department, which possibly led to violations of human rights?

  • 2. What was the role of the National Security Council (NSC)? Which individuals sat on the Council in the 1980s and 1990s? Were the names of members kept secret? To what extent did this body deal with the allegations of violations of human rights?

  • 3. Who were the members of the Directorate of NAT in the 1980s and 1990s? Who served on the body? What were the functions of this body? To whom did it report? To what extent did this body deal with the allegations of violations of human rights?

  • 4. The TRC is interested in all tribunals, military or other, which had any bearing on human rights violations, i.e. those dealing with offenses constituting gross violations of human rights, those leading to corporal punishment or capital punishment, and those where the accused were possibly ill-treated. What was the structure of the National People`s Tribunal? The Motsuenyane Commission comes to the conclusion that other tribunals of a military nature existed. What were these?

  • 5. Please describe the proceedings of all these tribunals. Who sat on the various tribunals? What type of legal representation was available to the accused? What type of evidence was produced? When and where were these tribunals held? Can documentation on these questions be provided? Beyond these general questions, several questions arise concerning specific tribunals:

  • a) Who were those sentenced to death and executed in the tribunal after the 1981 infiltration of the ANC? Who was sentenced to death and executed? What other forms of punishment were handed down? The ANC submission admits some wrongful arrests in this case. Were there any wrongful or doubtful executions?

  • b) How many people were executed after the military tribunal following the Pango mutiny in 1984? The ANC submission mentions seven executions, Chris Hani referred to eighteen or nineteen executions in an interview with Work in Progress, No 82, p 20). The Amnesty International Report mentions a certain Mbumbulu and one Mahero as being executed. These names do not appear in Appendix 2 of the ANC submission. Can the identity of these people be established?

  • c) According to evidence given to the Skweyiya Commission by Mr Zola Skweyiya and Mr James Stuart, certain members of the security department appeared before tribunals and were disciplined (Skweyiya Commission, p 64). Who were the accused? What were the charges? Who was found guilty on what charges? What was the disciplinary action taken? Are there any other such disciplinary cases?

  • d) The Skweyiya Commission refers to certain tribunals chaired by James Stuart. Mr Stuart corroborated evidence that confessions were extracted under force and dismissed several cases on these grounds (p 55). When were these tribunals held? Can further detail be provided?

  • e) The Motsuenyane Commission refers to a tribunal held at Quadro in 1987, dealing with 32 – 35 cases. What was the outcome of these cases? Were there any executions? What was the history of the accused? For how long had they been imprisoned before trial?

  • 6. What role did the Review Board play? Who sat on this board? With which cases did they deal? Can documentation be produced?

  • 7. The Officer of Justice was instrumental in upholding a standard of human rights. What steps were undertaken to allow the Officer of Justice to perform his functions? What, according to the ANC, were the shortcomings of the work of the Officer of Justice? What was done to deal with the refusal of the Intelligence Department, especially Mzwai Piliso, to co-operate with the Officer of Justice? According to evidence by Mr Zola Skweyiya to the Skweyiya Commission, Mr Piliso prevented the Officer of Justice from visiting the camps, threatened him with arrest, and told him that he would never set foot in Angola. Was this reported to the NEC and suitably dealt with?

  • 8. The various commissions of inquiries point to systematic and widespread violations of human rights by the ANC security personnel, especially with the head of security (Mzwai Piliso) being directly involved. Such an example by leadership obviously creates room for a culture of abuse. Various reports refer to changes and improvements under the leadership of Joe Nhlanhla since 1987. What steps were taken to deal with shortcomings of the security department and allegations of human rights abuse after 1987?

  • 9. Critics of the ANC, from groups to “left” and “right” have suggested that the use of torture was caused not by inexperience and individual excesses, but rather as a consequence of the training of ANC security personnel by GDR and KGB officials. Comment is invited. To what extent was GRD and KGB training an integral part of ANC security policy? What initiatives, if any, where taken to counter undesirable aspects of such training, such as particular interrogation techniques (third degree interrogation), or methods dealing with infiltrators?

    Attempts to prevent abuses

  • 1. Which of the recommendations from the Stuart and Skweyiya Commission were implemented by the ANC? Two recommendations are of particular importance:

  • a) Were the “notorious” security branch members re-deployed as recommended by the Stuart and Skweyiya Commission? Can names and details of re-deployment be given?

  • b) Internal Commissions of Inquiry and Amnesty International recommended to the ANC to hold inquiries into allegations of killings, extra-legal executions, and disappearances. Why was the recommendation to establish a Commission to investigate the deaths of exiles not followed? For example, all Commissions of Inquiry and the Amnesty International report mention several deaths as result of corporal punishment. The Douglas Commission refers to executions at Camp 32 and dead bodies being buried at a Lusaka Revolutionary Council House.

  • 2. What interventions did the NEC initiate into cases of violations of the Code of Conduct? What interventions were made by individual ANC leaders? To whom would such occurrences have been reported? Is additional evidence of Thenjiwe Mthintso`s or other interventions to improve conditions in Ugandan prison camps (Skweyiya Commission) available? Amnesty International mentions Gertrude Shope as having intervened during the executions in Pango in 1984. Chris Hani claims that he intervened. What was the nature of these interventions? When and to whom did Comrade Mashingo give orders to prevent brutalities (Stuart Commission, p 12)? What were his exact orders? Who raised issues with the NEC and did the NEC deal with these matters?

  • 3. Did ANC leaders who visited some of the detention/rehabilitation centers report to the NEC about inadequate living conditions for detainees? For example, according to evidence, Chris Hani, Joe Modise and Joe Nhlanhla visited 69 prisoners at Bukoloto Camp in Uganda. Oliver Tambo, Joe Modise, Moses Mabhida, Thomas Nkobi, Alfred Nzo, Chris Hani and Andrew Masondo visited Morris Seabelo (Quadro) on one or more occasions. Andrew Masondo visited detainees in Nampula (Mozambique). Were the conditions which apparently amounted to gross human rights violations discussed by the NEC? If so, when was this and what action was taken? Can minutes be produced?

    Alleged responsibility for abuses

  • 1. Some high profile ANC officials, mainly Mzwai Piliso and Andrew Masondo were named by the Stuart and Skweyiya Commission as directly responsible for gross human rights violations.

    Mzwai Piliso, the Head of the Security Department, allegedly testified reluctantly to the Skweyiya Commission. Quote form Skweyiya Commission Report (p 61 – 62): `Mr Piliso was directly responsible for the establishment of Quatro. […] Mr Piliso candidly admitted his personal participation in the beating of suspects in 1981. A plot to assassinate certain senior ANC members had been uncovered and suspects were interrogated over a period of two weeks. These suspects were beaten on the soles of their feet in Mr Piliso`s presence. […] Mr Piliso justified this treatment on the bases that he wanted information and he wanted it, in his words, “at any cost”.` Mr Piliso also admitted beatings, strenuous interrogations and tying to trees to the Motsuenyane Commission.

    According to the Stuart Commission, Andrew Masondo, National Commissar, was aware of the deterioration in the camps, excesses of punishment were known to him and he failed to adopt corrective measures.

    Did the NEC take any action against Mr Masondo and Mr Piliso after receiving the Stuart and the Skweyiya Report? If so, what action was taken? How does the ANC justify that both officials retained senior positions within the ANC and positions in the new administration (A Masondo as Major-General in the SANDF, M Piliso as a senior ANC official in the Eastern Cape)?

  • 2. What disciplinary action did the ANC take against members, especially security personnel, who engaged in excesses?

    Civil authorities in Zambia and Tanzania prosecuted certain members of DIS for offences (Skweyiya, p 64). Who was prosecuted? When were these trials held? What were the charges? What was the outcome?

  • 3. The Motsuenyane Commission gives names of personnel who seem to be responsible for repeated gross violations of human rights? Could the ANC assist in establishing their identity (many are only mentioned under their code name) and assist the TRC in contacting some of them for research and investigative purposes? The following people were named:

    Quadro: Dan Mashigo, Kingsley, Fortunate, Donald, Stalin, Mayibuye, Fury, Stanley Brown, Sonwabo, Austin, Sipho Masela, Griffiths Sibone, Bheki, Lawrence Sekwalo, Maurice, Brian, Cetshwayo, Valody, Golden Rahupe alias Pro, Cooper, Kila, Sidney, Commissar Hammer, Camp Commander Johnson, Dextor Mbona, (Head of Security in Angola?)

    Lusaka: Steve, Gibson, BM, Basil Mavuso alias Jomo (apparently in 1993 Nelson Mandela`s bodyguard), Bongo, Kwesh Mokoena, Robert Moima, Stanley Brown, Jacob Sithole, JJ, Peter, Floyd Huna alias Spinks, Tim Williams, Gift, Willie

    Viana: Itumeleng, Africa

    Mazimbu: Gabriel Mthembu alias Sizwe Mkhonto, Keith Masemola, Doctor

    Specific issues concerning alleged abuses

  • 1. The ANC submission to the TRC expresses serious doubts about the validity of the evidence produced by the Douglas Commission and the allegation made by members of the Returned Exiles Coordinating Committee (RECOC). The ANC submission alleges that RECOC and the Douglas Commission were state sponsored campaigns to discredit the ANC. Can information to this extent be provided to assist the TRC in its investigations?

  • 2. The Skweyiya Commission reports that ANC prisoners were kept at Angolan State prisons, especially Nova Instalacao. The ANC Security Department allegedly had free access to these prisons, prisoners were apparently taken out of prisons and brutally interrogated. Evidence suggests that Angolan security guards participated in assaults. What was the relationship and the nature of official agreements between the ANC Security Department and Angolan authorities? Does the ANC have records of such imprisonments?

  • 3. The crushing of the mutiny in Pango in May 1984 gives rise to several questions:

    Appendix 2 of the ANC submission only mentions loyal cadres killed by mutineers. How many mutineers died in the mutiny? Who were they? Under what exact circumstances did they die? For example, the Stuart Commission gives detail about the shootings of Diliza Dumagude and Salier Janemzi at the hands of security personnel on 7 February 1984. At the plot, Khotso Morena was shot and seriously injured when running away after exploding a handgrenade. Were mutineers travelling to Viana ambushed by ANC officials? If yes, how many and who was injured or killed? How many prisoners were taken after the mutiny? How many of them were transferred to Morris Seabelo Rehabilitation Centre? The Skweyiya Commission describes incidents of torture and ill-treatment of the mutineers. What is the response of the ANC to this finding?

  • 4. A witness of the Douglas Commission alleges a mutiny in 1977, which was suppressed by Mr Ronnie Kasrils “by giving orders to an East German trained platoon to lock the comrades up”. Can problematic events involving dissatisfaction of cadres in 1977 be described? How was the matter dealt with?

  • 5. Who planned and conceptualised the establishment of Morris Seabelo Rehabilitation Centre? Why were the cells designed to be without windows and limited ventilation? Why were there no sanitation facilities planned and build for prisoners? What was the motivation behind the building of the Centre? Comment is invited on the allegation from some quarters that it was primarily a torture centre.

  • 6. Further information is requested on the death of Bartholomew Hlapane? Does the ANC take any responsibility for his death? In his autobiography, Joe Slovo said of Hlapane`s death: “In 1983 he was executed for his treachery by a unit of Umkhonto we Sizwe.” (Joe Slovo, “The Unfinished Autobiography”, p. 158)

    Questions related to the armed struggle and related matters

    Responsibility for armed attacks

  • 1. What was the level of ANC involvement in UDF structures at national and regional leadership level as well as in local affiliates? To what extent should ANC leadership take responsibility for acts of violence committed by UDF supporters (eg necklacings, petrol bomb attacks)?

  • 2. To what extent do MK commanders in the front line states take responsibility for actions – especially those involving civilian targets – of cadres inside the country? Discussion is invited on the chain of command.

  • 3. Did MK operatives submit reports after all actions? To whom would they be sent? Can the ANC submit such reports to the TRC?

    The question of “legitimate” targets

    1. In the ANC`s submission to the TRC the use of landmines is justified on the basis that the targeted rural areas were military zones. It is indicated that cadres tried to avoid placing them where civilian life could be lost. The international debate, however, portrays landmines as indiscriminate weapons. Casualties of such attacks often include children and other civilians. How many children, farm labourers, peasants and other civilians were killed by ANC landmines? What was done by the ANC to avoid such casualties?

    2. Can detail about the planning, chain of command and execution of the Ellis Park car bomb and limpet mine in Roodepoort in 1988 be provided? Did ANC leadership condone such action of killing and injuring civilians? Steve Tshwete appeared to defend the Roodepoort mine in an interview he and Chris Hani gave on 3 June 1988. Hani was asked if the implications of taking the war into white areas meant taking into places “where whites enjoy the good life.” His response included the following:

    `We shall select those targets which are within white areas and there is no way the whites won`t open their eyes and ears and hear an explosion or get to know that so-and-so has been eliminated by an MK unit because he is an officer in the special branch or the SADF. That is the kind of armed propaganda which shows that we can hit and that it is dangerous to hang around the Carlton Centre because there might be an office there that would be a target for the ANC. So the best thing is to move and to barricade myself in my nice house in lower Houghton.`

    Steve Tshwete then added: “Or even to hang around Standard Bank as was the case with the Roodepoort bomb because there might be an office of the security branch on the top floor of the Standard Bank.”

    This seems to imply that any inner city location could represent a legitimate target because of the possibility that the police or army might have located an office in an ostensibly innocuous-looking building. Did such statements not confuse the definition of a legitimate target? Were there different perceptions on the definition of a legitimate targets among ANC leaders?

    Violence between 1990 and 1994

  • 1. The submission showed limited focus on the 1990-1994 conflict. It is clearly stated that violence was largely due to Third Force activity. While this may be true, indications are that ANC members and cadres were involved in the ongoing conflict. What level of responsibility should ANC leadership take for these actions?

  • 2. The ANC submission deals with the formation and in some cases the “subversion” of SDUs in Gauteng after 1990. Is there any record of MK`s role in these SDUs and instances where their actions may have resulted in gross human rights violations – even where actions were understood to be in self-defence? Can the ANC supply detail about the training, instruction, report back structures of the SDUs?

  • 3. Can the ANC give a more detailed account of MK activities in the Transkei in the early 1990s? How does the ANC respond, for example, to claims that MK – especially operating from the Transkei – was responsible for the killing or assassination of IFP office bearers, especially in the early 1990s. The Amnesty International Report states “the Sipho Phungulwa (killed in April 1990 apparently by ANC officials) case underlines the fear of many returning former prisoners that ANC officials in Transkei enjoy immunity, both from their own organisation and from the local authorities.”

    The conflict in KwaZulu Natal

  • 1. What was the ANC`s military policy towards the IFP in the years before its unbanning from the beginning of violent conflict in 1984 until 1990? Were IFP personnel perceived to be legitimate military targets? Did MK play any role in the violent conflict between the UDF and the IFP in KwaZulu or Natal? What was the role of Harry Gwala, who has been alleged to have been involved in violence?

  • 2. Can the ANC disclose the names and fate of IFP supporters that were killed or severely injured by ANC members? Although apparently more ANC than IFP supporters died in this conflict, the ANC needs to account for those IFP supporters who were killed by its members.

  • 3. What role did MK play in the SDUs in KwaZulu Natal, specifically in operations against the IFP and KZP members after February 1990. Is there a record of such MK actions?

  • 4. Were there other conflicts in other parts of the country between ANC supporters or UDF structures and other forces in which MK played a role, either before or after 1990? (For example, MK member`s attack on Maqina in Port Elizabeth; actions against other vigilante forces?)

    Questions on reparation and rehabilitation

  • 1. What specific contribution can the ANC offer to support applications for amnesty?

  • 2. The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34, 1995 also requires that we make recommendations on the reparation and rehabilitation of victims. The views of your party on this matter will be appreciated. The nation has limited resources, there are a range of initiatives included in the Reconstruction and Development Programme – and yet, there are individuals and communities who suffered in a specific way as a result of gross human rights violations. What is the obligation of the nation towards these people? What forms of memory, rehabilitation and reparation are reasonably possible?